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(कक्षा XI-XII के लिए संस्कृत व्याकरण,
छन्द एवं अलंकार की पाठ्यपुस्तक)

लेखक

प्रो. कमलाकान्त मिश्र



राष्ट्रीय शैक्षिक अनुसंधान और प्रशिक्षण परिषद्
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प्रकाशन विभाग में सचिव, राष्ट्रीय शैक्षिक अनुसंधान और प्रशिक्षण परिषद्, श्री अरविंद मार्ग, नई दिल्ली - 110016 द्वारा प्रकाशित तथा शगुन ऑफसेट, 132, मौहम्मदपुर, भीकाजी कामा प्लेस, नई दिल्ली 110066 द्वारा मुद्रित।

पुरोवाक्

भारतीय शिक्षा-व्यवस्था में संस्कृत के महत्त्व को ध्यान में रखकर राष्ट्रीय शैक्षिक अनुसंधान और प्रशिक्षण परिषद् का सामाजिक विज्ञान और मानविकी शिक्षा विभाग प्रारम्भिक स्तर से उच्चतर माध्यमिक स्तर तक आदर्श पाठ्यक्रम और आदर्श पाठ्यपुस्तकों का निर्माण करता रहा है। इसी क्रम में सन् 1979 में परिषद् द्वारा 10+2 की शिक्षा-पद्धति के अनुसार उच्चतर माध्यमिक कक्षाओं के छात्रों के लिए व्याकरण जैसे जटिल विषय को छात्रोपयुक्त सरल शैली में प्रस्तुत करने के लिए **व्याकरणसौरभम्** नामक पुस्तक प्रकाशित की गई जो छात्रों के लिए अत्यन्त उपादेय रही है।

परिषद् द्वारा सन् 2000 में प्रकाशित विद्यालयीय शिक्षा के लिए राष्ट्रीय पाठ्यचर्या की रूपरेखा के अनुसार विकसित संस्कृत के नवीन पाठ्यक्रम, विगत वर्षों में प्राप्त अनुभव तथा पाठ्यपुस्तक-समीक्षा-गोष्ठी में विशेषज्ञों से प्राप्त सत्परामर्शों के आलोक में प्रस्तुत पुस्तक–**व्याकरणसौरभम्** (*संशोधित-संस्करणम्*) तैयार की गई है जो कक्षा 11-12 (ऐच्छिक संस्कृत) के लिए निर्धारित व्याकरण, छन्द एवं अलङ्कार के अंशों के अध्ययन-अध्यापन की अपेक्षाओं को पूरा करती है। आशा है, यह संस्करण न केवल उच्चतर माध्यमिक कक्षाओं के छात्रों के लिए अपितु संस्कृत भाषा के जिज्ञासुओं के लिए भी उपयोगी सिद्ध होगा।

इस पुस्तक के लेखक एवं संशोधित-संस्करण की पाण्डुलिपि के समीक्षार्थ आयोजित कार्यगोष्ठी में उपस्थित होकर जिन विषय-विशेषज्ञों एवं अनुभवी अध्यापकों ने अपने बहुमूल्य सुझावों से सहयोग देकर पुस्तक को अधिक उपयोगी बनाने में योगदान किया है, परिषद् उन सभी के प्रति हार्दिक कृतज्ञता ज्ञापित करती है।

पाठ्यक्रम तथा पाठ्यपुस्तक का विकास एक निरन्तर गतिशील प्रक्रिया है। अतः पुस्तक को और अधिक छात्रोपयोगी बनाने के लिए विशेषज्ञों एवं अनुभवी अध्यापकों द्वारा प्रेषित परामर्शों का सदैव स्वागत होगा।

जगमोहन सिंह राजपूत
निदेशक
राष्ट्रीय शैक्षिक अनुसंधान और प्रशिक्षण परिषद्

मार्च 2002
नई दिल्ली

पाण्डुलिपि-समीक्षा-संशोधन-कार्यगोष्ठी के सदस्य

1. **प्रो. आद्याप्रसाद मिश्र**
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   राजकीय उच्चतर माध्यमिक बाल
   विद्यालय, नांगलोई, दिल्ली
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   पी.जी.टी. संस्कृत
   राजकीय उच्चतर माध्यमिक बाल विद्यालय
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   जहांगीर पुरी, दिल्ली
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   सेलेक्शन ग्रेड लेक्चरर
   सामाजिक विज्ञान और
   मानविकी शिक्षा विभाग
   एन.सी.ई.आर.टी.
   नई दिल्ली
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   सामाजिक विज्ञान और
   मानविकी शिक्षा विभाग
   एन.सी.ई.आर.टी.
   नई दिल्ली
15. **डा. दया शंकर तिवारी**
   प्रोजेक्ट फेलो, संस्कृत
   सामाजिक विज्ञान और
   मानविकी शिक्षा विभाग
   एन.सी.ई.आर.टी.
   नई दिल्ली

विषय-सूची

पाठ्यक्रम (नवीन)

कक्षा XI-XII के (ऐच्छिक संस्कृत) के लिए व्याकरण, छन्द एवं अलङ्कार के निर्धारित अंश –

कक्षा XI

प्रथम सत्र

व्याकरण **15 अंक**

1. *शब्दरूप :* (5 अंक)

अजन्त पुंलिङ्ग	-	बालक, मुनि, भानु, पितृ, भ्रातृ ।
अजन्त स्त्रीलिङ्ग	-	लता, मति, धेनु, मातृ ।
अजन्त नपुंसकलिङ्ग	-	फल, वारि, मधु ।
सर्वनाम	-	तद्, एतद्, किम् - तीनों लिङ्गों में । अस्मद्, युष्मद् ।
संख्यावाची	-	एक, द्वि, त्रि, चतुर् - तीनों लिङ्गों में ।

2. *धातुरूप :* (5 अंक)

भू, पठ्, पा (पानार्थक पिब) गम्, खाद्, स्मृ, पच्, अस्, कृ, शक्, प्रच्छ् (पृच्छ्), पत्, नश्, कथ, चुर् — परस्मैपदी पाँचों लकारों में (लट्, लोट्, लङ्, विधिलिङ्, लृट्) सेव्, लभ्, वृध्, वृत्, रुच्, जन् — आत्मनेपदी पाँचों लकारों में (लट्, लोट्, लङ्, विधिलिङ्, लृट्)

3. *कृदन्त प्रत्यय :* (5 अंक)

क्त्वा, ल्यप्, तुमुन्, क्त, क्तवतु, शतृ, शानच्, तव्यत्, अनीयर्, क्तिन्, ण्वुल्, तृच्, ल्युट् ।

द्वितीय सत्र

व्याकरण **15 अंक**

1. *तद्धित एवं स्त्री प्रत्यय :*

   त्व, तल्, त्रल्, मतुप्, ठक्, टाप्, ङीप्, (5 अंक)

2. *अव्यय :* (4 अंक)

   पुनः, उच्चैः, नीचैः, शनैः, अधः, चिरम्, नूनम्, पुरा, खलु, मुहुः, भूयः, ह्यः, श्वः, अद्य, अधुना, तूष्णीम्, कुत्र, उपरि, मा, न, च।

3. *सन्धि :* (6 अंक)

   (क) स्वर-सन्धि - दीर्घ, गुण, वृद्धि, यण्, अयादि। (2 अंक)

   (ख) व्यंजन-सन्धि - श्चुत्व, जश्त्व, ष्टुत्व, च् (तुक्) आगम, षत्व-विधान एवं णत्व-विधान। (2 अंक)

   (ग) विसर्ग-सन्धि - सत्व, षत्व, णत्व, उत्व, रुत्व, लोप। (2 अंक)

कक्षा XII

प्रथम सत्र

(1) *छंद :* **10 अंक**

(क) लघु, गुरु, गण एवं यति का प्रयोगात्मक ज्ञान

(ख) अनुष्टुप, इन्द्रवज्रा, उपेन्द्रवज्रा, उपजाति, वंशस्थ, शार्दूलविक्रीडित, वसन्ततिलका, मालिनी, शिखरिणी, मन्द्राकान्ता।

समस्त छन्दों का संस्कृत में लक्षण देकर सोदाहरण लघु, गुरु, मात्रा, यति लगाकर स्पष्ट करना।

(2) *समास :* **5 अंक**

सभी समासों का सामान्य परिचय

अव्ययीभाव, तत्पुरुष, कर्मधारय, द्वन्द्व, द्विगु, बहुव्रीहि।

(क) समस्त पदों का विग्रह करना तथा विग्रह किये गये पदों का समस्त पद बनाना।

(ख) समासों के नाम से परिचित कराना।

द्वितीय सत्र

अलङ्कार : **10 अंक**

अनुप्रास, उपमा, यमक, श्लेष, रूपक, उत्प्रेक्षा, अर्थान्तरन्यास, अतिशयोक्ति, व्याजस्तुति और अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा (अन्योक्ति)।

संकेतसूची

आ0	-	आत्मनेपदी
उ0	-	उभयपदी
उ0पु0	-	उत्तम पुरुष
ऋ0 प्रा0	-	ऋक् प्रातिशाख्य
एक0	-	एकवचन
च0	-	चतुर्थी
तृ0	-	तृतीया
द्वि0	-	द्वितीया
द्विव0	-	द्विवचन
नपुं0	-	नपुंसकलिंग
पं0	-	पंचमी.
प0	-	परस्मैपदी
प्र0	-	प्रथमा
प्र0 पु0	-	प्रथम पुरुष
पा0	-	पाणिनीय अष्टाध्यायी
पुं0	-	पुंलिंग
बहु0	-	बहुव्रीहि
बहुव0	-	बहुवचन
म0 पु0	-	मध्यम पुरुष
मध्यसि0 कौमुदी	-	मध्यसिद्धान्तकौमुदी
ल0 सि0 कौ0	-	लघुसिद्धान्तकौमुदी
ल0 सि0 कौ0 सू0 वृत्ति	-	लघुसिद्धान्तकौमुदीसूत्रवृत्ति
वा0	-	वार्तिक
ष0	-	षष्ठी
सं0	-	संबोधन

भारत का संविधान

भाग 4अ

नागरिकों के मूल कर्त्तव्य

अनुच्छेद 51अ

मूल कर्त्तव्य - भारत के प्रत्येक नागरिक का यह कर्त्तव्य होगा कि वह -

(क) संविधान का पालन करे और उसके आदर्शों, संस्थाओं, राष्ट्रध्वज और राष्ट्रगान का आदर करे,

(ख) स्वतंत्रता के लिए हमारे राष्ट्रीय आंदोलन को प्रेरित करने वाले उच्च आदर्शों को हृदय में संजोए रखे और उनका पालन करे,

(ग) भारत की संप्रभुता, एकता और अखंडता की रक्षा करे और उसे अक्षुण्ण बनाए रखे,

(घ) देश की रक्षा करे और आह्वान किए जाने पर राष्ट्र की सेवा करे,

(ङ) भारत के सभी लोगों में समरसता और समान भ्रातृत्व की भावना का निर्माण करे जो धर्म, भाषा और प्रदेश या वर्ग पर आधारित सभी भेदभावों से परे हो, ऐसी प्रथाओं का त्याग करे जो महिलाओं के सम्मान के विरुद्ध हों,

(च) हमारी सामासिक संस्कृति की गौरवशाली परंपरा का महत्त्व समझे और उसका परिरक्षण करे,

(छ) प्राकृतिक पर्यावरण की, जिसके अंतर्गत वन, झील, नदी और वन्य जीव हैं, रक्षा करे और उसका संवर्धन करे तथा प्रणिमात्र के प्रति दयाभाव रखे,

(ज) वैज्ञानिक दृष्टिकोण, मानववाद और ज्ञानार्जन तथा सुधार की भावना का विकास करे,

(झ) सार्वजनिक संपत्ति को सुरक्षित रखें और हिंसा से दूर रहे, और

(ञ) व्यक्तिगत और सामूहिक गतिविधियों के सभी क्षेत्रों में उत्कर्ष की ओर बढ़ने का सतत् प्रयास करे, जिससे राष्ट्र निरंतर बढ़ते हुए प्रयत्न और उपलब्धि की नई ऊंचाइयों को छू सके।

भूमिका

भाषाशरीरजीवातु ज्ञानविज्ञानपुष्पकम्।
शब्दानुशासनोद्यानं सर्वशास्त्रोपकारकम्॥
पाणिनीयं च तत्रापि प्रशस्तं सर्वतो मतम्।
तन्मूलकमिदं दद्याच्छात्रेभ्यो ज्ञानसौरभम्॥

जिस संस्कृत भाषा में वेदों के समय से लेकर आधुनिक काल तक की भारतीय परम्परा, विचार, चिन्तन और संस्कृति निहित है उसके सम्यक् अध्ययन के लिए व्याकरण का ज्ञान आवश्यक है। व्याकरण शब्द का अर्थ है –

व्याक्रियन्ते व्युत्पाद्यन्ते शब्दाः अनेन इति व्याकरणम्

अर्थात् जिसके द्वारा शब्दों की व्युत्पत्ति की जाए, उनके शुद्ध स्वरूप का ज्ञान प्राप्त हो, उसे व्याकरण कहते हैं। इसके समुचित ज्ञान के बिना भाषा का सही ज्ञान संभव नहीं होता। परिणामतः वास्तविक अर्थ की प्राप्ति भी संभव नहीं होती। इसलिए अति प्राचीन काल से ही सभी शास्त्रों में व्याकरण को प्रधान स्थान प्राप्त रहा है–

मुखं व्याकरणं स्मृतम्।[1]

व्याकरण का निर्माण भाषा में प्रचलित शिष्टजनप्रयुक्त शब्दों के विश्लेषण के आधार पर होता है। वैयाकरण शब्दों को विभिन्न वर्गों में

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1. छन्दः पादौ तु वेदस्य हस्तौ कल्पोऽथ पठ्यते।
ज्योतिषामयनं चक्षुर्निरुक्तं श्रोत्रमुच्यते॥
शिक्षा घ्राणं तु वेदस्य मुखं व्याकरणं स्मृतम्।
तस्मात् साङ्गमधीत्यैव ब्रह्मलोके महीयते॥ ❑ पाणिनीयशिक्षा 41-42

विभाजित कर उनकी सिद्धि के लिए कुछ सामान्य और कुछ विशेष नियमों का निर्माण करता है जिनके सहारे उस भाषा के वाङ्मय को सरलता से समझा जाता है। साधु शब्दों के विश्लेषण के आधार पर उत्पन्न यह शास्त्र शब्दानुशासन कहलाता है, जिसका अर्थ है शब्द की प्रवृत्ति का अनुसरण करते हुए अनुशासन करने वाला शास्त्र । किंतु कालान्तर में वह शब्दों का निरंकुश शासक बनने की कोशिश से अपने नियम तथा उपनियम की परिधि में नहीं आने वाले शब्दों को अशुद्ध करार देता है। इसका परिणाम यह होता है कि भाषा की वह गति रुक जाती है और धीरे-धीरे साधारण समाज में भाषा अपना दूसरा रूप अपना लेती है जो अभिव्यक्ति का माध्यम बन जाती है। वैयाकरण जब इसका भी विश्लेषण कर इसे भी नियमों में बाँध देते हैं तब वह भी कुण्ठित होकर अपना नया रूप धारण करती है। इस प्रकार अपने-अपने व्याकरण के कारण भाषायें नया-नया रूप धारण करती जाती हैं और एक समय ऐसा आता है जब प्राचीन भाषा को समझना अत्यन्त कठिन हो जाता है। उस समय उसका व्याकरण ही उस भाषा से परिचय कराने वाला एक साधन होता है। संस्कृत व्याकरण के सहारे ही हम अत्यन्त प्राचीन काल में लिखे गए वेद, उपनिषद्, पुराण, रामायण, महाभारत के साथ-साथ भास, कालिदास, माघ, श्रीहर्ष, बाण और जगन्नाथ आदि की भाषाओं का रसास्वादन करने में समर्थ होते हैं। अत एव पुराने वाङ्मय को समझना अर्थात् उसकी रक्षा करना व्याकरण का प्रथम प्रयोजन है जैसा कि महर्षि पतञ्जलि ने महाभाष्य में कहा भी है–

रक्षोहागमलध्वसन्देहाः प्रयोजनम्।

व्याकरण का दूसरा प्रयोजन ऊह (तर्क) है। एक प्रयोग को देखकर उसके आधार पर आवश्यकतानुसार अन्य प्रयोगों या रूपों की कल्पना को ऊह कहा गया है। नए रूपों की कल्पना के अवसर पर अवैयाकरण गलती कर बैठता है। गच्छति को देखकर गच्छिष्यति जैसे रूपों की गलत कल्पना न हो, अग्नये स्वाहा की तरह सूर्यये स्वाहा का ऊह न हो, इसके लिए व्याकरण का ज्ञान आवश्यक है।

भाषा के ज्ञान के लिए व्याकरण सबसे छोटा, सबसे सरल और सबसे सुलझा हुआ साधन है। व्याकरण वह शक्ति देता है जिसके कारण

सारे श्रुत और अश्रुत शब्दों का, पठित और अपठित वाङ्मय का रहस्य अल्प काल में सामने आ जाता है। इसलिए कहा गया है –

उत त्वः पश्यन्न ददर्श वाचम् उत त्वः श्रृण्वन्न शृणोत्येनाम्।
उतो त्वस्मै तन्वं विसस्रे ....। वाङ्. नो वृणुयादात्मानमित्यध्येयं
व्याकरणम्।

(कुछ ऐसे भी विद्वान् हैं जो वाणी को देखकर भी उसे नहीं देख पाते हैं, कुछ उसे सुनकर भी नहीं सुन पाते, परन्तु एक ऐसा भी विद्वान् है; जिसे वाणी अपना शरीर समर्पित कर देती है, जिसके निकट अपना सारा रहस्य खोल देती है।) पतञ्जलि ने बताया है कि इस श्रुति के पूर्वार्द्ध में अवैयाकरणों की ओर संकेत है और उत्तरार्द्ध में वर्णित विद्वान् वैयाकरण है। व्याकरण के अध्ययन से तत्सम्बद्ध भाषा में लिखित सारे शास्त्रों के रहस्य को समझने की अपूर्व शक्ति प्राप्त होने के कारण ही आनन्दवर्धनाचार्य ने वैयाकरण को प्रथम कोटि का विद्वान् माना है--

प्रथमे हि विद्वांसो वैयाकरणाः।

आजकल बिना व्याकरण पढ़ाए व्यवहार के द्वारा भाषा सिखाने की बात भी की जाती है। व्यवहार को शब्दार्थज्ञान का एक साधन वैयाकरण भी मानते हैं जैसा कि निम्नलिखित श्लोक से प्रकट होता है –

शक्तिग्रहं व्याकरणोपमानकोशाप्तवाक्याद् व्यवहारतश्च।
वाक्यस्य शेषाद् विवृतेर्वदन्ति सान्निध्यतः सिद्धपदस्य वृद्धाः॥

व्यवहार के द्वारा बोल-चाल में व्यवहृत और समाज में प्रचलित भाषा के शब्दों का ही ज्ञान कराना सम्भव है, और वह भी एक सीमा तक ही। अनन्त विचारों और भावों को अभिव्यक्त करने के लिए जिस प्रकार की भाषाओं और जैसे-जैसे शब्दरूपों की आवश्यकता होगी, उन सबको पहले से जानना अन्य प्रकार से संभव नहीं है। इसलिए जब प्रचलित भाषा के भी भावानुसार भविष्य में प्रयुक्त होने वाले रूपों को नियमित करने तथा उन्हें बोधगम्य बनाए रखने के लिए व्याकरण की आवश्यकता है, तब संस्कृत जैसी भाषाओं के ज्ञान के लिए जिनका व्यवहार आज विचार विनिमय के लिए प्रायः नहीं होता, व्याकरण का

प्रधान साधन होना स्वाभाविक ही है। केवल व्यवहार द्वारा प्राप्त संस्कृत ज्ञान हमें शास्त्रों के रहस्य तक नहीं पहुँचा पाएगा । आज संस्कृत सीखने की आवश्यकता इसलिए है कि हम इस भाषा में लिखित साहित्य की अतुल ज्ञानराशि को समझ सकें, वेदों, ब्राह्मण-ग्रन्थों, उपनिषद्, रामायण, महाभारत और गीता जैसे ग्रन्थों के रहस्यों से अवगत हो सकें। इस प्रयोजन की सिद्धि के लिए संस्कृत के जिस ठोस ज्ञान की अपेक्षा है, वह व्याकरण के समुचित अध्ययन से ही हो सकता है।

संस्कृत के मनीषी इस बात के लिए सदैव सतर्क रहें हैं कि अशुद्ध पदों का प्रयोग न हो, क्योंकि वे इष्ट अर्थ को न कहकर अनिष्ट का कारण बन जाते हैं। प्रसिद्ध श्लोक भी है–

दुष्टः शब्दः स्वरतो वर्णतो वा,
मिथ्या प्रयुक्तो न तमर्थमाह।
स वाग्वज्रो यजमानं हिनस्ति,
यथेन्द्रशत्रुः स्वरतोऽपराधात् ।।

❑ पाणिनीयशिक्षा, 52

इसलिए अनेक संदिग्ध शब्दों की अपेक्षा यदि एक ही शब्द का सही ज्ञान प्राप्त हो जाए तो उससे भी इष्टसिद्धि हो सकती है–

एकः शब्दः सम्यग्ज्ञातः सुष्ठु प्रयुक्तः स्वर्गे लोके च कामधुग् भवति।

शब्दों का असंदिग्ध ज्ञान व्याकरण से ही संभव है। अवैयाकरण को शब्द की शुद्धि और शब्दार्थनिर्णय में पदे-पदे जो सन्देह सताता है, उससे वैयाकरण सर्वथा मुक्त होता है । धनवान् शुद्ध है या धनमान्, बुद्धिमती शुद्ध है या बुद्धिवती इस प्रकार के उपस्थित सन्देह को मिटाने का कोई ठोस आधार अवैयाकरण के पास नहीं होता है। इसी तरह 'क्रेय' 'क्रय्य ' के बीच के अर्थभेद को अवैयाकरण नहीं समझ पाता है। भर्तृहरि ने वाक्यपदीय में लिखा है–

साधुत्वज्ञानविषया सैषा व्याकरणस्मृतिः।

अर्थात् व्याकरण भाषा के शुद्ध और अशुद्ध रूपों का ज्ञान कराता है। इसलिए किसी भाषा के सही ज्ञान के लिए व्याकरण का अध्ययन अत्यन्त आवश्यक है। किसी ने ठीक ही कहा है –

यद्यपि बहु नाधीषे तथापि पठ पुत्र व्याकरणम्
स्वजनः श्वजनो मा भूत् सकलं शकलं सकृच्छकृत्।।

संस्कृत व्याकरण की परम्परा

संस्कृत व्याकरण की परम्परा उतनी ही प्राचीन है, जितनी कि वैदिक संहिता। तैत्तिरीय संहिता में उल्लेख मिलता है कि अति प्राचीन काल में देवताओं के अनुरोध पर इन्द्र ने संस्कृत भाषा का सबसे पहला व्याकरण रचा--

वाग्वै पराच्यव्याकृतावदत्ते देवा इन्द्रमब्रुवन्निमां नो वाचं व्याकुर्विति तामिन्द्रो मध्यतोऽवक्रम्य व्याकरोत्तस्मादियं व्याकृता वागुद्यते।

❑ तै० सं० 6. 4. 7

ऐन्द्र-व्याकरण बहुत विस्तृत था। महाभारत के टीकाकार ने इसे समुद्र तथा इसकी तुलना में पाणिनि-व्याकरण को 'गोष्पद' (गाय के खुर का चिह्न) कहा है--

यान्युज्जहार माहेन्द्राद् व्यासो व्याकरणार्णवात्।
पदरत्नानि किं तानि सन्ति पाणिनि - गोष्पदे।।

पतञ्जलि के **महाभाष्य** से संकेत मिलता है कि इन्द्र से पहले भी व्याकरण-शास्त्र का अस्तित्व था। पतञ्जलि ने महाभाष्य में लिखा है कि इन्द्र ने बृहस्पति से व्याकरण विद्या पढ़ी थी –

बृहस्पतिरिन्द्राय दिव्यं वर्षसहस्त्रं प्रतिपदोक्तानां शब्दानां शब्दपारायणं प्रोवाच नान्तं जगाम।

❑ महाभाष्य पस्पशाह्निक

ऐन्द्र-व्याकरण की अविच्छिन्न परम्परा का उल्लेख **ऋक्तंत्र** में इस प्रकार मिलता है –

ब्रह्मा बृहस्पतये प्रोवाच, बृहस्पतिरिन्द्राय, इन्द्रो भरद्वाजाय, भरद्वाज ऋषिभ्यः, ऋषयो ब्राह्मणेभ्यः।

❑ ऋक्तंत्र 1.4

इससे प्रतीत होता है कि **ऐन्द्र-सम्प्रदाय** व्याकरण का एक प्रसिद्ध सम्प्रदाय था। इसके समकक्ष व्याकरणशास्त्र का एक दूसरा **माहेश्वर-सम्प्रदाय** था जिसके प्रवर्तक महेश्वर थे। पाणिनि को अ इ उ ण् आदि चौदह प्रत्याहार सूत्र महेश्वर से ही प्राप्त हुए थे जिसकी सुदृढ़ आधारशिला पर उन्होंने व्याकरण का भव्य प्रासाद खड़ा किया।

प्राचीन व्याकरणों में आज पाणिनीय व्याकरण ही सुरक्षित और प्रचलित है। यह अपने पीछे एक सुदीर्घ परम्परा को प्रकट करता है। अष्टाध्यायी में आपिशलि आदि दस वैयाकरणों के नामों का उल्लेख भी है। पाणिनि उस परम्परा के अन्तिम लेखक थे, जिन्होंने अपने से पूर्ववर्ती सभी वैयाकरणों के ग्राह्य तत्त्वों को अपनाया। उनके विचारों और विवेचनों को क्रमिक, तार्किक, व्यवस्थित एवं सूत्र रूप देने में पाणिनि को अभूतपूर्व सफलता मिली। उनका व्याकरण इतना वैज्ञानिक, संक्षिप्त, व्यापक एवं लोकप्रिय बना कि पूर्ववर्ती व्याकरणों का अस्तित्व भी न रहा, सदियों के बाद आज भी इनकी बराबरी करने वाला कोई दूसरा व्याकरण किसी भी भाषा में नहीं बन सका है।

पाणिनि का समय ई0 पू0 सप्तम और ई0 पू0 पञ्चम शताब्दी के बीच माना जाता है। इस विषय में विभिन्न मत हैं । ये उत्तर पश्चिम भारत में स्थित शालातुर गाँव के निवासी थे। महाभाष्य के अनुसार इनकी माता का नाम दाक्षी था।[1] ये उपवर्ष या वर्ष आचार्य के शिष्य थे । किम्वदन्ती के अनुसार इनकी मृत्यु व्याघ्र या सिंह[2] के आक्रमण द्वारा त्रयोदशी तिथि को हुई थी।

कहा जाता है कि प्रारम्भ में पाणिनि मन्दबुद्धि थे, किन्तु उन्होंने तपस्या की जिससे प्रसन्न होकर महेश्वर ने उन्हें विलक्षण बुद्धि दी तथा चौदह माहेश्वर सूत्रों का उपदेश दिया।[3] इसके आधार पर प्रत्याहार आदि का आश्रयण कर पाणिनि ने अत्यंत संक्षिप्त शैली में विशाल संस्कृत भाषा को नियमित करने वाला सुदृढ़ व्याकरण लिखा जिससे वे सदा के लिए अमर

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1. सर्वे सर्वपदादेशा दाक्षीपुत्रस्य पाणिनेः। ❑ **महाभाष्य**
2. सिंहो (व्याघ्रो) व्याकरणस्य कर्तुरहरत् प्राणान् प्रियान् पाणिनेः। ❑ **पञ्चतन्त्र**
3. नृत्तावसाने नटराजराजो ननाद ढक्कां नवपञ्चवारम्।
उद्धर्तुकामः सनकादिसिद्धानेतद्विमर्शे शिवसूत्रजालम्।।

हो गए। इनका व्याकरण आठ अध्यायों में विभाजित है। इस कारण इसका नाम अष्टाध्यायी है। प्रत्येक अध्याय में चार-चार पाद हैं। सम्पूर्ण ग्रन्थ में लगभग चार हजार सूत्र हैं –

चतुस्सहस्त्री सूत्राणां पञ्चसूत्री विवर्जिता।
अष्टाध्यायी पाणिनीया सूत्रैर्माहेश्वरैः सह[1] ॥

सारे सूत्र अध्याय, पाद और सूत्राङ्कों में विभक्त हैं। पहले अध्याय में प्रायः व्याकरण संबंधी संज्ञाओं तथा परिभाषाओं का विवेचन है। दूसरे अध्याय में समास और कारक के नियम वर्णित हैं । तीसरे तथा आठवें अध्यायों में कृदन्त प्रकरण है। चौथे तथा पाँचवें अध्यायों में स्त्री-प्रत्यय और तद्धित का विवेचन है। छठे तथा सातवें अध्यायों में सन्धि, आदेश और स्वर- प्रक्रिया से संबंधित नियम हैं । पाणिनि के सूत्र अल्पाक्षर, किन्तु विस्तृत अर्थ वाले हैं। इनका एक वर्ण भी निरर्थक नहीं है ।

पाणिनि की परम्परा में दूसरे प्रसिद्ध वैयाकरण हैं कात्यायन जिन्हें वररुचि भी कहते हैं । इनका समय ई0 पू0 400 से ई0 पू0 300 के बीच माना जाता है। ये दाक्षिणात्य थे। पाणिनि के लगभग 1250 सूत्रों की इन्होंने आलोचनात्मक व्याख्या की है जो वार्तिक के नाम से प्रसिद्ध हैं । वार्तिकों की संख्या प्रायः चार हजार है। इनके द्वारा कहीं तो इन्होंने पाणिनि की कमी को पूरा करने की कोशिश की है, कहीं उनके सूत्रों में दोष दिखाया है और उनमें परिवर्तन एवं परिवर्धन सुझाए हैं। ऐसा करने में कई स्थलों पर उनसे पाणिनि को समझने में भूल भी हुई है जिनका परिमार्जन पतञ्जलि ने किया है।

पाणिनि के कीर्ति-स्तम्भ को सुदृढ़ बनाने वाले उस युग के महान् वैयाकरण पतञ्जलि हैं जिन्होंने अत्यंत प्राञ्जल और सशक्त भाषा में प्रश्नोत्तर-शैली में कात्यायन के वार्तिकों की समीक्षा करते हुए अष्टाध्यायी पर विशद भाष्य लिखा जो महाभाष्य के नाम से प्रसिद्ध है। पाणिनि का व्याकरण कात्यायन के वार्तिक और पतञ्जलि के महाभाष्य से पूर्ण परिनिष्ठित रूप को प्राप्त कर सका है । अतः अष्टाध्यायी, वार्तिक एवं महाभाष्य इन तीन ग्रन्थों को पाणिनीय व्याकरण का मूल प्रामाणिक ग्रन्थ माना जाता है।

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1. सिद्धान्तकौमुदी तत्त्वबोधिनी। ❑ पृ0 780

पतञ्जलि का समय ई0 पू0 दूसरी शताब्दी है। महाभाष्य के **पुष्यमित्रं याजयामः अरुणद् यवनः साकेतम् अरुणद् यवनो मध्यमिकाम्** इत्यादि उदाहरणों से प्रतीत होता है कि ये शुङ्गवंशीय राजा पुष्यमित्र के समय में, प्रायः उन्हीं के दरबार में विराजमान थे। उन्हीं के समय में मिलिन्द (मिनेण्डर) ने अयोध्या और मध्यमिका पर आक्रमण किया था। अनेक लौकिक और घरेलू दृष्टान्तों से परिपूर्ण होने के कारण पतञ्जलि का महाभाष्य अत्यंत सरल और रोचक है। इसकी प्रसादमयी शैली का प्रवाह समस्त संस्कृत साहित्य में अद्वितीय है। अष्टाध्यायी के अध्याय, पाद और सूत्रक्रम में ही पतञ्जलि ने अपने भाष्य का क्रम रखा है। इसका विभाजन आह्निकों[1] में है। प्रथम पस्पशाह्निक है जिसे व्याकरण शास्त्र की भूमिका कह सकते हैं। इसमें व्याकरण की आवश्यकता आदि विषयों पर गम्भीर विवेचन है। ग्रन्थ में वार्तिकों की समीक्षा के अतिरिक्त अन्य शङ्काओं का भी समाधान किया गया है। कात्यायन के उपयोगी वार्तिकों को उन्होंने सहर्ष स्वीकार किया है तथा अनुपयुक्त आलोचनाओं का खण्डन किया है । विषय को सुगमता से प्रतिपादित करने के साथ-साथ पतञ्जलि ने तत्कालीन सामाजिक, ऐतिहासिक, धार्मिक, भौगोलिक तथा साहित्यिक प्रवृत्तियों का मनोरम परिचय भी अपने महाभाष्य में दिया है। व्याकरण का ज्ञान महाभाष्य के अध्ययन के बिना अधूरा रहता है। महाभाष्य पर कैयट की प्रदीप और नागेश की उद्योत टीकायें प्रसिद्ध हैं।

परवर्ती विद्वानों ने पाणिनि, कात्यायन और पतञ्जलि को व्याकरण का त्रिमुनि (या मुनित्रय) संज्ञा से अभिहित कर तीनों के प्रति समान रूप से सम्मान प्रदर्शित किया है।

काशिका और न्यास

पाणिनि, कात्यायन और पतञ्जलि ने जब मौलिक व्याकरण की विवेचना को चरम सीमा पर पहुँचा दिया और इससे आगे नियम-निर्माण की आवश्यकता नहीं रह गई, तब टीका-युग का प्रारम्भ हुआ। इन नियमों को बोधगम्य बनाने के लिए विविध टीका-ग्रन्थों का निर्माण चल पड़ा। इसी क्रम में सातवीं ई0 में जयादित्य और वामन ने अष्टाध्यायी पर एक टीका

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1. एक दिन में जितना पढ़ाया जाता था या जितने का भाष्य होता था वह एक आह्निक होता था।

लिखी जो **काशिकावृत्ति** के नाम से प्रसिद्ध है। उदाहरण, प्रत्युदाहरण, गणपाठ आदि से पूर्ण यह वृत्ति अनेक प्राचीन वृत्तियों का सार है। काशिका पर जिनेन्द्रबुद्धि ने **न्यास** और हरदत्त ने **पदमञ्जरी** नामक उपटीकायें लिखीं।

प्रक्रिया ग्रन्थ

टीकाओं और उपटीकाओं के बाद पाणिनीय सूत्रों की नई व्यवस्था की ओर वैयाकरणों का ध्यान गया। इस दिशा में पहला प्रयास धर्मकीर्ति ने **रूपावतार** लिख कर किया जिसमें अष्टाध्यायी के सूत्रों को विभिन्न प्रकरणों में विभक्त कर सम्पादित किया गया है। इसके बाद सन् 1350 ई0 में विमल सरस्वती ने **रूपमाला** और 1400 ई0 में पं0 रामचन्द्र ने **प्रक्रियाकौमुदी** नामक ग्रन्थ की रचना की। संस्कृत व्याकरण को सरलता से पढ़ाया ज़ा सके, इस उद्देश्य से इसमें पाणिनि के सूत्रों को नए ढंग से व्यवस्थित किया गया है। 1630 ई0 के लगभग भट्टोजिदीक्षित ने **सिद्धान्तकौमुदी** की रचना की जो सर्वाधिक लोकप्रिय हुई। आज यह ग्रन्थ व्याकरण पढ़ने-पढ़ाने का मुख्य साधन है। सिद्धान्तकौमुदी पर स्वयं भट्टोजिदीक्षित ने **प्रौढ़मनोरमा** नाम की टीका लिखी जिस पर पण्डितराज जगन्नाथ ने **मनोरमाकुचमर्दिनी** नाम से व्याख्या प्रस्तुत की। नागेशभट्ट का **लघुशब्देन्दुशेखर** सिद्धान्त कौमुदी पर एक प्रौढ़ व्याख्या है। सिद्धान्तकौमुदी की दो अन्य प्रसिद्ध टीकायें हैं - **तत्त्वबोधिनी** और **बालमनोरमा** जो बहुत ही उपयोगी हैं। छात्रों के अध्ययन की दृष्टि से आचार्य वरदराज ने **सिद्धान्तकौमुदी** का संक्षेप करके **लघुसिद्धान्तकौमुदी** एवं **मध्यसिद्धान्तकौमुदी** की रचना की जो व्याकरण के प्रारम्भिक छात्रों के लिए परम उपयोगी ग्रन्थ हैं। व्याकरण के अध्ययन को सरल बनाने के नाम पर आधुनिक युग में भी अनेक रूपज्ञानोपयोगी ग्रन्थ लिखे गए हैं, किन्तु वस्तुस्थिति यह है कि अष्टाध्यायी की अपेक्षा ये सारे प्रयास प्रायः अधिक कठिन हैं।

संस्कृत व्याकरण के दो पक्ष हैं — व्युत्पत्ति पक्ष और दार्शनिक पक्ष। उपर्युक्त सभी ग्रन्थ प्रायः व्युत्पत्ति पक्ष को लक्ष्य में रखकर लिखे गये हैं। व्याकरण के दार्शनिक पक्ष को लेकर लिखे ग्रन्थों में प्रमुख रूप से उल्लेखनीय हैं — भर्तृहरि का **वाक्यपदीय**, कौण्डभट्ट का **वैयाकरणभूषण**

एवं **वैयाकरणभूषणसार** तथा नागेशभट्ट की **लघुमञ्जूषा**, **परमलघुमञ्जूषा** और **स्फोटवाद** ।

प्रस्तुत पुस्तक

प्रस्तुत पुस्तक सन् 1979 में प्रकाशित "**व्याकरणसौरभम्**" का संशोधित संस्करण है । इस पुस्तक में कुल दस अध्याय हैं जिनमें क्रमशः वर्णविचार, सन्धि, शब्दरूप, धातुरूप, प्रत्यय, अव्यय, कारक, समास, छन्द एवं अलङ्कारों का विवेचन हुआ है। प्रत्येक अध्याय या विषय की समाप्ति पर अभ्यास के लिए विषयनिष्ठ और वस्तुपरक दोनों प्रकार के प्रश्न दिये गये हैं। ये प्रश्न पठित विषय को समझने तथा स्मरण रखने में सहायक होंगे। वस्तुपरक प्रश्न सन्देह की स्थिति उत्पन्न करके बुद्धि को शीघ्र निर्णय करने की क्षमता प्रदान करते हैं। ऐसे प्रश्नों की अधिकाधिक विधाओं का निवेश पूरी पुस्तक में हुआ है। विषय-वस्तु का प्रतिपादन सरल रूप में करने का प्रयास किया गया है। प्रतिपादित नियमों के समर्थन में पाणिनि के सूत्रों एवं अन्य प्रामाणिक ग्रन्थों के वाक्यों को यथास्थान पादटिप्पणी में उद्धृत किया गया है जिससे बी0 ए0 आदि कक्षाओं में लघुसिद्धान्तकौमुदी या सिद्धान्तकौमुदी जैसे ग्रन्थ पढ़ने वाले छात्रों के लिए यह पुस्तक सोपान स्वरूप सिद्ध हो सके।

विषय-वस्तु को समझाते समय यथासंभव पारिभाषिक शब्दों से बचने का प्रयास हुआ है ताकि सरलता बनी रहे। तथापि सन्दर्भसूत्रों में एवं अप्रत्यक्ष रूप से पुस्तक में भी कतिपय ऐसे शब्द आ गये हैं जो व्याख्या की अपेक्षा रखते हैं। अतः प्रमुख पारिभाषिक शब्दों के अर्थ परिशिष्ट III में दिये गये हैं।

संशोधित संस्करण की विशेषताएँ–

- प्रस्तुत संस्करण में परिषद् द्वारा सन् 2001 में विकसित संस्कृत के नवीन पाठ्यक्रम (कक्षा 11-12) में निर्धारित व्याकरण, छन्द एवम् अलङ्कार के अंशों का समुचित समावेश किया गया है ।
- पाठ्यक्रम में किए गए परिवर्तन के अनुसार पाठ्यपुस्तक में यथास्थान परिवर्तन एवं संशोधन किए गये हैं, जैसे – सन्धि-प्रकरण में णत्वविधान एवं षत्वविधान जोड़े गये हैं ।

- शब्दरूप एवं धातुरूप के अध्यायों में नवीन पाठ्यक्रम में निर्धारित सभी शब्दों एवं धातुओं के रूप दिए गये हैं जिससे छात्रों को पाठ्यक्रम के अनुसार इन अंशों को हृदयङ्गम करने में सुविधा हो सके ।
- अव्यय-प्रकरण में पाठ्यक्रम में निर्धारित नए अव्यय-शब्दों का समावेश कर उनके अर्थ एवं वाक्यप्रयोग दिये गये हैं ।
- छन्द-प्रकरण में नए पाठ्यक्रम में निर्धारित मन्दाक्रान्ता छन्द (लक्षण एवम् उदाहरण सहित) जोड़ दिया गया है ।
- अलङ्कार-प्रकरण में नवीन पाठ्यक्रम में जोड़े गये तीन अलङ्कारों – अतिशयोक्ति, व्याजस्तुति एवम् अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा का समावेश किया गया है ।
- पुस्तक में प्रयुक्त सङ्केताक्षरों की सूची अकारादिक्रम से (विवरण सहित) बनाकर पुस्तक के प्रारम्भ में जोड़ दी गयी है जिससे छात्रों को सङ्केताक्षरों को समझने में सुविधा हो सके ।

यद्यपि पुस्तक में व्याकरण, छन्द एवं अलङ्कार–तीनों का विवेचन हुआ है, किन्तु इनमें प्रमुख विवेच्य विषय व्याकरण ही है जिसका वर्णन आठ अध्यायों में हुआ है । शेष दो अध्यायों में प्रमुख छन्द एवं अलङ्कारों का संक्षिप्त परिचय छात्रों की सुविधा के लिए दिया गया है । अतएव *प्राधान्येन व्यपदेशाः भवन्ति* के आधार पर ग्रन्थ का नाम **व्याकरणसौरभम्** रखा गया है। आद्योपान्त यह लक्ष्य रहा है कि पुस्तक छात्रोपयोगी हो। अपने उद्देश्य में यह कहाँ तक सफल हुई है इसका निर्णय विज्ञ अध्यापक, विद्वान् और कोमल मति वाले छात्र ही करेंगे।

सञ्चाय्य शाब्दिकोद्यानात् प्रस्तुतोऽयं सुगुच्छकः।
सौरभाकृष्टबालानां भवतात् सुमनोहरः ॥

गांधी जी का जन्तर

तुम्हें एक जन्तर देता हूं। जब भी तुम्हें सन्देह हो या तुम्हारा अहम् तुम पर हावी होने लगे, तो यह कसौटी आजमाओ :

जो सबसे गरीब और कमजोर आदमी तुमने देखा हो, उसकी शकल याद करो और अपने दिल से पूछो कि जो कदम उठाने का तुम विचार कर रहे हो, वह उस आदमी के लिए कितना उपयोगी होगा। क्या उससे उसे कुछ लाभ पहुंचेगा ? क्या उससे वह अपने ही जीवन और भाग्य पर कुछ काबू रख सकेगा ? यानि क्या उससे उन करोड़ों लोगों को स्वराज्य मिल सकेगा जिनके पेट भूखे हैं और आत्मा अतृप्त है ?

तब तुम देखोगे कि तुम्हारा सन्देह मिट रहा है और अहम् समाप्त होता जा रहा है।

मो. क. गांधी

प्रथम अध्याय

वर्ण-विचार

संस्कृत वर्णमाला (Sanskrit Alphabets)

भाषा की सबसे छोटी ध्वन्यात्मक इकाई जिसका खण्ड न हो सके वर्ण कहलाती है। संस्कृत भाषा में निम्नलिखित वर्ण[1] हैं –

अ, इ, उ, ऋ, लृ आ, ई, ऊ, ॠ ए, ऐ, ओ, औ	स्वर (Vowels)

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[1] पाणिनि ने सम्पूर्ण अक्षर-समाम्नाय (वर्ण-समुदाय) को निम्नलिखित क्रम में सूत्रबद्ध किया है –

अ, इ, उ, (ण्) । ऋ, लृ (क्)। ए, ओ, (ङ्) । ऐ, औ (च्) ।	अच्
ह, य, व, र (ट्) । ल (ण्) । ञ, म, ङ, ण, न (म्) । झ, भ (ञ्) । घ, ढ, ध, (ष्) । ज, ब, ग, ड, द (श्) । ख, फ, छ, ठ, थ, च, ट, त, (व्) । क, प (य्) । श, ष, स (र्) । ह (ल्) ।	हल्

क्, ख्, ग्, घ्, ङ् (कवर्ग) च्, छ्, ज्, झ्, ञ् (चवर्ग) ट्, ठ्, ड्, ढ्, ण् (टवर्ग) त्, थ्, द्, ध्, न् (तवर्ग) प्, फ्, ब्, भ्, म् (पवर्ग) य्, र्, ल्, व् (अन्तःस्थ) श्, ष्, स्, ह् (ऊष्म)	व्यञ्जन (Consonants)

वर्णों के भेद

वर्ण मुख्यतया दो प्रकार के होते हैं- स्वर (Vowel) एवं व्यञ्जन (Consonant) । जिनका उच्चारण बिना किसी अन्य वर्ण की सहायता के होता है, वे स्वर कहलाते हैं[1], जैसे – अ, आ, इ, ई, इत्यादि ।

जो वर्ण किसी स्वर की सहायता से ही बोले जाते हैं वे व्यञ्जन कहलाते हैं, जैसे – क्, ख्, ग् आदि। इनका उच्चारण वर्णमाला में 'अ' की सहायता से किया जाता है। इनके स्वतन्त्र उच्चारण प्रायः संभव नहीं होते।

स्वर भेद

स्वर के तीन भेद हैं – ह्रस्व, दीर्घ एवं प्लुत।[2]

1. **ह्रस्व स्वर** – जिसके उच्चारण में एक मात्रा का समय लगे वह ह्रस्व स्वर (Short Vowel) कहलाता है। ये पाँच हैं –
   अ, इ, उ, ऋ, लृ।
   इन्हें **मूल स्वर** भी कहते हैं।
2. **दीर्घ स्वर** – जिस स्वर के उच्चारण में दो मात्राओं का समय लगे वह दीर्घ स्वर (Long Vowel) कहलाता है। ये आठ हैं –
   आ, ई, ऊ, ॠ, ए, ऐ, ओ, औ।
   इनमें अन्तिम चार सन्ध्यक्षर या संयुक्त स्वर कहलाते हैं, क्योंकि ये दो स्वर वर्णों की सन्धि से बने हैं।

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1. "स्वयं राजन्त इति स्वरा अन्वग्भवति व्यञ्जनम्"। ❑ **महाभाष्य 1.2.29**
2. "एकमात्रो भवेद्ध्रस्वो द्विमात्रो दीर्घ उच्यते ।
   त्रिमात्रस्तु प्लुतो ज्ञेयो व्यञ्जनं चार्धमात्रकम् ॥"

3. **प्लुत स्वर** – जिस स्वर के उच्चारण में तीन मात्राओं का समय लगे, वह प्लुत कहलाता है। कभी-कभी दूर से किसी व्यक्ति को पुकारते समय किसी स्वर की ध्वनि देर तक होती है, जैसे – एहि शारदे । इस प्रकार उच्चारण करने पर 'ए' **प्लुत स्वर** कहलाएगा। ऐसी स्थिति में कोई भी स्वर प्लुत हो सकता है।

उपर्युक्त प्रत्येक स्वर के **उदात्त, अनुदात्त** और **स्वरित** – ये तीन भेद हो सकते हैं। अपने निर्धारित स्थान के ऊपरी भाग से उच्चरित होने पर कोई स्वर उदात्त, निचले भाग से उच्चरित होने पर अनुदात्त और दोनों भागों से सम्मिलित होकर उच्चरित होने पर स्वरित होते हैं।[1] उदाहरण के लिए 'अ' का उच्चारण स्थान कण्ठ है। इसके ऊपरी भाग से उच्चरित होने पर यह उदात्त, निचले भाग से उच्चरित होने पर अनुदात्त तथा दोनों भागों से उच्चरित होने पर स्वरित होगा।

उदात्त, अनुदात्त और स्वरित का प्रयोग केवल वैदिक संस्कृत में मिलता है जहाँ इनका संकेत निम्नलिखित चिह्नों द्वारा किया जाता है-

उदात्त – कोई चिह्न नहीं, जैसे – अ, इ आदि।

अनुदात्त – नीचे पड़ी रेखा, जैसे – अ, इ आदि।

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स्वरित – ऊपर खड़ी रेखा, जैसे – अ, इ आदि।

उदाहरण –

| | |

सह नाववतु। सह नौ भुनक्तु। सह वीर्यं करवावहै। तेजस्विना-

| |

वधीतमस्तु मा विद्विषावहै। ॐ शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः ॥

इन सभी प्रकार के स्वरों के पुनः दो भेद हो सकते हैं –

अनुनासिक – जिसके उच्चारण में नासिका की सहायता ली जाए, जैसे – अँ, एँ।

अननुनासिक- जिसके उच्चारण में नासिका की सहायता न ली जाए, जैसे – अ, ए आदि।

इन्हें क्रमशः **सानुनासिक** तथा **निरनुनासिक** स्वर भी कहते हैं।

उच्चैरुदात्तः। नीचैरनुदात्तः। समाहारः स्वरितः। ❑ **पा. 1.2. 29, 30, 31**

व्यञ्जन भेद

व्यञ्जन वर्णों के निम्नलिखित भेद हैं–

1. **स्पर्श** (Plosive) – उपरिनिर्दिष्ट क् से लेकर म् तक के पच्चीस वर्ण **स्पर्श** कहलाते हैं[1], क्योंकि इनके उच्चारण के समय जिह्वा मुख के विभिन्न स्थानों का स्पर्श करती है।
2. **अन्तःस्थ** (Semi-Vowel) – य्, र्, ल्, व् – इन चार वर्णों को **अन्तःस्थ** कहा जाता है।[2] इन्हें **अर्द्धस्वर** (Semi-Vowel) भी कहते हैं। उच्चारण तथा प्रयोग की दृष्टि से ये स्वर एवं व्यञ्जन के मध्य के हैं।
3. **ऊष्म** (Fricative) – श्, ष्, स्, ह् **ऊष्म** कहलाते हैं।[3] इनके उच्चारण के समय मुख में जिह्वा के घर्षण से ऊष्मा उत्पन्न होती है।
4. **अयोगवाह** – इनके अतिरिक्त कुछ ऐसे व्यञ्जन हैं जो स्वर के अनन्तर ही उच्चरित होते हैं। वे **अयोगवाह**[4] कहलाते हैं। वे हैं – **अनुस्वार**[5] (ं), और **विसर्ग** अथवा **विसर्जनीय** (:), **जिह्वामूलीय** (ᳵ) और **उपध्मानीय** (ᳶ)।
   1. जिह्वामूलीय (ᳵ) केवल क्, ख् से पहले उच्चरित होता है, जैसे – सुरेश (ᳵ) करोति । शिशु (ᳵ) खादति ।
   2. उपध्मानीय (ᳶ) जो केवल प्, फ् से पहले उच्चरित होता है, जैसे – पाचक (ᳶ) पचति । वृक्ष (ᳶ) फलति । अयोगवाह मूलभूत वर्ण नहीं हैं।

   जिह्वामूलीय तथा उपध्मानीय का लेखन अर्द्धविसर्ग के समान[6] होता है।

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1. कादयो मावसानाः स्पर्शाः ।
2. यणोऽन्तःस्थाः ।
3. शल ऊष्माणः ।
4. अयोगाश्च ते वाहाश्च अयोगवाहाः
5. अनुस्वार को स्वर भी माना जाता है ।
   अनुस्वारो व्यञ्जनं वा स्वरो वा । ❑ **ऋ. प्रा. 24.22**
6. ᳵ 'क' ᳵ ख इति कखाभ्यां प्रागर्धविसर्गसदृशो जिह्वामूलीयः
   ᳶ 'प' ᳶ फ इति पफाभ्यां प्रागर्धविसर्गसदृश उपध्मानीयः

   ❑ **ल. सि. कौ. सू. 10 वृत्ति**

संयुक्त व्यञ्जन

संयुक्त स्वर के समान **संयुक्त व्यञ्जन** भी होते हैं। हिंदी वर्णमाला में तीन **संयुक्त व्यञ्जन** प्रचलित हैं–

क्ष् (क् + ष्) । त्र् (त् + र्) । ज्ञ् (ज् + ञ्) ।

वस्तुतः ये दो व्यञ्जन वर्णों के संयोगमात्र हैं, कोई स्वतन्त्र व्यञ्जन वर्ण नहीं ।

उच्चारण-स्थान (Points of Articulation)

मनुष्य के फेफड़े से निःश्वास रूप में छोड़ी गई हवा जब प्रयत्न-विशेष से जिह्वा, तालु आदि मुख के स्थानों से सम्पर्क करती हुई निःसृत होती है, तब वर्ण (या ध्वनि) विशेष का उच्चारण होता है। प्रत्येक वर्ण का उच्चारण-स्थान और प्रयत्न निश्चित हैं। उपरिनिर्दिष्ट संस्कृत वर्णों के उच्चारण-स्थान[1] इस प्रकार हैं –

वर्ण	उच्चारण-स्थान	वर्ण का नाम
अ, आ, कवर्ग, ह्, विसर्ग (:)	कण्ठ	कण्ठ्य
इ, ई, चवर्ग, य्, श्	तालु	तालव्य,
ऋ, ॠ, टवर्ग, र्, ष्	मूर्धा	मूर्धन्य
लृ, तवर्ग, ल्, स्	दन्त	दन्त्य
उ, ऊ, पवर्ग, उपध्मानीय (⏝)	ओष्ठ	ओष्ठ्य
ङ्, ञ्, ण्, न्, म्	नासिका एवं कण्ठादि	अनुनासिक
ए, ऐ	कण्ठ और तालु	कण्ठतालव्य
ओ, औ	कण्ठ और ओष्ठ	कण्ठोष्ठ्य
व्	दन्त और ओष्ठ	दन्तोष्ठ्य
जिह्वामूलीय (⏝)	जिह्वामूल	जिह्वामूलीय
अनुस्वार (ं)	नासिका	नासिक्य

1. अ-कु-ह-विसर्जनीयानां कण्ठः । इ-चु-य-शानां तालु । ऋ-टु-र-षाणां मूर्धा । लृ-तु-ल-सानां दन्ताः । उपूपध्मानीयानामोष्ठौ । ञ-म-ङ-ण-नानां नासिका च । एदैतोः कण्ठतालु। ओदौतोः कण्ठोष्ठम् । वकारस्य दन्तोष्ठम् । जिह्वामूलीयस्य जिह्वामूलम्। नासिकाऽनुस्वारस्य।
❑ ल.सि.कौ. सू. 10 वृत्ति

प्रयत्न (Manner of Articulation)

मनुष्य जब कुछ कहने की इच्छा करता है तो अपने फेफड़े से निःश्वास रूप में छोड़ी गई हवा को अपने संकल्प के अनुसार प्रेरित करता है जिससे वह (हवा) काकलक (Larynx) तथा उससे आगे मुख विवर (Oral Cavity) एवं नासिका विवर (Nasal Cavity) से विविध रूपों में गुजरती हुई स्थान-विशेष के सम्पर्क से वर्ण-विशेष का उच्चारण करती है। इस समस्त क्रिया का नाम **यत्न** (प्रयत्न) है।

इसके दो[1] भेद हैं – आभ्यन्तर और बाह्य ।

आभ्यन्तर प्रयत्न

आभ्यन्तर प्रयत्न वह प्रयत्न है जिसका कार्य मुख के भीतर (ओष्ठ से लेकर काकलक से पहले) होता है । इसके पाँच भेद हैं[2] –

स्पृष्ट, ईषत्स्पृष्ट, ईषद्विवृत, विवृत और संवृत। वर्णोत्पत्ति से पूर्व जब जिह्वा के अग्र (Tip of the tongue) (आदि) भाग तालु आदि स्थानों का पूर्णतया स्पर्श करते हैं, तब वह प्रयत्न **स्पृष्ट** कहलाता है और जब पास पहुँच कर अल्प स्पर्श करते हैं, तब वह **ईषत्स्पृष्ट** कहलाता है । किसी वर्ण विशेष के उच्चारण में जिह्वा जब कम ऊपर उठती है तो मुख विवर खुला रहता है। जब यह थोड़ा खुला रहता है, तब **ईषद्विवृत** और जब पूरा खुला रहता है, तब **विवृत** प्रयत्न होता है। जब जिह्वा की स्थिति ऊपर उठी होती है तब मुखविवर बहुत पतला हो जाता है। यह **संवृत** प्रयत्न कहलाता है। विभिन्न वर्णों के आभ्यन्तर[3] प्रयत्न इस प्रकार हैं –

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1. यत्नो द्विधा – आभ्यन्तरो बाह्यश्च। ❑ **ल० सि० कौ० सू० 10 वृत्ति**

2. आद्यः पञ्चधा–स्पृष्टेषत्स्पृष्टेषद्विवृतविवृतसंवृतभेदात्। तत्र स्पृष्टं प्रयत्नं स्पर्शानाम् ईषत्स्पृष्टमन्तःस्थानाम्। ईषद्विवृतमूष्मणाम्। विवृतं स्वराणाम् ह्रस्वस्यावर्णस्य प्रयोगे संवृतम्। प्रक्रियादशायां तु विवृतमेव। ❑ **ल० सि० कौ० सू० 10 वृत्ति**

3. कुछ लोग ऊष्म वर्ण और स्वर वर्ण दोनों को विवृत कहकर आभ्यन्तर प्रयत्न के कुल चार ही भेद मानते हैं।

स्पृष्ट	**ईषत्स्पृष्ट**	**ईषद्विवृत**	**विवृत**	**संवृत**
स्पर्श वर्ण	अन्तःस्थ वर्ण	ऊष्म वर्ण	स्वर वर्ण	अ[1]
(क् से लेकर म् तक के वर्ण)	(य्, र्, ल्, व्)	(श्, ष्, स्, ह्)		(प्रयोग दशा में)

बाह्य प्रयत्न

वर्णोच्चारण का वह यत्न जिसका कार्य मुख (ओष्ठ से लेकर काकलक) के बाहर होता है, बाह्य प्रयत्न कहलाता है। इसके ग्यारह भेद[2] बताए गए हैं –

विवार, संवार, श्वास, नाद, घोष, अघोष, अल्पप्राण, महाप्राण, उदात्त, अनुदात्त और स्वरित[3] ।

काकलक (Larynx) के मुँह दो स्वरतन्त्रियाँ (Vocal/chords) हैं जो रबर की तरह फैलने और सिकुड़ने वाले दो परदे हैं इनका विवार (खुलना) और संवार (सटना, बन्द होना) फेफड़े से निकले हुए वायु को पृथक्-पृथक् रूप देता है। **संवार** की अवस्था में वायु स्वरतन्त्रियों के कम्पन के कारण नादवान् होकर और **विवार** की अवस्था में श्वास रूप में मुखविवर में पहुँचती है। काकलक से आए नादवान् वायु से उच्चरित वर्ण **घोष** कहलाते हैं और केवल श्वास रूप में आए वायु से उच्चरित वर्ण **अघोष** कहलाते हैं।

जिन वर्णों की उत्पत्ति में प्राणवायु (फेफड़े से निःसृत वायु) अल्प मात्रा में होती है, वे **अल्पप्राण** कहलाते हैं। जिन वर्णों की उत्पत्ति में प्राणवायु अधिक मात्रा में होती है, वे **महाप्राण** कहलाते हैं ।

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1. व्याकरण में (प्रक्रिया हेतु) अ को विवृत माना गया है, किन्तु व्यवहार में अ संवृत है।
2. बाह्यप्रयत्नस्त्वेकादशधा-विवारः संवारः श्वासो नादो घोषोऽघोषोऽल्पप्राणो महाप्राण उदात्तोऽनुदात्तःस्वरितश्चेति। ❑ **ल० सि० कौ० सू० 10 वृत्ति।**
3. महाभाष्यकार के मतानुसार बाह्य प्रयत्न आठ ही हैं (उदात्तादि तीन नहीं)।

विभिन्न वर्णों के बाह्य प्रयत्न[1] इस प्रकार हैं –

विवार, श्वास, अघोष	*संवार, नाद, घोष*	*अल्पप्राण*	*महाप्राण*	*उदात्त, अनुदात्त, स्वरित*
वर्गों के प्रथम, द्वितीय वर्ण एवं श्, ष्, स्	वर्गों के तृतीय, चतुर्थ, पञ्चम वर्ण, अन्तःस्थ एवं ह्	वर्गों के प्रथम, तृतीय, पञ्चम वर्ण एवं अन्तःस्थ	वर्गों के द्वितीय, चतुर्थ वर्ण एवं ऊष्म	सभी स्वर वर्ण

अभ्यास

1. **स्वर एवं व्यञ्जन वर्णों में क्या अन्तर है ?**
2. **मूल स्वर कितने हैं,उनके नाम लिखें।**
3. **निम्नलिखित स्वर वर्णों में कौन ह्रस्व हैं और कौन दीर्घ हैं ?**
   आ, इ, ऊ, ऋ, लृ, ए, ऐ, ओ।
4. **संयुक्त स्वर कौन-कौन हैं, उनके नाम लिखें।**
5. **निम्नलिखित शीर्षक के अन्तर्गत कौन-कौन वर्ण आते हैं –**
   स्पर्श, अन्तःस्थ, ऊष्म।
6. **अयोगवाह किसे कहते हैं ?**
7. **निम्नलिखित संयुक्त-वर्ण किन-किन वर्णों के संयोग से बने हैं –**
   क्ष्, त्र्, ज्ञ् ।
8. **निम्नलिखित वर्णों के सामने उनका उच्चारण स्थान लिखें –**

इ............................ ह्............................

ण्............................ ऊ............................

ब्............................ श्............................

1. खरो विवाराः श्वासा अघोषाश्च। हशः संवाराः नादाः घोषाश्च। वर्गाणां प्रथम-तृतीयपञ्चमा यणश्चाल्पप्राणाः वर्गाणां द्वितीय-चतुर्थौ शलश्च महाप्राणाः।

❑ ल0 सि0 कौ0 सू0 10 वृत्ति

ओ .... व् ....
ष् .... ऋ ....
द् .... स् ....
ऌ .... च् ....
(.) (अनुस्वार) .... ऐ ....
घ् .... (:) (विसर्ग) ....

9. निम्नलिखित वर्णों में से जिस आभ्यन्तर प्रयत्न से जो वर्ण उच्चरित होते हैं उसके सामने उन वर्णों को लिखें –

अ, ई, त्, म्, य्, र्, ल्, व्, श्, ष्, स्, ह् ।

स्पृष्ट–

ईषत्स्पृष्ट–

ईषद्विवृत–

विवृत–

संवृत–

10. नीचे लिखे वर्णों को उपयुक्त प्रयत्नों के सामने लिखें –

(अ) ख्, ज्, ठ्, ण्, त्, प्, फ्, व्, ल्, श्, ह् ।

घोष –

अघोष –

(आ) क्, ध्, च्, ज्, झ्, ठ्, ण्, थ्, द्, घ्, प्, भ्, म्, ल्, व्, स्, ह् ।

अल्पप्राण –

महाप्राण –

11. स्पर्श, अन्तःस्थ और ऊष्म - ये नाम क्यों रखे गये हैं ?

12. 'शुद्ध' शब्द का वर्णक्रम श् + उ + द् + ध् + अ है ; इसी प्रकार निम्नलिखित शब्दों के सामने उनका वर्णक्रम लिखिए –

(i) रिक्त

(ii) क्षत्रिय

(iii) आर्द्र

(iv) दुःख

(v) ज्ञान

13. **निम्नलिखित युग्मों में से शुद्ध शब्दों को इस चिह्न (✓) से चिह्नित कीजिए –**

आशीर्वाद/आर्शिवाद

विव्दान् /विद्वान्

ब्रह्म/ब्रम्ह

शब्द/शद्ब

यन्त्र/यत्न

द्वितीय अध्याय

सन्धि

परिचय

दो वर्णों की अत्यन्त समीपता (अर्थात् अव्यवहित उच्चारण) के कारण उनमें जो विकार (परिवर्तन) होता है, उसे **सन्धि** कहते हैं, जैसे – सुर + ईशः = सुरेशः। यहाँ अ + ई मिलकर ए हो गए हैं। यह परिवर्तन तीन प्रकार का होता है –

1. आदेश 2. लोप 3. आगम।

1. **आदेश** – कभी दो वर्णों या एक वर्ण के स्थान में एक नया वर्ण (आदेश) आ जाता है, जैसे – सुर + ईशः = सुरेशः में अ + ई के स्थान पर 'ए' का आदेश। तथा यदि + अपि = यद्यपि में 'इ' के स्थान पर य् का आदेश।
2. **लोप** – कभी दो वर्णों में से एक वर्ण का लोप हो जाता है, जैसे – बालकाः + हसन्ति = बालका हसन्ति में विसर्ग का लोप।
3. **आगम** – कभी दो वर्णों के बीच एक तीसरा वर्ण (आगम) आ जाता है, जैसे – वृक्ष + छाया = वृक्षच्छाया में च् का आगम।

   सन्धि तोड़ने की क्रिया **सन्धि-विच्छेद** कहलाती है, जैसे – जगदीशः का विच्छेद होगा – जगत् + ईशः।

सन्धि का क्षेत्र

एक पद में, उपसर्ग और धातु के बीच तथा समास में सन्धि करना अनिवार्य है । किन्तु वाक्य में सन्धि करना या न करना वक्ता की इच्छा पर निर्भर है। इस विषय में यह कारिका प्रसिद्ध है –

[1]संहितैकपदे नित्या नित्या धातूपसर्गयोः ।
नित्या समासे वाक्ये तु सा विवक्षामपेक्षते ॥

उदाहरण–

क. अनिवार्य – 1. पदगत सन्धि – बालकेन (बालक + इन)।
2. उपसर्ग और धातु (क्रिया) के बीच सन्धि – उपैति (उप + एति)।
3. समासगत सन्धि – सूर्योदयः (सूर्यस्य उदयः, सूर्य + उदयः)

ख. वैकल्पिक – वाक्य में पदों के बीच सन्धि –
सुरेशो ग्रामादागच्छति ।
अथवा, सुरेशः ग्रामात् आगच्छति ।

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1. संहिता – परः सन्निकर्षः संहिता । ❑ **पा0 1.4.109**
वर्णों के व्यवधानरहित उच्चारण को संहिता कहते हैं, जैसे – र् + आ + म् + अ + : –ये वर्ण जब बिना किसी व्यवधान के उच्चरित होते हैं अर्थात् संहिता में होते हैं तब इनका स्वरूप रामः पद के रूप में प्रकट होता है । किसी पद के अन्दर, समास में तथा धातु और उपसर्ग के योग में संहिता अनिवार्य होती है । जब वक्ता को अभीष्ट होता है तब वाक्य में दो पदों के बीच आने वाले वर्णों (प्रथम पद के अन्तिम वर्ण और दूसरे पद के प्रथम वर्ण) में भी संहिता हो सकती है। संहिता होने पर ही सन्धि के नियम लागू होते हैं। स् + उ + र् + अ + ई + श् + अ + : (विसर्ग) इन वर्णों में संहिता के कारण अ + ई की सन्धि होकर सुरेशः पद उच्चरित होता है।

सन्धि के भेद

सन्धि मुख्यतः तीन प्रकार की होती है –

1. **स्वर सन्धि**–या अच् सन्धि अर्थात् स्वर + स्वर –
जहाँ किसी स्वर वर्ण की दूसरे स्वर वर्ण के साथ सन्धि हो।
जैसे– रमा + ईशः = रमेशः (आ = ई = ए)।
यदि + अपि = यद्यपि (इ + अ + य)।
2. **व्यञ्जन सन्धि**–या हल् सन्धि – व्यञ्जन + व्यञ्जन या स्वर –
जहाँ किसी व्यञ्जन वर्ण की किसी व्यञ्जन अथवा स्वर वर्ण के साथ सन्धि हो ।
जैसे–सत् + जनः = सज्जनः (त् + ज् = ज्ज) ।
वाक् + ईशः = वागीशः (क् + ई = गी)
3. **विसर्ग सन्धि**–विसर्ग + व्यञ्जन अथवा स्वर –
जब विसर्ग की किसी व्यञ्जन अथवा स्वर के साथ सन्धि हो।
जैसे – नमः + ते = नमस्ते (: + ते = स्ते) ।
रामः + इच्छति = राम इच्छति (: + इ = इ)

I. स्वर सन्धि

स्वर सन्धि के प्रमुख भेद निम्नलिखित हैं –

1. दीर्घ सन्धि (आ, ई, ऊ, ॠ)

नियम ह्रस्व या दीर्घ अ, इ,उ, ऋ के बाद यदि क्रमशः ह्रस्व या दीर्घ अ, इ, उ, ऋ आए तो दोनों मिलकर दीर्घ (क्रमेण आ, ई, ऊ, ॠ) हो जाते हैं।[1]

उदाहरण–

(i) अ/आ + अ/आ = आ
परम + अर्थः = परमार्थः (अ + अ = आ)
देव + आलयः = देवालयः (अ + आ = आ)
विद्या + अभ्यासः = विद्याभ्यासः (आ + अ = आ)
विद्या + आलयः = विद्यालयः (आ + आ = आ)

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1. अकः सवर्णे दीर्घः । ◻ पा0 6.1.101

(ii) इ /ई + इ /ई = ई

कवि + इन्द्रः = कवीन्द्रः (इ + इ = ई)

कवि + ईश्वरः = कवीश्वरः (इ + ई = ई)

मही + इन्द्रः = महीन्द्रः (ई + इ = ई)

लक्ष्मी + ईश्वरः = लक्ष्मीश्वरः (ई + ई = ई)

(iii) उ/ऊ + उ/ऊ = ऊ

सु + उक्तिः + सूक्तिः (उ + उ = ऊ)

(iv) ऋ + ऋ = ॠ

पितृ + ऋणम् = पितॄणम् (ऋ + ऋ = ॠ)

2. गुण सन्धि – (ए, ओ, अर्, अल्)

नियम – यदि अ/ आ के बाद इ/ई हो तो दोनों मिलकर ए, उ/ऊ हो तो दोनों मिलकर ओ, ऋ हो तो दोनों मिलकर अर् और लृ हो तो अल् हो जाते हैं।[1]

उदाहरण–

(i) अ/आ + इ/ ई = ए

देव + इन्द्रः = देवेन्द्र (अ + इ = ए)

गण + ईशः = गणेशः (अ + ई = ए)

महा + इन्द्रः = महेन्द्रः (आ + इ = ए)

महा + ईशः = महेशः (आ + ई = ए)

(ii) अ/आ + उ/ऊ = ओ

सूर्य + उदयः = सूर्योदयः (अ + उ = ओ)

महा + उत्सवः = महोत्सवः (आ + उ = ओ)

एक + ऊनविंशतिः = एकोनविंशतिः (अ + ऊ = ओ)

महा + ऊर्मिः = महोर्मिः (आ + ऊ = ओ)

(iii) अ/आ + ऋ/ॠ = अर्

सप्त + ऋषयः = सप्तर्षयः (अ + ऋ = अर्)

महा + ऋषिः = महर्षिः (आ + ऋ = अर्)

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1. आद् गुणः । ❑ पा० 6.1.87

(iv) अ/आ + ऌ = अल्

तव + ऌकारः = तवल्कारः (अ + ऌ = अल्)

अपवाद – स्वैरम् (स्व + ईरम्), अक्षौहिणी (अक्ष + ऊहिनी), प्रौढः (प्र + ऊढः), दुःखार्तः (दुःख + ऋतः), प्रार्णम् (प्र + ऋणम्), दशार्णः (दश + ऋणः) आदि उदाहरण इस नियम के अपवाद हैं । इनमें वृद्धि (ऐ, औ, आर्) होती है ।

3. वृद्धि सन्धि – (ऐ, औ, आर्)

नियम – अ/आ के बाद यदि ए/ऐ आए तो दोनों मिलकर 'ऐ', ओ/औ आए तो दोनों मिलकर 'औ' हो जाते हैं।[1]

उदाहरण–

(i) अ/आ + ए/ऐ = ऐ

एक + एकम् = एकैकम् (अ + ए = ऐ)

मत + ऐक्यम् = मतैक्यम् (अ + ऐ = ऐ)

सदा + एव = सदैव (आ + ए = ऐ)

महा + ऐश्वर्यम् = महैश्वर्यम् (आ + ऐ = ऐ)

(ii) अ/आ + ओ/औ = औ

परम + ओषधिः = परमौषधिः (अ + ओ = औ)

गङ्गा + ओघः = गङ्गौघः (आ + ओ = औ)

दिव्य + औषधम् = दिव्यौषधम् (अ + औ = औ)

महा + औत्सुक्यम् = महौत्सुक्यम् (आ + औ = औ)

टिप्पणी – समास में प्रयुक्त होने पर अ/आ के बाद यदि 'ओष्ठ' शब्द आए तो विकल्प से उपर्युक्त नियम लगता है। पक्ष में, अ + ओ = ओ होता है, जैसे –

	वृद्धिसहित	वृद्धिरहित
बिम्ब + ओष्ठः	= बिम्बौष्ठः	(बिम्बोष्ठः)।
अधर + ओष्ठः	= अधरौष्ठः	(अधरोष्ठः) ।
दन्त + ओष्ठम्	= दन्तौष्ठम्	(दन्तोष्ठम्)।

1. वृद्धिरेचि । ❑ पा0 6.1.88

4. यण् सन्धि – (य्, व्, र्, ल्)

नियम – ह्रस्व या दीर्घ इ, उ, ऋ, लृ के बाद किसी असवर्ण (असमान) स्वर के आने पर इ का य्, उ का व्, ऋ का र् तथा लृ का ल् हो जाता है।[1]

(i) इ/ई + असमान स्वर = य् (स्वर)
यदि + अपि = यद्यपि (इ + अ = य)
इति + आदिः = इत्यादिः (इ + आ = या)
प्रति + उपकारः = प्रत्युपकारः (इ + उ = यु)
नि + ऊनः = न्यूनः (इ + ऊ = यू)
प्रति + एकम् = प्रत्येकम् (इ + ए = ये)
देवी + अनुग्रहः = देव्यनुग्रहः (ई + अ = य)
नदी + एव = नद्येव (ई + ए = ये)
यादृशी + उक्तिः = यादृश्युक्तिः (ई + उ = यु)

(ii) उ/ऊ + असमान स्वर = व् (+ स्वर)
अनु + अयः = अन्वयः (उ + अ = व)
सु + आगतम् = स्वागतम् (उ + अ = व)
अनु + एषणम् = अन्वेषणम् (उ + अ = वे)
वधू + आगमनम् = वध्वागमनम् (ऊ + आ = वा)

(iii) ऋ + असमान स्वर = र् (+ स्वर)
पितृ + इच्छा = पित्रिच्छा (ऋ + इ = रि)
मातृ + आज्ञा = मात्राज्ञा (ऋ + आ = रा)

(iv) लृ + असमान स्वर = ल् (+ स्वर)
लृ + आकृतिः = लाकृतिः (लृ + आ = ला)

5. अयादि सन्धि – (अय्, आय्, अव्, आव्)

नियम – यदि ऐ, ऐ, ओ अथवा औ के बाद कोई स्वर हो तो ए का अय्, ऐ का आय्, ओ का अव् और औ का आव् हो जाता है।[2]

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1. इको यणचि। ☐ पा0 **6.1.77**

2. एचोऽयवायावः। ☐ पा0 **6.1.78**

उदाहरण–

(i) ए + स्वर = अय् (+ स्वर)
ने + अनम् = नयनम् (ए + अ = अय)
मुने + ए = मुनये (ए + ए = अये)

(ii) ऐ + स्वर = आय् (+ स्वर)
नै + अकः = नायकः (ऐ + अ = आय)
परिचै + अकः = परिचायकः (ऐ + अ = आय)

(iii) ओ + स्वर = अव् (+ स्वर)
भो + अनम् = भवनम् (ओ + अ = अव)
भानो + ए = भानवे (ओ + ए = अवे)

(iv) औ + स्वर = आव् (+ स्वर)
पौ + अकः = पावकः (औ + अ = आव)
नौ + इकः = नाविकः (औ + इ = आवि)
भौ + उकः = भावुकः (औ + उ = आवु)
बालकौ + आगतौ = बालकावागतौ (औ + आ = आवा)

विशेष–

ओ या औ के बाद यदि यकार आदि वाला कोई प्रत्यय हो तो भी ओ के स्थान पर अव् और औ के स्थान पर आव् हो जाता है[1]। जैसे –

गो + यम् = गव्यम् (ओ + य = अव्य)
नौ + यम् = नाव्यम् (औ + य = आव्य)

टिप्पणी – पदान्त ए/ओ के बाद अ रहने पर यह नियम लागू नहीं होता। अपितु अगला (पूर्वरूप) नियम लागू होता है।

6. पूर्वरूप सन्धि

नियम – पदान्त ए/ओ के बाद यदि अ हो तो दोनों मिलकर पूर्वरूप अर्थात् ए/ओ हो जाते हैं। यह सन्धि अवग्रह (ऽ) द्वारा सूचित होती है।[2]

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1. वान्तो यि प्रत्यये। ❑ **पा० 6.1.79**

2. एङः पदान्तादति। ❑ **पा० 6.1.109**

उदाहरण–

वृक्षे + अपि = वृक्षेऽपि (ए + अ = एऽ)

ते + अपि = तेऽपि (ए + अ = एऽ)

विष्णो + अत्र = विष्णोऽत्र (ओ + अ = ओ ऽ)

7. पररूप सन्धि

नियम – अकारान्त उपसर्ग के बाद यदि ए/ओ से प्रारम्भ होने वाली धातु हो तो दोनों मिलकर पररूप अर्थात् ए/ओ हो जाते हैं।[1]

उदाहरण–

प्र + एजते = प्रेजते (अ + ए = ए)

उप + ओषति = उपोषति (अ + ओ = ओ)

अपवाद–

अव + एति = अवैति

उप + एधते = उपैधते

प्रकृतिभाव[2]

प्लुत[3] एवं प्रगृह्यसंज्ञक[4] स्वर के बाद यदि कोई स्वर आता है तो उपर्युक्त नियमों के अनुसार सन्धि के प्राप्त रहने पर भी सन्धि नहीं होती। इसे **प्रकृतिभाव** कहते हैं, जैसे –

(1) **प्लुत** – आगच्छ रमेश 3, अत्र क्रीडावः।

यहाँ रमेश 3 + अत्र में प्लुत के कारण दीर्घ सन्धि नहीं हुई।

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1. एङि, पररूपम्। ❑ पा0 **6.1.94**
2. प्लुतप्रगृह्या अचि नित्यम्। ❑ पा0 **6.2.125**
3. जब किसी को दूर से पुकारा जाता है तो उस पद में अन्तिम स्वर प्लुत हो जाता है– दूराद्धूते च। ❑ पा0 **8.2.84**
4. प्रगृह्यसंज्ञक –
   (i) ईकारान्त, ऊकारान्त और एकारान्त द्विवचन को **प्रगृह्य** कहते हैं।
   (ईदूदेद्द्विवचनं प्रगृह्यम्। ❑ पा0 **1.1.11**)
   (ii) अदस् (= यह) शब्द के मकार से युक्त ईकारान्त और ऊकारान्त रूप ही प्रगृह्य है। (अदसो मात्। ❑ **1.1.12**)
   (iii) ओकारान्त अव्यय भी प्रगृह्य है। (ओत्। ❑ पा० **1.1.15**)

(2) **प्रगृह्य–**

(i) कवी आगतौ – यहाँ यण् सन्धि नहीं हुई ।
साधू ईशं स्मरतः – यहाँ यण् सन्धि नहीं हुई ।
बालिके आगच्छतः – यहाँ अयादि सन्धि नहीं हुई।

(ii) अमी अजाः – यहाँ यण् सन्धि नहीं हुई।
अमू अश्वौ – यहाँ यण् सन्धि नहीं हुई।

(iii) अहो ईशाः – यहाँ अयादि सन्धि नहीं हुई ।
अहो अनर्थः – यहाँ पूर्वरूप सन्धि नहीं हुई ।

अभ्यास

1. **सन्धि कहाँ-कहाँ अनिवार्य है?**
2. **स्वर-सन्धि किसे कहते हैं?**
   यण्-सन्धि और वृद्धि-सन्धि के दो-दो उदाहरण लिखिए ।
3. **सन्धि-विच्छेद कीजिए -**
   इत्युक्त्वा, हिमालयः, वार्तालापः, विद्यार्थी, गिरीशः, गुरूपदेशः, नरेशः, परोपकारः, राजर्षिः, अत्याचारः, मात्राज्ञा, सुखार्तः, वनेऽपि, कवी एतौ, हितोपदेशः, रात्रावागतः, चयनम्, तथैव, वनौषधिः ।
4. **निम्नलिखित में सन्धि कीजिए –**

अभि	+	उदयः	=	देव	+	ऋषिः	=
शिक्षा	+	अर्थी	=	ग्रीष्म	+	ऋतुः	=
महा	+	आशयः	=	वर्षा	+	ऋतुः	=
अभि	+	इष्टः	=	अधुना	+	एव	=
रजनी	+	ईशः	=	सदा	+	एव	=
मातृ	+	ऋणम्	=	हरे	+	ए	=
रमा	+	ईशः	=	जे	+	अति	=
महा	+	उदयः	=	गौ	+	औ	=
चन्द्र	+	उदयः	=	ने	+	अति	=
साधो	+	ए	=	पितृ	+	अर्थम्	=
प्र	+	ऊढः	=				

II. व्यञ्जन सन्धि

व्यञ्जन के साथ स्वर या व्यञ्जन की सन्धि **व्यञ्जन सन्धि** कहलाती है। इसके प्रमुख नियम निम्नलिखित हैं –

1. **श्चुत्व** (स→ श, तवर्ग→ चवर्ग)

नियम – सकार या तवर्ग का शकार या चवर्ग के साथ योग होने (आगे या पीछे) पर स्–श् में और तवर्ग–चवर्ग में परिवर्तित हो जाता है।[1]

उदाहरण–

(i) स् → श्

मनस् + चलति = मनश्चलति (स् + च् =श्च्)

रामस् + शेते = रामश्शेते (स् + श् = श्श्)

(ii) तवर्ग→ चवर्ग

सत् + चरित्रम् = सच्चरित्रम् (त् + च् = च्च्)

शरत् + चन्द्रः = शरच्चन्द्रः (त् + च् = च्च्)

उत् + चारणम् = उच्चारणम् (त् + च् = च्च्)

याच् + ना = याच्ञा (च् + न् = च्ञ्)

यज् + नः = यज्ञः (ज् + न् = ज्ञ्)

राज् + नः = राज्ञः (ज् + न् = ज्ञ्)

सद् + जनः = सज्जनः (द् + ज् = ज्ज्)

अपवाद – शकार के बाद तवर्ग के आने पर तवर्ग का चवर्ग नहीं होता।[2] जैसे – प्रश् + नः = प्रश्नः।

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1. स्तोः श्चुना श्चुः। ☐ पा0 8.4.40
2. शात् । ☐ पा0 8.4.44

2. ष्टुत्व (स् →ष्, तवर्ग→ टवर्ग)

नियम – सकार या तवर्ग का यदि षकार या टवर्ग के साथ (आगे या पीछे) योग हो तो स् के स्थान में ष् और तवर्ग के स्थान में टवर्ग हो जाता है।[1]

उदाहरण–

(i) स् → ष्
हरिस् + टीकते = हरिष्टीकते (स् + ट् = ष्ट्)

(ii) तवर्ग→ टवर्ग
तत् + टीका = तट्टीका (त् + ट् = ट्ट्)
आकृष् + तः = आकृष्टः (ष् + त् = ष्ट्)
इष् + तः = इष्टः (ष् + त् = ष्ट्)
पुष् + तिः = पुष्टिः (ष् + त् = ष्ट्)
षष् + थः = षष्ठः (ष् + थ् = ष्ठ्)

अपवाद–

(क) पदान्त टवर्ग के बाद सकार या तवर्ग हो तो उसका षकार या टवर्ग नहीं होता,[2] जैसे – षट् + सन्तः = षट्सन्तः ।
परन्तु पदान्त टवर्ग के बाद नाम्, नवति और नगरी शब्दों के रहने पर भी न् का ण् हो जाता है, जैसे–
षट् + नाम् = षण्णाम्। (ट् + न् = ण्ण्)
इसी प्रकार षण्णवति, षण्णगर्यः ।

(ख) तवर्ग के बाद षकार हो तो तवर्ग का टवर्ग नहीं होता,[3]
जैसे – सन् + षष्ठः = सन्षष्ठः ।

3. जश्त्व

(1) वर्ग का प्रथम वर्ण→ तृतीय वर्ण

(2) चतुर्थ वर्ण →तृतीय वर्ण

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1. ष्टुना ष्टुः। ❑ पा0 8.4.41
2. न पदान्ताट्टोरनाम्।। ❑ पा0 8.4.42
3. तोः षि। ❑ पा0 8.4.43

नियम (i) पदान्त क्, च्, ट्, त्, प् के बाद यदि कोई स्वर वर्ण हो अथवा कोई घोष व्यञ्जन (वर्गों के तृतीय, चतुर्थ, पञ्चम वर्ण तथा य्, र्, ल्, व्, ह्) हो तो क्, च्, ट्, त्, प् क्रमशः ग्, ज्, ड्, द्, ब् में बदल जाते हैं।[1]

उदाहरण–

(i) प्रथम वर्ण + स्वर = तृतीय वर्ण + स्वर
वाक् + ईशः = वागीशः (क् + ई = गी)
अच् + आदिः = अजादिः (च् + आ = जा)
षट् + आननः = षडाननः (ट् + आ = डा)
जगत् + ईशः = जगदीशः (त् + ई = दी)
सुप् + अन्तम् = सुबन्तम् (प् + अ = ब)

(ii) प्रथमवर्ण + घोष व्यञ्जन = तृतीय वर्ण
दिक् + गजः = दिग्गजः (क् + ग् = ग्ग्)
षट् + रिपवः = षड्रिपवः (ट् + र् = ड्र्)
सत् + धर्मः = सद्धर्मः (त् + ध् = द्ध)
भगवत् + भक्तिः = भगवद्भक्ति (त् + भ् = द्भ)
अप् + जम् = अब्जम् (प् + ज् = ब्ज्)

टिप्पणी–

(अ) वर्ग के प्रथम वर्ण के बाद यदि कोई अनुनासिक वर्ण (ङ्, ञ्, ण्, न्, म्) हो तो उपर्युक्त नियम विकल्प से लगता है। पक्ष में पञ्चम वर्ण हो जाता है।[2] जैसे –
दिक् + मुखम् = दिङ्मुखम् (दिग्मुखम्)।
जगत् + नाथः = जगन्नाथः (जगद्नाथः)
षट् + मासाः = षण्मासाः (षड्मासाः)

(आ) बाद में आने वाला अनुनासिक वर्ण यदि प्रत्यय का हो तो प्रथम वर्णका पञ्चम वर्ण ही होता है।[3] जैसे–
वाक् + मयम् = वाङ्मयम्,
तत् + मात्रम् = तन्मात्रम्,
अप् + मयम् = अम्मयम्।

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1. झलां जशोऽन्ते । ❑ पा0 8.2.39
2. यरोऽनुनासिकेऽनुनासिको वा । ❑ पा0 8.4.45
3. प्रत्यये भाषायां नित्यम् । ❑ पा0 8.4.45

नियम (ii) चतुर्थ वर्ण → तृतीय वर्ण ।

किसी पद में यदि वर्ग के चतुर्थ वर्ण के बाद पुनः किसी वर्ग का चतुर्थ वर्ण आ जाए तो पहले आनेवाला चतुर्थ वर्ण अपने ही वर्ग का तृतीय वर्ण हो जाता है[1], जैसे –

क्रुध् + धः = क्रुद्धः (ध् + ध् = द्ध्)
दध् + धः = दग्धः (ध् + ध् = ग्ध्)
दुध् + धम् = दुग्धम् (ध् + ध् = ग्ध्)
बुध् + धिः = बुद्धिः (ध् + धि = द्धि)
वृध् + धिः = वृद्धिः (ध् + धि = द्धि)
सिध् + धिः = सिद्धिः (ध् + धि = द्धि)
लभ् + धः = लब्धः (भ् + ष् = ब्ध्)
क्षुभ् + धः = क्षुब्धः (भ् + ध् = ब्ध्)
आरभ् + धम् = आरब्धम् (भ् + ध् = ब्ध्)

4. चर्त्व (ग्, ज्, ड्, द्, ब्, → क्, च्, ट्, त्, प्)

नियम – वर्गों के तृतीय वर्ण के बाद यदि कोई अघोष वर्ण (वर्ग का प्रथम, द्वितीय वर्ण एवं श्, ष्, स्) हो तो तृतीय वर्ण अपने वर्ग का प्रथम वर्ण हो जाता है।[2]

उदाहरण–

दिग् + पालः = दिक्पालः (ग् + प् = क्प्)
विपद् + कालः = विपत्कालः (द् + क् = त्क्)
सद् + कारः = सत्कारः (द् + क् = त्क्)

5. अनुस्वार – (म्/न् → ं)

नियम – (i) म् के बाद यदि कोई व्यञ्जन वर्ण आए तो म् के स्थान में अनुसार (ं) हो जाता है।[3]

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1. झलां जश् झशि। ❑ **पा0 8.4.53**
2. खरि च। ❑ **पा0 8.4.55**
3. मोऽनुस्वारः। ❑ **पा0 8.3.23**

उदाहरण–

सम् + हारः = संहारः।

सम् + योगः = संयोगः।

हरिम् + वन्दे = हरिं वन्दे।

किम् + वा = किं वा।

अपवाद – अपदान्त म् के उपरान्त यदि अन्तःस्थ या अनुनासिक व्यञ्जन वर्ण आए तो यह नियम लागू नहीं होता, जैसे – गम्यते,नम्यते,शाम्यते ।

नियम – (ii) (न्→ ं)

अपदान्त न् के बाद यदि अन्तःस्थ तथा अनुनासिक को छोड़कर कोई अन्य व्यञ्जन वर्ण आता है तो न् के स्थान में अनुस्वार हो जाता।[1]

उदाहरण-

यशान् + सि = यशांसि।

मन् + स्यते = मंस्यते।

6. परसवर्ण – (अनुस्वार→पञ्चम वर्ण)

नियम – अनुस्वार (ं) के बाद यदि कोई स्पर्श वर्ण हो तो अनुस्वार के स्थान में उसके आगे वाले वर्ण के वर्ग का पञ्चम वर्ण हो जाता है।[2] जैसे–

सं + कल्पः = सङ्कल्पः (ं + क् = ङ्क)

सं + तोषः = सन्तोषः (ं + त् = न्त्)

सं + पूर्णम् = सम्पूर्णम् (ं + प् = म्प्)

अं + कितः = अङ्कितः (ं + क् = ङ्क)

कुं + ठितः = कुण्ठितः (ं + ठ् = ण्ठ्)

गुं + फितः = गुम्फितः (ं + फ् = म्फ्)

शां + तः = शान्तः (ं + त् = न्त्)

अं + चितः = अञ्चितः (ं + च् = ञ्च्)

टिप्पणी–

पदान्त अनुस्वार (ं) के बाद यह नियम विकल्प से लगता है।[3] जैसे–
ग्रामं + गच्छति = ग्रामङ्गच्छति या ग्रामं गच्छति ।

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1. नश्चापदान्तस्य झलि। ❑ पा0 **8.3.24**

2. अनुस्वारस्य ययि परसवर्णः। ❑ पा0 **8.4.58**

3. वा पदान्तस्य। ❑ पा0 **8.4.59**

किं + चित् = किञ्चित् या किंचित् ।

अलं + कारः = अलङ्कारः या अलंकारः ।

7. लत्व – (तवर्ग→ल्)

नियम – तवर्ग के बाद ल् आए तो तवर्ग का ल् हो जाता है । किन्तु न् के बाद ल् के आने पर सानुनासिक लकार (लँ्) होता है[1], जैसे–

तत् + लीनः = तल्लीनः (त् +ल् = ल्ल्)

उत् + लङ्घनम् = उल्लङ्घनम् (त् + ल् = ल्ल्)

महान् + लाभः = महाँल्लाभः (न् + ल् = ल्ल्)

8. छत्व (श→छ)

नियम – श् के पहले यदि पदान्त में स्थित किसी वर्ग का प्रथम, द्वितीय तृतीय अथवा चतुर्थ वर्ण हो और बाद में कोई स्वर, अन्तःस्थ वर्ण (य्, र्, ल्, व्) या ह् हो तो श् के स्थान पर छ् आ जाता है।[2]

उदाहरण–

एतत् + शोभनम् = एतच्छोभनम् (त् + श् = च् + श् = च्छ्)

सत् + शास्त्रम् = सच्छास्त्रम् (त् + श् = च् + श् = च्छ्)

तत् + श्रुत्वा = तच्छ्रुत्वा (त् + श् = च् + श् = च्छ्)

9. च् का आगम

नियम – ह्रस्व के बाद यदि छ् आए तो छ् के पहले एक त् का आगम होकर उसे श्चुत्व (च्) होता है।[3] किन्तु पदान्त दीर्घ स्वर के बाद छ् के आने पर विकल्प से त् (च्) का आगम होता है।[4]

उदाहरण–

तरु + छाया = तरुच्छाया

परि + छेदः = परिच्छेदः

अनु + छेदः = अनुच्छेदः

किन्तु

लक्ष्मी + छाया = लक्ष्मीच्छाया या लक्ष्मीछाया।

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1. तोर्लि । ❑ पा0 8.4.60
2. शश्छोऽटि। ❑ पा0 8.4.63, छत्वममीतिवाच्यम् । 8.4.63 वा0
3. छे च । ❑ पा0 6.1.73
4. पदान्ताद्वा । ❑ पा0 6.1.76

10. अनुनासिक वर्णों का आगम

नियम – जब पदान्त ङ्, ण्, न् के पूर्व कोई ह्रस्व स्वर हो और बाद में कोई भी स्वर आ जाय तो इन अनुनासिक वर्णों को क्रमशः ङ्, ण्, न् का आगम हो जाता है।[1]

उदाहरण –

तस्मिन् + एव = तस्मिन्नेव (इन् + ए = इन्ने)
खादन् + इव = खादन्निव (अन् + इ = अन्नि)
प्रत्यङ् + आत्मा = प्रत्यङ्ङात्मा (अङ् + आ = अङ्ङा)
सुगण् + ईशः = सुगण्णीशः (अण् + ई = अण्णी)

11. र् का लोप और पूर्व स्वर का दीर्घत्व

नियम – र् के बाद यदि र् हो तो पहले र् का लोप हो जाता है और उसके पूर्ववर्ती स्वर का दीर्घ हो जाता है।[2]

उदाहरण–

स्वर् + राज्यम् = स्वाराज्यम्
निर् + रसः = नीरसः
गुरुर् + रमते = गुरूरमते

12. ह् → चतुर्थ वर्ण

नियम – वर्गों के प्रथम, द्वितीय, तृतीय या चतुर्थ वर्ण के उपरान्त यदि ह् आए तो वह विकल्प से अपने पूर्ववर्ती वर्ण के वर्ग का चतुर्थ वर्ण हो जाता है।[3]

उदाहरण–

वाग् + हरिः = वाग्घरिः या वाग्हरिः
उद् + हारः = उद्धारः या उद्हारः
तद् + हितम् = तद्धितम् या तद्हितम्

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1. ङमो ह्रस्वादचि ङमुण्नित्यम्। ❑ पा0 8.3.32
2. रो रि । ❑ पा0 8.3.14
   ढ्रलोपे पूर्वस्य दीर्घोऽणः। ❑ पा0 6.3.111
3. झयो होऽन्यतरस्याम् । ❑ पा0 8.4.62

13. षत्व-विधान–

नियम – इ, ई, उ, ऊ, ऋ, ए, ऐ, ओ, औ तथा कवर्ग के बाद आदेश एवं प्रत्यय के स् को ष् हो जाता है।[1]

उदाहरण–

रामे + सुप् (सु) = रामेषु
हरि + सुप् (सु) = हरिषु
कर्तृ + सुप् (सु) = कर्तृषु
वाक् + सुप् (सु) = वाक्षु
साधु + सुप् (सु) = साधुषु
गो + सुप् (सु) = गोषु
नौ + सुप् (सु) = नौषु

14. णत्व-विधान

नियम--र् और ष् के बाद न् को ण् हो जाता है।[2] यदि "र या ष् " तथा "न्" के बीच में स्वर, ह्, य्, व्, र्, कवर्ग तथा पवर्ग, में से कोई एक या एक से अधिक वर्ण भी हों तो भी न् को ण् हो जाता है।[3]

उदाहरण–

रामे + न = रामेण
पुरुषा + नाम् = पुरुषाणाम्
कर् + नः = कर्णः
यूष् + नः = यूष्णः

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1. आदेशप्रत्यययोः। ❑ पा0 8.3.59
2. रषाभ्यां नो णः समानपदे। ❑ पा0 8.4.1
3. अट्कुप्वाङ्नुम्व्यवायेऽपि। ❑ पा0 8.4.2

अभ्यास

1. निम्नलिखित में सन्धि कीजिए –

सत् + जनः =	उद् + गमः =	मधु + सु =
इष् + तः =	तत् + लीनः =	दातृ + सु =
विष् + नुः =	सत् + आनन्दः =	हरी + नाम् =
कृष् + नः =	सत्यम् + वद =	
षट् + आननः =	तत् + श्रुत्वा =	
तस्मिन् + एव =	मुनि + सु =	

2. निम्नलिखित में सन्धि-विच्छेद कीजिए –

उच्चारणम् =	वागीशः =
जगदीशः =	सच्चिदानन्दः =
दुष्टः =	वृक्षच्छाया =
वाङ्मयम् =	उद्धारः =
दिक्पालः =	उल्लेखः =
महाँल्लाभः =	नीरसः =
नदीषु =	हरिणा =
साधुषु =	वर्णः =

III. विसर्ग सन्धि

विसर्ग के साथ स्वर या व्यञ्जन की सन्धि **विसर्ग सन्धि** कहलाती है। इसके निम्नलिखित प्रमुख प्रकार हैं–

1. सत्व (: → श्, ष्, स्)

नियम – (i) विसर्ग (:) के बाद यदि च् या छ् हो तो विसर्ग का श्; ट् या ठ् हो तो ष् तथा त् या थ् हो तो स् हो जाता है।[1]

उदाहरण–

निः + चलः = निश्चलः (: + च् = श्च्)
शिरः + छेदः = शिरश्छेदः (:+ छ् = श्छ्)
धनुः + टङ्कारः = धनुष्टङ्कारः (:+ ट् = ष्ट्)
नमः + ते = नमस्ते (:+ त् = स्त्)
मनः + तापः = मनस्तापः = (:+ त् = स्त्)
इतः + ततः = इतस्ततः (:+ त् = स्त्)

(ii) विसर्ग के बाद यदि श्, ष् या स् आए तो विसर्ग का क्रमशः श्, ष् या स् हो जाता है या विसर्ग ही रह जाता है।[2] जैसे–

हरिः + शेते = हरिश्शेते (: श् + श्श्) या हरिः शेते
दुः + शासनः = दुश्शासनः या दुःशासनः
निःसन्देहः = निःसन्देहः या निस्सन्देहः

(iii) विसर्ग के पहले यदि इ या उ हो और बाद में क्, ख् या प्, फ् में से कोई वर्ण हो तो विसर्ग के स्थान में ष् हो जाता है।[3] जैसे-

निः + कपटः = निष्कपटः
दुः + कर्म = दुष्कर्म
चतुः + पात् = चतुष्पात्
निः + फलः = निष्फलः

अपवाद– दुः + खम् = दुःखम्

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1. विसर्जनीयस्य सः। ❑ पा0 8.3.34
2. वा शरि । ❑ पा0 8.3.36
3. इदुदुपधस्य चाप्रत्ययः । ❑ पा0 8.3.41

(iv) गति-संज्ञक नमः और पुरः के बाद यदि क्, ख् या प्, फ् आए तो विसर्ग का स् हो जाता है।[1] जैसे–

नमः + कारः = नमस्कारः (: + क् = स्क्).

पुरः + कारः = पुरस्कारः (: + क् = स्क्)

इसी प्रकार नमस्करोति, पुरस्करोति ।

2. उत्व (:→ उ)

(i) अः + अ = अ + उ (ओ) + अ

नियम - विसर्ग के पहले यदि अ हो और विसर्ग के बाद भी अ हो तो विसर्ग के स्थान में उ होता है।[2] इसके बाद गुण तथा पूर्वरूप हो जाता है ।

उदाहरण–

सः + अपि = सोऽपि (अः + अ = अ + उ + अ = ओ + अ = ओऽ)

प्रथमः + अध्यायः = प्रथमोऽध्यायः (")

नृपः + अवदत् = नृपोऽवदत् (")

(ii) अः + घोष व्यञ्जन = अउ (ओ)+ घोष व्यञ्जन

विसर्ग के पहले यदि अ हो और बाद में कोई घोष व्यञ्जन (वर्गों के तृतीय, चतुर्थ एवं पञ्चम वर्ण, य्, र्, ल्, व्, ह्) हो तो विसर्ग के स्थान में उ हो जाता है।[3]

उदाहरण–

तपः + वनम् = तपोवनम् (अः + व् = अ + उ + व् = ओव्)

मनः + रथः = मनोरथः (अः + र् = अ + उ + र् = ओर्)

बालः + गच्छति = बालो गच्छति (अः+ ग् = अ + उ + ग् = ओग्)

नमः + वयम् = नमो वयम् (अः + व् = अ + उ = ओव्)

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1. नमस्पुरसोर्गत्योः । ☐ पा0 8.3.40
कृ धातु के साथ समास में आने पर नमः शब्द (अव्यय) गतिसंज्ञक होता है । साक्षात्प्रभृतीनि च ।☐ पा0 1.4 . 74 । पुरः शब्द (अव्यय) नित्य गतिसंज्ञक है । (पुरोऽव्ययम् ।) ☐ पा0 1 . 4 . 67

2. अतो रोरप्लुतादप्लुते ।☐ पा0 6.1.113

3. हशि च ।☐ पा0 6.1. 114

3. रुत्व (:→ र्)

नियम - यदि विसर्ग से पहले अ, आ को छोड़ कोई अन्य स्वर हो तथा बाद में कोई स्वर या घोष व्यञ्जन हो तो विसर्ग के स्थान में र् हो जाता है ।

उदाहरण–

मुनिः + अयम् = मुनिरयम् (इः + अ = इर् + अ)

हरिः + आगच्छति = हरिरागच्छति (इः + आ = इर् + आ)

पितुः + इच्छा = पितुरिच्छा (उः + इ = उर् + इ)

गुरुः + जयति = गुरुर्जयति (उः + ज् = उर् + ज्)

4. लोप (: → लोप)

नियम – (i) यदि विसर्ग के पहले अ हो और बाद में अ को छोड़ कोई अन्य स्वर हो तो विसर्ग का लोप हो जाता है । (और पुनः वहाँ कोई सन्धि नहीं होती)।

उदाहरण–

अतः + एव = अत एव (अः + ए = अ + ए)

नरः + इव = नर इव

सूर्यः + उदेति = सूर्य उदेति

कुतः + आगतः = कुत आगतः

विशेष - सः और एषः के बाद अ को छोड़ कोई भी वर्ण हो (स्वर या व्यञ्जन) तो इनके विसर्ग का लोप हो जाता है। जैसे-

सः + पठति = स पठति

सः + करोति = स करोति

एषः + हरिः = एष हरिः

एषः + इच्छति = एष इच्छति

सः + उवाच = स उवाच

(ii) यदि विसर्ग के पहले आ हो और विसर्ग के बाद घोष व्यञ्जन या कोई स्वर हो तो विसर्ग का लोप हो जाता है ।

उदाहरण–

छात्राः + आगच्छन्ति = छात्रा आगच्छन्ति

अध्यापकाः + वदन्ति = अध्यापका वदन्ति

अश्वाः + धावन्ति = अश्वा धावन्ति
देवाः + रक्षन्तु = देवा रक्षन्तु

अभ्यास

1. निम्नलिखित में सन्धि कीजिए–

निः	+	छलः	=
निः	+	सन्देहः	=
मेघः	+	गर्जति	=
तेजः	+	राशिः	=
सः	+	पठति	=
पयः	+	दः	=
मनः	+	रथः	=
कविः	+	अयम्	=
प्रथमः	+	सर्गः	=

2. निम्नलिखित में सन्धि-विच्छेद कीजिए–

नमस्ते	=
पुरस्कारः	=
बालकोऽयम्	=
मनोयोगः	=
वयोवृद्धः	=
मनोजः	=
मनोहरम्	=
अधोगतिः	=
निष्फलः	=
प्रथमोऽध्यायः	=

3. सन्धिभेद का कारण बताइए—

क. देवो गच्छति – देव आगच्छति

ख. नीरसः – निर्धनः

ग. रामोऽयम् – पुनरयम्

घ. गजो याति – गजश्चलति

ङ. कः पचति – कोऽपचत्

4. "मालेशः" पद के शुद्ध सन्धि-विच्छेद को (√) इस चिह्न से चिह्नित कीजिये –

क. माल + ईशः　　ख. माला + इशः

ग. माल + एशः　　घ. माला + ईशः

ङ. माले + शः ।

5. जिस पद में व्यञ्जन सन्धि है, उसपर (√) यह चिह्न लगाइये ।

क. नदीशः　　ख. जगदीशः

ग. कपीशः　　घ. कपिरीशः

ङ. क्षितीशः

6. रिक्त स्थानों को उचित पदों से भरिए—

क. नमः + ———— = नमस्तस्यै

ख. तत्र + अगच्छत् = ————

ग. ———— + लासः = उल्लासः

7. अशुद्ध-सन्धि पद को (×) इस चिह्न से चिह्नित कीजिए—

क. अत्यावश्यकम्　　ख. अत्यानन्दः

ग. अत्यादरः　　घ. अत्यानिवार्यम् ।

8. इन्हें शुद्ध कीजिए और कारण भी बताइए—

क. गंगोघः　　ख. प्रत्यैकम्

ग. मनोकामना　　घ. कव्यागच्छतः

ङ. राजछत्रम् ।

9. 'क' भाग की सन्धि 'ख' भाग में ढूँढिए और रिक्त स्थान में ठीक संख्या लगाइए–

	'क'	'ख'	
(i)	द्वौ + अपि	चतुष्टयम्	—
(ii)	अतः + एव	तच्छ्रुत्वा	—
(iii)	हन् + सः	मनीषा	—
(iv)	चतुः + तयम्	नीरोगः	—
(v)	तत् + हितम्	द्वावपि	—
(vi)	लते + एते	अत एव	—
(vii)	तत् + श्रुत्वा	तद्धितम्	—
(viii)	निर् + रोगः	हंसः	—
(ix)	मनस् + ईषा	लते एते	—

10. निम्नलिखित वाक्यों में जहाँ-जहाँ सन्धियाँ हैं, उनका विच्छेद दिखाइए–

क. एको हि दोषो गुणसन्निपाते निमज्जतीन्दोः किरणेष्विवाङ्कः ।

ख. अयं निजः परो वेति गणना लघुचेतसाम् ।
उदारचरितानान्तु वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम् ॥

ग. इति चिन्तयन्नेव तेनासौ व्याघ्रेण व्यापादितः खादितश्च ।

तृतीय अध्याय

शब्दरूप

परिचय

संस्कृत में सार्थक शब्द भी तभी वाक्य में प्रयुक्त हो सकता है जब वह पद बन जाए। संज्ञा (विशेषण सहित), सर्वनाम आदि शब्द कारक विभक्तियों को ग्रहण कर पद बन जाते हैं और क्रियार्थक शब्द (धातु) लट्, लोट् आदि लकारों के प्रत्ययों से युक्त होकर क्रियापद बन जाते हैं। संज्ञा आदि शब्दों में जुड़ने वाली विभक्तियाँ और उनके प्रत्यय निम्नांकित हैं जो सुप् कहलाते हैं-

विभक्ति	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथमा	सु (स् = :)	औ	जस् (अस्)
द्वितीया	अम्	औट् (औ)	शस् (अस्)
तृतीया	टा (आ)	भ्याम्	भिस् (भिः)
चतुर्थी	ङे (ए)	भ्याम्	भ्यस् (भ्यः)
पञ्चमी	ङसि (अस्)	भ्याम्	भ्यस् (भ्यः)
षष्ठी	ङस् (अस्)	ओस् (ओः)	आम्
सप्तमी	ङि (इ)	ओस् (ओः)	सुप् (सु)

विभिन्न लिंगों के शब्दों में जब ये विभक्ति-प्रत्यय जुड़ते हैं तो नियमानुसार विभिन्न रूपों में परिवर्तित हो जाते हैं। ये प्रथमा आदि विभक्तियाँ विभिन्न कारकों के अर्थ को द्योतित करने के लिए प्रयुक्त होती हैं। सामान्यतः कर्ता के लिए प्रथमा, कर्म के लिए द्वितीया, करण के लिए तृतीया, सम्प्रदान के लिए चतुर्थी, अपादान के लिए पञ्चमी, सम्बन्ध के लिए षष्ठी एवं अधिकरण के लिए सप्तमी विभक्ति का प्रयोग होता है। सम्बोधन के लिए प्रथमा विभक्ति ही प्रयुक्त होती है। इसके अतिरिक्त विभिन्न शब्दों के योग के कारण भी विभिन्न विभक्तियाँ प्रयुक्त होती हैं, जो **उपपद विभक्ति** कहलाती हैं। इनका विशद विचार कारक एवं विभक्ति-प्रकरण (सप्तम अध्याय) में प्रतिपादित है।

रूप-भेद की दृष्टि से संज्ञादि शब्दों को निम्नलिखित तीन वर्गों में विभक्त किया जा सकता है-

(क) संज्ञाशब्द (विशेषण सहित)

(ख) सर्वनामशब्द

(ग) संख्यावाचकशब्द

संज्ञा शब्दों को पुनः दो उपवर्गों में रखा जा सकता है– (1) स्वरान्त (अजन्त), जैसे – बालक, कवि, नदी आदि। (2) व्यञ्जनान्त (हलन्त), जैसे – राजन्, दिश्, पयस् आदि।

इन सभी प्रकार के शब्दों के विभिन्न विभक्तियों में रूप यहां प्रस्तुत हैं।

I. संज्ञा शब्द

1. स्वरान्त

(i) अकारान्त

(अ) पुंलिङ्ग

बालक

विभक्ति	**एकवचन**	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथमा	बालकः	बालकौ	बालकाः
सम्बोधन[1]	हे बालक	हे बालकौ	हे बालकाः
द्वितीया	बालकम्	बालकौ	बालकान्
तृतीया	बालकेन	बालकाभ्याम्	बालकैः
चतुर्थी	बालकाय	”	बालकेभ्यः
पञ्चमी	बालकात्	”	”
षष्ठी	बालकस्य	बालकयोः	बालकानाम्
सप्तमी	बालके	”	बालकेषु

सभी अकारान्त पुंलिङ्ग शब्दों के रूप इसी तरह होंगे, जैसे– वृक्ष, अध्यापक, छात्र, विद्यालय, नर, देव, बाल, काक इत्यादि ।

(आ) नपुंसकलिङ्ग

फल

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथमा एवं द्वितीया	फलम्	फले	फलानि
सम्बोधन	फल	”	

शेष तृतीया से सप्तमी तक के रूप **बालक** के समान होते हैं।

सभी अकारान्त नपुंसकलिङ्ग शब्दों के रूप इसी तरह होंगे, जैसे – उद्यानम्, नगरम्, कुसुमम्, पुस्तकम्, मित्रम्, अरविन्दम् आदि ।

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1. सभी प्रकार के शब्दों के रूप सम्बोधन में प्रथमा के समान ही होते हैं । केवल एकवचन का रूप कुछ भिन्न होता है। सभी वचनों में शब्द के प्रारंभ में सम्बोधन सूचक अव्यय 'हे' का प्रयोग प्रायः होता है ।

(ii) आकारान्त स्त्रीलिङ्ग

लता

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथमा	लता	लते	लताः
सम्बोधन	लते	लते	लताः
द्वितीया	लताम्	लते	लताः
तृतीया	लतया	लताभ्याम्	लताभिः
चतुर्थी	लतायै	लताभ्याम्	लताभ्यः
पञ्चमी	लतायाः	लताभ्याम्	लताभ्यः
षष्ठी	लतायाः	लतयोः	लतानाम्
सप्तमी	लतायाम्	लतयोः	लतासु

इसी प्रकार बाला, कन्या, बालिका, छात्रा, गङ्गा, रमा, बाला आदि आकारान्त स्त्रीलिंङ्ग शब्दों के रूप होंगे।

जरा (बुढ़ापा)

जरा शब्द का कुछ विभक्तियों में (अजादि) विकल्प से जरस् आदेश हो जाता है।[1] परिणामतः इसके निम्नलिखित वैकल्पिक रूप भी बनते हैं–

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथमा	जरा	जरसौ	जरसः
सम्बोधन	जरे	,,	,,
द्वितीया	जरसम्	,,	,,
तृतीया	जरसा	जराभ्याम्	जराभिः
चतुर्थी	जरसे	,,	जराभ्यः
पञ्चमी	जरसः	,,	,,
षष्ठी	,,	जरसोः	जरसाम्
सप्तमी	जरसि	,,	जरासु

1. जरायाः जरसन्यतरस्याम्। ❑ पा० 7. 2.101

(iii) इकारान्त (अ) पुंलिङ्ग

मुनि

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथमा	मुनिः	मुनी	मुनयः
सम्बोधन	मुने	”	”
द्वितीया	मुनिम्	”	मुनीन्
तृतीया	मुनिना	मुनिभ्याम्	मुनिभिः
चतुर्थी	मुनये	”	मुनिभ्यः
पञ्चमी	मुनेः	”	”
षष्ठी	मुनेः	मुन्योः	मुनीनाम्
सप्तमी	मुनौ	”	मुनिषु

कवि, ऋषि, हरि, रवि आदि सभी इकारान्त पुंलिङ्ग शब्दों (**अपवाद**– सखि, पति आदि) के रूप **मुनि** के समान होते हैं।

पति

पति शब्द जब किसी समास के अन्त में आता है, जैसे – श्रीपति, भूपति, नरपति आदि तब उसके रूप मुनि के समान ही होते हैं, किन्तु जब केवल पति शब्द होगा, तब तृतीया से सप्तमी तक के एकवचन में रूप भिन्न होंगे–

तृ0	च0	पं0	ष0	स0
पत्या	पत्ये	पत्युः	पत्युः	पत्यौ

शेष रूप मुनि के समान ही होंगे।

सखि (मित्र)

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	सखा	सखायौ	सखायः
सं0	सखे	”	”
द्वि0	सखायम्	”	सखीन्

तृतीया से सप्तमी तक के एकवचन के रूप पति के समान होंगे तथा द्विवचन और बहुवचन के रूप मुनि के समान होंगे।

(आ) नपुंसकलिङ्ग

वारि (जल)

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र०	वारि	वारिणी	वारीणि*
सं०	वारे, वारि	"	"
द्वि०	वारि	"	"
तृ०	वारिणा	वारिभ्याम्	वारिभिः
च०	वारिणे	"	वारिभ्यः
पं०	वारिणः	"	"
ष०	"	वारिणोः	वारीणाम्
स०	वारिणि	"	वारिषु

इकारान्त नपुंसकलिङ्ग शब्दों के रूप वारि के समान होते हैं ।

अपवाद – अस्थि (= हड्डी), सक्थि (= जाँघ), दधि (= दही) एवं अक्षि (= आँख) के रूप तृतीया से सप्तमी तक निम्नलिखित रूप में भिन्न होते हैं–

अक्षि (आँख)

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
तृ०	अक्ष्णा		
च०	अक्ष्णे		
पं०	अक्ष्णः		
ष०	"	अक्ष्णोः	अक्ष्णाम्
स०	अक्ष्णि, अक्षणि	"	

शेष रूप वारि के समान ही होते हैं ।

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* र् के बाद आने के कारण यहाँ ण हुआ है । अन्यथा न ही होता । इसी प्रकार अक्षि शब्द में ष के बाद (क् + ष = क्ष) आने के कारण ण होगा। अन्य शब्दों के साथ न ही होगा।

(इ) इकारान्त स्त्रीलिङ्ग

मति (बुद्धि)

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	मतिः	मती	मतयः
सं0	मते	”	”
द्वि0	मतिम्	”	मतीः
तृ0	मत्या	मतिभ्याम्	मतिभिः
च0	मत्यै	”	मतिभ्यः
पं0	मत्याः	”	”
ष0	”	मत्योः	मतीनाम्
स0	मत्याम्	”	मतिषु

स्तुति, शक्ति, बुद्धि, नीति, बिभूति आदि इकारान्त स्त्रीलिङ्ग शब्दों के रूप मति के समान होते हैं।

(iv) ईकारान्त स्त्रीलिङ्ग

नदी

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	नदी	नद्यौ	नद्यः
सं0	नदि	”	”
द्वि0	नदीम्	”	नदीः
तृ0	नद्या	नदीभ्याम्	नदीभिः
च0	नद्यै	”	नदीभ्यः
पं0	नद्याः	”	”
ष0	”	नद्योः	नदीनाम्
स0	नद्याम्	”	नदीषु

इसी प्रकार जननी, नगरी, पुत्री, युवती, अटवी (जंगल), नारी, राज्ञी आदि ईकारान्त स्त्रीलिङ्ग शब्दों के रूप नदी के समान होते हैं।

अपवाद – लक्ष्मी, तरी (नौका), तन्त्री (वीणा), अवी (भेड़), श्री (लक्ष्मी), धी (बुद्धि), ह्री (लज्जा); भी (भय) आदि शब्दों के प्रथमा एकवचन में विसर्ग

होता है[1] जैसे – लक्ष्मीः, श्रीः, धीः आदि । श्री आदि के रूप कुछ भिन्न भी होते हैं।

श्री

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	श्रीः	श्रियौ	श्रियः
सं0	”	”	”
द्वि0	श्रियम्	”	”
तृ0	श्रिया	श्रीभ्याम्	श्रीभिः
च0	श्रियै, श्रिये	”	श्रीभ्यः
पं0	श्रियाः, श्रियः	”	”
ष0	” ”	श्रियोः	श्रीणाम्, श्रियाम्
स0	श्रियि, श्रियाम्	”	श्रीषु

इसी प्रकार ह्री, धी, भी इत्यादि के रूप होते हैं ।

स्त्री

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	स्त्री	स्त्रियौ	स्त्रियः
सं0	स्त्रि	”	”
द्वि0	स्त्रीम्, स्त्रियम्	”	स्त्रीः
तृ0	स्त्रिया	स्त्रीभ्याम्	स्त्रीभिः
च0	स्त्रियै	”	स्त्रीभ्यः
पं0	स्त्रियाः	”	”
ष0	”	स्त्रियोः	स्त्रीणाम्
स0	स्त्रियाम्	”	स्त्रीषु

1. अवी–तन्त्री–तरी–लक्ष्मी–धी–ह्री–श्रीणामुणादिषु ।
सप्तस्त्रीलिङ्गशब्दानां न सुलोपः कदाचन ।।
(मध्यसि0 कौमुदी पृ067 सं0पं0 विश्वनाथशास्त्री मोतीलाल बनारसीदास, 1975)

(४) उकारान्त (अ) पुंलिङ्ग

भानु (सूर्य)

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	भानुः	भानू	भानवः
सं0	भानो	"	"
द्वि0	भानुम्	"	भानून्
तृ0	भानुना	भानुभ्याम्	भानुभिः
च0	भानवे	"	भानुभ्यः
पं0	भानोः	"	"
ष0	"	भान्वोः	भानूनाम्
स0	भानौ	"	भानुषु

शिशु, साधु, गुरु, विष्णु, रिपु आदि उकारान्त पुंलिङ्ग शब्दों के रूप इसी प्रकार होते हैं।

(आ) नपुंसकलिङ्ग

मधु (शहद)

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	मधु	मधुनी	मधूनि
सं0	मधो, मधु	"	"
द्वि0	मधु	"	"
तृ0	मधुना	मधुभ्याम्	मधुभिः
च0	मधुने	"	मधुभ्यः
पं0	मधुनः	"	"
ष0	"	मधुनोः	मधूनाम्
स0	मधुनि	"	मधुषु

अश्रु (आँसू), अम्बु (जल), वस्तु, वसु (धन) आदि उकारान्त नपुंसकलिङ्ग शब्दों के रूप मधु के समान होते हैं।

(इ) स्त्रीलिङ्ग

धेनु (गाय)

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	धेनुः	धेनू	धेनवः
सं0	धेनो	”	”
द्वि0	धेनुम्	”	धेनूः
तृ0	धेन्वा	धेनुभ्याम्	धेनुभिः
च0	धेनवे	”	धेनुभ्यः
पं0	धेनोः	”	”
ष0	”	धेन्वोः	धेनूनाम्
स0	धेनौ	”	धेनुषु

तनु (शरीर), रज्जु (रस्सी), चञ्चु (चोंच) आदि उकारान्त स्त्रीलिङ्ग शब्दों के रूप धेनु के समान होते हैं ।

एकवचन में च0 से स0 तक इसके वैकल्पिक रूप भी होते हैं–

च0 – धेन्वै, पं0 एवं ष0 – धेन्वाः, स0 – धेन्वाम्।

तनु (शरीर), रज्जु (रस्सी),चञ्चु (चोंच) आदि उकारान्त स्त्रीलिङ्ग शब्दों के रूप इसी प्रकार होते हैं ।

(vi) ऊकारान्त – स्त्रीलिङ्ग

वधू

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	वधूः	वध्वौ	वध्वः
सं0	वधु	”	”
द्वि0	वधूम्	”	वधूः
तृ0	वध्वा	वधूभ्याम्	वधूभिः
च0	वध्वै	”	वधूभ्यः
पं0	वध्वाः	”	”
ष0	”	वध्वोः	वधूनाम्
स0	वध्वाम्	”	वधूषु

चमू (सेना), श्वश्रू (सास), चम्पू (गद्य–पद्यमय काव्य) आदि ऊकारान्त स्त्रीलिङ्ग शब्दों के रूप वधू के समान होते हैं ।

(vii) ऋकारान्त (अ) पुंलिङ्ग

पितृ (पिता)

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	पिता	पितरौ	पितरः
सं0	पितः	”	”
द्वि0	पितरम्	”	पितॄन्
तृ0	पित्रा	पितृभ्याम्	पितृभिः
च0	पित्रे	”	पितृभ्यः
पं0	पितुः	”	”
ष0	”	पित्रोः	पितॄणाम्
स0	पितरि	”	पितृषु

जामातृ, भ्रातृ, देवृ, (देवर), नृ आदि के रूप पितृ के समान होते हैं ।

दातृ (देने वाला)

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	दाता	दातारौ	दातारः
सं0	दातः	”	”
द्वि0	दातारम्	”	दातॄन्
तृ0	दात्रा	दातृभ्याम्	दातृभिः
च0	दात्रे	”	दातृभ्यः
पं0	दातुः	”	”
ष0	”	दात्रोः	दातॄणाम्
स0	दातरि	”	दातृषु

कर्तृ, धातृ (ब्रह्मा), वक्तृ (बोलने वाला), नेतृ (ले जाने वाला), श्रोतृ (सुनने वाला), सवितृ (सूर्य), भर्तृ (स्वामी), द्रष्टृ (देखने वाला) आदि ऋकारान्त पुंलिङ्ग शब्दों के रूप इसी प्रकार होते हैं ।

नृ के षष्ठी बहुवचन में दो रूप होते हैं –

नृणाम् (दीर्घ रहित) और नॄणाम् (दीर्घ सहित)
नृ के पूरे रूप इस प्रकार हैं–

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र०	ना	नरौ	नरः
सं०	नः	"	"
द्वि०	नरम्	"	नॄन्
तृ०	न्रा	नृभ्याम्	नृभिः
च०	न्रे	"	नृभ्यः
पं०	नुः	"	"
ष०	"	न्रोः	नृणाम्, नॄणाम्
स०	नरि	"	नृषु

(आ) **नपुंसकलिङ्ग**

धातृ, कर्तृ, नेतृ, रक्षितृ आदि शब्द विशेषण हैं। अतएव इनके प्रयोग तीनों लिङ्गों में हो सकते हैं। पुंलिङ्ग में इनके रूप दातृ के समान होते हैं। नपुंसकलिङ्ग के रूप इस प्रकार होते हैं–

धातृ (धारण करने वाला)

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र०	धातृ	धातृणी	धातॄणि
सं०	धातः, धातृ	"	"
द्वि०	धातृ	"	"
तृ०	धात्रा, धातृणा	धातृभ्याम्	धातृभिः
च०	धात्रे, धातृणे	"	धातृभ्यः
पं०	धातुः, धातृणः	"	"
ष०	" "	धात्रोः, धातृणोः	धातॄणाम्
स०	धातरि, धातृणि	" "	धातृषु

कर्तृ, नेतृ आदि नपुंसकलिङ्ग शब्दों के रूप इसी प्रकार होते हैं।

(इ) **स्त्रीलिङ्ग**

1. स्वसृ (बहन) के रूप पुं. दातृ के समान होते हैं। केवल द्वितीया बहुवचन में भिन्न रूप होता है– स्वसृः।

2. मातृ, दुहितृ (कन्या), यातृ (जेठानी या देवरानी) ननान्दृ (ननद) के रूप पितृवत् होते हैं। केवल द्वितीया बहुवचन में भिन्न रूप होता है, जैसे– मातृः, दुहितृः, यातृः ननान्दृः । इनके पूरे रूप इस प्रकार होते हैं–

मातृ

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	माता	मातरौ	मातरः
सं0	मातः	”	”
द्वि0	मातरम्	”	मातृः
तृ0	मात्रा	मातृभ्याम्	मातृभिः
च0	मात्रे	”	मातृभ्यः
पं0	मातुः	”	”
ष0	”	मात्रो	मातृणाम्
स0	मातरि	”	मातृषु

(viii) ओकारान्त - पुंलिङ्ग

गो (गाय या बैल)

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	गौः	गावौ	गावः
सं0	”	”	”
द्वि0	गाम्	”	गाः
तृ0	गवा	गोभ्याम्	गोभिः
च0	गवे	”	गोभ्यः
पं0	गोः	”	”
ष0	”	गवोः	गवाम्
स0	गवि	”	गोषु

सभी ओकारान्त शब्दों के रूप इसी प्रकार होते हैं, जैसे – स्त्रीलिङ्ग द्यो शब्द के रूप होते हैं – द्यौः, द्यावौ, द्यावः इत्यादि ।

(ix) औकारान्त - स्त्रीलिङ्ग

नौ (नाव)

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	नौः	नावौ	नावः
सं0	"	"	"
द्वि0	नावम्	"	"
तृ0	नावा	नौभ्याम्	नौभिः
च0	नावे	"	नौभ्यः
पं0	नावः	"	"
ष0	"	नावोः	नावाम्
स0	नावि	"	नौषु

सभी औकारान्त शब्दों के रूप इसी प्रकार होते हैं, जैसे - पुंलिङ्ग ग्लौ (चन्द्रमा) के रूप - ग्लौः, ग्लावौ, ग्लावः - इत्यादि ।

अभ्यास

1. **निम्नलिखित शब्दों के रूप निर्दिष्ट विभक्तियों एवं वचनों में लिखिए—**

विद्यालय (स0 एकवचन)।	भूपति (स0 एकवचन)।
छात्र (द्वि0 बहुवचन)।	सखि (प्र0 एकवचन)।
वृक्ष (स0 बहुवचन)।	गति (स0 एकवचन)।
पत्र (प्र0 बहुवचन)।	अक्षि (ष0 एकवचन)।
फल (प्र0 एकवचन)।	नगरी (प्र0 बहुवचन)।
गङ्गा (ष0 एकवचन)।	भी (प्र0 बहुवचन)।
पति (तृ0 एकवचन)।	मातृ (द्वि0 बहुवचन)।

2. निम्नलिखित पदों के शब्द, लिङ्ग, विभक्ति और वचन यथास्थान भरिए–

पद	शब्द	लिङ्ग	विभक्ति	वचन
जरसि	———	———	———	———
गवे	———	———	———	———
गाः	———	———	———	———
नावे	———	———	———	———
नावः	———	———	———	———
गवाम्	———	———	———	———

3. इन पद्यों को उसी विभक्ति के एकवचनान्त पदों में बदलिए–

क) गुरुभिः ख) जननीषु ग) वारीणाम्
घ) मातृः ङ) सखायः।

2. व्यञ्जनान्त

प्रायः सभी व्यञ्जनान्त शब्दों के रूपों में लिङ्ग भेद के कारण विशेष अन्तर नहीं पड़ता है। कुछ प्रमुख व्यञ्जनान्त संज्ञा (विशेषण सहित) शब्दों के रूप यहाँ प्रस्तुत हैं।

(i) **चकारान्त**

वाच् (वाणी) स्त्री0

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्र0	वाक्, वाग्	वाचौ	वाचः
सं0	”	”	”
द्वि0	वाचम्	”	”
तृ0	वाचा	वाग्भ्याम्	वाग्भिः
च0	वाचे	”	वाग्भ्यः
पं0	वाचः	”	”
ष0	”	वाचोः	वाचाम्
स0	वाचि	”	वाक्षु

त्वच् (स्त्री0, चमड़ा, पेड़ की छाल), शुच् (स्त्री0, सोच), ऋच् (स्त्री0, ऋग्वेद के मन्त्र - ऋचा), जलमुच् (पुं0, बादल) आदि चकारान्त शब्दों के रूप इसी प्रकार होते हैं ।

(ii) तकारान्त

श्रीमत् (भाग्यवान्) पुं0

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	श्रीमान्	श्रीमन्तौ	श्रीमन्तः
सं0	श्रीमन्	”	”
द्वि0	श्रीमन्तम्	”	श्रीमतः
तृ0	श्रीमता	श्रीमद्भ्याम्	श्रीमद्भिः
च0	श्रीमते	”	श्रीमद्भ्यः
पं0	श्रीमतः	”	”
ष0	”	श्रीमतोः	श्रीमताम्
स0	श्रीमति	”	श्रीमत्सु

धीमत् (बुद्धिमान्), बुद्धिमत्, विद्यावत् (विद्यावान्), भवत् (आप), भगवत् (भगवान्), एतावत्, कियत् आदि शब्दों के रूप श्रीमत् के समान ही होते हैं।

कुर्वत्, धावत्, पठत् आदि शतृ प्रत्ययान्त शब्दों के रूप भी इसके समान होते हैं । केवल प्रथमा एकवचन में न् के पूर्व ह्रस्व होगा, जैसे – कुर्वन्, धावन्, पठन् आदि ।

महत् (बड़ा) पुं0

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	महान्	महान्तौ	महान्तः
सं0	महन्	”	”
द्वि0	महान्तम्	”	महतः

शेष रूप श्रीमत् के समान होते हैं ।

भूभृत् (राजा या पहाड़) पुं0

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	भूभृत्	भूभृतौ	भूभृतः
सं0	”	”	”
द्वि0	भूभृतम्	”	”

शेष रूप श्रीमत् के समान होते हैं ।

महीभृत् (राजा या पहाड़), मरुत् (वायु), शशभृत् (चन्द्रमा), दिनकृत् (सूर्य) आदि पुंलिङ्ग शब्दों तथा सरित् (नदी), तडित्, विद्युत्, योषित् आदि तकारान्त स्त्रीलिङ्ग शब्दों के रूप भूभृत् के समान होते हैं,

जैसे –	प्र0	सरित्	सरितौ	सरितः
	द्वि0	सरितम्	सरितौ	सरितः इत्यादि ।

जगत् (संसार) नपुं0

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0 एवं द्वि0	जगत्, जगद्	जगती	जगन्ति

शेष रूप श्रीमत् के समान होते हैं ।

इसी प्रकार सभी नपुंसकलिङ्ग तकारान्त शब्दों के रूप होते हैं ।

नपुंसकलिङ्ग बहुवचन में महत् शब्द का प्रथमा एवं द्वितीया में रूप महान्ति होता है ।

(iii) नकारान्त

(क) अन् से अन्त होने वाले नकारान्त शब्द –

आत्मन् (आत्मा) पुं0

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	आत्मा	आत्मानौ	आत्मानः
सं0	आत्मन्	”	”
द्वि0	आत्मानम्	”	आत्मनः
तृ0	आत्मना	आत्मभ्याम्	आत्मभिः
च0	आत्मने	”	आत्मभ्यः
पं0	आत्मनः	”	”
ष0	”	आत्मनोः	आत्मनाम्
स0	आत्मनि	”	आत्मसु

ब्रह्मन् (ब्रह्मा), अश्मन् (पत्थर), अध्वन् (मार्ग) आदि शब्दों के रूप इसी प्रकार होते हैं ।

पुंलिङ्ग – राजन् (राजा)

निम्नलिखित रूपों के अतिरिक्त इसके शेष रूप आत्मन् की तरह होते हैं ।

द्वि० बहुव० – राज्ञः, तृ एकव०– राज्ञा, च० एकव० – राज्ञे, पं० एवं ष० एकव० – राज्ञः, सप्तमी एकव० – राज्ञि (विकल्प से), षष्ठी और सप्तमी द्विव० – राज्ञोः तथा ष० बहुव० – राज्ञाम् ।

युवन् (जवान) पुं०

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र०	युवा	युवानौ	युवानः
सं०	युवन्	"	"
द्वि०	युवानम्	"	यूनः
तृ०	यूना	युवभ्याम्	युवभिः
च०	यूने	"	युवभ्यः
पं०	यूनः	"	"
ष०	"	यूनोः	यूनाम्
स०	यूनि	"	युवसु

श्वन् (कुत्ता) पुं०

निम्नलिखित रूपों के अतिरिक्त इसके शेष रूप युवन् की तरह होते हैं । द्वि० बहुव० – शुनः, तृ० एकव० – शुना, च० एकव० – शुने, पं० एवं ष० एकवचन –शुनः, स० एकव० – शुनि, ष० एवं स० द्वि०व० – शुनोः, ष० बहुवचन– शुनाम् ।

नामन् (नाम) नपुं0

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	नाम	नाम्नी, नामनी	नामानि
सं0	नाम, नामन्	,, ,,	,,
द्वि0	,,	,, ,,	,,
तृ0	नाम्ना	नामभ्याम्	नामभिः
च0	नाम्ने	,,	नामभ्यः
पं0	नाम्नः	,,	,,
ष0	,,	नाम्नोः	नाम्नाम्
स0	नाम्नि, नामनि	,,	नामसु

व्योमन् (आकाश), धामन् (घर), सामन् (सामवेद का मन्त्र), प्रेमन् (प्यार), दामन् (रस्सी) आदि नकारान्त नपुंसकलिङ्ग शब्दों के रूप इसी प्रकार होते हैं।

उपर्युक्त नपुंसकलिङ्ग के नकारान्त शब्दों से अहन् शब्द के रूप भिन्न होते हैं–

अहन् (दिन) नपुं0

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	अहः	अह्नी, अहनी	अहानि
सं0	,,	,, ,,	,,
द्वि0	,,	,, ,,	,,
तृ0	अह्ना	अहोभ्याम्	अहोभिः
च0	अह्ने	,,	अहोभ्यः
पं0	अह्नः	,,	,,
ष0	,,	अह्नोः	अह्नाम्
स0	अह्नि, अहनि	,,	अहस्सु, अहःसु

ख) इन् से अन्त होने वाले (नकारान्त) शब्द –

दण्डिन् (दण्ड धारण करने वाला) पुं०

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र०	दण्डी	दण्डिनौ	दण्डिनः
सं०	दण्डिन्	"	"
द्वि०	दण्डिनम्	"	"
तृ०	दण्डिना	दण्डिभ्याम्	दण्डिभिः
च०	दण्डिने	"	दण्डिभ्यः
पं०	दण्डिनः	"	"
ष०	"	दण्डिनोः	दण्डिनाम्
स०	दण्डिनि	दण्डिनोः	दण्डिषु

गुणिन् (गुणी), करिन् (हाथी), धनिन् (धनी), तपस्विन् (तपस्वी), मन्त्रिन् (मन्त्री), पक्षिन् (पक्षी), शशिन् (चन्द्रमा), सुखिन् (सुखी), सत्यवादिन् (सत्य बोलने वाला) आदि इन् से अन्त होने वाले शब्दों के रूप इसी प्रकार होते हैं।

पथिन् (रास्ता) पुं०

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र०	पन्थाः	पन्थानौ	पन्थानः
सं०	"	"	"
द्वि०	पन्थानम्	"	पथः
तृ०	पथा	पथिभ्याम्	पथिभिः
च०	पथे	"	पथिभ्यः
पं०	पथः	पथिभ्याम्	पथिभ्यः
ष०	"	पथोः	पथाम्
स०	पथि	"	पथिषु

(iv) **पकारान्त**

अप् (जल) स्त्री0

इसके रूप केवल बहुवचन में होते हैं –

प्र0	आपः
सं0	"
द्वि0	अपः
तृ0	अद्भिः
च0	अद्भ्यः
पं0	"
ष0	अपाम्
स0	अप्सु

(v) **रकारान्त**

गिर् (वाणी) स्त्री0

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्र0	गीः	गिरौ	गिरः
सं0	"	"	"
द्वि0	गिरम्	"	"
तृ0	गिरा	गीर्भ्याम्	गीर्भि
च0	गिरे	"	गीर्भ्यः
पं0	गिरः	"	"
ष0	"	गिरोः	गिराम्
स0	गिरि	"	गीर्षु

इसी प्रकार पुर् (नगर), धुर् (धुरी) शब्दों के रूप होते हैं ।

(vi) शकारान्त

तादृश् (उसके समान) पुं०

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र०	तादृक्	तादृशौ	तादृशः
सं०	”	”	”
द्वि०	तादृशम्	”	”
तृ०	तादृशा	तादृग्भ्याम्	तादृग्भिः
च०	तादृशे	”	तादृग्भ्यः
पं०	तादृशः	”	”
ष०	”	तादृशोः	तादृशाम्
स०	तादृशि	”	तादृक्षु

इसी प्रकार भवादृश् (आपके समान), मादृश् (मेरे समान), त्वादृश् (तुम्हारे समान), एतादृश् (इसके समान) इत्यादि शब्दों के रूप होते हैं। तादृश् आदिशब्द (समानार्थ) अकारान्त भी हैं,जिसके रूप बालक के समान होते हैं।

दिश् (दिशा) स्त्री०

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र०	दिक्, दिग्	दिशौ	दिशः
सं०	” ”	”	”
द्वि०	दिशम्	”	”
तृ०	दिशा	दिग्भ्याम्	दिग्भिः
च०	दिशे	”	दिग्भ्यः
पं०	दिशः	”	”
ष०	”	दिशोः	दिशाम्
स०	दिशि	”	दिक्षु

(vii) सकारान्त

पुंस् (पुरुष) पुं0

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	पुमान्	पुमांसौ	पुमांसः
सं0	पुमन्	”	”
द्वि0	पुमांसम्	”	पुंसः
तृ0	पुंसा	पुम्भ्याम्	पुम्भिः
च0	पुंसे	”	पुम्भ्यः
पं0	पुंसः	”	”
ष0	”	पुंसोः	पुंसाम्
स0	पुंसि	”	पुंसु

विद्वस् (विद्वान्) पुं0

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	विद्वान्	विद्वांसौ	विद्वांसः
सं0	विद्वन्	”	”
द्वि0	विद्वांसम्	”	विदुषः
तृ0	विदुषा	विद्वद्भ्याम्	विद्वद्भिः
च0	विदुषे	”	विद्वद्भ्यः
पं0	विदुषः	”	”
ष0	”	विदुषोः	विदुषाम्
स0	विदुषि	”	विद्वत्सु

गरीयस् (अधिक बड़ा) पुं0

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	गरीयान्	गरीयांसौ	गरीयांसः
सं0	गरीयः	”	”
द्वि0	गरीयांसम्	”	गरीयसः
तृ0	गरीयसा	गरीयोभ्याम्	गरीयोभिः
च0	गरीयसे	”	गरीयोभ्यः
पं0	गरीयसः	”	”
ष0	”	गरीयसोः	गरीयसाम्
स0	गरीयसि	”	गरीयःसु, गरीयस्सु

इसी प्रकार लघीयस् (उससे छोटा), द्रढीयस् (अधिक मजबूत), श्रेयस् (अधिक कल्याणकारी) आदि शब्दों के रूप होते हैं ।

चन्द्रमस् (चन्द्रमा) पुं0

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	चन्द्रमाः	चन्द्रमसौ	चन्द्रमसः
सं0	चन्द्रमः	”	”
द्वि0	चन्द्रमसम्	”	”

शेष रूप गरीयस् के समान ।

दिवौकस् (देवता), सुमनस् (अच्छे मन वाला), महायशस् (बड़े यश वाला), वेधस् (ब्रह्मा), दुर्वासस् (बुरे कपड़ों वाला), वनौकस् (वनवासी), विशालवक्षस् (बड़ी छाती वाला), महातेजस् (बड़ा तेजस्वी), महौजस् (बड़ा ओजस्वी) आदि सकारान्त पुंलिङ्ग शब्दों के रूप इसी प्रकार होते हैं ।

पयस् (दूध या पानी) नपुं0

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	पयः	पयसी	पयांसि
सं0	”	”	”
द्वि0	”	”	”
तृ0	पयसा	पयोभ्याम्	पयोभिः
च0	पयसे	”	पयोभ्यः
पं0	पयसः	”	”
ष0	”	पयसोः	पयसाम्
स0	पयसि	”	पयःसु, पयस्सु

इसी प्रकार मनस् (मन), अम्भस् (जल), नभस् (आकाश), सरस् (तालाब), तमस् (अन्धकार), वयस् (उम्र), वक्षस् (छाती), उरस् (छाती), यशस् (यश), वचस् (वचन), शिरस् (शिर), तपस् (तप), रजस् (धूल), अयस् (लोहा), चेतस् (चित्त), छन्दस् (छन्द), वासस् (वस्त्र), एनस् (पाप), ओकस् (गृह) इत्यादि नपुंसकलिङ्ग सकारान्त शब्दों के रूप होते हैं ।

अभ्यास

1. **निर्दिष्ट विभक्तियों एवं वचनों में निम्नलिखित शब्दों के रूप लिखिए–**

वाच्	(च० एकव०)।	दण्डिन्	(ष० एकव०)।
वाच्	(स० एकव०)।	पथिन्	(द्वि० बहुव०)।
ऋच्	(प्र० एकव०)।	पथिन्	(स० एकव०)।
भवत्	(स० एकव०)।	महत्	(प्र० बहुव०)।
बुद्धिमत्	(प्र० एकव०)।	गिर्	(प्र० बहुव०)।
आत्मन्	(द्वि० बहुव०)।	दिश्	(द्वि० बहुव०)।
राजन्	(प्र० बहुव०)।	पुंस्	(प्र० बहुव०)।
युवन्	(द्वि० बहुव०)।	पुंस्	(द्वि० बहुव०)।
युवन्	(ष० बहुव०)।	विद्वस्	(द्वि० बहुव०)।
विद्वस्	(तृ० द्विव०)।	पयस्	(प्र० एकव०)।
अहन्	(प्र० बहुव०)।	पयस्	(स० बहु०)।

2. **निम्नलिखित पदों के शब्द, लिङ्ग, विभक्ति तथा वचन भरिए–**

पद	शब्द	लिङ्ग	विभक्ति	वचन
वाक्	——	——	——	——
श्रीमताम्	——	——	——	——
यूनः	——	——	——	——
दण्डी	——	——	——	——
पथा	——	——	——	——
महान्	——	——	——	——
राज्ञि	——	——	——	——
गिरे	——	——	——	——
दिक्षु	——	——	——	——
पुंसे	——	——	——	——

II. सर्वनाम शब्द (Pronouns)

वह शब्द जो किसी संज्ञा के स्थान पर प्रयुक्त होता है, **सर्वनाम** कहलाता है । संस्कृत में 'सर्व' आदि लगभग 35 शब्द सर्वनाम हैं।[1] कुछ प्रमुख सर्वनाम के रूप यहाँ दिए जा रहे हैं । सर्वनाम शब्दों के संबोधन नहीं होते। अस्मद् (मैं) तथा युष्मद् (तुम) के रूप तीनों लिङ्गों में एक समान होते हैं । शेष सर्वनाम शब्दों के तीनों लिङ्गों में भिन्न रूप होते हैं ।

1. स्वरान्त

सर्व (सब)

सर्व, पूर्व, अन्य आदि अकारान्त सर्वनाम शब्दों के रूप पुंलिङ्ग में बालक के समान होते हैं, किन्तु इनके निम्नलिखित रूप भिन्न होते हैं–
प्र0 बहुव0 – सर्वे । च0 एकव0 – सर्वस्मै । पं0 एकव0 – सर्वस्मात्। स0 – सर्वेषाम् स0 एकव0 – सर्वस्मिन् ।

इनके पूरे रूप इस प्रकार हैं ।

पुंलिङ्ग

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	सर्वः	सर्वौ	सर्वे
द्वि0	सर्वम्	"	सर्वान्
तृ0	सर्वेण	सर्वाभ्याम्	सर्वैः
च0	सर्वस्मै	"	सर्वेभ्यः
पं0	सर्वस्मात्	"	"
ष0	सर्वस्य	सर्वयोः	सर्वेषाम्
स0	सर्वस्मिन्	"	सर्वेषु

1. सर्वादीनि सर्वनामानि । ❑ पा0 1.1. 27

सर्वादि – 1. सर्व, 2. विश्व, 3. उभय, 4. उभ, 5. डतर जोड़कर बनाए हुए शब्द, जैसे– कतर, यतर आदि 6. डतम जोड़कर बनाये हुए शब्द जैसे – कतम, यतम आदि, 7. अन्य, 8. अन्यतर, 9. इतर, 10. त्वत्, 11. त्व, 12. नेम, 13. सम (सर्वार्थक), 14. सिम, 15. पूर्व, 16. पर, 17.अवर, 18. दक्षिण, 19. उत्तर, 20. अपर, 21. अधर, 22. स्व, 23. अन्तर, 24. त्यद्, 25. तद्, 26. यद्, 27. एतद्, 28. इदम्, 29. अदस्, 30. एक, 31. द्वि 32. युष्मद्, 33. अस्मद्, 34. भवत्, 35. किम् ।

स्त्रीलिङ्ग

इसके रूप आकारान्त 'बाला' के समान होते हैं । केवल चतुर्थी, पञ्चमी, षष्ठी एवं सप्तमी के एकवचन में तथा षष्ठी बहुवचन में रूप भिन्न होते हैं । पूरे रूप इस प्रकार हैं–

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्र०	सर्वा	सर्वे	सर्वाः
द्वि०	सर्वाम्	"	सर्वाः
तृ०	सर्वया	सर्वाभ्याम्	सर्वाभिः
च०	सर्वस्यै	"	सर्वाभ्यः
पं०	सर्वस्याः	"	"
ष०	"	सर्वयोः	सर्वासाम्
स०	सर्वस्याम्	"	सर्वासु

नपुंसकलिङ्ग

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्र०	सर्वम्	सर्वे	सर्वाणि
द्वि०	"	"	"

शेष रूप पुंलिङ्ग के समान होते हैं ।

अन्य (दूसरा)

इसके रूप पुंलिङ्ग तथा स्त्रीलिङ्ग में सर्व के समान ही होते हैं, किन्तु नपुंसकलिङ्ग में थोड़ा भिन्न होता है, जैसे–

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्र० और द्वि०	अन्यत्	अन्ये	अन्यानि
तृ०	अन्येन	अन्याभ्याम्	अन्यैः

शेष सर्व के समान होते हैं ।

पूर्व (पहला)

तीनों लिङ्गों में इसके रूप सर्व के समान होते हैं, किन्तु पुंलिङ्ग में प्रथमा बहुवचन, पञ्चमी एकवचन एवं सप्तमी एकवचन में इसके वैकल्पिक रूप भी होते हैं – क्रमशः पूर्वाः, पूर्वात्, पूर्वे । इसके पूरे रूप इस प्रकार हैं –

पुंलिङ्ग

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	पूर्वः	पूर्वौ	पूर्वे, पूर्वाः
द्वि0	पूर्वम्	”	पूर्वान्
तृ0	पूर्वेण	पूर्वाभ्याम्	पूर्वैः
च0	पूर्वस्मै	”	पूर्वेभ्यः
पं0	पूर्वस्मात्, पूर्वात्	”	”
ष0	पूर्वस्य	पूर्वयोः	पूर्वेषाम्
स0	पूर्वस्मिन, पूर्वे	”	पूर्वेषु

नपुंसकलिङ्ग

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0 एवं द्वि0	पूर्वम्	पूर्वे	पूर्वाणि

शेष पुंलिङ्ग के समान होते हैं।

स्त्रीलिङ्ग

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	पूर्वा	पूर्वे	पूर्वाः
द्वि0	पूर्वाम्	”	”
तृ0	पूर्वया	पूर्वाभ्याम्	पूर्वाभिः
च0	पूर्वस्यै	”	पूर्वाभ्यः
पं0	पूर्वस्याः	”	”
ष0	”	पूर्वयोः	पूर्वासाम्
स0	पूर्वस्याम्	पूर्वयोः	पूर्वासु

अवर, दक्षिण, उत्तर, पर (दूसरा), अपर (दूसरा), अधर (नीचे वाला) आदि शब्दों के रूप पूर्व के समान होते हैं।

उभ (दोनों)

विशेषण के समान तीनों लिङ्गों में तथा सभी विभक्तियों में केवल द्विवचन में इसका प्रयोग होता है। सभी विभक्तियों को मिलाकर इसके कुल चार रूप होते हैं–

पुं0 प्रथमा, द्वितीया – उभौ । नपुं0 तथा स्त्री0 प्र0, द्वि0 – उभे ।
सभी लिङ्गों में तृ0, च0 एवं पं0 – उभाभ्याम् । ष0, स0 – उभयोः ।

2. व्यञ्जनान्त

भवत् (आप) पुं0

इसके रूप पुंलिङ्ग में श्रीमत् के समान तथा नपुंसकलिङ्ग में जगत् के समान होते हैं । स्त्रीलिङ्ग में ई जोड़कर भवती शब्द होता है, जिसके रूप नदी के समान होते हैं ।

अस्मद् (मैं)

इसके रूप सभी लिङ्गों में समान होते हैं ।

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	अहम्	आवाम्	वयम्
द्वि0	माम्, मा	", नौ	अस्मान्, नः
तृ0	मया	आवाभ्याम्	अस्माभिः
च0	मह्यम्, मे	", नौ	अस्मभ्यम्, नः
पं0	मत्	"	अस्मत्
ष0	मम, मे	आवयोः, नौ	अस्माकम्, नः
स0	मयि	आवयोः	अस्मासु

युष्मद् (तुम)

इसके रूप भी तीनों लिङ्गों में समान होते हैं ।

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	त्वम्	युवाम्	यूयम्
द्वि0	त्वाम्, त्वा	", वाम्	युष्मान्, वः
तृ0	त्वया	युवाभ्याम्	युष्माभिः
च0	तुभ्यम्, ते	", वाम्	युष्मभ्यम्, वः
पं0	त्वत्	"	युष्मत्
ष0	तव, ते	युवयोः, वाम्	युष्माकम्, वः
स0	त्वयि	"	युष्मासु

तद् (वह)

पुंलिङ्ग

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	सः	तौ	ते
द्वि0	तम्	"	तान्
तृ0	तेन	ताभ्याम्	तैः
च0	तस्मै	"	तेभ्यः
पं0	तस्मात्	"	"
ष0	तस्य	तयोः	तेषाम्
स0	तस्मिन्	"	तेषु

नपुंसकलिङ्ग

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र० एवं द्वि०	तत्	ते	तानि

शेष रूप पुंलिङ्ग के समान होते हैं।

तद् (वह)

स्त्रीलिङ्ग

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	सा	ते	ताः
द्वि0	ताम्	"	"
तृ0	तया	ताभ्याम्	ताभिः
च0	तस्यै	"	ताभ्यः
पं0	तस्याः	"	"
ष0	"	तयोः	तासाम्
स0	तस्याम्	"	तासु

यद् (जो)

पुंलिङ्ग

इसके रूप भी **तद्** के समान होते हैं ।

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	यः	यौ	ये
द्वि0	यम्	”	यान्
तृ0	येन	याभ्याम्	यैः
च0	यस्मै	”	येभ्यः
पं0	यस्मात्	”	”
ष0	यस्य	ययोः	येषाम्
स0	यस्मिन्	”	येषु

नपुंसकलिङ्ग

प्र0 एवं द्वि0 यत् ये यानि

शेष रूप पुंलिङ्ग के समान होते हैं ।

स्त्रीलिङ्ग

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	या	ये	याः
द्वि0	याम्	”	”
तृ0	यया	याभ्याम्	याभिः
च0	यस्यै	”	याभ्यः
पं0	यस्याः	”	”
ष0	”	ययोः	यासाम्
स0	यस्याम्	”	यासु

किम् (कौन)

तद्, यद् के समान ही **किम्** के भी रूप होते हैं । लेकिन पुं0 तथा स्त्री0 में किम् के स्थान पर 'क' होता है ।

पुंलिङ्ग

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	कः	कौ	के
द्वि0	कम्	"	कान्
तृ0	केन	काभ्याम्	कैः
च0	कस्मै	"	केभ्यः
पं0	कस्मात्	"	"
ष0	कस्य	कयोः	केषाम्
स0	कस्मिन्	"	केषु

नपुंसकलिङ्ग

प्र0 एवं द्वि0 में **किम् के कानि** होता है और शेष रूप पुंलिङ्ग के समान होते हैं।

स्त्रीलिङ्ग

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	का	के	काः
द्वि0	काम्	"	"
तृ0	कया	काभ्याम्	काभिः
च0	कस्यै	"	काभ्यः
पं0	कस्याः	"	"
ष0	"	कयोः	कासाम्
स0	कस्याम्	कयोः	कासु

इदम् (यह)

पुंलिङ्ग

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	अयम्	इमौ	इमे
द्वि0	इमम्, एनम्	इमौ, एनौ	इमान्, एनान्
तृ0	अनेन, एनेन	आभ्याम्	एभिः
च0	अस्मै	"	एभ्यः
पं0	अस्मात्	"	"

ष0	अस्य	अनयोः, एनयोः	एषाम्
स0	अस्मिन्	” ”	एषु

नपुंसकलिङ्ग

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्र0	इदम्	इमे	इमानि
द्वि0	इदम्, एनत्	इमे, एने	इमानि, एनानि

शेष रूप पुंलिङ्ग के समान होते हैं।

स्त्रीलिङ्ग

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्र0	इयम्	इमे	इमाः
द्वि0	इमाम्, एनाम्	इमे, एने	इमाः, एनाः
तृ0	अनया, एनया	आभ्याम्	आभिः
च0	अस्यै	”	आभ्यः
पं0	अस्याः	”	”
ष0	”	अनयोः, एनयोः	आसाम्
स0	अस्याम्	”, ”	आसु

एतद् (यह)

पुंलिङ्ग

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्र0	एषः	एतौ	एते
द्वि0	एतम्, एनम्	एतौ,एनौ	एतान्, एनान्
तृ0	एतेन, एनेन	एताभ्याम्	एतैः
च0	एतस्मै	”	एतेभ्यः
पं0	एतस्मात्	”	”
ष0	एतस्य	एतयोः, एनयोः	एतेषाम्
स0	एतस्मिन्	”, ”	एतेषु

नपुंसकलिङ्ग

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	एतत्	एते	एतानि
द्वि0	एतत्, एनत्	एते, एने	एतानि, एनानि

शेष रूप पुंलिङ्ग के समान होते हैं।

स्त्रीलिङ्ग

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	एषा	एते	एताः
द्वि0	एताम्, एनाम्	एते, एने	एताः, एनाः
तृ0	एतया, एनया	एताभ्याम्	एताभिः
च0	एतस्यै	"	एताभ्यः
पं0	एतस्याः	"	"
ष0	"	एतयोः, एनयोः	एतासाम्
स0	एतस्याम्	", "	एतासु

अदस् (वह)

पुंलिङ्ग

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र0	असौ	अमू	अमी
द्वि0	अमुम्	"	अमून्
तृ0	अमुना	अमूभ्याम्	अमीभिः
च0	अमुष्मै	"	अमीभ्यः
पं0	अमुष्मात्	"	"
ष0	अमुष्य	अमुयोः	अमीषाम्
स0	अमुष्मिन्	"	अमीषु

नपुंसकलिङ्ग

प्र0 एवं द्वि0 अदः अमू अमूनि

शेष रूप पुंलिङ्ग के समान होते हैं।

स्त्रीलिङ्ग

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्र०	असौ	अमू	अमूः
द्वि०	अमूम्	”	”
तृ०	अमुया	अमूभ्याम्	अमूभिः
च०	अमुष्यै	”	अमूभ्यः
पं०	अमुष्याः	”	”
ष०	”	अमुयोः	अमूषाम्
स०	अमुष्याम्	”	अमूषु

अभ्यास

1. निम्निलिखित सर्वनामों के रूप निर्दिष्ट लिङ्ग, विभक्ति एवं वचन में लिखिए–

सर्वनाम (लिङ्ग, विभक्ति, वचन)	रूप
सर्व (पुं० च० एकवचन)	——
अन्य (पुं० ष० बहुवचन)	——
पूर्व (स्त्री० ष० एकवचन)	——
अस्मद् (द्वि० बहुव०)	——
तद् (पुं० प्र० बहुव०)	——
एतद् (पुं० प्र० द्विव०)	——
अदस् (पुं० प्र० द्विव०)	——
इदम् (पुं० च० एकवचन)	——

2. निम्नलिखित पदों के लिङ्ग, विभक्ति और वचन यथास्थान लिखिए–

पद	शब्द	लिङ्ग	विभक्ति	वचन
सर्वेण	——	——	——	——
सर्वस्यै	——	——	——	——
सर्वस्याम्	——	——	——	——

पूर्वस्मात्	——	——	——	——
मह्यम्	——	——	——	——
तस्यै	——	——	——	——
कस्याम्	——	——	——	——
युष्माकम्	——	——	——	——
अमी	——	——	——	——
अमुष्य	——	——	——	——

3. निम्नलिखित वाक्यों में प्रयुक्त अशुद्ध सर्वनाम रूपों को शुद्ध कीजिए–

क. सुखं सर्वाणां प्रियं भवति ।

ख. इदं जलं गङ्गाजलात् अन्यम् अस्ति ।

ग. भीरुः बालकः सर्वाद् बिभेति ।

घ. भवानस्य किं नाम ?

ङ. पाणिनेः इतरा वैयाकरणा अपि प्रशस्याः ।

4. 'क' भाग में प्रयुक्त सर्वनाम पद को 'ख' भाग के नामपदों के साथ जोड़िए–

	(क)	(ख)
1.	तस्यां	नदीषु
2.	तस्मिन्	नगरात्
3.	अनया	कवितायाम्
4.	अमुष्य	ग्रामे
5.	एतस्याः	नगर्याः
6.	कस्मात्	कवितया
7.	केषाम्	नराणाम्
8.	कासाम्	नरस्य
9.	केषु	नारीणाम्
10.	कासु	ग्रन्थेषु

III. संख्यावाचक शब्द (Numerals)

1. **संख्या** – एक, द्वि (दो), त्रि (तीन) तथा चतुर् (चार्) शब्दों के रूप तीनों लिङ्गों में भिन्न होते हैं । शेष संख्यावाची शब्दों के रूप सभी लिङ्गों में समान होते हैं ।

(अ) एक

एक शब्द संख्यावाची होने पर एकवचन होता है।[1] अतः इसके रूप एकवचन में ही होते हैं । तीनों लिङ्गों में इसके रूप सर्व शब्द के समान होते हैं । पूरे रूप इस प्रकार हैं–

	पुंलिङ्ग	**नपुंसकलिङ्ग**	**स्त्रीलिङ्ग**
प्र0	एकः	एकम्	एका
द्वि0	एकम्	”	एकाम्
तृ0	एकेन	(शेष रूप पुंलिङ्ग	एकया
च0	एकस्मै	के समान)	एकस्यै
पं0	एकस्मात्		एकस्याः
ष0	एकस्य		”
स0	एकस्मिन्		एकस्याम्

द्वि (दो)

यह शब्द नित्य द्विवचनान्त है । इसके रूप निम्नलिखिल हैं–
प्र0, द्वि0, – द्वौ (पुं) । द्वे (नपुं0, स्त्री0) । तृ0, च0, पं0 – द्वाभ्याम् । ष0, स0 – द्वयोः । तृतीया से सप्तमी तक के रूप तीनों लिङ्गों में समान हैं।

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[1] एक शब्द – 'कुछ', 'कोई–कोई' – इस अर्थ में बहुवचन भी होता है । जैसे – एके जनाः। एकानि फलानि । एक शब्द के अर्थ नाना प्रकार के हो सकते हैं, जैसे–

एकोऽल्पार्थे प्रधाने च प्रथमे केवले तथा ।
साधारणे समानेऽपि संख्यायां च प्रयुज्यते ।।

त्रि (तीन)

यह नित्य बहुवचनान्त है । इसके रूप इस प्रकार हैं–

	पुं0	**स्त्री0**
प्र0	त्रयः	तिस्रः
द्वि0	त्रीन्	,,
तृ0	त्रिभिः	तिसृभिः
च0	त्रिभ्यः	तिसृभ्यः
पं0	,,	,,
ष0	त्रयाणाम्	तिसृणाम्
स0	त्रिषु	तिसृषु

नपुंसकलिङ्ग में प्र0 एवं द्वि0 में रूप होता है – त्रीणि । शेष रूप पुंलिङ्ग के समान होते हैं ।

चतुर् (चार)

यह नित्य बहुवचनान्त है । नपुंसकलिङ्ग में प्रथमा एवं द्वितीया का रूप है – चत्वारि । शेष रूप पुंलिङ्ग के समान होते हैं ।

	प्र0	**द्वि0**	**तृ0**	**च0**	**पं0**	**ष0**	**स0**
पुं0	चत्वारः	चतुरः	चतुर्भिः	चतुर्भ्यः	चतुर्भ्यः	चतुर्णाम्	चतुर्षु
स्त्री0	चतस्रः	चतस्रः	चतसृभिः	चतसृभ्यः	चतसृभ्यः	चतसृणाम्	चतसृषु

(आ) पञ्चन् (पाँच)

पञ्चन, सप्तन्, अष्टन्[1], नवन्, दशन्, एकादशन् आदि नकारान्त शब्दों के रूप एक से होते हैं तथा सभी लिङ्गों में समान होते हैं ।

प्र0	**द्वि0**	**तृ0**	**च0**	**पं0**	**ष0**	**स0**
पञ्च	पञ्च	पञ्चभिः	पञ्चभ्यः	पञ्चभ्यः	पञ्चानाम्	पञ्चसु

1. अष्टन् के कुछ वैकल्पिक रूप भी होते हैं, जो हैं - अष्टौ (प्र0), अष्टाभिः (तृ0), अष्टाभ्यः (च0,पं0), अष्टासु (स0) ।

(इ) षष् (छः)

प्र0	द्वि0	तृ0	च0	पं0	ष0	स0
षट्	षट्	षड्भिः	षड्भ्यः	षड्भ्यः	षण्णाम्	षट्सु

सप्तन् से अष्टादशन् तक की संख्या के रूप पञ्चन् के समान होते हैं ।

(ई) अन्य संख्यावाची शब्द

ऊनविंशतिः (19) से ऊपर के सभी संख्यावाची शब्द एकवचन हैं । नवनवतिः (99) तक के सभी शब्द स्त्रीलिङ्ग में हैं । विंशति से अन्त होने वाले शब्द जैसे – एकविंशति आदि तथा षष्टि (60), सप्तति (70), अशीति (80), नवति (90) इत्यादि इकारान्त शब्दों के रूप **मति** शब्द के समान होते हैं ।

त्रिंशत् (30) चत्वारिंशत् (40), पञ्चाशत् आदि शत् में अन्त होने वाले संख्यावाची शब्दों के रूप **भूभृत्** के समान होते हैं । शत, सहस्र के रूप **फल** के समान होते हैं ।

2. पूरणी संख्या

पहला, दूसरा, तीसरा आदि अर्थों में संस्कृत में एक, द्वि, त्रि आदि से पूरणी संख्या बनाते हैं – प्रथम, द्वितीय, तृतीय आदि । सभी पूरणी संख्या के तीनों लिङ्गों में रूप होते हैं। पुंलिङ्ग में वह अकारान्त होता है तथा **बालक** के समान उसके रूप होते हैं । नपुंसकलिङ्ग में भी वह अकारान्त होता है तथा उसके रूप **फल** के समान होते हैं । स्त्रीलिङ्ग में पूरणी संख्या एक से चार तक आकारान्त है और उसके रूप **बाला** के समान होते हैं, किन्तु चार से ऊपर की पूरणी संख्या ईकारान्त होती हैं और उसके रूप **नदी** के समान होते हैं । कुछ पूरणी संख्या के विभिन्न लिङ्गों के प्रथमा विभक्ति के रूप इस प्रकार हैं–

संख्या			पूरणी संख्या
	पुं0	नपुं0	स्त्री0
एक	प्रथमः	प्रथमम्	प्रथमा
द्वि	द्वितीयः	द्वितीयम्	द्वितीया
त्रि	तृतीयः	तृतीयम्	तृतीया
चतुर्	तुरीयः	तुरीयम्	तुरीया
	तुर्यः	तुर्यम्	तुर्या
	चतुर्थः	चतुर्थम्	चतुर्थी
पञ्चन्	पञ्चमः	पञ्चमम्	पञ्चमी
षष्	षष्ठः	षष्ठम्	षष्ठी
सप्तन्	सप्तमः	सप्तमम्	सप्तमी

इसी प्रकार अष्टन् (8) से नवदशन् (19) तक के रूप होते हैं ।

एकोनविंशति	एकोनविंशः	एकोनविंशम्	एकोनविंशी
	एकोनविंशतितमः	एकोनविंशतितमम्	एकोनविंशतितमी

इसी प्रकार आगे की सभी संख्याओं के रूप होते हैं ।

संख्यावाची शब्दों की सूची परिशिष्ट–I में दी गई है ।

अभ्यास

1. निम्नलिखित शब्दों के रूप निर्दिष्ट विभक्ति में लिखिए–

पञ्चन् (प्र0) ———

षष् (पं0) ———

सप्तन् (द्वि0) ———

अष्टन् (च0) ———

नवन् (ष0) ———

दशन् (स0) ———

2. कोष्ठक में दिए शब्दों से उचित पद बनाकर रिक्त स्थानों की पूर्ति कीजिए–

उदाहरण – (चतुर्) चत्वारः बालकाः ।

(एक) —— छात्रा ।
(द्वि) —— हस्तौ ।
(त्रि) —— मनुष्याः ।
(त्रि) —— फलानि ।
(चतुर्) —— पुस्तकानि ।
(चतुर्) —— नगरीणाम् ।

3. पूरणी संख्या बनाइए–

		पुं0	स्त्री0	नपुं0
उदाहरण–	एक	प्रथमः	प्रथमा	प्रथमम्
	द्वि	——	——	——
	त्रि	——	——	——
	चतुर्	——	——	——
	पञ्चन्	——	——	——
	षष्	——	——	——
	एकादशन्	——	——	——
	विंशतिः	——	——	——

4. निम्नलिखित अङ्कों के लिए संख्यावाचक शब्द संस्कृत में लिखिए–

3, 16, 19, 30, 48, 49, 70, 99, 100

चतुर्थ अध्याय

धातुरूप

(Conjugation of Verbs)

परिचय

भवति, पचति, शृणोति, गृह्णाति–इत्यादि क्रिया-पदों की प्रकृति या मूल है–भू, पच्, श्रु, ग्रह् आदि। इसी प्रकृति या मूल को **धातु** (root) कहते हैं। भ्वादि, अदादि इत्यादि दस गणों में पठित क्रिया-वाचक शब्द **धातु** कहलाते हैं।[1] इसके अतिरिक्त कुछ नाम-पद भी क्यच्, क्यङ्, क्विप्, णिच् आदि प्रत्यय लगने के कारण धातु बनते हैं और वे क्रिया-पदों की तरह प्रयुक्त होते हैं–जैसे पुत्रीयति, ओजायते आदि।

सन्, यङ् आदि प्रत्यय जुड़ने पर जो सन्नन्त और यङन्त आदि रूप बनते हैं उन्हें भी धातु मानते हैं–जैसे पिपठिषति का पिपठिष और पापच्यते का पापच्य धातु माना जाता है।[2] धातु से बने हुए तिङन्त रूपों पर विविध वाच्यों का प्रभाव पड़ता है।

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1. भूवादयो धातवः। ❑ पा. 1.3.1

2. सनाद्यन्ता धातवः। ❑ पा. 3.1.32

वाच्य (Voice)

(अ) कर्तृवाच्य या कर्तरि प्रयोग (Active Voice)

कुछ वाक्य कर्तृप्रधान होते हैं और कुछ कर्म–प्रधान होते हैं तथा कुछ में क्रिया या भाव की प्रधानता होती है। जिस वाक्य में क्रिया के रूपों के वचन और पुरुष कर्ता के वचन और पुरुष के अनुसार चलते हैं उन्हें कर्तृ–प्रधान वाक्य माना जाता है। ऐसे वाक्यों के प्रयोग को कर्तरि प्रयोग या कर्तृवाच्य कहते हैं। जैसे–

रामः ग्रामं गच्छति।
सीतारामौ ग्रामं गच्छतः।
बालकाः ग्रामं गच्छन्ति।
त्वं ग्रामं गच्छसि।
युवां ग्रामं गच्छथः।
यूयं ग्रामं गच्छथ।
अहं ग्रामं गच्छामि।
आवां ग्रामं गच्छावः।
वयं ग्रामं गच्छामः।

इन वाक्यों के क्रियारूप कर्ता के वचन और पुरुषों से प्रभावित हैं। उनके वचन कर्ता के पुरुष और वचन के अनुसार बदलते हैं । अतः उन्हें कर्तरि प्रयोग या **कर्तृवाच्य** कहते हैं । कर्तरि प्रयोग में कर्ता से प्रथमा और कर्म से द्वितीया होती है।

(आ) कर्मवाच्य या कर्मणि प्रयोग (Passive Voice)

कर्मवाच्य या कर्मणि प्रयोग में क्रिया-पद कर्म से प्रभावित होते हैं । अर्थात् क्रिया-पदों के वचन और पुरुष कर्म के वचन और पुरुष के अनुरूप होते हैं। जैसे–

रामेण फलं भक्ष्यते।
बालकैः फलं भक्ष्यते।
मया, त्वया, तैः, ताभिश्च फलं भक्ष्यते।
बालकेन फलानि भक्ष्यन्ते।
मया द्वे कविते श्रूयेते।

त्वया अहं दृश्ये।
तेन वयं दृश्यामहे।
मया यूयं दृश्यध्वे।

इत्यादि वाक्यों में क्रिया-पद के रूप कर्म के वचन और पुरुष से प्रभावित हैं। कर्मवाच्य में कर्ता से तृतीया और कर्म से प्रथमा होती है। कर्मवाच्य में सकर्मक धातुओं का ही प्रयोग होता है।

(इ) भाववाच्य या भावे प्रयोग

भाववाच्य में क्रिया या भाव की प्रधानता होती है। उस पर कर्ता का प्रभाव नहीं होता है। कर्म तो वहाँ होता ही नहीं। अतः उसके प्रभाव पड़ने पर या न पड़ने की बात ही नहीं उठती। भाववाच्य में क्रिया-पद सदा एकवचन और प्रथम पुरुष में प्रयुक्त होता है, जैसे–

त्वया नृपेण भूयते।
मया नृपेण भूयते।
बालकैरत्र स्थीयते।
स्वकोटरे पक्षिभिः शय्यते।

भावे प्रयोग या भाववाच्य में उन्हीं धातुओं का प्रयोग हो सकता है जो धातुएँ अकर्मक होती हैं।

परस्मैपदी, आत्मनेपदी एवं उभयपदी धातुएँ

संस्कृत भाषा में क्रिया रूपों की विविधता की दृष्टि से धातुएं मुख्यतः दो प्रकार की होती हैं, क्योंकि उनसे जुड़ने वाले प्रत्यय दो भिन्न प्रकार के होते हैं।

ति, तस्, अन्ति आदि प्रत्ययों को **परस्मैपद-प्रत्यय** कहा जाता है। अतः जिन धातुओं से ये प्रत्यय आते हैं उन्हें **परस्मैपदी धातु** कहते हैं। **ते, इते, अन्ते** आदि प्रत्ययों को **आत्मनेपद-प्रत्यय** कहा जाता है। अतः जिनसे ये प्रत्यय आते हैं उन्हें **आत्मनेपदी धातु** कहा जाता है। संस्कृत में कुछ धातुएँ ऐसी भी हैं जिनसे ये दोनों प्रकार के प्रत्यय आते हैं, अतः उन्हें **उभयपदी धातु** कहा जाता है।

धातुओं का यह वर्गीकरण कर्तृवाच्य के प्रत्ययों को ध्यान में रखकर किया गया है किन्तु कर्मवाच्य या भाववाच्य में इस नियम का अपवाद

देखने को मिलता है। अतः परस्मैपदी धातु से भी आत्मनेपद-प्रत्यय कर्मवाच्य एवं भाववाच्य में होते हैं। इन वाच्यों में परस्मैपद का प्रयोग कभी भी नहीं होता।

इसके अतिरिक्त यह बात ध्यान देने योग्य है कि परस्मैपदी धातुएँ भी उपसर्ग विशेष के साथ प्रयुक्त होने पर आत्मनेपदी बन जाती हैं। इसी प्रकार उपसर्ग-विशेष के साथ आत्मनेपदी धातु का प्रयोग परस्मैपद में हो जाता है जैसे 'स्था' धातु का सामान्य रूप परस्मैपद में 'तिष्ठति' है किन्तु 'प्र' उपसर्ग के साथ आने पर 'प्रतिष्ठते' आदि आत्मनेपद में प्रयोग होता है। रम् धातु मूलतः आत्मनेपदी है, अतः 'रमते' रूप होता है। किन्तु 'वि' उपसर्ग आ जाने पर उसका 'विरमति' आदि परस्मैपद में रूप होता है।

दस गण एवं उनके विकरण

कर्तृवाच्य के रूपों में विकरणों का भेद भी पाया जाता है। वे विकरण दस हैं। इन्हीं विकरणों को ध्यान में रखते हुए धातुओं को दस गणों में बाँटा गया है। प्रकृति (धातु) और प्रत्यय (तिङ्) के बीच में आने वाले उप-प्रत्यय को विकरण कहा जाता है। कर्तृवाच्य के विकरणों की तालिका नीचे दी जाती है–

गण	विकरण	धातु	परस्मैपदी-रूप	आत्मनेपदी-रूप
1. भ्वादि	शप्	भू	भवति	——
	(अ)	वृत्		वर्तते
		अद्	अत्ति	——
2. अदादि	शप्—लुक्	हन्	हन्ति	——
	(0)	शीङ् (शी)	——	शेते
3. जुहोत्यादि	श्लु	हु	जुहोति	——
	(धातु द्वित्व)	भृ	बिभर्ति	बिभृते
		दा (डुदाञ्)	ददाति	दत्ते

4. दिवादि	श्यन्	दिव्	दीव्यति	—
	(य)	बुध्	—	बुध्यते
5. स्वादि	श्नु	सु	सुनोति	सुनुते
	(नु)	चि	चिनोति	चिनुते
6. तुदादि	श	तुद्	तुदति	तुदते
	(अ)	सिच्	सिञ्चति	सिञ्चते
7. रुधादि	श्नम्	रुध्	रुणद्धि	रुन्धे
	(न)	भुज्	—	भुङ्क्ते
8. तनादि	उ	तन्	तनोति,	तनुते
		कृ	करोति	कुरुते
9. क्रयादि	श्ना	क्री	क्रीणाति	क्रीणीते
	(ना)	ज्ञा	जानाति	जानीते
10. चुरादि	णिच् (अय्)	चुर्	चोरयति	चोरयते

कर्मवाच्य और भाववाच्य में लट्, लोट् आदि लकारों में यक् (य) ही विकरण होता है। इसलिए गणभेद के कारण विकरण भेद वहाँ नहीं होता है। और न गण-भेद के कारण क्रिया-पद के रूपों में ही भेद होता है।

भू, वृत् (भ्वादि), अद्, हन्, शी (अदादि) हु, भृ दा, (जुहोत्यादि), दिव्, बुध् (दिवादि),सु, चि (स्वादि), तुद्, सिच् (तुदादि), रुध्, भुज (रुधादि), तन्, कृ (तनादि), क्री, ज्ञा (क्रयादि), चुर्, गण (चुरादि) धातुओ में यक् विकरण और आत्मनेपद समान रूप से हो जाते हैं और उनके भूयते, वृत्यते, अद्यते, हन्यते, शय्यते, हूयते, भ्रियते, दीयते, दीव्यते, बुध्यते, सूयते, चीयते, तुद्यते, सिच्यते, रुच्यते, रुध्यते, भुज्यते, 'तन्यते, क्रियते, क्रीयते, ज्ञायते, चोर्यते, गण्यते आदि रूपों में प्रायः समानता पाई जाती है। इसलिए संस्कृत

भाषा में कर्तरि प्रयोग की अपेक्षा कर्मणि प्रयोग और भावे प्रयोगों को सरलतर माना जाता है। यदि सकर्मक और अकर्मक धातुओं को पहचान लिया जाए और सकर्मक का कर्मवाच्य में और अकर्मक का भाववाच्य में प्रयोग कर दिया जाए तो विकरण, परस्मैपद आदि के कारण आने वाली जटिलता दूर हो सकती है, परन्तु सब जगह ऐसा करना सम्भव नहीं है। लोग हमेशा कर्म पर ही जोर डाल कर नहीं बोलते हैं और न क्रिया को ही वाच्य बनाते हैं। इसलिए कर्तृवाच्य को छोड़ देने पर विवक्षित अभिव्यक्ति नहीं हो पाएगी और भाषा भावानुरूप न रहकर भाव से दूर हट जाएगी। इसलिए कर्तृवाच्य को हटाया नहीं जा सकता, भले ही उसे अपनाने से हमें कितनी ही कठिनाई क्यों न हो। कर्तृवाच्य का क्षेत्र विस्तृत है। धातु चाहे सकर्मक हों या अकर्मक उनका हम कर्तृवाच्य में प्रयोग कर सकते हैं। कर्मवाच्य में केवल सकर्मक धातु गृहीत होते हैं और भाववाच्य का क्षेत्र अकर्मक धातुओं तक ही सीमित है।

लकार

क्रिया-पदों से विभिन्न कालों और आज्ञा, विधि आदि अर्थों की सूचना मिलती है। इनके सूचक उपायों को **लकार** कहा गया है। ये लकार संख्या में दस हैं। इन लकारों के स्थान में जो तिङ्–प्रत्यय होते हैं, उनमें लकार विशेष के कारण विशेषता आ जाती है। मुख्य रूप से इन प्रत्ययों को दो वर्गों में बाँटा जा सकता है। भ्वादि, दिवादि तुदादि एवं चुरादि गण की धातुओं से आने वाले तिङ्-प्रत्यय प्रथम वर्ग में आते हैं और शेष गणों की धातुओं से आने वाले तिङ्-प्रत्यय द्वितीय वर्ग में आते हैं। प्रथम वर्ग के प्रत्ययों को नीचे की तालिका में स्पष्ट किया जाता है–

I. प्रथम वर्ग के तिङ् प्रत्यय

लकार	काल, अर्थ	पुरुष	परस्मैपदी प्रत्यय			आत्मनेपदी प्रत्यय		
			एकव.	द्विव.	बहुव.	एकव.	द्विव.	बहुव.
1. लट्	वर्तमान	प्रथम पुरुष	ति	तः	अन्ति	ते	इते	अन्ते
		मध्यम पुरुष	सि	थः	थ	से	इथे	ध्वे
		उत्तम पुरुष	मि	वः	मः	ए	वहे	महे
2. लङ्	अनद्यतन भूत	प्रथम पुरुष	त्	ताम्	अन्	त	इताम्	अन्त
		मध्यम पुरुष	:	तम्	त	थाः	इथाम्	ध्वम्
		उत्तम पुरुष	अम्	व	म	इ	वहि	महि
3 लोट्	आज्ञार्थ प्रवर्तना	प्रथम पुरुष	तु	ताम्	अन्तु	ताम्	इताम्	अन्ताम्
		मध्यम पुरुष	--	तम्	त	स्व	इथाम्	ध्वम्
		उत्तम पुरुष	आनि	आव	आम	ऐ	आवहै	आमहै
4. विधि–लिङ्	विध्यर्थ प्रवर्तना संभावना	प्रथम पुरुष	इत्	इताम्	इयुः	ईत	ईयाताम्	ईरन्
		मध्यम पुरुष	इः	इतम्	इत	ईथाः	ईयाथाम्	ईध्वम्
		उत्तम पुरुष	इयम्	इव	इम	ई	ईवहि	ईमहि
* 5.लृट्	भविष्यत्	प्रथम पुरुष	स्यति	स्यतः	स्यन्ति	स्यते	स्येते	स्यन्ते
		मध्यम पुरुष	स्यसि	स्यथः	स्यथ	स्यसे	स्येथे	स्यध्वे
		उत्तम पुरुष	स्यामि	स्यावः	स्यामः	स्ये	स्यावहे	स्यामहे

विद्यालयों में पढ़ाये जाने वाले इन प्रमुख लकारों के अतिरिक्त पाँच लकार और हैं। संस्कृत भाषा में उनके प्रयोगों का प्राचुर्य है, परन्तु विद्यालयीय पाठ्यक्रमों में उनका निर्धारण नहीं है। अतः उनके यहाँ नाममात्र गिनाए जा रहे हैं–

* लृट् लकार के तिङ्-प्रत्यय लट् की तरह होते हैं। यहाँ स्पष्टता के लिए 'स्य' (लृट् का विकरण) के साथ जोड़कर उन्हें दिखाया गया है। लृट् के प्रत्यय सभी गणों में एक से रहते हैं।

लकार	काल अर्थ	धातु	परस्मैपद-रूप	आत्मनेपद-रूप
6. लिट्	परोक्ष भूत	भू	बभूव	—
		कम्	—	चकमे
7. लुट्	अनद्यतन	भू	भविता	—
		एध्	—	एधिता
8. लुङ्	सामान्य भूत	भू	अभूत्	—
		क्षि	अक्षैषीत्	—
		वद्	अवादीत्	—
		एध्	—	ऐधिष्ट
9. लृङ्	हेतुहेतुमद्भाव	भू	अभविष्यत्	—
		एव्	—	ऐधिष्यत
10. लेट्	केवल वेद में प्रयुक्त होने वाला लिङ् का समानार्थक लकार	भू	भवाति	—
		तृ	—	तारिषत्

सेट्, अनिट् और वेट् धातुएँ

धातु का शुद्ध रूप लृट् लकार में दिखाई पड़ता है। जैसे—पा, गम्, दृश् आदि धातु लट् में पिब, गच्छ, पश्य आदि रूपों में परिवर्तित हो जाते हैं, किन्तु लृट् में पास्यति, गमिष्यति और द्रक्ष्यति आदि रूपों में वे अविकृत रहते हैं। कुछ धातुओं के लुट् लृट् आदि लकारों के रूप में इकार (इट्) का आगम हुआ दिखाई पड़ता है और कुछ में नहीं। जिन धातुओं के लुट् लकार के रूपों में इकार होता है उन्हें **सेट्** और जिनमें इकार नहीं आता, उन्हें **अनिट्** कहते हैं। कुछ धातुएँ ऐसी भी हैं जिनके लुट् के रूपों में इकार विकल्प से आता है, उन्हें **वेट्** धातुएँ कहा जाता है। स्था, पा, हन्, गम् इत्यादि धातुओं के लुट् लकार में या तृच् प्रत्ययान्त रूपों—स्थाता, पाता, हन्ता, गन्ता— में 'इ' नहीं आता, इसलिए ये अनिट धातु हैं। भू, एध्—इन धातुओं के लृट् और तृच् प्रत्यय वाले रूपों—भविता और एधिता—में 'इ' भी समाया हुआ है। अतः ये धातु सेट् माने जाते हैं। प्रमुख धातुओं की एक सूची इस पुस्तक के **परिशिष्ट II** में दी गई है, जिसमें सेट् एवं अनिट् का भी

निर्देश हुआ है। इसकी सहायता से कहाँ इकार लगाना चाहिए कहाँ नहीं–इसका ज्ञान आसान हो जाता है। वेट् धातुएँ बहुत ही कम है, अतः उनका अधिक विवेचन आवश्यक नहीं है।

भ्वादि गण (प्रथम गण)

भ्वादि का विकरण शप् (अ) है। इस विकरण शप् का 'अ' धातु में गुण आदि विकारों का कारण होता है।

नीचे इस गण की कुछ प्रमुख धातुएँ दी जाती हैं। उनके साथ पूर्वोक्त प्रत्ययों के जोड़ने पर क्रिया-पद सरलता से बन जाते हैं।

भ्वादिगण की प्रमुख धातुएँ

परस्मैपदी

1. भू (भव्)	=	होना	सेट्	भवति
2. अर्च्	=	पूजा करना	सेट्	अर्चति
3. व्रज्	=	जाना	सेट्	व्रजति
4. क्षि (क्षय्)	=	नष्ट होना	अनिट्	क्षयति
5. स्मृ (स्मर्)	=	याद करना	अनिट्	स्मरति
6. पा (पिब)	=	पीना	अनिट्	पिबति
7. स्था (तिष्ठ)	=	ठहरना	अनिट्	तिष्ठति
8. दा (यच्छ्)	=	देना	अनिट्	यच्छति
9. गम् (गच्छ्)	=	जाना	अनिट्	गच्छति
10. दृश् (पश्य्)	=	देखना	अनिट्	पश्यति
11. घ्रा (जिघ्र्)	=	सूँघना	अनिट्	जिघ्रति
12. नम्	=	नमस्कार करना	अनिट्	नमति
13. श्रु (शृ[1])	=	सुनना	अनिट्	शृणोति

आत्मनेपदी

14. सेव्	=	सेवा करना	सेट्	सेवते
15. मुद्	=	प्रसन्न होना	सेट्	मोदते
16. रुच्	=	अच्छा लगना	सेट्	रोचते

1. इस धातु के रूप स्वादिगण की धातु के समान होते हैं, अतः विशेष विवरण स्वादि गण निरूपण में दिया गया है।

17. वृत् (वर्त्)	=	होना, विद्यमान होना	सेट्	वर्तते
18. लभ्	=	प्राप्त करना	अनिट्	लभते

उभयपदी

19. याच्	=	माँगना	सेट्	याचति, याचते
20. श्रि (श्रय्)	=	सेवा करना, अपनाना	सेट्	श्रयति, श्रयते
21. नी (नय्)	=	ले जाना	अनिट्	नयति, नयते
22. हृ (हर्)	=	चुराना, हरण करना	अनिट्	हरति, हरते
23. वह्	=	बहना, ढोना	अनिट्	वहति, वहते
24. यज्	=	यज्ञ करना	अनिट्	यजति, यजते
25. भज्	=	सेवा करना	अनिट्	भजति, भजते
26. भृ (भर्)	=	भरण–पोषण करना	अनिट्	भरति, भरते
27. ह्वे (ह्वय्)	=	पुकारना	अनिट्	ह्वयति, ह्वयते

परस्मैपदी धातुरूप

1. भू धातु, सेट्, (होना)

लट् लकार- (वर्तमान काल)

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	भवति	भवतः	भवन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	भवसि	भवथः	भवथ
उत्तम पुरुष	भवामि	भवावः	भवामः

लोट् लकार (आज्ञार्थ)

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	भवतु भवतात्	भवताम्	भवन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	भव भवतात्	भवतम्	भवत
उत्तम पुरुष	भवानि	भवाव	भवाम

लङ् लकार (भूतकाल)

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अभवत्	अभवताम्	अभवन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अभवः	अभवतम्	अभवत
उत्तम पुरुष	अभवम्	अभवाव	अभवाम

विधिलिङ् लकार (विधि, प्रवर्तनार्थ)

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	भवेत्	भवेताम्	भवेयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	भवेः	भवेतम्	भवेत
उत्तम पुरुष	भवेयम्	भवेव	भवेम

लृट् लकार (भविष्यत् काल)

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	भविष्यति	भविष्यतः	भविष्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	भविष्यसि	भविष्यथः	भविष्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	भविष्यामि	भविष्यावः	भविष्यामः

2. पठ् (पढ़ना)

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	पठति	पठतः	पठन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	पठसि	पठथः	पठथ
उत्तम पुरुष	पठामि	पठावः	पठामः

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
ष	पठतु पठतात्	पठताम्	पठन्तु
ष	पठ पठतात्	पठतम्	पठत
ष	पठानि	पठाव	पठाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
ष	अपठत्	अपठताम्	अपठन्
ष	अपठः	अपठतम्	अपठत
ष	अपठम्	अपठाव	अपठाम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
ष	पठेत्	पठेताम्	पठेयुः
ष	पठेः	पठेतम्	पठेत
ष	पठेयम्	पठेव	पठेम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
ष	पठिष्यति	पठिष्यतः	पठिष्यन्ति
ष	पठिष्यसि	पठिष्यथः	पठिष्यथ
ष	पठिष्यामि	पठिष्यावः	पठिष्यामः

· लङ्लकार में धातु से पूर्व अट् (अ) या आट् (आ) जुड़ जाता है। व्यञ्जन अगर धातु के आदि में हो तो अट् (अ) जुड़ता है। स्वर यदि आदि में रहे तो आट् (आ) जुड़ता है ।

3. अर्च् (पूजा करना) (प०) धातु के रूप **पठ्** धातु की तरह होते हैं, जैसे–

लट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	अर्चति	अर्चतः	अर्चन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	अर्चसि	अर्चथः	अर्चथ
उत्तम पुरुष	अर्चामि	अर्चावः	अर्चामः

लोट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	अर्चतु	अर्चताम्	अर्चन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	अर्च	अर्चतम्	अर्चत
उत्तम पुरुष	अर्चानि	अर्चाव	अर्चाम

लङ् लकार में इस धातु के आदि में 'आ' जुड़ता है, क्योंकि इस धातु के आदि में स्वर है, व्यञ्जन नहीं। इसलिए रूप इस तरह होगा–

लङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	आर्चत्	आर्चताम्	आर्चन्
मध्यम पुरुष	आर्चः	आर्चतम्	आर्चत
उत्तम पुरुष	आर्चम्	आर्चाव	आर्चाम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	अर्चेत्	अर्चेताम्	अर्चेयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	अर्चेः	अर्चेतम्	अर्चेत
उत्तम पुरुष	अर्चेयम्	अर्चेव	अर्चेम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अर्चिष्यति	अर्चिष्यतः	अर्चिष्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	अर्चिष्यसि	अर्चिष्यथः	अर्चिष्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	अर्चिष्यामि	अर्चिष्यावः	अर्चिष्यामः

पा, घ्रा, स्था, दाण्, दृश्, गम् आदि धातु लट्, लङ्, लोट्, विधिलिङ्– इन 4 लकारों में **पिब, जिघ्र, तिष्ठ, यच्छ, पश्य, गच्छ** आदि में बदल जाते हैं, इसका संकेत किया जा चुका है, परन्तु भविष्यत् काल में वे अपने मूल रूप में प्रयुक्त होते हैं। इसलिए लृट् लकार (भविष्यत् काल) में इनके रूप होंगे– पास्यति, घ्रास्यति, स्थास्यति, दास्यति, द्रक्ष्यति और गमिष्यति। यद्यपि गम्, भू, हृ आदि धातु अनिट् हैं। इसलिए लुट् में इनका रूप गन्ता, भविता और हर्ता होते हैं परन्तु लृट् में विशेष नियम के कारण इट् होता है।[1]

4. श्रि (श्रय्) (सेवा करना) उभयपदी, सेट् धातु–

परस्मैपद में इसके रूप 'भू' धातु के समान होते हैं, जैसे–

लट्–श्रयति, लङ्–अश्रयत्, लोट्–श्रयतु, विधिलिङ्–श्रयेत्, लृट्–श्रयिष्यति आदि।

आत्मनेपदी धातुरूप

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	श्रयते	श्रयेते	श्रयन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	श्रयसे	श्रयेथे	श्रयध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	श्रये	श्रयावहे	श्रयामहे

1. ऋद्धनोः स्ये। ❑ पा. **7.2.70**
गमेरिट् परस्मैपदेषु। ❑ पा. **7.2.58**

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	श्रयताम्	श्रयेताम्	श्रयन्ताम्
मध्यम पुरुष	श्रयस्व	श्रयेथाम्	श्रयध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	श्रयै	श्रयावहै	श्रयामहै

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अश्रयत	अश्रयेताम्	अश्रयन्त
मध्यम पुरुष	अश्रयथाः	अश्रयेथाम्	अश्रयध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	अश्रये	अश्रयावहि	अश्रयामहि

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	श्रयेत	श्रयेयाताम्	श्रयेरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	श्रयेथाः	श्रयेयाथाम्	श्रयेध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	श्रयेय	श्रयेवहि	श्रयेमहि

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	श्रयिष्यते	श्रयिष्येते	श्रयिष्यन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	श्रयिष्यसे	श्रयिष्येथे	श्रयिष्यध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	श्रयिष्ये	श्रयिष्यावहे	श्रयिष्यामहे

सेव् (सेवा करना) आदि केवल आत्मनेपद धतुओं के रूप भी इसी प्रकार होते हैं। जैसे– लट्–सेवते, लङ्–असेवत, लोट्–सेवताम्, विधिलिङ्–सेवेत, लृट्–सेविष्यते आदि।

5. गम् (गच्छ्) = जाना, परस्मैपदी, अनिट्

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	गच्छति	गच्छतः	गच्छन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	गच्छसि	गच्छथः	गच्छथ
उत्तम पुरुष	गच्छामि	गच्छावः	गच्छामः

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	गच्छतु	गच्छताम्	गच्छन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	गच्छ	गच्छतम्	गच्छत
उत्तम पुरुष	गच्छानि	गच्छाव	गच्छाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अगच्छत्	अगच्छताम्	अगच्छन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अगच्छः	अगच्छतम्	अगच्छत
उत्तम पुरुष	अगच्छम्	अगच्छाव	अगच्छाम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	गच्छेत्	गच्छेताम्	गच्छेयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	गच्छेः	गच्छेतम्	गच्छेत
उत्तम पुरुष	गच्छेयम्	गच्छेव	गच्छेम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	गमिष्यति	गमिष्यतः	गमिष्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	गमिष्यसि	गमिष्यथः	गमिष्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	गमिष्यामि	गमिष्यावः	गमिष्यामः

6. क्षि (क्षय्) = नष्ट होना, परस्मैपदी, अनिट्

लट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	क्षयति	क्षयतः	क्षयन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	क्षयसि	क्षयथः	क्षयथ
उत्तम पुरुष	क्षयामि	क्षयावः	क्षयामः

लोट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	क्षयतु	क्षयताम्	क्षयन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	क्षय	क्षयतम्	क्षयत
उत्तम पुरुष	क्षयाणि	क्षयाव	क्षयाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	अक्षयत्	अक्षयताम्	अक्षयन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अक्षयः	अक्षयतम्	अक्षयत
उत्तम पुरुष	अक्षयम्	अक्षयाव	अक्षयाम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	क्षयेत्	क्षयेताम्	क्षयेयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	क्षयेः	क्षयेतम्	क्षयेत
उत्तम पुरुष	क्षयेयम्	क्षयेव	क्षयेम

लृट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	क्षेष्यति	क्षेष्यतः	क्षेष्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	क्षेष्यसि	क्षेष्यथः	क्षेष्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	क्षेष्यामि	क्षेष्यावः	क्षेष्यामः

7. पा (पिब) = पीना, परस्मैपदी, अनिट्

लट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	पिबति	पिबतः	पिबन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	पिबसि	पिबथः	पिबथ
उत्तम पुरुष	पिबामि	पिबावः	पिबामः

लोट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	पिबतु	पिबताम्	पिबन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	पिब	पिबतम्	पिबत
उत्तम पुरुष	पिबानि	पिबाव	पिबाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	अपिबत्	अपिबताम्	अपिबन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अपिबः	अपिबतम्	अपिबत
उत्तम पुरुष	अपिबम्	अपिबाव	अपिबाम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	पिबेत्	पिबेताम्	पिबेयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	पिबेः	पिबेतम्	पिबेत
उत्तम पुरुष	पिबेयम्	पिबेव	पिबेम

लृट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	पास्यति	पास्यतः	पास्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	पास्यसि	पास्यथः	पास्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	पास्यामि	पास्यावः	पास्यामः

8. व्रज् = जाना, परस्मैपदी, सेट्

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	व्रजति	व्रजतः	व्रजन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	व्रजसि	व्रजथः	व्रजथ
उत्तम पुरुष	व्रजामि	व्रजावः	व्रजामः

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	व्रजतु	व्रजताम्	व्रजन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	व्रज	व्रजतम्	व्रजत
उत्तम पुरुष	व्रजानि	व्रजाव	व्रजाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अव्रजत्	अव्रजताम्	अव्रजन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अव्रजः	अव्रजतम्	अव्रजत
उत्तम पुरुष	अव्रजम्	अव्रजाव	अव्रजाम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	व्रजेत्	व्रजेताम्	व्रजेयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	व्रजेः	व्रजेतम्	व्रजेत
उत्तम पुरुष	व्रजेयम्	व्रजेव	व्रजेम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	व्रजिष्यति	व्रजिष्यतः	व्रजिष्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	व्रजिष्यसि	व्रजिष्यथः	व्रजिष्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	व्रजिष्यामि	व्रजिष्यावः	व्रजिष्यामः

9. खाद् (खाना), प0, सेट्

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	खादति	खादतः	खादन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	खादसि	खादथः	खादथ
उत्तम पुरुष	खादामि	खादावः	खादामः

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	खादतु	खादताम्	खादन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	खाद	खादतम्	खादत
उत्तम पुरुष	खादानि	खादाव	खादाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अखादत्	अखादताम्	अखादन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अखादः	अखादतम्	अखादत
उत्तम पुरुष	अखादम्	अखादाव	अखादाम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	खादेत्	खादेताम्	खादेयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	खादेः	खादेतम्	खादेत
उत्तम पुरुष	खादेयम्	खादेव	खादेम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	खादिष्यति	खादिष्यतः	खादिष्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	खादिष्यसि	खादिष्यथः	खादिष्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	खादिष्यामि	खादिष्यावः	खादिष्यामः

10. स्मृ (स्मरण करना)

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	स्मरति	स्मरतः	स्मरन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	स्मरसि	स्मरथः	स्मरथ
उत्तम पुरुष	स्मरामि	स्मरावः	स्मरामः

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	स्मरतु	स्मरताम्	स्मरन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	स्मर	स्मरतम्	स्मरत
उत्तम पुरुष	स्मराणि	स्मराव	स्मराम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अस्मरत्	अस्मरताम्	अस्मरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अस्मरः	अस्मरतम्	अस्मरत
उत्तम पुरुष	अस्मरम्	अस्मराव	अस्मराम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	स्मरेत्	स्मरेताम्	स्मरेयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	स्मरेः	स्मरेतम्	स्मरेत
उत्तम पुरुष	स्मरेयम्	स्मरेव	स्मरेम

लृट्लकार

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	स्मरिष्यति	स्मरिष्यतः	स्मरिष्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	स्मरिष्यसि	स्मरिष्यथः	स्मरिष्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	स्मरिष्यामि	स्मरिष्यावः	स्मरिष्यामः

11. पच्[1] (पकाना)

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	पचति	पचतः	पचन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	पचसि	पचथः	पचथ
उत्तम पुरुष	पचामि	पचावः	पचामः

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	पचतु	पचताम्	पचन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	पच	पचतम्	पचत
उत्तम पुरुष	पचानि	पचाव	पचाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अपचत्	अपचताम्	अपचन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अपचः	अपचतम्	अपचत
उत्तम पुरुष	अपचम्	अपचाव	अपचाम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	पचेत्	पचेताम्	पचेयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	पचेः	पचेतम्	पचेत
उत्तम पुरुष	पचेयम्	पचेव	पचेम

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1. यह उभयपदी है। इसके आत्मनेपदी रूप वह् के समान होते हैं।

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	पक्ष्यति	पक्ष्यतः	पक्ष्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	पक्ष्यसि	पक्ष्यथः	पक्ष्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	पक्ष्यामि	पक्ष्यावः	पक्ष्यामः

12. पत् (गिरना), प०, सेट्

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	पतति	पततः	पतन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	पतसि	पतथः	पतथ
उत्तम पुरुष	पतामि	पतावः	पतामः

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	पततु	पतताम्	पतन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	पत	पततम्	पतत
उत्तम पुरुष	पतानि	पताव	पताम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अपतत्	अपतताम्	अपतन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अपतः	अपततम्	अपतत
उत्तम पुरुष	अपतम्	अपताव	अपताम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	पतेत्	पतेताम्	पतेयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	पतेः	पतेतम्	पतेत
उत्तम पुरुष	पतेयम्	पतेव	पतेम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	पतिष्यति	पतिष्यतः	पतिष्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	पतिष्यसि	पतिष्यथः	पतिष्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	पतिष्यामि	पतिष्यावः	पतिष्यामः

13. सेव् (सेवा करना) आत्मनेपदी, सेट्

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	सेवते	सेवेते	सेवन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	सेवसे	सेवेथे	सेवध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	सेवे	सेवावहे	सेवामहे

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	सेवताम्	सेवेताम्	सेवन्ताम्
मध्यम पुरुष	सेवस्व	सेवेथाम्	सेवध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	सेवै	सेवावहै	सेवामहै

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	असेवत	असेवताम्	असेवन्त
मध्यम पुरुष	असेवथाः	असेवेथाम्	असेवध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	असेवे	असेवावहि	असेवामहि

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	सेवेत	सेवेयाताम्	सेवेरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	सेवेथाः	सेवेयाथाम्	सेवेध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	सेवेय	सेवेवहि	सेवेमहि

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	सेविष्यते	सेविष्येते	सेविष्यन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	सेविष्यसे	सेविष्येथे	सेविष्यध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	सेविष्ये	सेविष्यावहे	सेविष्यामहे

14. लभ् (पाना) आत्मनेपदी, अनिट्

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	लभते	लभेते	लभन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	लभसे	लभेथे	लभध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	लभे	लभावहे	लभामहे

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	लभताम्	लभेताम्	लभन्ताम्
मध्यम पुरुष	लभस्व	लभेथाम्	लभध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	लभै	लभावहै	लभामहै

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अलभत	अलभेताम्	अलभन्त
मध्यम पुरुष	अलभथाः	अलभेथाम्	अलभध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	अलभे	अलभावहि	अलभामहि

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	लभेत	लभेयाताम्	लभेरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	लभेथाः	लभेयाथाम्	लभेध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	लभेय	लभेवहि	लभेमहि

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	लप्स्यते	लप्स्येते	लप्स्यन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	लप्स्यसे	लप्स्येथे	लप्स्यध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	लप्स्ये	लप्स्यावहे	लप्स्यामहे

15. वृध् (बढ़ना) आत्मनेपदी, सेट्

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	वर्धते	वर्धेते	वर्धन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	वर्धसे	वर्धेथे	वर्धध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	वर्धे	वर्धावहे	वर्धामहे

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	वर्धताम्	वर्धेताम्	वर्धन्ताम्
मध्यम पुरुष	वर्धस्व	वर्धेथाम्	वर्धध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	वर्धै	वर्धावहै	वर्धामहै

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अवर्धत	अवर्धेताम्	अवर्धन्त
मध्यम पुरुष	अवर्धथाः	अवर्धेथाम्	अवर्धध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	अवर्धे	अवर्धावहि	अवर्धामहि

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	वर्धेत	वर्धेयाताम्	वर्धेरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	वर्धेथाः	वर्धेयाथाम्	वर्धेध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	वर्धेय	वर्धेवहि	वर्धेमहि

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	वर्धिष्यते	वर्धिष्येते	वर्धिष्यन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	वर्धिष्यसे	वर्धिष्येथे	वर्धिष्यध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	वर्धिष्ये	वर्धिष्यावहे	वर्धिष्यामहे

16. वृत् (होना) आत्मनेपदी, सेट्

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	वर्तते	वर्तेते	वर्तन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	वर्तसे	वर्तेथे	वर्तध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	वर्ते	वर्तावहे	वर्तामहे

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	वर्तताम्	वर्तेताम्	वर्तन्ताम्
मध्यम पुरुष	वर्तस्व	वर्तेथाम्	वर्तध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	वर्तै	वर्तावहै	वर्तामहै

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अवर्तत	अवर्तेताम्	अवर्तन्त
मध्यम पुरुष	अवर्तथाः	अवर्तेथाम्	अवर्तध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	अवर्ते	अवर्तावहि	अवर्तामहि

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	वर्तेत	वर्तेयाताम्	वर्तेरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	वर्तेथाः	वर्तेयाथाम्	वर्तेध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	वर्तेय	वर्तेवहि	वर्तेमहि

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	वर्तिष्यते	वर्तिष्येते	वर्तिष्यन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	वर्तिष्यसे	वर्तिष्येथे	वर्तिष्यध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	वर्तिष्ये	वर्तिष्यावहे	वर्तिष्यामहे

17. रुच् (अच्छा लगना) आत्मनेपदी, सेट्

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	रोचते	रोचेते	रोचन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	रोचसे	रोचेथे	रोचध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	रोचे	रोचावहे	रोचामहे

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	रोचताम्	रोचेताम्	रोचन्ताम्
मध्यम पुरुष	रोचस्व	रोचेथाम्	रोचध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	रोचै	रोचावहै	रोचामहै

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अरोचत	अरोचेताम्	अरोचन्त
मध्यम पुरुष	अरोचथाः	अरोचेथाम्	अरोचध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	अरोचे	अरोचावहि	अरोचामहि

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	रोचेत	रोचेयाताम्	रोचेरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	रोचेथाः	रोचेयाथाम्	रोचेध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	रोचेय	रोचेवहि	रोचेमहि

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	रोचिष्यते	रोचिष्येते	रोचिष्यन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	रोचिष्यसे	रोचिष्येथे	रोचिष्यध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	रोचिष्ये	रोचिष्यावहे	रोचिष्यामहे

18. वह् = बहना, ढोना, उभयपदी, अनिट्

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	वहति	वहतः	वहन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	वहसि	वहथः	वहथ
उत्तम पुरुष	वहामि	वहावः	वहामः

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	वहतु	वहताम्	वहन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	वह	वहतम्	वहत
उत्तम पुरुष	वहानि	वहाव	वहाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अवहत्	अवहताम्	अवहन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अवहः	अवहतम्	अवहत
उत्तम पुरुष	अवहम्	अवहाव	अवहाम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	वहेत्	वहेताम्	वहेयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	वहेः	वहेतम्	वहेत
उत्तम पुरुष	वहेयम्	वहेव	वहेम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	वक्ष्यति	वक्ष्यतः	वक्ष्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	वक्ष्यसि	वक्ष्यथः	वक्ष्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	वक्ष्यामि	वक्ष्यावः	वक्ष्यामः

आत्मनेपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	वहते	वहेते	वहन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	वहसे	वहेथे	वहध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	वहे	वहावहे	वहामहे

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	वहताम्	वहेताम्	वहन्ताम्
मध्यम पुरुष	वहस्व	वहेथाम्	वहध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	वहै	वहावहै	वहामहै

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अवहत	अवहेताम्	अवहन्त
मध्यम पुरुष	अवहथाः	अवहेथाम्	अवहध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	अवहे	अवहावहि	अवहामहि

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	वहेत	वहेयाताम्	वहेरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	वहेथाः	वहेयाथाम्	वहेध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	वहेय	वहेवहि	वहेमहि

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	वक्ष्यते	वक्ष्येते	वक्ष्यन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	वक्ष्यसे	वक्ष्येथे	वक्ष्यध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	वक्ष्ये	वक्ष्यावहे	वक्ष्यामहे

19. भज् (सेवा करना) और **यज् (यज्ञ करना)** धातुओं के रूप भी **वह्** धातु की तरह होते हैं।

20. ह्वे (ह्वय्) (पुकारना) धातु के रूप भी परस्मैपद और आत्मनेपद में **श्रि (श्रय्)** धातु की तरह चलते हैं।

लट्–ह्वयति, ह्वयते, लङ्–अह्वयत्, अह्वयत, विधिलिङ्–ह्वयेत्, ह्वयेत, लोट्–ह्वयतु, ह्वयताम् । लृट् में उसके रूप परस्मैपद में **पा (पीना)** के समान होते हैं, जैसे–ह्वास्यति और आत्मनेपद में ये रूप होंगे–

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	ह्वास्यते	ह्वास्येते	ह्वास्यन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	ह्वास्यसे	ह्वास्येथे	ह्वास्यध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	ह्वास्ये	ह्वास्यावहे	ह्वास्यामहे

21. श्रु (प., अनिट्) इस धातु के रूप स्वादिगण की धातु के समान होते हैं। अतः इसके रूप स्वादिगण के अन्तर्गत दिए गए हैं।

दिवादि गण (चतुर्थ गण)

दिवादि और तुदादि धातुओं के परस्मैपद और आत्मनेपद के रूप प्रायः भ्वादि धातुओं के समान होते हैं। दिवादि का विकरण **श्य (य)** है और तुदादि का **श (अ)** । ये दोनों गुण विरोधी हैं। इसलिए धातु में इनके कारण गुण नहीं होगा। उदाहरण के लिए इनका एक रूप दिया जाता है–

1. दिव् (खेलना आदि) परस्मैपदी, सेट्

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	दीव्यति	दीव्यतः	दीव्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	दीव्यसि	दीव्यथः	दीव्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	दीव्यामि	दीव्यावः	दीव्यामः

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	दीव्यतु	दीव्यताम्	दीव्यन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	दीव्य	दीव्यतम्	दीव्यत
उत्तम पुरुष	दीव्यानि	दीव्याव	दीव्याम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अदीव्यत्	अदीव्यताम्	अदीव्यन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अदीव्यः	अदीव्यतम्	अदीव्यत
उत्तम पुरुष	अदीव्यम्	अदीव्याव	अदीव्याम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	दीव्येत्	दीव्येताम्	दीव्येयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	दीव्येः	दीव्येतम्	दीव्येत
उत्तम पुरुष	दीव्येयम्	दीव्येव	दीव्येम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	देविष्यति	देविष्यतः	देविष्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	देविष्यसि	देविष्यथः	देविष्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	देविष्यामि	देविष्यावः	देविष्यामः

2. जन् (उत्पन्न होना) आत्मनेपदी, सेट्

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	जायते	जायेते	जायन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	जायसे	जायेथे	जायध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	जाये	जायावहे	जायामहे

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	जायताम्	जायेताम्	जायन्ताम्
मध्यम पुरुष	जायस्व	जायेथाम्	जायध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	जायै	जायावहै	जायामहै

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अजायत	अजायेताम्	अजायन्त
मध्यम पुरुष	अजायथाः	अजायेथाम्	अजायध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	अजाये	अजायावहि	अजायामहि

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	जायेत	जायेयाताम्	जायेरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	जायेथाः	जायेयाथाम्	जायेध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	जायेय	जायेवहि	जायेमहि

लृट्लकार

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	जनिष्यते	जनिष्येते	जनिष्यन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	जनिष्यसे	जनिष्येथे	जनिष्यध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	जनिष्ये	जनिष्यावहे	जनिष्यामहे

3. नश् (नष्ट होना), प०, वेट्

लट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	नश्यति	नश्यतः	नश्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	नश्यसि	नश्यथः	नश्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	नश्यामि	नश्यावः	नश्यामः

लोट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	नश्यतु	नश्यताम्	नश्यन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	नश्य	नश्यतम्	नश्यत
उत्तम पुरुष	नश्यानि	नश्याव	नश्याम

लङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	अनश्यत्	अनश्यताम्	अनश्यन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अनश्यः	अनश्यतम्	अनश्यत
उत्तम पुरुष	अनश्यम्	अनश्याव	अनश्याम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	नश्येत्	नश्येताम्	नश्येयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	नश्येः	नश्येतम्	नश्येत
उत्तम पुरुष	नश्येयम्	नश्येव	नश्येम

लृट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	नशिष्यति	नशिष्यतः	नशिष्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	नशिष्यसि	नशिष्यथः	नशिष्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	नशिष्यामि	नशिष्यावः	नशिष्यामः

अथवा

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	नङ्क्ष्यति	नङ्क्ष्यतः	नङ्क्ष्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	नङ्क्ष्यसि	नङ्क्ष्यथः	नङ्क्ष्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	नङ्क्ष्यामि	नङ्क्ष्यावः	नङ्क्ष्यामः

दिवादि गण की कुछ प्रमुख धातुएँ ये हैं–

1.	दिव् (दीव्)	= खेलना	परस्मैपदी,	सेट्	दीव्यति
2.	नृत्	= नाचना	,,	,,	नृत्यति
3.	कुप्	= क्रोध करना	,,	,,	कुप्यति
4.	हृष्	= प्रसन्न होना	,,	,,	हृष्यति
5.	क्रुध्	= क्रोध करना	,,	अनिट्	क्रुध्यति
6.	द्रुह्	= द्रोह करना	,,	वेट्	द्रुह्यति
7.	नश्	= नष्ट होना	,,	,,	नश्यति
8.	जन् (जा)	= उत्पन्न होना	आत्मनेपदी	सेट्	जायते
9.	विद्	= होना	,,	अनिट्	विद्यते

इन सभी धातुओं में 'य' विकरण के साथ तिङ् प्रत्यय जुड़ने पर रूप बनेंगे, जैसे– **नृत् (प.)** –नृत्यति, अनृत्यत्, नृत्यतु, नृत्येत्। लृट् में 'स्य' विकरण सभी शप्, श्यन् आदि विकरणों का अपवाद है। इसलिए 'श्यन्' नहीं होता और रूप बनेगा–नर्तिष्यति।

तुदादि गण (षष्ठ गण)

तुदादिगण का विकरण श (अ) है। भ्वादि के **शप् (अ)** से इसमें अन्तर है। श के परे धातु में गुण नहीं होता, जैसे–तुदति (तोदति नहीं) किन्तु शप् के परे हो जाता है–भवति ।

तुदादिगण की कुछ प्रमुख धातुएँ निम्नलिखित हैं –

1.	तुद्	= कष्ट देना	उ०	अनिट्	तुदति-तुदते
2.	मुच् (मुञ्च्)	= छोड़ना	,,	,,	मुञ्चति-मुञ्चते
3.	सिच् (सिञ्च्)	= सींचना	,,	,,	सिञ्चति-सिञ्चते

4. लुप् (लुम्प्)	= लुप्त होना	उ0	अनिट्	लुम्पति-लुम्पते
5. मिल्	= मिलना	"	सेट्	मिलति-मिलते
6. स्पृश्	= स्पर्श करना	प0	अनिट्	स्पृशति
7. प्रच्छ् (पृच्छ)	= पूछना	"	"	पृच्छति
8. क्षिप्	= फेंकना	"	"	क्षिपति
9. विश्	= प्रवेश करना	"	"	विशति
10. लिख्	= लिखना	"	सेट्	लिखति
11. इष् (इच्छ्)	= इच्छा करना	"	वेट्	इच्छति
12. मृ	= मरना	आ0	अनिट्	म्रियते (लृट् में परस्मैपद)

1. **मृङ्** (मरना) आत्मनेपदी है किन्तु लृट् में परस्मैपद होता है।[1]

2. **इष्** का रूप चार लकारों में इच्छ् में बदल कर–इच्छति, ऐच्छत्, इच्छतु, इच्छेत् – होगा, किन्तु लृट् में–एषिष्यति–बनेगा।

3. **मुच्** (मुञ्च्, उभयपदी, अनिट्) का रूप उदाहरण के लिए दिया जाता है–

लट्–मुञ्चति, मुञ्चते; लङ्–अमुञ्चत् अमुञ्चत; लोट्–मुञ्चतु, मुञ्चताम्; विधिलिङ्–मुञ्चेत्, मुञ्चेत; और लृट्–मोक्ष्यति, मोक्ष्यते।

4. **लुप्** (लुम्प्) (लुप्त होना) और **सिच्** (सिञ्च्) (सींचना) धातु के रूप **मुच्** की तरह होते हैं।

5. प्रच्छ्-पृच्छ् (पूछना), प0, अनिट्

लट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	पृच्छति	पृच्छतः	पृच्छन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	पृच्छसि	पृच्छथः	पृच्छथ
उत्तम पुरुष	पृच्छामि	पृच्छावः	पृच्छामः

1. म्रियतेर्लुङ्लिङोश्च । ❑ पा. 1.3.61

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	पृच्छतु	पृच्छताम्	पृच्छन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	पृच्छ	पृच्छतम्	पृच्छत
उत्तम पुरुष	पृच्छानि	पृच्छाव	पृच्छाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अपृच्छत्	अपृच्छताम्	अपृच्छन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अपृच्छः	अपृच्छतम्	अपृच्छत
उत्तम पुरुष	अपृच्छम्	अपृच्छाव	अपृच्छाम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	पृच्छेत्	पृच्छेताम्	पृच्छेयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	पृच्छेः	पृच्छेतम्	पृच्छेत
उत्तम पुरुष	पृच्छेयम्	पृच्छेव	पृच्छेम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	प्रक्ष्यति	प्रक्ष्यतः	प्रक्ष्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	प्रक्ष्यसि	प्रक्ष्यथः	प्रक्ष्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	प्रक्ष्यामि	प्रक्ष्यावः	प्रक्ष्यामः

6. **मिल्** (मिलना), उभयपदी, सेट्

परस्मैपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	मिलति	मिलतः	मिलन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	मिलसि	मिलथः	मिलथ
उत्तम पुरुष	मिलामि	मिलावः	मिलामः

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	मिलतु	मिलताम्	मिलन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	मिल	मिलतम्	मिलत
उत्तम पुरुष	मिलानि	मिलाव	मिलाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अमिलत्	अमिलताम्	अमिलन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अमिलः	अमिलतम्	अमिलत
उत्तम पुरुष	अमिलम्	अमिलाव	अमिलाम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	मिलेत्	मिलेताम्	मिलेयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	मिलेः	मिलेतम्	मिलेत
उत्तम पुरुष	मिलेयम्	मिलेव	मिलेम

लृट्

मेलिष्यति, इत्यादि–पठिष्यति की तरह चलती है।

आत्मनेपद में लट्–मिलते, लोट्–मिलताम्, लङ्–अमिलत, विधिलिङ्–मिलेत, लृट्–मेलिष्यते इत्यादि पाँचों लकारों में सारे रूप **सेव्** धातु की तरह होते हैं।

7. **विश्** (प्रवेश करना) धातु के रूप **मिल्** धातु के परस्मैपदी रूपों के समान होते हैं। किन्तु लृट् में रूप–

वेक्ष्यति वेक्ष्यतः वेक्ष्यन्ति –इस प्रकार चलते हैं।

8. **लिख्** (परस्मैपदी, सेट्) के रूप होते हैं–

लट्–लिखति, लोट्–लिखतु, लङ्–अलिखत्, विधिलिङ्–लिखेत् और लृट्–लेखिष्यति।

चुरादि गण (दशम गण)

चुरादिगण का विकरण **णिच्** है। कर्तृवाच्य में **शप्** (अ) आ जाने पर दोनों मिलकर 'अय' का रूप धारण कर लेता है। णिच् के कारण धातु के इकार और उकार को गुण हो जाता है। उपधा 'अ' को तथा अन्तिम इकार उकार को वृद्धि– आ ऐ या औ हो जाता है। किन्तु कथ या गण आदि कुछ धातु ऐसे हैं जिनमें अकार का लोप होने के कारण उपधा में वृद्धि नहीं होती, जैसे–

चुर् + णिच् (अय्) + शप् (अ) = (उपधा का ओ) चोरयति

चुरादिगण की प्रमुख धातुएँ निम्नलिखित हैं–

1.	चुर् =	चुराना	उभयपदी,	सेट्	चोरयति, चोरयते
2.	कथ =	कहना	"	"	कथयति, कथयते
3.	गण =	गिनना	"	"	गणयति, गणयते
4.	भक्ष् =	खाना	"	"	भक्षयति, भक्षयते
5.	प्रथ् =	प्रसिद्ध होना	"	"	प्राथयति, प्राथयते

इस गण के धातुओं के रूप भ्वादिगणीय धातुओं की तरह चलते हैं, जैसे–

1. कथ - कहना (उभयपदी), परस्मैपदी, सेट्

परस्मैपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	कथयति	कथयतः	कथयन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	कथयसि	कथयथः	कथयथ
उत्तम पुरुष	कथयामि	कथयावः	कथयामः

लोट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	कथयतु	कथयताम्	कथयन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	कथय	कथयतम्	कथयत
उत्तम पुरुष	कथयानि	कथयाव	कथयाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अकथयत्	अकथयताम्	अकथयन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अकथयः	अकथयतम्	अकथयत
उत्तम पुरुष	अकथयम्	अकथयाव	अकथयाम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	कथयेत्	कथयेताम्	कथयेयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	कथयेः	कथयेतम्	कथयेत
उत्तम पुरुष	कथयेयम्	कथयेव	कथयेम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	कथयिष्यति	कथयिष्यतः	कथयिष्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	कथयिष्यसि	कथयिष्यथः	कथयिष्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	कथयिष्यामि	कथयिष्यावः	कथयिष्यामः

आत्मनेपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	कथयते	कथयेते	कथयन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	कथयसे	कथयेथे	कथयध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	कथये	कथयावहे	कथयामहे

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	कथयताम्	कथयेताम्	कथयन्ताम्
मध्यम पुरुष	कथयस्व	कथयेथाम्	कथयध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	कथयै	कथयावहै	कथयामहै

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अकथयत	अकथयेताम्	अकथयन्त्
मध्यम पुरुष	अकथयथाः	अकथयेथाम्	अकथयध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	अकथये	अकथयावहि	अकथयामहि

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	कथयेत	कथयेयाताम्	कथयेरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	कथयेथाः	कथयेयाथाम्	कथयेध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	कथयेय	कथयेवहि	कथयेमहि

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	कथयिष्यते	कथयिष्येते	कथयिष्यन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	कथयिष्यसे	कथयिष्येथे	कथयिष्यध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	कथयिष्ये	कथयिष्यावहे	कथयिष्यामहे

2. चुर् - चोरी करना (उभयपदी), सेट्
परस्मैपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	चोरयति	चोरयतः	चोरयन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	चोरयसि	चोरयथः	चोरयथ
उत्तम पुरुष	चोरयामि	चोरयावः	चोरयामः

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	चोरयतु	चोरयताम्	चोरयन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	चोरय	चोरयतम्	चोरयत
उत्तम पुरुष	चोरयानि	चोरयाव	चोरयाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अचोरयत्	अचोरयताम्	अचोरयन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अचोरयः	अचोरयतम्	अचोरयत
उत्तम पुरुष	अचोरयम्	अचोरयाव	अचोरयाम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	चोरयेत्	चोरयेताम्	चोरयेयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	चोरयेः	चोरयेतम्	चोरयेत
उत्तम पुरुष	चोरयेयम्	चोरयेव	चोरयेम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	चोरयिष्यति	चोरयिष्यतः	चोरयिष्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	चोरयिष्यसि	चोरयिष्यथः	चोरयिष्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	चोरयिष्यामि	चोरयिष्यावः	चोरयिष्यामः

आत्मनेपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	चोरयते	चोरयेते	चोरयन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	चोरयसे	चोरयेथे	चोरयध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	चोरये	चोरयावहे	चोरयामहे

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	चोरयताम्	चोरयेताम्	चोरयन्ताम्
मध्यम पुरुष	चोरयस्व	चोरयेथाम्	चोरयध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	चोरयै	चोरयावहै	चोरयामहै

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अचोरयत	अचोरयेताम्	अचोरयन्त
मध्यम पुरुष	अचोरयथाः	अचोरयेथाम्	अचोरयध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	अचोरये	अचोरयावहि	अचोरयामहि

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	चोरयेत	चोरयेयाताम्	चोरयेरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	चोरयेथाः	चोरयेयाथाम्	चोरयेध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	चोरयेय	चोरयेवहि	चोरयेमहि

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	चोरयिष्यते	चोरयिष्येते	चोरयिष्यन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	चोरयिष्यसे	चोरयिष्येथे	चोरयिष्यध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	चोरयिष्ये	चोरयिष्यावहे	चोरयिष्यामहे

II. द्वितीय वर्ग के तिङ् प्रत्यय

(अदादि, जुहोत्यादि, स्वादि, रुधादि, तनादि एवं क्र्यादि गणों की धातुओं से होने वाले तिङ् प्रत्यय)

अदादि, जुहोत्यादि आदि धातुओं से होने वाले तिङ् प्रत्ययों में भ्वादि, चुरादि, दिवादि और तुदादि गणों के प्रत्ययों से कुछ अन्तर पाये जाते हैं। वे इस प्रकार हैं–

1. परस्मैपद के प्रत्ययों में विशेष अन्तर नहीं है। लट्, लङ् और लोट् में वे ही प्रत्यय आते हैं जो पहले दिए जा चुके हैं।
2. केवल लोट् मध्यमपुरुष एक वचन में शेष गणों में **हि** प्रत्यय लगता है। अतः भ्वादि आदि में भव, चोरय आदि रूप बनते हैं तो अदादि आदि में पाहि, देहि आदि रूप होते हैं।
3. शेष गणों में परस्मैपद में विधिलिङ् के प्रत्यय भिन्न हैं, जैसे–

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	यात्	याताम्	युस्
मध्यम पुरुष	यास्	यातम्	यात
उत्तम पुरुष	याम्	याव	याम

इन गणों में आत्मनेपद प्रत्ययों की तालिका इस प्रकार है –

लकार	काल	पुरुष	आत्मनेपद प्रत्यय		
			एक.	द्वि.	बहु.
1. लट्	वर्तमान	प्र. पु.	ते	आते	अते
		म. पु.	से	आथे	ध्वे
		उ. पु.	ए	वहे	महे
2. लोट्	आज्ञार्थ	प्र. पु.	ताम्	आताम्	अताम्
		म. पु.	स्व	आथाम्	ध्वम्
		उ. पु.	ऐ	आवहै	आमहै
3. लङ्	अनद्यतन	प्र. पु.	त	आताम्	अत
	भूत	म. पु.	थास्	आथाम्	ध्वम्
		उ. पु.	इ	वहि	महि
4. विधिलिङ्	विध्यर्थ	प्र. पु.	ईत	ईयाताम्	ईरन्
		म. पु.	ईथाः	ईयाथाम्	ईध्वम्
		उ. पु.	ईय	ईवहि	ईमहि

टिप्पणी- लृट् लकार में (तथा शेष लकारों में भी) आत्मनेपद के वे ही प्रत्यय लगते हैं जो भ्वादि आदि गणों में लगते हैं।

अदादि गण (द्वितीय गण)

अदादि में विकरण का लोप् हो जाता है। इसलिए इसका विकरण 'शून्य' माना जाता है। अदादि में लट्, लोट्, लङ् और विधिलिङ् में धातु और तिङ् का साक्षात् संबन्ध पाया जाता है।

अदादि गण की कुछ प्रमुख धातुएँ निंम्नलिखित हैं–

परस्मैपदी

1. अद्	=	खाना	अनिट्	अत्ति
2. हन्	=	मारना	”	हन्ति
3. या	=	जाना	”	याति
4. पा	=	रक्षा करना	”	पाति
5. इण् (इ)	=	जाना	”	एति
6. स्वप्	=	सोना	”	स्वपिति
7. वच्	=	बोलना	”	वक्ति
8. अस्	=	होना	सेट्	अस्ति
9. विद्	=	जानना	”	वेत्ति
10. शास्	=	शासन करना	”	शास्ति
11. जागृ	=	जागना	”	जागर्ति
12. रुद्	=	रोना	”	रोदिति

आत्मनेपदी

13. शीङ् (शी)	=	सोना	सेट्	शेते
14. आस्	=	बैठना, होना	”	आस्ते
15. अधि + इङ् (इ)	=	अध्ययन करना	अनिट्	अधीते

उभयपदी

16. ब्रू	=	बोलना	सेट्	ब्रवीति, ब्रूते
17. दुह्	=	दुहना	अनिट्	दोग्धि, दुग्धे

1. अद् = खाना, परस्मैपदी, अनिट्

लट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	अत्ति	अत्तः	अदन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	अत्सि	अत्थः	अत्थ
उत्तम पुरुष	अद्मि	अद्वः	अद्मः

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अत्तु	अत्ताम्	अदन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	अद्धि	अत्तम्	अत्त
उत्तम पुरुष	अदानि	अदाव	अदाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	आदत्	आत्ताम्	आदन्
मध्यम पुरुष	आदः	आत्तम्	आत्त
उत्तम पुरुष	आदम्	आद्व	आद्म

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अद्यात्	अद्याताम्	अद्युः
मध्यम पुरुष	अद्याः	अद्यातम्	अद्यात
उत्तम पुरुष	अद्याम्	अद्याव	अद्याम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अत्स्यति	अत्स्यतः	अत्स्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	अत्स्यसि	अत्स्यथः	अत्स्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	अत्स्यामि	अत्स्यावः	अत्स्यामः

अदादि के रूप भ्वादि की अपेक्षा क्लिष्ट होते हैं। धातु और प्रत्यय के बीच विकरण न होने से इस गण में प्रकृति और प्रत्ययों में अधिक विकार देखे जाते हैं, जैसे–

2. अस् = होना, प०, सेट्

लट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	अस्ति	स्तः	सन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	असि	स्थः	स्थ
उत्तम पुरुष	अस्मि	स्वः	स्मः

लोट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	अस्तु	स्ताम्	सन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	एधि	स्तम्	अस्त
उत्तम पुरुष	असानि	असाव	असाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	आसीत्	आस्ताम्	आसन्
मध्यम पुरुष	आसीः	आस्तम्	आस्त
उत्तम पुरुष	आसम्	आस्व	आस्म

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	स्यात्	स्याताम्	स्युः
मध्यम पुरुष	स्याः	स्यातम्	स्यात
उत्तम पुरुष	स्याम्	स्याव	स्याम

लृट्

इस लकार में अस् धातु को भू आदेश हो जाता है।[1] इसलिए इसके रूप भविष्यति इत्यादि भू धातु की तरह चलते हैं ।

3. हन् = मारना, प०, अनिट्, (किन्तु लृट् में विशेष नियम से इट्[2])

1. अस्तेर्भूः । ☐ पा. **2.4.52**

2. ऋद्धनोः स्ये । ☐ पा. **7.2.70**

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	हन्ति	हतः	घ्नन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	हंसि	हथः	हथ
उत्तम पुरुष	हन्मि	हन्वः	हन्मः

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	हन्तु	हताम्	घ्नन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	जहि	हतम्	हत
उत्तम पुरुष	हनानि	हनाव	हनाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अहन्	अहताम्	अघ्नन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अहन्	अहतम्	अहत
उत्तम पुरुष	अहनम्	अहन्व	अहन्म

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	हन्यात्	हन्याताम्	हन्युः
मध्यम पुरुष	हन्याः	हन्यातम्	हन्यात
उत्तम पुरुष	हन्याम्	हन्याव	हन्याम

लृट् में अनिट् होने पर भी विशेष नियम से इट् होता है।

अतः हनिष्यति हनिष्यतः हनिष्यन्ति –इत्यादि रूप होते हैं।

4. पा = रक्षा करना, प0, अनिट्

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	पाति	पातः	पान्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	पासि	पाथः	पाथ
उत्तम पुरुष	पामि	पावः	पामः

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	पातु	पाताम्	पान्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	पाहि	पातम्	पात
उत्तम पुरुष	पानि	पाव	पाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अपात्	अपाताम्	अपुः, अपान्
मध्यम पुरुष	अपाः	अपातम्	अपात
उत्तम पुरुष	अपाम्	अपाव	अपाम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	पायात्	पायाताम्	पायुः
मध्यम पुरुष	पायाः	पायातम्	पायात
उत्तम पुरुष	पायाम्	पायाव	पायाम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	पास्यति	पास्यतः	पास्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	पास्यसि	पास्यथः	पास्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	पास्यामि	पास्यावः	पास्यामः

5. या = जाना, अनिट् के रूप **पा** धातु की तरह ही होते हैं, जैसे – लट्–याति, लोट्–यातु, लङ्–अयात्, विधिलिङ्–यायात्, और लृट्–यास्यति ।

6. इण् (इ) = जाना, प0, अनिट्,

लट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	एति	इतः	यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	एषि	इथः	इथ
उत्तम पुरुष	एमि	इवः	इमः

लोट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	एतु	इताम्	यन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	इहि	इतम्	इत
उत्तम पुरुष	अयानि	अयाव	अयाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	ऐत्	ऐताम्	आयन्
मध्यम पुरुष	ऐः	ऐतम्	ऐत
उत्तम पुरुष	आयम्	ऐव	ऐम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	इयात्	इयाताम्	इयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	इयाः	इयातम्	इयात
उत्तम पुरुष	इयाम्	इयाव	इयाम

लृट्

प्रथम पुरुष	एष्यति	एष्यतः	एष्यन्ति आदि

7. दुह् = दुहना, उ0, अनिट्
परस्मैपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	दोग्धि	दुग्धः	दुहन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	धोक्षि	दुग्धः	दुग्ध
उत्तम पुरुष	दोह्मि	दुह्वः	दुह्मः

लोट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	दोग्धु	दुग्धाम्	दुहन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	दुग्धि	दुग्धम्	दुग्ध
उत्तम पुरुष	दोहानि	दोहाव	दोहाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	अधोक्	अदुग्धाम्	अदुहन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अधोक्	अदुग्धम्	अदुग्ध
उत्तम पुरुष	अदोहम्	अदुह्व	अदुह्म

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	दुह्यात्	दुह्याताम्	दुह्युः
मध्यम पुरुष	दुह्याः	दुह्यातम्	दुह्यात
उत्तम पुरुष	दुह्याम्	दुह्याव	दुह्याम

लृट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	धोक्ष्यति	धोक्ष्यतः	धोक्ष्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	धोक्ष्यसि	धोक्ष्यथः	धोक्ष्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	धोक्ष्यामि	धोक्ष्यावः	धोक्ष्यामः

आत्मनेपद में लट्–दुग्धे, लोट्–दुग्धाम्, लङ्–अदुग्ध, विधिलिङ्–दुहीत, लृट्–धोक्ष्यते आदि रूप होते हैं।

8. ब्रू = कहना, (लृट् में वच्) उभयपदी, अनिट्

परस्मैपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	ब्रवीति	ब्रूतः	ब्रुवन्ति
	(आह	आहतुः	आहुः)
मध्यम पुरुष	ब्रवीषि	ब्रूथः	ब्रूथ
	(आत्थ	आहथुः	--)
उत्तम पुरुष	ब्रवीमि	ब्रूवः	ब्रूमः

लोट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	ब्रवीतु	ब्रूताम्	ब्रुवन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	ब्रूहि	ब्रूतम्	ब्रूत
उत्तम पुरुष	ब्रवाणि	ब्रवाव	ब्रवाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	अब्रवीत्	अब्रूताम्	अब्रुवन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अब्रवीः	अब्रूतम्	अब्रूत
उत्तम पुरुष	अब्रवम्	अब्रूव	अब्रूम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	ब्रूयात्	ब्रूयाताम्	ब्रूयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	ब्रूयाः	ब्रूयातम्	ब्रूयात
उत्तम पुरुष	ब्रूयाम्	ब्रूयाव	ब्रूयाम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	वक्ष्यति	वक्ष्यतः	वक्ष्यन्ति इत्यादि

आत्मनेपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	ब्रूते	ब्रुवाते	ब्रुवते
मध्यम पुरुष	ब्रूषे	ब्रुवाथे	ब्रूध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	ब्रुवे	ब्रूवहे	ब्रूमहे

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	ब्रूताम्	ब्रुवाताम्	ब्रुवताम्
मध्यम पुरुष	ब्रूष्व	ब्रुवाथाम्	ब्रूध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	ब्रवै	ब्रवावहै	ब्रवामहै

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अब्रूत	अब्रुवाताम्	अब्रुवत
मध्यम पुरुष	अब्रूथाः	अब्रुवाथाम्	अब्रूध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	अब्रुवि	अब्रूवहि	अब्रूमहि

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	ब्रुवीत	ब्रुवीयाताम्	ब्रुवीरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	ब्रुवीथाः	ब्रुवीयाथाम्	ब्रुवीध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	ब्रुवीय	ब्रुवीवहि	ब्रुवीमहि

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	वक्ष्यते	वक्ष्येते	वक्ष्यन्ते इत्यादि

9. स्वप् = सोना, प0, अनिट्

स्वप् और **रुद्** धातु के लट् के अन्ति को छोड़कर सर्वत्र इट् (इ) हो जाता है। लोट् के अन्तु और उत्तम पुरुष के तीनों वचनों को छोड़कर अन्यत्र इट् (इ) हो जाता है। इसलिए रूप होते हैं–

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	स्वपिति	स्वपितः	स्वपन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	स्वपिषि	स्वपिथः	स्वपिथ
उत्तम पुरुष	स्वपिमि	स्वपिवः	स्वपिमः

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	स्वपितु	स्वपिताम्	स्वपन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	स्वपिहि	स्वपितम्	स्वपित
उत्तम पुरुष	स्वपानि	स्वपाव	स्वपाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अस्वपत्, अस्वपीत्	अस्वपिताम्	अस्वपन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अस्वपः, अस्वपीः	अस्वपितम्	अस्वपित
उत्तम पुरुष	अस्वपम्	अस्वपिव	अस्वपिम

टिप्पणी - लङ् में प्रथम और मध्यम पुरुष के एकवचन में तिङ् के पूर्व और धातु के अन्त में अट् (अ) और ईट् (ई) भी लगता है। प्र. पु. बहुवचन और उ. पु. एकवचन को छोड़कर धातु के अन्त में सर्वत्र (इ) लग जाता है।

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	स्वप्यात्	स्वप्याताम्	स्वप्युः
मध्यम पुरुष	स्वप्याः	स्वप्यातम्	स्वप्यात
उत्तम पुरुष	स्वप्याम्	स्वप्याव	स्वप्याम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	स्वप्स्यति	स्वप्स्यतः	स्वप्स्यन्ति इत्यादि

10. रुद् = रोना, प0, अनिट् का रूप स्वप् की तरह होता है।

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	रोदिति	रुदितः	रुदन्ति इत्यादि

11. विद् = जानना, प0, सेट्

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	वेत्ति	वित्तः	विदन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	वेत्सि	वित्थः	वित्थ
उत्तम पुरुष	वेद्मि	विद्वः	विद्मः

तथा

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	वेद	विदतुः	विदुः
मध्यम पुरुष	वेत्थ	विदथुः	विद
उत्तम पुरुष	वेद	विद्व	विद्म

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	वेत्तु	वित्ताम्	विदन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	विद्धि	वित्तम्	वित्त
उत्तम पुरुष	वेदानि	वेदाव	वेदाम

तथा

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	विदाङ्करोतु	विदाङ्कुरुताम्	विदाङ्कुर्वन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	विदाङ्कुरु	विदाङ्कुरुतम्	विदाङ्कुरुत
उत्तम पुरुष	विदाङ्करवाणि	विदाङ्करवाव	विदाङ्करवाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अवेत्	अवित्ताम्	अविदुः
मध्यम पुरुष	अवेः, अवेत्	अवित्तम्	अवित्त
उत्तम पुरुष	अवेदम्	अविद्व	अविद्म

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	विद्यात्	विद्याताम्	विद्युः
मध्यम पुरुष	विद्याः	विद्यातम्	विद्यात
उत्तम पुरुष	विद्याम्	विद्याव	विद्याम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	वेदिष्यति	वेदिष्यतः	वेदिष्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	वेदिष्यसि	वेदिष्यथः	वेदिष्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	वेदिष्यामि	वेदिष्यावः	वेदिष्यामः

टिप्पणी – विद् के लट् में परस्मैपद के स्थान में णल् (अ), अतुस्, उस्, थल्, अथुस्, अ, णल् (अ), व, और म, आदेश भी हो जाता है। इसलिए वेत्ति आदि

रूपों के साथ-साथ वेद आदि रूप भी बनते हैं जो कि ऊपर दिए गए हैं। लोट् में वेत्तु आदि जाने-पहचाने रूपों के साथ-साथ विदाङ्करोतु इत्यादि रूप भी बनते हैं, जिन्हें बनाने का सरल तरीका यह है कि 'विदाम्' के आगे कृ धातु के लोट् के रूप 'करोतु', 'कुरुताम्' आदि जोड़ा जाए। इस धातु के लङ् में प्रथम पुरुष बहुवचन में 'अन्' नहीं लगता है किन्तु उस् लगता है।

12. शीङ्[1] = सोना, आत्मनेपदी, सेट्

लट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	शेते	शयाते	शेरते
मध्यम पुरुष	शेषे	शयाथे	शेध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	शये	शेवहे	शेमहे

लोट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	शेताम्	शयाताम्	शेरताम्
मध्यम पुरुष	शेष्व	शयाथाम्	शेध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	शयै	शयावहै	शयामहै

लङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	अशेत	अशयाताम्	अशेरत
मध्यम पुरुष	अशेथाः	अशयाथाम्	अशेध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	अशयि	अशेवहि	अशेमहि

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	शयीत	शयीयाताम्	शयीरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	शयीथाः	शयीयाथाम्	शयीध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	शयीय	शयीवहि	शयीमहि

1. प्रारंभ के चार लकारों में 'शीङः सार्वधातुके गुणः' ❑ **पा. 7.4.21** से गुण हुआ है और लृट् में 'सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोः' ❑ **पा. 7.3.84 से गुण होता है।**

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	शयिष्यते	शयिष्येते	शयिष्यन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	शयिष्यसे	शयिष्येथे	शयिष्यध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	शयिष्ये	शयिष्यावहे	शयिष्यामहे

13. आस् = बैठना, आत्मनेपदी, सेट्

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	आस्ते	आसाते	आसते
मध्यम पुरुष	आस्से	आसाथे	आध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	आसे	आस्वहे	आस्महे

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	आस्ताम्	आसाताम्	आसताम्
मध्यम पुरुष	आस्स्व	आसाथाम्	आध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	आसै	आसावहै	आसामहै

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	आस्त	आसाताम्	आसत
मध्यम पुरुष	आस्थाः	आसाथाम्	आध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	आसि	आस्वहि	आस्महि

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	आसीत	आसीयाताम्	आसीरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	आसीथाः	आसीयाथाम्	आसीध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	आसीय	आसीवहि	आसीमहि

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	आसिष्यते	आसिष्येते	आसिष्यन्ते इत्यादि

14. अधि + इङ् (इ) = अध्ययन करना, आत्मनेपदी, अनिट्

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अधीते	अधीयाते	अधीयते
मध्यम पुरुष	अधीषे	अधीयाथे	अधीध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	अधीये	अधीवहे	अधीमहे

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अधीताम्	अधीयाताम्	अधीयताम्
मध्यम पुरुष	अधीष्व	अधीयाथाम्	अधीध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	अध्ययै	अध्ययावहै	अध्ययामहै

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अध्यैत	अध्यैयाताम्	अध्यैयत
मध्यम पुरुष	अध्यैथाः	अध्यैयाथाम्	अध्यैध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	अध्यैयि	अध्यैवहि	अध्यैमहि

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अधीयीत	अधीयीयाताम्	अधीयीरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अधीयीथाः	अधीयीयाथाम्	अधीयीध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	अधीयीय	अधीयीवहि	अधीयीमहि

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अध्येष्यते	अध्येष्येते	अध्येष्यन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	अध्येष्यसे	अध्येष्येथे	अध्येष्यध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	अध्येष्ये	अध्येष्यावहे	अध्येष्यामहे

15. जागृ = जागना, परस्मैपदी, सेट्

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	जागर्ति	जागृतः	जाग्रति
मध्यम पुरुष	जागर्षि	जागृथः	जागृथ
उत्तम पुरुष	जागर्मि	जागृवः	जागृमः

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	जागर्तु	जागृताम्	जाग्रतु
मध्यम पुरुष	जागृहि	जागृतम्	जागृत
उत्तम पुरुष	जागराणि	जागराव	जागराम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अजागः	अजागृताम्	अजागरुः
मध्यम पुरुष	अजागः	अजागृतम्	अजागृत
उत्तम पुरुष	अजागरम्	अजागृव	अजागृम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	जागृयात्	जागृयाताम्	जागृयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	जागृयाः	जागृयातम्	जागृयात
उत्तम पुरुष	जागृयाम्	जागृयाव	जागृयाम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	जागरिष्यति	जागरिष्यतः	जागरिष्यन्ति इत्यादि

जुहोत्यादि गण (तृतीय गण)

जुहोत्यादि धातु का विकरण **श्लु** (शून्य) माना गया है। लट्, लोट्, लङ् और विधिलिङ् में श्लु होता है। यह श्लु धातु को दुहरा देता है। लट् और लङ् के प्रथम पुरुष बहुवचन में क्रमशः अति और उस् प्रत्यय लगते हैं। लोट् के प्रथम पुरुष बहुवचन में अतु लगता है।

जुहोत्यादिगण की प्रमुख धातुएँ निम्नलिखित हैं–

1. हु = हवन करना, यज्ञ करना	परस्मैपदी,	अनिट्	जुहोति
2. भी = डरना	”	”	बिभेति
3. दा = देना	उभयपदी	”	ददाति, दत्ते
4. भृ = भरणपोषण करना	”	”	बिभर्ति, बिभृते

1. हु = (हवन करना, प0 अनिट्) का रूप इस तरह चलता है–

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	जुहोति	जुहुतः	जुह्वति
मध्यम पुरुष	जुहोषि	जुहुथः	जुहुथ
उत्तम पुरुष	जुहोमि	जुहुवः	जुहुमः

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	जुहोतु	जुहुताम्	जुह्वतु
मध्यम पुरुष	जुहुधि	जुहुतम्	जुहुत
उत्तम पुरुष	जुहवानि	जुहवाव	जुहवाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अजुहोत्	अजुहुताम्	अजुहुवुः
मध्यम पुरुष	अजुहोः	अजुहुतम्	अजुहुत
उत्तम पुरुष	अजुहवम्	अजुहुव	अजुहुम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	जुहुयात्	जुहुयाताम्	जुहुयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	जुहुयाः	जुहुयातम्	जुहुयात
उत्तम पुरुष	जुहुयाम्	जुहुयाव	जुहुयाम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	होष्यति	होष्यतः	होष्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	होष्यसि	होष्यथः	होष्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	होष्यामि	होष्यावः	होष्यामः

टिप्पणी – हु धातु के लोट् के मध्यम पुरुष एकवचन में **हि** का **धि** होता है।[1]

2. दा = देना, उभयपदी, अनिट्
परस्मैपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	ददाति	दत्तः	ददति
मध्यम पुरुष	ददासि	दत्थः	दत्थ
उत्तम पुरुष	ददामि	दद्वः	दद्मः

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	ददातु	दत्ताम्	ददतु
मध्यम पुरुष	देहि	दत्तम्	दत्त
उत्तम पुरुष	ददानि	ददाव	ददाम

1. हुझल्भ्यो हेर्धिः। ☐ पा. **6.4.101**

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अददात्	अदत्ताम्	अददुः
मध्यम पुरुष	अददाः	अदत्तम्	अदत्त
उत्तम पुरुष	अददाम्	अदद्व	अदद्म

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	दद्यात्	दद्याताम्	दद्युः
मध्यम पुरुष	दद्याः	दद्यातम्	दद्यात
उत्तम पुरुष	दद्याम्	दद्याव	दद्याम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	दास्यति	दास्यतः	दास्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	दास्यसि	दास्यथः	दास्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	दास्यामि	दास्यावः	दास्यामः

आत्मनेपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	दत्ते	ददाते	ददते
मध्यम पुरुष	दत्से	ददाथे	दद्ध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	ददे	दद्वहे	दद्महे

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	दत्ताम्	ददाताम्	ददताम्
मध्यम पुरुष	दत्स्व	ददाथाम्	दद्ध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	ददै	ददावहै	ददामहै

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अदत्त	अददात्ताम्	अददत
मध्यम पुरुष	अदत्थाः	अददाथाम्	अदद्ध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	अददि	अदद्वहि	अदद्महि

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	ददीत	ददीयाताम्	ददीरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	ददीथाः	ददीयाथाम्	ददीढ्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	ददीय	ददीवहि	ददीमहि

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	दास्यते	दास्येते	दास्यन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	दास्यसे	दास्येथे	दास्यध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	दास्ये	दास्यावहे	दास्यामहे

स्वादि गण (पञ्चम गण)

स्वादिगण के धातुओं का विकरण श्नु (नु) है। इस विकरण के कारण धातु को गुण नहीं होता है।

स्वादिगण की प्रमुख धातुएँ निम्नलिखत हैं–

1. सु	= रस निकालना	उभयपदी,	अनिट्,	सुनोति, सुनुते
2. चि	= चुनना, इकट्ठा करना	”	”	चिनोति, चिनुते
3. आप्	= पाना	”	”	आप्नोति, आप्नुते
4. श्रु	= सुनना	परस्मैपदी	”	शृणोति

1. सु (रस निंचोड़ना, उ0, अनिट्) धातु के रूप
परस्मैपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	सुनोति	सुनुतः	सुन्वन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	सुनोषि	सुनुथः	सुनुथ
उत्तम पुरुष	सुनोमि	सुन्वः, सुनुवः	सुन्मः, सुनुमः

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	सुनोतु	सुनुताम्	सुन्वन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	सुनु	सुनुतम्	सुनुत
उत्तम पुरुष	सुनवानि	सुनवाव	सुनवाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	असुनोत्	असुनुताम्	असुन्वन्
मध्यम पुरुष	असुनोः	असुनुतम्	असुनुत
उत्तम पुरुष	असुनवम्	असुन्व, असुनुव	असुन्म, असुनुम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	सुनुयात्	सुनुयाताम्	सुनुयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	सुनुयाः	सुनुयातम्	सुनुयात
उत्तम पुरुष	सुनुयाम्	सुनुयाव	सुनुयाम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	सोष्यति	सोष्यतः	सोष्यन्ति इत्यादि

आत्मनेपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	सुनुते	सुन्वाते	सुन्वते
मध्यम पुरुष	सुनुषे	सुन्वाथे	सुनुध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	सुन्वे	सुन्वहे, सुनुवहे	सुन्महे, सुनुमहे

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	सुनुताम्	सुन्वाताम्	सुन्वताम्
मध्यम पुरुष	सुनुष्व	सुन्वाथाम्	सुनुध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	सुनवै	सुनवावहै	सुनवामहै

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	असुनुत	असुन्वाताम्	असुन्वत
मध्यम पुरुष	असुनुथाः	असुन्वाथाम्	असुनुध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	असुन्वि	असुन्वहि, असुनुवहि	असुन्महि, असुनुमहि

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	सुन्वीत	सुन्वीयाताम्	सुन्वीरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	सुन्वीथाः	सुन्वीयाथाम्	सुन्वीध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	सुन्वीय	सुन्वीवहि	सुन्वीमहि

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	सोष्यते	सोष्येते	सोष्यन्ते इत्यादि

2. शक् (सकना) परस्मैपदी, अनिट्

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	शक्नोति	शक्नुतः	शक्नुवन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	शक्नोषि	शक्नुथः	शक्नुथ
उत्तम पुरुष	शक्नोमि	शक्नुवः	शक्नुमः

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	शक्नोतु	शक्नुताम्	शक्नुवन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	शक्नुहि	शक्नुतम्	शक्नुत
उत्तम पुरुष	शक्नवानि	शक्नवाव	शक्नवाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अशक्नोत्	अशक्नुताम्	अशक्नुवन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अशक्नोः	अशक्नुतम्	अशक्नुत
उत्तम पुरुष	अशक्नवम्	अशक्नुव	अशक्नुम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	शक्नुयात्	शक्नुयाताम्	शक्नुयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	शक्नुयाः	शक्नुयातम्	शक्नुयात
उत्तम पुरुष	शक्नुयाम्	शक्नुयाव	शक्नुयाम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	शक्ष्यति	शक्ष्यतः	शक्ष्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	शक्ष्यसि	शक्ष्यथः	शक्ष्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	शक्ष्यामि	शक्ष्यावः	शक्ष्यामः

3. चि = चुनना, इकट्ठा करना, उभयपदी, अनिट्
परस्मैपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	चिनोति	चिनुतः	चिन्वन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	चिनोषि	चिनुथः	चिनुथ
उत्तम पुरुष	चिनोमि	चिन्वः, चिनुवः	चिन्मः, चिनुमः

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	चिनोतु	चिनुताम्	चिन्वन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	चिनु	चिनुतम्	चिनुत
उत्तम पुरुष	चिनवानि	चिनवाव	चिनवाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अचिनोत्	अचिनुताम्	अचिन्वन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अचिनोः	अचिनुतम्	अचिनुत
उत्तम पुरुष	अचिनवम्	अचिन्व, अचिनुव	अचिन्म, अचिनुम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	चिनुयात्	चिनुयाताम्	चिनुयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	चिनुयाः	चिनुयातम्	चिनुयात
उत्तम पुरुष	चिनुयाम्	चिनुयाव	चिनुयाम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	चेष्यति	चेष्यतः	चेष्यन्ति इत्यादि

आत्मनेपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	चिनुते	चिन्वाते	चिन्वते
मध्यम पुरुष	चिनुषे	चिन्वाथे	चिनुध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	चिन्वे	चिन्वहे, चिनुवहे	चिन्महे, चिनुमहे

लोट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	चिनुताम्	चिन्वाताम्	चिन्वताम्
मध्यम पुरुष	चिनुष्व	चिन्वाथाम्	चिनुध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	चिनवै	चिनवावहै	चिनवामहै

लङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	अचिनुत	अचिन्वाताम्	अचिन्वत
मध्यम पुरुष	अचिनुथाः	अचिन्वाथाम्	अचिनुध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	अचिन्वि	अचिन्वहि, अचिनुवहि	अचिन्महि, अचिनुमहि

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	चिन्वीत	चिन्वीयाताम्	चिन्वीरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	चिन्वीथाः	चिन्वीयाथाम्	चिन्वीध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	चिन्वीय	चिन्वीवहि	चिन्वीमहि

लृट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	चेष्यते	चेष्येते	चेष्यन्ते इत्यादि

4. आप् = पाना, उभयपदी, अनिट् के रूप प्र उपसर्ग के साथ इस प्रकार चलते हैं–

परस्मैपद में लट्–प्राप्नोति, लोट्–प्राप्नोतु, (मध्यम पु0, एकव0–प्राप्नुहि) लङ्–प्राप्नोत्, विधिलिङ्–प्राप्नुयात्, और लृट्–प्राप्स्यति । और आत्मनेपद में लट्–प्राप्नुते इत्यादि रूप भी **सु** धातु की तरह होते हैं।

5. श्रु = सुनना, परस्मैपदी, अनिट्

टिप्पणी – यद्यपि **श्रु** धातु को भ्वादिगण में पढ़ा गया है। परन्तु इसमें 'श्नु' विकरण का विधान किया गया है। इसलिए इसका रूप **सु** की तरह होता है। अतः विद्यार्थियों को आसानी से समझने के लिए उसको स्वादिगणीय माना जा सकता है। भ्वादि गण में पाठ का प्रयोजन है वेद में 'शृणोति' के साथ-साथ 'श्रवति' की सिद्धि। **श्रुवः शृ च**[1] सूत्र से पाणिनि श्नु प्रत्यय का विधान करते हैं और श्रु को **शृ** आदेश करते हैं। इसलिए जहाँ-जहाँ (लट्, लोट्, लङ् और विधिलिङ् में) श्नु प्रत्यय होगा वहाँ-वहाँ शृ आदेश होगा।

इसका रूप **सु** की तरह चलेगा। श्रु धातु बहुत प्रयोग में आता है। इसलिए इसके रूप नीचे दिए जाते हैं–

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	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	शृणोति	शृणुतः	शृण्वन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	शृणोषि	शृणुथः	शृणुथ
उत्तम पुरुष	शृणोमि	शृण्वः, शृणुवः	शृण्मः, शृणुमः

लोट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	शृणोतु, शृणुतात्	शृणुताम्	शृण्वन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	शृणु, शृणुतात्	शृणुतम्	शृणुत
उत्तम पुरुष	शृणवानि	शृणवाव	शृणवाम

1. ❑ पा. 3.1.74

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	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अशृणोत्	अशृणुताम्	अशृण्वन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अशृणोः	अशृणुतम्	अशृणुत
उत्तम पुरुष	अशृणवम्	अशृण्व, अशृणुव	अशृण्म, अशृणुम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	शृणुयात्	शृणुयाताम्	शृणुयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	शृणुयाः	शृणुयातम्	शृणुयात
उत्तम पुरुष	शृणुयाम्	शृणुयाव	शृणुयाम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	श्रोष्यति	श्रोष्यतः	श्रोष्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	श्रोष्यसि	श्रोष्यथः	श्रोष्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	श्रोष्यामि	श्रोष्यावः	श्रोष्यामः

रुधादि गण (सप्तम गण)

रुधादि धातुओं का विकरण **श्नम्** (न) है। यह **न** धातु के अन्तिम स्वर के आगे होता है। सभी पुरुषों के एक वचन **तिप्**, **सिप्** और **मिप्** में **न** पूरा रहता है किन्तु अन्यत्र 'न' का 'अ' लुप्त हो जाता है। आत्मनेपद में तो सर्वत्र 'न्' हलन्त होकर ही आता है। इस गण के प्रमुख धातु ये हैं–

1. **रुध् =** रोकना, उभयपदी, अनिट्
2. **भुज् =** भोगना और खाना, (खाना-अर्थ में आत्मनेपद, उपभोग करना या भोगना-अर्थ में परस्मैपद), अनिट्

1. रुध् धातु के रूप—

परस्मैपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	रुणद्धि	रुन्धः	रुन्धन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	रुणत्सि	रुन्धः	रुन्ध
उत्तम पुरुष	रुणध्मि	रुन्ध्वः	रुन्ध्मः

लोट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	रुणद्धु	रुद्धाम्	रुन्धन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	रुन्द्धि	रुन्धम्	रुन्द्ध
उत्तम पुरुष	रुणधानि	रुणधाव	रुणधाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	अरुणत्, अरुणद्	अरुन्धाम्	अरुन्धन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अरुणः, अरुणत्	अरुन्द्धम्	अरुन्ध
उत्तम पुरुष	अरुणधम्	अरुन्ध्व	अरुन्ध्म

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	रुन्ध्यात्	रुन्ध्याताम्	रुन्ध्युः
मध्यम पुरुष	रुन्ध्याः	रुन्ध्यातम्	रुन्ध्यात
उत्तम पुरुष	रुन्ध्याम्	रुन्ध्याव	रुन्ध्याम

लृट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	रोत्स्यति	रोत्स्यतः	रोत्स्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	रोत्स्यसि	रोत्स्यथः	रोत्स्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	रोत्स्यामि	रोत्स्यावः	रोत्स्यामः

आत्मनेपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	रुन्धे	रुन्धाते	रुन्धते
मध्यम पुरुष	रुन्त्से	रुन्धाथे	रुन्ध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	रुन्धे	रुन्ध्वहे	रुन्ध्महे

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	रुन्द्धाम्	रुन्द्धाताम्	रुन्धताम्
मध्यम पुरुष	रुन्त्स्व	रुन्धाथाम्	रुन्द्ध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	रुणधै	रुणधावहै	रुणधामहै

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अरुन्द्ध	अरुन्धाताम्	अरुन्धत
मध्यम पुरुष	अरुन्द्धाः	अरुन्धाथाम्	अरुन्ध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	अरुन्धि	अरुन्ध्वहि	अरुन्ध्महि

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	रुन्धीत	रुन्धीयाताम्	रुन्धीरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	रुन्धीथाः	रुन्धीयाथाम्	रुन्धीध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	रुन्धीय	रुन्धीवहि	रुन्धीमहि

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	रोत्स्यते	रोत्स्येते	रोत्स्यन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	रोत्स्यसे	रोत्स्येथे	रोत्स्यध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	रोत्स्ये	रोत्स्यावहे	रोत्स्यामहे

2. भुज् = 'भोगना' अर्थ में परस्मैपदी[1] है और 'खाना' अर्थ में आत्मनेपदी[2] है। उसका रूप इस प्रकार चलता है–

परस्मैपदी

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	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	भुनक्ति	भुङ्क्तः	भुञ्जन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	भुनक्षि	भुङ्क्थः	भुङ्क्थ
उत्तम पुरुष	भुनज्मि	भुञ्ज्वः	भुञ्ज्मः

लोट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	भुनक्तु	भुङ्क्ताम्	भुञ्जन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	भुङ्ग्धि	भुङ्क्तम्	भुङ्क्त
उत्तम पुरुष	भुनजानि	भुनजाव	भुनजाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	अभुनक्	अभुङ्क्ताम्	अभुञ्जन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अभुनक्	अभुङ्क्तम्	अभुङ्क्त
उत्तम पुरुष	अभुनजम्	अभुञ्ज्व	अभुञ्ज्म

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	भुञ्ज्यात्	भुञ्ज्याताम्	भुञ्ज्युः
मध्यम पुरुष	भुञ्ज्याः	भुञ्ज्यातम्	भुञ्ज्यात
उत्तम पुरुष	भुञ्ज्याम्	भुञ्ज्याव	भुञ्ज्याम

1. प्रयोग – चोरः कारावासकष्टं यद् भुनक्ति तदुचितमेव।
2. प्रयोग – बालकः स्वादु फलं भुङ्क्ते।

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	भोक्ष्यति	भोक्ष्यतः	भोक्ष्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	भोक्ष्यसि	भोक्ष्यथः	भोक्ष्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	भोक्ष्यामि	भोक्ष्यावः	भोक्ष्यामः

आत्मनेपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	भुङ्क्ते	भुञ्जाते	भुञ्जते
मध्यम पुरुष	भुङ्क्षे	भुञ्जाथे	भुङ्ध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	भुञ्जे	भुञ्ज्वहे	भुञ्ज्महे

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	भुङ्क्ताम्	भुञ्जाताम्	भुञ्जताम्
मध्यम पुरुष	भुङ्क्ष्व	भुञ्जाथाम्	भुङ्ध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	भुनजै	भुनजावहै	भुनजामहै

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अभुङ्क्त	अभुञ्जाताम्	अभुञ्जत
मध्यम पुरुष	अभुङ्क्थाः	अभुञ्जाथाम्	अभुङ्ध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	अभुञ्जि	अभुञ्ज्वहि	अभुञ्ज्महि

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	भुञ्जीत	भुञ्जीयाताम्	भुञ्जीरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	भुञ्जीथाः	भुञ्जीयाथाम्	भुञ्जीध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	भुञ्जीय	भुञ्जीवहि	भुञ्जीमहि

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	भोक्ष्यते	भोक्ष्येते	भोक्ष्यन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	भोक्ष्यसे	भोक्ष्येथे	भोक्ष्यध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	भोक्ष्ये	भोक्ष्यावहे	भोक्ष्यामहे

तनादि गण (अष्टम गण)

तनादि (तन् और कृ धातु) का विकरण **उ** है। इस 'उ' को तिप्, सिप्, मिप् अर्थात् सभी पुरुषों के एकवचनों में गुण 'ओ' हो जाता है।
तनादि के कुछ मुख्य धातु के रूप इस प्रकार हैं–

1. तन् = फैलाना, उभयपदी, सेट्

परस्मैपद

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	तनोति	तनुतः	तन्वन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	तनोषि	तनुथः	तनुथ
उत्तम पुरुष	तनोमि	तन्वः, तनुवः	तन्मः, तनुमः

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	तनोतु	तनुताम्	तन्वन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	तनु	तनुतम्	तनुत
उत्तम पुरुष	तनवानि	तनवाव	तनवाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अतनोत्	अतनुताम्	अतन्वन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अतनोः	अतनुतम्	अतनुत
उत्तम पुरुष	अतनवम्	अतन्व, अतनुव	अतन्म, अतनुम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	तनुयात्	तनुयाताम्	तनुयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	तनुयाः	तनुयातम्	तनुयात
उत्तम पुरुष	तनुयाम्	तनुयाव	तनुयाम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	तनिष्यति	तनिष्यतः	तनिष्यन्ति इत्यादि

आत्मनेपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	तनुते	तन्वाते	तन्वते
मध्यम पुरुष	तनुषे	तन्वाथे	तनुध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	तन्वे	तन्वहे, तनुवहे	तन्महे, तनुमहे

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	तनुताम्	तन्वाताम्	तन्वताम्
मध्यम पुरुष	तनुष्व	तन्वाथाम्	तनुध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	तनवै	तनवावहै	तनवामहै

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अतनुत	अतन्वाताम्	अतन्वत
मध्यम पुरुष	अतनुथाः	अतन्वाथाम्	अतनुध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	अतन्वि	अतन्वहि, अतनुवहि	अतन्महि, अतनुमहि

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	तन्वीत	तन्वीयाताम्	तन्वीरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	तन्वीथाः	तन्वीयाथाम्	तन्वीध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	तन्वीय	तन्वीवहि	तन्वीमहि

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	तनिष्यते	तनिष्येते	तनिष्यन्ते इत्यादि

2. कृ = करना, उभयपदी, अनिट् (किन्तु लृट् में सेट्)

तिप्, सिप्, मिप् में तन् धातु की तरह रूप होते हैं। कृ के ऋ को गुण अर् होने पर करोति करोषि करोमि में उ को गुण हुआ है। अन्यत्र 'क' का 'अ' 'उ' में बदल जाता है और कुरुतः इत्यादि बनता है। लोट् के मध्यम पुरुष में भी 'क' के 'अ' को 'उ' हो जाता है ।

परस्मैपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	करोति	कुरुतः	कुर्वन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	करोषि	कुरुथः	कुरुथ
उत्तम पुरुष	करोमि	कुर्वः	कुर्मः

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	करोतु	कुरुताम्	कुर्वन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	कुरु	कुरुतम्	कुरुत
उत्तम पुरुष	करवाणि	करवाव	करवाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अकरोत्	अकुरुताम्	अकुर्वन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अकरोः	अकुरुतम्	अकुरुत
उत्तम पुरुष	अकरवम्	अकुर्व	अकुर्म

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	कुर्यात्	कुर्याताम्	कुर्युः
मध्यम पुरुष	कुर्याः	कुर्यातम्	कुर्यात
उत्तम पुरुष	कुर्याम्	कुर्याव	कुर्याम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	करिष्यति	करिष्यतः	करिष्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	करिष्यसि	करिष्यथः	करिष्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	करिष्यामि	करिष्यावः	करिष्यामः

आत्मनेपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	कुरुते	कुर्वाते	कुर्वते
मध्यम पुरुष	कुरुषे	कुर्वाथे	कुरुध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	कुर्वे	कुर्वहे	कुर्महे

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	कुरुताम्	कुर्वाताम्	कुर्वताम्
मध्यम पुरुष	कुरुष्व	कुर्वाथाम्	कुरुध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	करवै	करवावहै	करवामहै

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अकुरुत	अकुर्वाताम्	अकुर्वत
मध्यम पुरुष	अकुरुथाः	अकुर्वाथाम्	अकुरुध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	अकुर्वि	अकुर्वहि	अकुर्महि

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	कुर्वीत	कुर्वीयाताम्	कुर्वीरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	कुर्वीथाः	कुर्वीयाथाम्	कुर्वीध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	कुर्वीय	कुर्वीवहि	कुर्वीमहि

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	करिष्यते	करिष्येते	करिष्यन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	करिष्यसे	करिष्येथे	करिष्यध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	करिष्ये	करिष्यावहे	करिष्यामहे

क्र्यादि गण (नवम गण)

क्र्यादि गण का विकरण **श्ना** (ना) है। यह 'ना' सभी पुरुषों के एकवचन में 'ना' के रूप में रहता है परन्तु 'अन्ति' में 'न्' स्वरहीन बन जाता है और अन्यत्र 'नी' के रूप में आता है। लोट् के मध्यम पुरुष में और विधिलिङ् में सर्वत्र 'नी' बन जाता है। आत्मनेपद में स्वरादि प्रत्यय को छोड़कर अन्यत्र 'नी' हो जाता है।

क्र्यादि गण की प्रमुख धातुएँ निम्नलिखित हैं–

1. क्री	= खरीदना	उभयपदी,	अनिट्	क्रीणाति, क्रीणीते
2. ज्ञा (जा)	= जानना	"	"	जानाति, जानीते
3. पू (पु)	= पवित्र करना	"	सेट्	पुनाति, पुनीते
4. ग्रह् (गृह्)	= लेना	"	"	गृह्णाति, गृह्णीते

1. क्री = खरीदना, उभयपदी, अनिट् के रूप इस प्रकार होते हैं–
परस्मैपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	क्रीणाति	क्रीणीतः	क्रीणन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	क्रीणासि	क्रीणीथः	क्रीणीथ
उत्तम पुरुष	क्रीणामि	क्रीणीवः	क्रीणीमः

लोट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	क्रीणातु	क्रीणीताम्	क्रीणन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	क्रीणीहि	क्रीणीतम्	क्रीणीत
उत्तम पुरुष	क्रीणानि	क्रीणाव	क्रीणाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	अक्रीणात्	अक्रीणीताम्	अक्रीणन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अक्रीणाः	अक्रीणीतम्	अक्रीणीत
उत्तम पुरुष	अक्रीणाम्	अक्रीणीव	अक्रीणीम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	क्रीणीयात्	क्रीणीयाताम्	क्रीणीयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	क्रीणीयाः	क्रीणीयातम्	क्रीणीयात
उत्तम पुरुष	क्रीणीयाम्	क्रीणीयाव	क्रीणीयाम

लृट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	क्रेष्यति	क्रेष्यतः	क्रेष्यन्ति इत्यादि

आत्मनेपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	क्रीणीते	क्रीणाते	क्रीणते
मध्यम पुरुष	क्रीणीषे	क्रीणाथे	क्रीणीध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	क्रीणे	क्रीणीवहे	क्रीणीमहे

लोट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	क्रीणीताम्	क्रीणाताम्	क्रीणताम्
मध्यम पुरुष	क्रीणीष्व	क्रीणाथाम्	क्रीणीध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	क्रीणै	क्रीणावहै	क्रीणामहै

लङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	अक्रीणीत	अक्रीणाताम्	अक्रीणत
मध्यम पुरुष	अक्रीणीथाः	अक्रीणाथाम्	अक्रीणीध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	अक्रीणि	अक्रीणीवहि	अक्रीणीमहि

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	क्रीणीत	क्रीणीयाताम्	क्रीणीरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	क्रीणीथाः	क्रीणीयाथाम्	क्रीणीध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	क्रीणीय	क्रीणीवहि	क्रीणीमहि

लृट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	क्रेष्यते	क्रेष्येते	क्रेष्यन्ते इत्यादि

2. ज्ञा = जानना, उभयपदी, अनिट् के स्थान में 'जा' हो जाता है। अन्य परिवर्तन **क्री** धातु की तरह होते हैं–

परस्मैपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	जानाति	जानीतः	जानन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	जानासि	जानीथः	जानीथ
उत्तम पुरुष	जानामि	जानीवः	जानीमः

लोट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	जानातु	जानीताम्	जानन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	जानीहि	जानीतम्	जानीत
उत्तम पुरुष	जानानि	जानाव	जानाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	अजानात्	अजानीताम्	अजानन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अजानाः	अजानीतम्	अजानीत
उत्तम पुरुष	अजानाम्	अजानीव	अजानीम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	जानीयात्	जानीयाताम्	जानीयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	जानीयाः	जानीयातम्	जानीयात
उत्तम पुरुष	जानीयाम्	जानीयाव	जानीयाम

लृट्

	एकवचन	**द्विवचन**	**बहुवचन**
प्रथम पुरुष	ज्ञास्यति	ज्ञास्यतः	ज्ञास्यन्ति इत्यादि

आत्मनेपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	जानीते	जानाते	जानते
मध्यम पुरुष	जानीषे	जानाथे	जानीध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	जाने	जानीवहे	जानीमहे

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	जानीताम्	जानाताम्	जानताम्
मध्यम पुरुष	जानीष्व	जानाथाम्	जानीध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	जानै	जानावहै	जानामहै

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अजानीत	अजानाताम्	अजानत
मध्यम पुरुष	अजानीथाः	अजानाथाम्	अजानीध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	अजानि	अजानीवहि	अजानीमहि

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	जानीत	जानीयाताम्	जानीरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	जानीथाः	जानीयाथाम्	जानीध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	जानीय	जानीवहि	जानीमहि

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	ज्ञास्यते	ज्ञास्येते	ज्ञास्यन्ते इत्यादि

3. पू = पवित्र करना, उभयपदी, सेट्

इस धातु में तिङन्त रूप बनते समय ऊ को ह्रस्व हो जाता है। अन्य रूप क्री धातु के समान चलते हैं। जैसे–

लट्–पुनाति, पुनीते; लोट्–पुनातु, पुनीताम्; लङ्–अपुनात्, अपुनीत; विधिलिङ्–पुनीयात्, पुनीत; लृट्–पविष्यति, पविष्यते आदि।

4. ग्रह् (गृह्) = लेना, उभयपदी, सेट्

परस्मैपदी

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	गृह्णाति	गृह्णीतः	गृह्णन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	गृह्णासि	गृह्णीथः	गृह्णीथ
उत्तम पुरुष	गृह्णामि	गृह्णीवः	गृह्णीमः

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	गृह्णातु	गृह्णीताम्	गृह्णन्तु
मध्यम पुरुष	गृहाण	गृह्णीतम्	गृह्णीत
उत्तम पुरुष	गृह्णानि	गृह्णाव	गृह्णाम

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अगृह्णात्	अगृह्णीताम्	अगृह्णन्
मध्यम पुरुष	अगृह्णाः	अगृह्णीतम्	अगृह्णीत
उत्तम पुरुष	अगृह्णम्	अगृह्णीव	अगृह्णीम

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	गृह्णीयात्	गृह्णीयाताम्	गृह्णीयुः
मध्यम पुरुष	गृह्णीयाः	गृह्णीयातम्	गृह्णीयात
उत्तम पुरुष	गृह्णीयाम्	गृह्णीयाव	गृह्णीयाम

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	ग्रहीष्यति[1]	ग्रहीष्यतः	ग्रहीष्यन्ति
मध्यम पुरुष	ग्रहीष्यसि	ग्रहीष्यथः	ग्रहीष्यथ
उत्तम पुरुष	ग्रहीष्यामि	ग्रहीष्यावः	ग्रहीष्यामः

आत्मनेपद

लट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	गृह्णीते	गृह्णाते	गृह्णते
मध्यम पुरुष	गृह्णीषे	गृह्णाथे	गृह्णीध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	गृह्णे	गृह्णीवहे	गृह्णीमहे

1. ग्रहोऽलिटि दीर्घः। ☐ **पा. 7.2.37 से 'इ' (इट्) को दीर्घ हुआ है।**

लोट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	गृह्णीताम्	गृह्णाताम्	गृह्णताम्
मध्यम पुरुष	गृह्णीष्व	गृह्णाथाम्	गृह्णीध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	गृह्णै	गृह्णावहै	गृह्णामहै

लङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	अगृह्णीत	अगृह्णाताम्	अगृह्णत
मध्यम पुरुष	अगृह्णीथाः	अगृह्णाथाम्	अगृह्णीध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	अगृह्णि	अगृह्णीवहि	अगृह्णीमहि

विधिलिङ्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	गृह्णीत	गृह्णीयाताम्	गृह्णीरन्
मध्यम पुरुष	गृह्णीथाः	गृह्णीयाथाम्	गृह्णीध्वम्
उत्तम पुरुष	गृह्णीय	गृह्णीवहि	गृह्णीमहि

लृट्

	एकवचन	द्विवचन	बहुवचन
प्रथम पुरुष	ग्रहीष्यते	ग्रहीष्येते	ग्रहीष्यन्ते
मध्यम पुरुष	ग्रहीष्यसे	ग्रहीष्येथे	ग्रहीष्यध्वे
उत्तम पुरुष	ग्रहीष्ये	ग्रहीष्यावहे	ग्रहीष्यामहे

णिजन्त (प्रेरणार्थक Causals)

कर्ता जब स्वयं किसी क्रिया को न करता हो, किन्तु दूसरे की प्रेरणा से क्रिया में प्रवृत्त होता हो तो उस वाक्य में धातु के **णिजन्त** रूप का प्रयोग होता है*। णिजन्त रूप बनाने में धातुओं के गणों की विभिन्नता नहीं होती। किन्तु सभी गणों की धातुओं से **णिच्** प्रत्यय लगाकर चुरादि की तरह रूप बनाये जाते हैं। जैसे–

धातु	गण का रूप	णिजन्त
1. पठ्	पठति	पाठयति–ते
2. अद्	अत्ति	आदयति–ते
3. दिव्	दीव्यति	देवयति–ते
4. रुध्	रुणद्धि	रोधयति–ते

टिप्पणी – णिजन्त रूपों में परस्मैपद और आत्मनेपद दोनों प्रकार के प्रत्यय आते हैं।

कुछ धातुओं के णिजन्त रूप इस प्रकार हैं–

धातु	प.	आ.
भू	भावयति	भावयते
स्था	स्थापयति	स्थापयते
पठ्	पाठयति	पाठयते
गम्	गमयति	गमयते
कृ	कारयति	कारयते
क्री	क्रापयति	क्रापयते

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* णिजन्त क्रिया के प्रयोग में यह बात ध्यान देने योग्य है कि गत्यर्थक, ज्ञानार्थक, भक्षणार्थक, सकर्मक एवं अकर्मक धातुओं के मूल (प्रयोज्य) कर्ता के वाचक शब्द से द्वितीया विभक्ति का प्रयोग होता है, किन्तु अन्य सभी अर्थों की धातुओं के मूल कर्ता की तृतीया विभक्ति होती है। जैसे–

1. रमेशः ग्रामं गच्छति। पिता रमेशं ग्रामं गमयति।
2. मोहनः क्रीडति। माता मोहनं क्रीडयति।

किन्तु

3. सूदः ओदनं पचति। स्वामी सूदेन ओदनं पाचयति।
4. भृत्यः कार्यं करोति। प्रभुः भृत्येन कार्यं कारयति।

नामधातु (Nominal Verbs)

संस्कृत भाषा में नाम (प्रातिपदिक) या संज्ञा से भी कुछ प्रत्यय लगाकर धातुएँ बनती हैं, जिन्हें **नामधातु** कहा जाता है। ये प्रत्यय कई हैं। उदाहरण के लिए क्यच् या क्यङ् (य) को लिया जा सकता है–

पुत्रीयति गुरुः छात्रम्। (गुरु छात्र के साथ पुत्रवत् आचरण करता है।)
तपस्यति तापसः। इत्यादि।

अभ्यास

1. **टिप्पणी लिखिए–**
   धातु, नामधातु, विकरण, वाच्य, परस्मैपद, आत्मनेपद, लकार, वेट्, अनिट्।
2. **विधिलिङ् में भ्वादि, चुरादि, दिवादि और तुदादि के प्रत्ययों से अन्य गणों के प्रत्ययों में क्या भेद है, उदाहरण देकर स्पष्ट कीजिए–**
3. **निम्नलिखित धातुओं के रूप, निर्दिष्ट काल, पुरुष और वचन में लिखिए–**

भू	लोट्	– म. पु., एकवचन
गम्	लृट्	– प्र. पु., बहुवचन
श्रु	लट्	– परस्मैपद, म. पु., बहुवचन
हन्	लोट्	– म. पु., एकवचन
स्वप्	लट्	– उ. पु., एकवचन
आस्	विधिलिङ्	– प्र. पु. बहुवचन
दा	(जुहोत्यादि) लङ्	– प्र. पु., बहुवचन
जन्	लट्	– उ. पु., एकवचन
चि	लोट्	– उभयपद, उ. पु., एकवचन
प्रच्छ्	लृट्	– प्र. पु., द्विवचन
सिच्	लङ्	– प्र. पु., एकवचन

भुज्	लट्	– उभयपद, प्र. पु., बहुवचन
कृ	विधिलिङ्	– आत्मनेपद, प्र. पु., बहुवचन
ग्रह्	लोट्	– म. पु., एकवचन
चुर्	लृट्	– उ. पु., बहुवचन

4. निम्नलिखित क्रियापदों के लिए प्रेरणार्थक क्रियापद लिखिए–

गच्छति –

तिष्ठतु –

क्रीणाति –

अपठत् –

भविष्यति –

कुर्यात् –

5. कोष्ठक में निर्दिष्ट धातुओं के उचित रूप से रिक्त स्थानों की पूर्ति कीजिए–

(क) वयं श्वः नाटकम्....... । (दृश्)

(ख) गतवार्षिकपरीक्षायां परीक्षकाः प्रतिपत्रं पञ्च प्रश्नान्.......। (प्रच्छ्)

(ग) जनाः कदापि प्राणिनं न.......। (हन्)

(घ) महापुरुषः न सर्वदा......। (जन्)

(ङ) स्वामी सेवकम् आज्ञापयति– 'त्वं भिक्षुकाय अन्नम्....' इति। (दा)

6. कोष्ठक में कुछ काल और अर्थ दिए गए हैं, उन्हें नीचे लिखे उपयुक्त लकारों के सामने लिखिए–

(आज्ञार्थ, भूतकाल, विध्यर्थ, वर्तमानकाल, भविष्यत्काल)

(च) लङ् ....

(छ) लट् .....

(ज) लोट् .....

(झ) लृट् .....

(ञ) लिङ् .....

7. निम्नलिखित जोड़ियों में शुद्ध रूप पर ✓ यह चिह्न लगाइए–

पास्यति / पिबिष्यति

नृत्स्यति / नर्तिष्यति

अजायत् / अजायत

करोति / करति

लेखति / लिखति

8. निम्नलिखित क्रियापदों का परिचय निर्दिष्ट पद्धति के अनुसार दीजिए–

	धातु	**विकरण**	**पद**	**काल**	**पुरुष**	**वचन**
गच्छति	गम्	अ (शप्)	परस्मैपद	वर्तमान	प्रथम	एकवचन
अपिबत्	——	——	——	——	——	——
एधि	——	——	——	——	——	——
पुनातु	——	——	——	——	——	——
ब्रुवते	——	——	——	——	——	——
कुर्वीरन्	——	——	——	——	——	——

पञ्चम अध्याय

प्रत्यय

(Suffixes)

I. कृदन्त (Primary Suffixes)

धातु के बाद जिन प्रत्ययों को लगा कर संज्ञा, विशेषण अव्यय आदि शब्द बनाए जाते हैं, वे प्रत्यय **कृत्** ('करने वाले' अर्थात् धातु से मूल शब्द बनाने वाले) कहलाते हैं और उनसे बने शब्द **कृदन्त**, जैसे –

पठनीयं (पठ् + अनीयर्) पुस्तकम्, कर्तव्यं (कृ+तव्यत्) कर्म आदि । कृदन्त शब्दों में कारक विभक्तियाँ लगती हैं और उनके प्रथमादि विभक्तियों में रूप बनते हैं । कुछ कृदन्त-शब्द अव्यय बन जाते हैं और उनका रूप परिवर्तित नहीं होता, जैसे– कृत्वा, गत्वा आदि । कुछ कृदन्त-शब्द क्रिया के रूप में भी प्रयुक्त होते हैं, जैसे– सः ग्रामं गतः । कुछ प्रमुख कृत् प्रत्ययों का परिचय यहाँ प्रस्तुत है–

1. कृत्य प्रत्यय[1] (विध्यर्थक)

तव्यत् (तव्य) और अनीयर् (अनीय) –

'चाहिए' तथा 'योग्य' अर्थ में किसी भी धातु में 'तव्यत्' या 'अनीयर्' प्रत्यय जोड़े जाते हैं, जैसे–

गम् + तव्यत् = गन्तव्यम् = जाना चाहिए ।

दा + तव्यत् = दातव्यम् = देना चाहिए ।

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1. कृत्य प्रत्यय सात हैं – तव्यत् (तव्य),तव्य, अनीयर् (अनीय), केलिमर् (एलिम), यत् (य), क्यप् (य) और ण्यत् (य) । कृत्य प्रत्यय सामान्यतया भाववाच्य एवं कर्मवाच्य में प्रयुक्त होते हैं ।

इसी प्रकार–

पठ् + अनीयर् = पठनीयम् = पढ़ना चाहिए ।

गम् + अनीयर् = गमनीयम् = जाना चाहिए ।

इनके रूप पुंलिङ्ग में **बालक**, नपुंसकलिङ्ग में **फल** और स्त्रीलिङ्ग में **बाला** के समान होंगे, जैसे – पठनीयो ग्रन्थः (पढ़ने योग्य ग्रन्थ या ग्रन्थ पढ़ना चाहिए) । दानं दातव्यम् (दान देना चाहिए) । गन्तव्या नगरी (उस नगरी में जाना चाहिए) आदि ।

तव्य और अनीय जोड़ते समय धातु में निम्नलिखित नियमानुसार परिवर्तन होते हैं–

(i) धातु के अन्त में आने वाले अथवा उपधा (अन्तिम वर्ण से पूर्व) में आने वाले इ, उ, ऋ क्रमशः ए, ओ, अर् हो जाते हैं, जैसे–

धातु	**तव्य**	**अनीय**
कृ	कर्तव्यम्	करणीयम्
नी	नेतव्यम्	नयनीयम्
स्तु	स्तोतव्यम्	स्तवनीयम्
श्रु	श्रोतव्यम्	श्रवणीयम्
लिख्	लेखितव्यम्	लेखनीयम्
मुद्	मोदितव्यम्	मोदनीयम्

(ii) धातु के अन्त वाले ए और ऐ का आ हो जाता है, जैसे–

वे	वातव्यम्	वानीयम्
गै	गातव्यम्	गानीयम्
त्रै	त्रातव्यम्	त्राणीयम्

निम्नलिखित नियम केवल तव्य प्रत्यय जोड़ते समय लगेंगे–

(i) धातु के अन्त में आने वाले च् तथा ज् → क् में, द् → त् में, भ् → ब् में, ध्→ द्, में तथा म्→ न् में परिवर्तित हो जाते हैं, जैसे–

वच्	वक्तव्यम्	बुध्	बोद्धव्यम्
भुज्	भोक्तव्यम्	गम्	गन्तव्यम्
भिद्	भेत्तव्यम्	लभ्	लब्धव्यम्

(ii) सेट् धातुओं में इट् (इ) लगता है, जैसे–

पठ्	पठितव्यम्	रक्ष्	रक्षितव्यम्
हस्	हसितव्यम्	लिख्	लेखितव्यम्

तव्य (त) और अनीय (र) प्रत्ययान्त शब्द क्रिया के रूप में भी प्रयुक्त होते हैं। तब इसका कर्ता तृतीयान्त और कर्म प्रथमान्त होता है, जैसे–

युष्माभिः पुस्तकं पठितव्यम् । छात्रैः पाठः स्मरणीयः ।
त्वया कुकृत्यानि न कर्तव्यानि ।

अकर्मक धातुओं में तव्य प्रत्यय लगने पर क्रियारूप सदा प्रथमान्त नपुंसकलिङ्ग और एकवचन में होते हैं, जैसे –

अस्माभिः स्नातव्यम् (हम लोगों को नहाना चाहिए)। त्वया अत्र स्थातव्यम् (तुम्हें यहाँ ठहरना चाहिए)। तेन जीवितव्यम् (उसे जीना चाहिए)।

यत् (य)

'चाहिए' या 'योग्यता' अर्थ में (भाव/कर्म में) निम्नलिखित प्रकार की धातुओं में यत् (य) प्रत्यय होता है–

1. स्वर से अन्त होने वाली धातु (जैसे – जि, नी, पा आदि) में।[1]
2. पवर्ग से अन्त होने वाली ऐसी धातुओं में जिनकी उपधा (अन्तिम वर्ण के पूर्व का वर्ण) में अ हो, जैसे[2] –

   लभ् + यत् = लभ्य (लभ्यम्)
   जप् + यत् = जप्य (जप्यम्)
   शप् + यत् = शप्य (शप्यम्)

(i) यत् प्रत्यय लगने पर उसके पूर्ववर्ती स्वर इ, उ, ऋ क्रमशः ए, ओ, अर् में परिवर्तित हो जाते हैं, जैसे–

जि + यत् = जेय → जेयः, जेयम्, जेया ।
नी + यत् = नेय → नेयः, नेयम्, नेया ।
चि + यत् = चेय → चेयः, चेयम्, चेया ।

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1. अचो यत् । ❑ पा0 3.1. 97
2. पोरदुपधात् । ❑ पा0 3.1.98

(ii) यदि धातु के अन्त में आ हो तो यत् लगने पर वह ई में परिवर्तित होता है और पुनः गुण होकर ए हो जाता है, जैसे–

पा + यत् = पी + य = पेय → पेयः, पेयम्, पेया।

दा + यत् = दी + य = देयम् ।

धा + यत् = धी + य = धेयम् ।

स्था + यत् = स्थी + य = स्थेयम् ।

(iii) ऐ से अन्त होने वाली धातुओं का भी अन्तिम स्वर ई में परिवर्तित हो जाता है और पुनः गुण हो कर ए हो जाता है, जैसे–

गै + यत् = गी + य = गेय (गेयम्)

टिप्पणी – कुछ ऐसे भी यत्प्रत्ययान्त शब्द है जो उपर्युक्त नियमों से नहीं बन पाते, अपितु उनके विशेष नियम हैं, जैसे–
वध्य (हन् + यत्), सह्य (सह् + यत्), शक्य (शक् + यत्), गद्य (गद्+यत्), मद्य (मद् + यत्) आदि ।

ण्यत् (य)

ऋकारान्त अथवा व्यञ्जनान्त धातुओं से 'चाहिए' या 'योग्य' अर्थ में ण्यत् (य) प्रत्यय लगता है।[1] ण्यत् लगने पर पूर्व स्वर की वृद्धि होती है (ऋ का आर् हो जाता है) । उपधा में यदि अ हो तो उसका आ हो जाता है । उदाहरण–

(i) कृ + ण्यत् = कृ + य = कार् + य = कार्य – कार्यम् = करने योग्य

हृ + ण्यत् = हृ + य = हार् + य = हार्य–हार्यम् = हरण करने योग्य

(ii) पठ् + ण्यत् = पाठ् + य = पाठ्य (पाठ्यम्)

ग्रह् + ण्यत् = ग्राह् + य = ग्राह्य (ग्राह्यम्)

वच् + ण्यत् = वाच् + य = वाच्य (वाच्यम्)

त्यज् + ण्यत् = त्याज्+ य = त्याज्य (त्याज्यम्)

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1. ऋहलोर्ण्यत् । ❑ पा० 3.1.124

2. भूतकालिक कृत् प्रत्यय – क्त (त) और क्तवतु (तवत्)

क्त और क्तवतु को **निष्ठा** भी कहते है।[1] ये दोनों प्रत्यय किसी कार्य के समाप्त हो जाने के सूचक हैं। क्त और क्तवतु में क्रमशः **त** और **तवत्** रहते हैं। शेष अक्षर लुप्त हो जाते हैं। भूतकालिक क्रिया के अर्थ में किसी भी धातु से क्त (त) एवं क्तवतु (तवत्) प्रत्यय हो सकते हैं। उदाहरण–

कृ + क्त (त) = कृत। कृ + क्तवतु (तवत्) = कृतवत्।

मृ + क्त (त) = मृत। मृ + क्तवतु (तवत्) = मृतवत्।

क्त प्रत्ययान्त शब्दों के रूप पुंलिङ्ग में **बालक** के समान, नपुंसकलिङ्ग में **फल** के समान और स्त्रीलिङ्ग में **बाला** के समान होते हैं। क्तवतु प्रत्ययान्त शब्दों के रूप पुंलिङ्ग में **श्रीमत्** के समान, नपुंसकलिङ्ग में **जगत्** के समान और स्त्रीलिङ्ग में **नदी** के समान चलते हैं। इनके रूप तीनों लिङ्गों में सभी विभक्तियों और सभी वचनों में होते हैं, जैसे–

धातु + प्रत्यय	**= निष्पन्न शब्द**	**प्रथमा के रूप**		
		पुं0	नपुं0	स्त्री0
मृ + (क्त) त	= मृत	= मृतः	मृतम्	मृता
मृ + (क्तवतु) तवत्	= मृतवत्	= मृतवान्	मृतवत्	मृतवती
स्ना + (क्त) त	= स्नात	= स्नातः	स्नातम्	स्नाता
स्ना + (क्तवतु) तवत्	= स्नातवत्	= स्नातवान्	स्नातवत्	स्नातवती

सेट् धातुओं में क्त या क्तवतु लगने से पूर्व इट् (इ) का आगम होता है, जैसे–

धातु	**क्त प्रत्ययान्त**	**क्तवतु प्रत्ययान्त**
पठ्	पठित	पठितवत्
कथ	कथित	कथितवत्
लिख्	लिखित	लिखितवत्

निष्ठा प्रत्यय (**क्त, क्तवतु**) जुड़ने पर धातु के प्रारम्भ में स्थित **य्, र्, ल्, व्** के स्थान में क्रमशः इ, ऋ, लृ, उ बन जाते हैं, जैसे–

धातु +	**क्त**	**+ क्तवतु**
वस्	उषित	उषितवत्

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1. क्तक्तवतू निष्ठा। ❑ **पा0 1.1.26**

वच्	उक्त	उक्तवत्
ग्रह्	गृहीत	गृहीतवत्
स्वप्	सुप्त	सुप्तवत्
यज्	इष्ट	इष्टवत्

प्रायः धातु के अन्त में स्थित **म्** का लोप हो जाता है, जैसे–

गम्	गत	गतवत्
यम्	यत	यतवत्
नम्	नत	नतवत्

क्त और **क्तवतु** के तकार में भी कभी–कभी कुछ परिवर्तन होते हैं। **द्** या **र्** के बाद में आने वाले **त** का **न** हो जाता है और पूर्ववर्ती **द्** का भी **न्** हो जाता है।[1] जैसे–

धातु	**+ क्त**	**+ क्तवतु**
छिद्	छिन्न	छिन्नवत्
भिद्	भिन्न	भिन्नवत्
जॄ	जीर्ण	जीर्णवत्
श्रॄ	शीर्ण	शीर्णवत्

निष्ठा का **त** 'शुष्' के बाद आने पर **क** और पच् के बाद आने पर **व** हो जाता है, जैसे–

शुष् + त = शुष्कः, शुष्कवत्   पच् + त = पक्वः, पक्ववत्

निष्ठा का प्रयोग – क्त और क्तवतु प्रत्ययों से निष्पन्न शब्द विशेषण के रूप में भी प्रयुक्त होते हैं, जैसे – सुप्तः शिशुः – और क्रिया रूप में भी, जैसे– सः पुस्तकं पठितवान्, तेन पुस्तकं पठितम्।

क्रिया रूप में क्त प्रत्यय **कर्मवाच्य** और **भाववाच्य** (Passive Voice) में प्रयुक्त होते हैं।[2] तब क्त से निष्पन्न शब्द के लिङ्ग, वचन और विभक्ति कर्म के अनुसार होते हैं, जैसे – मया रामायणं पठितम्।[3] क्तवतु प्रत्यय से निष्पन्न शब्द सदैव **कर्तृवाच्य** में प्रयुक्त होते हैं। अतएव उनके लिङ्ग, वचन और विभक्ति कर्ता के अनुसार होते हैं, जैसे – छात्रः पुस्तकं पठितवान्। सीता रामायणं पठितवती आदि।

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1. रदाभ्यां निष्ठातो नः पूर्वस्य च दः। ☐ **पा0 8. 2. 42**
2. तयोरेव कृत्यक्तखलर्थाः। ☐ **पा0 3.4. 70**
3. कुछ क्रियाओं के साथ क्त प्रत्यय होने पर कर्तृवाच्य में भी प्रयोग होता है, जैसे–सः गृहं गतः आदि।

कुछ प्रमुख धातुओं के 'क्त' और 'क्तवतु, प्रत्ययों से निष्पन्न रूप–

धातु	क्त (त)	क्तवतु (तवत्)	धातु	क्त (त)	क्तवतु (तवत्)
हन्	हतः	हतवान्	युज्	युक्तः	युक्तवान्
मन्	मतः	मतवान्	पच्	पक्वः	पक्ववान्
जन्	जातः	जातवान्	शुष्	शुष्कः	शुष्कवान्
वच्	उक्तः	उक्तवान्	इष्	इष्टः	इष्टवान्
वद्	उदितः	उदितवान्	तुष्	तुष्टः	तुष्टवान्
वह्	ऊढः	उढवान्	हृष्	हृष्टः	हृष्टवान्
ग्रह्	गृहीतः	गृहीतवान्	दृश्	दृष्टः	दृष्टवान्
पा(पिब)	पीतः	पीतवान्	शास्	शिष्टः	शिष्टवान्
दम्	दान्तः	दान्तवान्	स्पृश्	स्पृष्टः	स्पृष्टवान्
शम्	शान्तः	शान्तवान्	नश्	नष्टः	नष्टवान्
गम्	गतः	गतवान्	प्रच्छ्	पृष्टः	पृष्टवान्
भञ्ज्	भग्नः	भग्नवान्	दा	दत्तः	दत्तवान्
मज्ज्	मग्नः	मग्नवान्	घ्रा	घ्राणः, घ्रातः	घ्रातवान्
सह्	सोढः	सोढवान्	धा	हितः	हितवान्
भिद्	भिन्नः	भिन्नवान्	गै	गीतः	गीतवान्
शी	शयितः	शयितवान्	कथ	कथितः	कथितवान्
लभ्	लब्धः	लब्धवान्	पत्	पतितः	पतितवान्
दह्	दग्धः	दग्धवान्	पूज्	पूजितः	पूजितवान्
आरुह्	आरूढः	आरूढवान्	स्था	स्थितः	स्थितवान्
त्यज्	त्यक्तः	त्यक्तवान्	स्मृ	स्मृतः	स्मृतवान्
भुज्	भुक्तः	भुक्तवान्	अधि+इ	अधीतः	अधीतवान्
मुच्	मुक्तः	मुक्तवान्	भू	भूतः	भूतवान्

3. वर्तमानकालार्थ कृत् प्रत्यय

शतृ (अत्) और शानच् (आन)

जाता हुआ (जाती हुई), पढ़ता हुआ (पढ़ती हुई) आदि वर्तमान काल के अर्थ को प्रकट करने के लिए संस्कृत में शतृ (अत्) और शानच् (आन) प्रत्ययों का प्रयोग होता है। इन्हें **'सत्'** (विद्यमान, वर्तमान) भी कहा जाता

है । परस्मैपदी धातुओं में शतृ (अत्) और आत्मनेपदी धातुओं में शानच् (आन) जोड़ा जाता है । उभयपदी धातुओं में दोनों – शतृ और शानच् लगते हैं। ऐसे शब्द कर्ता के विशेषण के रूप होते हैं । शतृ प्रत्ययान्त शब्दों के रूप पुंलिङ्ग में 'पठन्, पठन्तौ पठन्तः' के समान, नपुंसकलिङ्ग में जगत् के समान और स्त्रीलिङ्ग में नदी के समान चलते हैं । शानच् प्रत्ययान्त शब्द अकारान्त होते हैं । उनके रूप बालक, फल एवं लता के समान क्रमश् पुं0, नपुं0 एवं स्त्री0 में होते हैं । धातुओं का लट् लकार प्र0पु0 बहुवचन में प्रत्यय जोड़ने से पूर्व जो रूप रहता है, जैसे – पठन्ति में पठ, उसमें अत् जोड़ देने से शतृ प्रत्ययान्त तथा आन जोड़ने से शानच् प्रत्ययान्त रूप बन जाते हैं । आन के पहले यदि अकारान्त रूप आए तो आन के स्थान पर मान हो जाता है । अत् के पहले अकारान्त रूप आने पर दोनों अ के स्थान में एक ही अ रह जाता है ।

उदाहरण–

धातु	**लट् लकार में प्रत्यय जुड़ने से पूर्व का रूप**	**शतृ प्रत्यय से निष्पन्न शब्द**
भू	(भव)	भवत्
पठ्	(पठ)	पठत्
कृ	(कुर्व)	कुर्वत्
गम्	(गच्छ)	गच्छत्
दृश्	(पश्य)	पश्यत्
वद्	(वद)	वदत्
वस्	(वस)	वसत्
स्था	(तिष्ठ)	तिष्ठत्
पा	(पिब)	पिबत्
दा	(दद)	ददत्
नी	(नये)	नयत्

धातु	**शानच् प्रत्यय से निष्पन्न शब्द**
वृध्	वर्धमानः
सेव्	सेवमानः
ईक्ष्	ईक्षमाणः
कम्प्	कम्पमानः
वृत्	वर्तमानः

आस् (बैठना) के बाद शानच् प्रत्यय लगने पर आन का ईन हो जाता है।[1] तब रूप बनता है आस् – आसीनः ।

टिप्पणी – शतृ और शानच् प्रत्यय भविष्यत् काल के अर्थ में भी प्रयुक्त होते हैं । ऐसी स्थिति में लृट् लकार के प्रथम पुरुष बहुवचन में प्रत्यय लगने से पूर्व धातु का जो रूप बनता है, उसमें आन (मान) लगता है, जैसे–

धातु	**शतृ**	**धातु**	**शानच्**
भू	भविष्यत्	सह्	सहिष्यमाणः
गम्	गमिष्यत्	युध्	योत्स्यमानः
हन्	हनिष्यत्		

4. पूर्वकालिक क्रियार्थक

क्त्वा (त्वा) और ल्यप् (य)

जब एक ही कर्ता कोई एक कार्य समाप्त करके दूसरा कार्य करता है, तो पहली क्रिया **पूर्वकालिक क्रिया** कहलाती है[2], जैसे– सुरेश जल लेकर आता है । लेकर, पढ़कर, खाकर, जाकर आदि अर्थों में पूर्वकालिक कृदन्त बनाने के लिए संस्कृत में **क्त्वा** (त्वा) प्रत्यय लगाया जाता है, जैसे–

सुरेशः जलं गृहीत्वा (ग्रह्+ त्वा) आगच्छति ।

क्त्वा (त्वा) प्रत्यय से बने शब्द

धातु	**शब्द**		
जि	जित्वा	=	जीत कर
स्मृ	स्मृत्वा	=	स्मरण कर

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1. ईदासः । ❑ पा0 7.2.83

2. समानकर्तृकयोः पूर्वकाले । ❑ पा0 3.4.21

नी	नीत्वा	=	लेकर
श्रु	श्रुत्वा	=	सुनकर
ज्ञा	ज्ञात्वा	=	जानकर
स्पृश्	स्पृष्ट्वा	=	छूकर
दृश्	दृष्ट्वा	=	देखकर
क्री	क्रीत्वा	=	खरीदकर
भू	भूत्वा	=	होकर
कृ	कृत्वा	=	करके
धृ	धृत्वा	=	धारण कर

धातुओं से क्त्वा (त्वा) प्रत्यय जोड़ते समय निम्नलिखित नियमों का पालन करना पड़ता है–

(1) सेट् धातुओं में (इट्) का आगम होता है, जैसे–

पठ्	पठित्वा
पत्	पतित्वा
लिख्	लिखित्वा
कथ	कथयित्वा
भक्ष्	भक्षयित्वा
पूज्	पूजयित्वा

(2) धातुओं में स्थित य्, र्, ल्, व् का (सम्प्रसारण अर्थात्) क्रमशः इ, ऋ, लृ, उ हो जाता है, जैसे–

ग्रह्	गृहीत्वा
वद्	उदित्वा
यज्	इष्ट्वा

(3) धातु के अन्त में स्थित म् और न् का प्रायः लोप हो जाता है, जैसे

गम्	गत्वा	हन्	हत्वा
नम्	नत्वा	मन्	मत्वा

(4) धातु के अन्तिम वर्ण में परिवर्तन हो जाता है, जैसे–

च्/ज् →क्	:	वच्	उक्त्वा
		मुच्	मुक्त्वा
		त्यज्	त्यक्त्वा
		भुज्	भुक्त्वा आदि
च्छ् → ष्	:	प्रच्छ्	पृष्ट्वा

ल्यप् (य)

यदि धातु के पूर्व कोई उपसर्ग लगा हो अथवा क्त्वा प्रत्ययान्त शब्द समास में प्रयुक्त हो रहे हों तो **क्त्वा** के स्थान में **ल्यप्** (य) प्रत्यय लगते हैं । इसमें केवल **य** अवशिष्ट रहता है । शेष का लोप हो जाता है । किन्तु नञ् समास में क्त्वा ही रहता है[1], जैसे–

आ + नी + ल्यप् (य)	=	आनीय
प्र + दा + ल्यप् (य)	=	प्रदाय
आ + दा + ल्यप् (य)	=	आदाय
अनु + भू + ल्यप् (य)	=	अनुभूय
नञ् (अ) + कृ + क्त्वा (त्वा)	=	अकृत्वा

धातु का अन्तिम स्वर यदि ह्रस्व हो तो 'य' जोड़ने से पूर्व तुक (त्) का आगम होता है।[2] अर्थात् 'य' के स्थान में 'त्य' जुड़ता है, जैसे–

प्र + कृ + ल्यप् (य)	=	प्रकृत्य
सम् + चि + ल्यप् (य)	=	संचित्य
वि + जि + ल्यप् (य)	=	विजित्य
अधि + इ + ल्यप् (य)	=	अधीत्य

क्त्वा और ल्यप् प्रत्ययान्त शब्द अव्यय बन जाते हैं अर्थात् इनके रूप सदा एक से रहते हैं।

णमुल् (अम्)

किसी समानकर्तृक पूर्वकालिक क्रिया को बार-बार किए जाने के भाव को प्रकट करने के लिए णमुल् (अम्) प्रत्यय का विकल्प से प्रयोग होता है।[3] पक्ष में क्त्वा भी होता है । णमुल् प्रत्ययान्त शब्दों का प्रयोग दो बार होता है।[4] जैसे– भक्तः स्मारं स्मारं (बार-बार स्मरण कर) भजति

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1. समासेऽनञ्पूर्वे क्त्वो ल्यप् । ❑ **पा0 7.1. 37**
2. ह्रस्वस्य पिति कृति तुक् । ❑ **पा0 6.1. 71**
3. आभीक्ष्ण्ये णमुल् च । ❑ **पा0 3. 4. 22**
4. नित्यवीप्सयोः । ❑ **पा0 8.1.4**

ईशम् । धातु में णमुल् प्रत्यय का केवल अम् बचता है । शेष अक्षरों का लोप हो जाता है । प्रत्यय जुड़ने से पूर्व धातु के अन्तिम स्वर अथवा उपधा अ की वृद्धि (आ, ऐ, औ, आर्) हो जाती है । उपधा में इ, उ, ऋ के रहने पर गुण होता है ।

उदाहरण–

स्मृ	स्मारं स्मारम्	(पक्ष में, स्मृत्वा स्मृत्वा)
श्रु	श्रावं श्रावम्	(पक्ष में, श्रुत्वा श्रुत्वा)
लभ	लाभं लाभम्	(पक्ष में, लब्ध्वा लब्ध्वा)
गम्	गामं गामम्	(पक्ष में, गत्वा गत्वा)
भुज्	भोजं भोजम्	(पक्ष में, भुक्त्वा, भुक्त्वा)

आकारान्त धातु में अम् और धातु के बीच य जोड़ा जाता है[1], जैसे–

पा + अम् = पायं पायम् (पक्ष में, पीत्वा पीत्वा)

दा + अम् = दायं दायम् (पक्ष में, दत्वा दत्वा)

स्ना + अम् = स्नायं स्नायम् (पक्ष में, स्नात्वा स्नात्वा)

णमुल् प्रत्ययान्त शब्द अव्यय होते हैं अर्थात् इनके रूप नहीं चलते ।

5. निमित्तार्थक – तुमुन् (तुम्)

जब कोई क्रिया किसी दूसरी क्रिया के लिए की जाती है तो निमित्तार्थक क्रिया में **तुमुन्** प्रत्यय होता है[2], जैसे – रमेश पढ़ने के लिए विद्यालय जाता है । यहाँ 'पढ़ने के लिए' निमित्तार्थक क्रिया है । संस्कृत में इसके लिए तुमुन् प्रत्यय का प्रयोग होता है । अतः इस वाक्य का संस्कृत रूप होगा – रमेशः पठितुं विद्यालयं गच्छति ।

जिस क्रिया के साथ तुमुन् प्रत्यय आता है, उसका तथा मुख्य क्रिया का कर्ता एक ही होना चाहिए[3], जैसे– रमेशः पठितुं विद्यालयं गच्छति । इस वाक्य में पठितुम् और गच्छति दोनों क्रियाओं का कर्ता रमेश ही है ।

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1. आतो युक् चिण्कृतोः । ❑ पा० 7.3.33
2. तुमुन्ण्वुलौ क्रियायां क्रियार्थायाम् । ❑ पा०3.3.10
3. समानकर्तृकेषु तुमुन् । ❑ पा० 3.3.158

कालवाची शब्दों (जैसे काल, समय, बेला इत्यादि) के साथ समान कर्ता न होने पर भी तुमुन् प्रत्यय होता है[1], जैसे–

गन्तुं कालोऽधुना । पठितुं समयोऽधुना ।

तुमुन् प्रत्ययान्त शब्द अव्यय होते हैं। अतएव इनके रूप सदा एक समान होते हैं।

तुमुन् प्रत्यय से बने शब्दों के उदाहरण–

धातु	**निष्पन्न शब्द**	**धातु**	**निष्पन्न शब्द**
गम्	गन्तुम्	स्था	स्थातुम्
हन्	हन्तुम्	दा	दातुम्
पा	पातुम्	स्ना	स्नातुम्

सेट् धातुओं में इट् (इ) का आगम होता है, जैसे–

पठ् पठितुम्

पत् पतितुम्

हस् हसितुम्

धातु के अन्त में या उपधा में स्थित इ, उ, ऋ का गुण (ए,ओ,अर्) होता है, जैसे–

जि	जेतुम्	भू	भवितुम्
नी	नेतुम्	श्रु	श्रोतुम्
लिख्	लेखितुम्	कृ	कर्तुम्
विद्	वेदितुम्	हृ	हर्तुम्

6. कर्तृवाचक

ण्वुल् (वु = अक), तृच् (तृ), णिनि (इन्)

कर्ता (करने वाला) अर्थ में किसी भी धातु से ण्वुल् (वु = अक) तथा तृच् (तृ) प्रत्यय होते हैं।[2] ण्वुल् के लगने पर धातु के स्वर की वृद्धि तथा तृच् के लगने पर गुण हो जाता है।

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1. कालसमयवेलासु तुमुन् । ❑ पा० 3.3.167

2. ण्वुलतृचौ । ❑ पा० 3.1.133

उदाहरण–

धातु	ण्वुल् (वु = अक)	धातु	तृच् से निष्पन्न शब्द
पठ्	पाठक	कृ	कर्तृ
पच्	पाचक	दा	दातृ
कृ	कारक	नी	नेतृ
नी	नायक	श्रु	श्रोतृ
स्मृ	स्मारक	जि	जेतृ
दा	दायक	भृ	भर्तृ
गै	गायक	युध्	योद्धृ
दृश्	दर्शक	हन्	हन्तृ
यज्	याजक	पठ्	पठितृ
ग्रह्	ग्राहक		

ण्वुल् (अक) प्रत्ययान्त शब्दों के रूप तीनों लिङ्गों में बनते हैं – पुंलिङ्ग में बालक के समान, स्त्रीलिङ्ग में लता के समान और नपुंसकलिङ्ग में फल के समान । तृच् प्रत्ययान्त शब्दों के रूप तीनों लिङ्गों में कर्ता, कर्त्री, कर्तृ जैसे चलते हैं ।

णिनि (इन्)

ग्रह् आदि धातुओं में कर्ता अर्थ में णिनि (इन्) प्रत्यय होता है[1], जैसे–
ग्रह् + इन् = ग्रा, ग्राहिन् –ग्राही, उत्साही, स्थायी आदि ।

7. भावार्थक

ल्युट्, घञ्, अच् तथा क्तिन् प्रत्यय धातु से भाववाचक संज्ञा बनाने के लिए प्रयुक्त होते हैं ।

ल्युट् (यु = अन)

भाववाचक संज्ञा बनाने के लिए ल्युट् (यु = अन) प्रत्यय होता है । साथ ही इसका प्रयोग करण तथा अधिकरण के अर्थ में भी होता है।[2] ल्युट् प्रत्ययान्त शब्द प्रायः नपुंसकलिङ्ग में होते हैं तथा इसके रूप फल के समान चलते हैं ।

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1. नन्दिग्रहिपचादिभ्यो ल्युणिन्यचः । ☐ **पा0 3.1.134**

2. करणाधिकरणयोश्च । ☐ **पा0 3.3.117**

उदाहरण–

दा	दानम्	गम्	गमनम्
या	यानम्	साध्	साधनम्
पा	पानम्	पठ्	पठनम्
पत्	पतनम्	सह्	सहनम्
मन्	मननम्	भज्	भजनम्
वद्	वदनम्	रक्ष्	रक्षणम्
आस्	आसनम्	दृश्	दर्शनम्

धातु में आने वाले ह्रस्व या दीर्घ इ,उ, ऋ का गुण (ए, ओ,अर्) हो जाता है, जैसे–

शी	शयनम्	कृ	करणम्
नी	नयनम्	हृ	हरणम्
श्रु	श्रवणम्	दृश्	दर्शनम्
भू	भवनम्	भुज्	भोजनम्

घञ् (अ)

भाव अर्थ में (अर्थात् सिद्धावस्थापन्न क्रिया के अर्थ में) धातु में घञ् प्रत्यय होता है।[1] घञ् में अ बचता है, जो धातु से जुड़ता है। शेष अक्षरों का लोप हो जाता है। घञ् जोड़ते समय धातु के अन्त में स्थित ह्रस्व या दीर्घ इ, उ, ऋ तथा उपधा में स्थित 'अ' की प्रायः वृद्धि (क्रमशः ऐ, औ आर् तथा आ) हो जाती है। उपधा में स्थित इ, उ, ऋ को गुण (क्रमशः ए, ओ, अर्) हो जाता है।

उदाहरण–

भू	भावः	उप + कृ	उपकारः
आधृ	आधारः	लभ्	लाभः
पठ्	पाठः	कम्	कामः
हस्	हासः	आ + चर्	आचारः
रम्	रामः	आमुद्	आमोदः
अवतृ	अवतारः	लिख्	लेखः

1. भावे। ❑ पा० 3.3.18

यदि धातु के अन्त में च् या ज् हो तो वे क्रमशः क् या ग् में बदल जाते हैं।[1]

पच् पाकः , शुच् शोकः , यज् यागः।
भुज् भोगः , त्यज् त्यागः ,

म् से अन्त होने वाली कुछ धातुओं में वृद्धि नहीं होती, जैसे–

दम् दमः , श्रम् श्रमः।

अच् (अ)

इ/ई से अन्त होने वाली धातुओं में भाव अर्थ में अच् (अ) प्रत्यय लगता है[2] अच् लगने के पूर्व इ/ई का गुण हो कर ए होता है । जैसे–

जि जयः, चि चयः , नी नयः इत्यादि

अच् प्रत्ययान्त शब्द प्रायः पुंलिङ्ग होते हैं ।

क्तिन् (ति)

स्त्रीलिङ्ग भाववाचक संज्ञा बनाने के लिए धातु में क्तिन् (ति) प्रत्यय का प्रयोग होता है।[3] क्तिन् प्रत्ययान्त शब्द सदा स्त्रीलिङ्ग होते हैं तथा इसके रूप मति की तरह चलते हैं ।

उदाहरण–

कृ	+ क्तिन् (ति)	=	कृतिः	श्रु	+ ति	=	श्रुतिः
भी	+ ति	=	भीतिः	स्तु	+ ति	=	स्तुतिः
स्मृ	+ ति	=	स्मृतिः	जागृ	+ ति	=	जागर्तिः

क्त्वा प्रत्यय जोड़ने से पूर्व धातु में जो परिवर्तन होते हैं वे यहाँ भी होते हैं।

(1) धातु के अन्त में स्थित म् और न् का प्रायः लोप होता है[4]–

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1. चजोः कु धिण्ण्यतोः। ❑ पा० 7. 3. 52

2. एरच् । ❑ पा० 3.3.56

3. स्त्रियां क्तिन् । ❑ पा० 3.3.94

4. किन्तु शम् + ति = शान्तिः
कम् + ति = कान्तिः, आदि में म् का लोप नहीं होता ।

गम्	गतिः	मन्	मतिः
रम्	रतिः	नम्	नतिः

(2) धातु के अन्तिम वर्ण में परिवर्तन हो जाते हैं, जैसे–

भज्	भक्तिः	सृज्	सृष्टिः
दृश्	दृष्टिः	बुध्	बुद्धिः

(3) अन्य परिवर्तन–

वच् उक्तिः, कृ कीर्तिः, जन् जातिः इत्यादि

अभ्यास

1. निम्नलिखित से उचित रूप बनाइए–

पठ्	+	अनीयर्	=	छिद्	+	क्त	=
स्था	+	तव्य	=	दृश्	+	क्त	=
दा	+	अनीयर्	=	गम्	+	क्तवत्	=
पूज्	+	अनीयर्	=	नम्	+	क्त्वा	=
स्था	+	अनीयर्	=	दृश्	+	क्त्वा	=
निन्द्	+	अनीयर्	=	प्र + स्था	+	ल्यप्	=
जि	+	यत्	=	दा	+	ल्युट्	=
दा	+	यत्	=	नी	+	ल्युट्	=
पठ्	+	ण्यत्	=	कृ	+	ल्युट्	=
कृ	+	ण्यत्	=	स्था	+	क्तिन्	
भू	+	यत्	=	मन्	+	क्तिन्	=
भुज्	+	ण्यत्	=	लभ्	+	यत्	=

2. निम्नलिखित रूपों में प्रकृति (धातु) और प्रत्यय को अलग-अलग कीजिए–

श्रोतव्यम्	श्रवणीयम्
भोजनीयम्	पठितव्यम्
करणीयम्	हसितव्यम्
गेयम्	श्रुत्वा
पेयम्	श्रोतुम्
लभ्यम्	पठनम्
ग्राह्यम्	शयनम्
उक्तम्	भोजनम्
गृहीतम्	दर्शनम्
आदाय	गतिः
त्यागः	पाठः
जयः	उपाध्यायः
स्मारम्	स्नानम्

3. टिप्पणी लिखिए–

कृत्, कृत्य, निष्ठा, शतृ, शानच्, तुमुन् ।

4. 'क' भाग में दिए गए कृदन्त शब्दों को 'ख' में दिए उपयुक्त शब्दों के साथ जोड़िए–

(क)	(ख)
भोज्यः	प्रदेशः
भोग्यः	का
निर्वातः	ग्रामः
निर्वाणः	दीपः
गन्तव्यः	वयम्
गतिः	रसः
श्रावं-श्रावम्	रामायणम्
पेयः	शापः

II. तद्धित प्रत्यय (Secondary Suffixes)

सामान्य नियम

जो प्रत्यय प्रातिपादक[1] (संज्ञा, विशेषण, कृदन्त आदि) के साथ लगकर उनके अर्थ को परिवर्तित कर देते हैं, वे **तद्धित प्रत्यय**[2] कहलाते हैं। जैसे–

वसुदेवस्य अपत्यं पुमान् वासुदेवः (वसुदेव + अण्)

तद्धित प्रत्ययान्त शब्दों में कारक विभक्तियाँ लगती हैं। तद्धित प्रत्यय जोड़ते समय निम्नलिखित नियमों का पालन करना पड़ता है–

1. तद्धित प्रत्यय यदि ञित्, णित् या कित् हो (अर्थात् ञ, ण्, या क् में से किसी का लोप हुआ हो) तो वह जिस शब्द में लगता है, उसके आदि स्वर की वृद्धि होती है[3], जैसे – वसुदेव+ अण्+ (अ)= वासुदेवः । यहाँ आदि स्वर अ की वृद्धि आ हो गई है ।

2. स्वर या यकार से प्रारम्भ होने वाले तद्धित प्रत्यय जिस शब्द में जोड़े जाते हैं, उस शब्द के अन्त में यदि अ/ आ या इ/ई हो तो उसका लोप हो जाता है और यदि उ/ऊ हो तो उसका गुण होकर ओ हो जाता है।[4] जैसे–

दशरथ + इञ् (इ) = दाशरथ् + इ = दाशरथिः ।
वसुदेव + अण् (अ) = वासुदेव् + अ = वासुदेवः ।
विनता + ढक् (एय) = विनत् + एय = वैनतेयः
उपगु + अण् (अ) = उपगो + अ = औपगवः

तद्धित प्रत्ययों की संख्या अनेक हैं और ये विभिन्न अर्थों में प्रयुक्त होते हैं। कुछ प्रमुख तद्धित प्रत्ययों का परिचय यहाँ दिया जा रहा है–

अण् (अ)

1. निम्नलिखित से अपत्य (पुत्र या पुत्री) अर्थ में अण् प्रत्यय होता है।[5] (शब्द में आदि स्वर की वृद्धि, शब्द के अन्तिम अ/आ या इ/ई का लोप होता है)

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1. अर्थवदधातुरप्रत्ययः प्रातिपदिकम् । कृतद्धितसमासाश्च । ❑ पा0 **1.2.45,46**
2. (तत् + हित) तेभ्यः प्रयोगेभ्यः हिता इति तद्धिता ।
3. तद्धितेष्वचामादेः । किति च । ❑ पा0 **7.2.117, 118**
4. यस्येति च । ओगुर्णः । ❑ पा0 **6.4.148,146**
5. तस्यापत्यम् । ❑ पा0 **4.1.92**

(i) अश्वपति आदि से[1] –

अश्वपति + अण् (अ)= आश्वपतम् (अश्वपतेः अपत्यम्)

गणपति + अण् (अ)= गाणपतम्

(ii) शिव आदि से[2] –

शिव + अण् (अ)= शैवः (शिवस्यापत्यम् पुमान्)

गङ्गा + अण् (अ)= गाङ्गः

(iii) ऋषिवाचक, वृष्णिवंशीवाचक और कुरुवंशीवाचक से[3] –

ऋषि – वसिष्ठ + अण् (अ) = वासिष्ठः (वसिष्ठस्य अपत्यं पुमान्)

विश्वमित्र + अण् (अ) = वैश्वामित्रः (विश्वामित्रस्यापत्यं पुमान्)

वृष्णि – वसुदेव + अण् (अ) = वासुदेवः

यदु + अण् (अ) = यादवः

कुरु – नकुल + अण् (अ) = नाकुलः

सहदेवः + अण् (अ) = साहदेवः

2. कोई संख्या, सम् तथा भद्र शब्द यदि पहले हो तो मातृ शब्द से[4] अण् होता है (मातृ का मातुर हो जाता है)

द्विमातृ + अण् (अ)= द्वैमातुरः

षण्मातृ + अण् (अ)= षाण्मातुरः

संमातृ + अण् (अ)= साम्मातुरः

भद्रमातृ + अण् (अ)= भाद्रमातुरः

3. जिससे कोई वस्तु रंगी जाय, उस रंगवाची शब्द में अण् प्रत्यय लगता है।[5] जैसे–

कषाय + अण् (अ)= काषायम् (कषायेण रक्तं वस्त्रम् = गेरूए रंग में रंगा हुआ)

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1. अश्वपत्यादिभ्यश्च। ❑ पा0 4.1.84

अश्वपत्यादि—अश्वपति, शतपति, धनपति, गणपति, राष्ट्रपति, कुलपति, गृहपति, पशुपति, धान्यपति, धर्मपति, सभापति, प्राणपति, क्षेत्रपति ।

2. शिवादिभ्योऽण् । ❑ पा0 4.1.112

3. ऋष्यन्धकवृष्णिकुरुभ्यश्च। ❑ पा0 4.1.114

4. मातृरुत्सख्यासंभद्रपूर्वायाः। ❑ पा0 4.1.115

5. तेन रक्तं रागात् । ❑ पा0 4.2.1

4. नक्षत्र से युक्त समयवाची शब्द बनाने के लिए नक्षत्र वाचक शब्द में अण् प्रत्यय लगता है।[1] जैसे–

चित्रा + अण् (अ)= चैत्रः मासः ।

विशाखा + अण् (अ)= वैशाखः मासः ।

5. उसे पढ़ता है, उसे जानता है, इस अर्थ में अण् प्रत्यय होता है।[2]
व्याकरण + अण् (अ) = वैयाकरणः (व्याकरणम् अधीते वेद वा)

इस प्रकार अण् प्रत्यय अनेक अर्थों में प्रयुक्त होता है।

इञ् (इ)

अपत्य अर्थ में अकारान्त प्रातिपादिक (संज्ञा आदि) से इञ् (इ) प्रत्यय होता है।[3] (शब्द के प्रथम स्वर की वृद्धि एवं अन्त में आये **अ** का लोप होता है)। जैसे–

दशरथ + इञ् (इ) = दाशरथिः (दशरथस्य अपत्यं पुमान्)= रामः
सुमित्रा + इ = सौमित्रिः = लक्ष्मणः
द्रोण + इ = द्रौणिः = अश्वत्थामा

मतुप् (मत्)

इसके पास है या इसमें है, इस अर्थ में मतुप् (मत्) प्रत्यय होता है।[4] जैसे–

गो + मत् = गोमत् (गोमान्) गावः अस्य सन्तीति (गाय वाला) ।

बुद्धि + मत् = बुद्धिमत् (बुद्धिमान्, बुद्धि वाला)

इसी प्रकार–

शक्ति + मत् = शक्तिमत् (शक्तिमान्), धी + मत् = धीमत् (धीमान्)

श्री + मत् = श्रीमत् (श्रीमान्), कीर्ति + मत् = कीर्तिमत् (कीर्तिमान्)

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1. नक्षत्रेण युक्तः कालः । ❑ **पा0 4.2.3**
2. तदधीते तद्वेद । ❑ **पा0 4.2.59**
3. अत इञ् । ❑ **पा0 4.1.95**
4. तदस्यास्त्यस्मिन्निति मतुप् । ❑ **पा0 5.2.94**

वतुप् (वत्)

शब्द के अन्त में या उपधा में यदि अ/आ या म् हो तो मत् के स्थान पर वत् हो जाता है[1], जैसे–

धन – धनवत् (धनवान्, धनम् अस्य अस्तीति) धन वाला

गुण – गुणवत् (गुणवान्), गुण वाला

विद्या – विद्यावत् (विद्यावान्) विद्या वाला

लक्ष्मी – लक्ष्मीवत् (लक्ष्मीवान्) लक्ष्मी वाला

मतुप् या वतुप् प्रत्ययान्त शब्दों के रूप पुंलिङ्ग में भवत् के समान, स्त्रीलिङ्ग में नदी के समान और नपुंसकलिङ्ग में जगत् के समान होते हैं।

इनि (इन्) और ठन् (इक)

युक्त या वाला अर्थ में अकारान्त शब्दों से इनि (इन्) और ठन् (इक) प्रत्यय लगते हैं।[2] जैसे–

दण्ड + इन् = दण्डिन् – दण्डी

दण्ड + इक = दण्डिक – दण्डिकः, दण्ड वाला

रथ + इन् = रथिन् – रथी

रथ + इक = रथिक – रथिकः, रथ वाला

धन + इन् = धनिन् – धनी

धन + इक = धनिक – धनिकः, धन वाला

इन् प्रत्ययान्त शब्दों के रूप पुंलिङ्ग में दण्डिन् के समान और स्त्रीलिङ्ग में ई लगाकर नदी के समान होते हैं।

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1. मादुपधायाश्च मतोर्वोऽयवादिभ्यः । ❑ पा० 8.2.9
2. अत इनिठनौ । ❑ पा० 5.2.115

इतच् (इत)

युक्त अर्थ में तारक आदि शब्दों से इतच् (इत) प्रत्यय लगता है[1], जैसे–
तारका + इतच् (इत) = तारकितं नभः (तारों से युक्त)
पिपासा + इतच् (इत) = पिपासितः (प्यास से युक्त) ।

इसी प्रकार दुःखित, पुष्पितः, कुसुमितः, अङ्कुरितः, क्षुधितः आदि ।

भावार्थक – त्व और तल् (ता)

किसी शब्द में त्व और तल् (ता) जोड़ कर भाववाचक संज्ञाएं बनाई जाती हैं।[2] त्व प्रत्ययान्त शब्द नपुंसकलिङ्ग होते हैं और ता प्रत्ययान्त शब्द स्त्रीलिङ्ग। इनके रूप क्रमशः फलम् और बाला के समान चलते हैं ।

उदाहरण –

मूल शब्द	त्व प्रत्ययान्त	तल् (ता) प्रत्यान्त	
गुरु	गुरुत्वम्	गुरुता	(गुरोः भावः – इस अर्थ में)
मूर्ख	मूर्खत्वम्	मूर्खता	
मित्र	मित्रत्वम्	मित्रता	
दुष्ट	दुष्टत्वम्	दुष्टता	
लघु	लघुत्वम्	लघुता	
पवित्र	पवित्रत्वम्	पवित्रता	
विद्वस्	विद्वत्त्वम्	विद्वत्ता	
महत्	महत्त्वम्	महत्ता	
मनुष्य	मनुष्यत्वम्	मनुष्यता	

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1. तदस्य सञ्जातं तारकादिभ्य इतच् । ❑ पा० **5.2.36**

तारकादि गण के मुख्य शब्द –

तारका, सूत्र, मूत्र, उच्चार, प्रचार, विचार, कुड्मल, कण्टक, मुकुल, कुसुम, कुतूहल, स्तवक, किसलय, पल्लव, निद्रा, मुद्रा, बुभुक्षा, पिपासा, श्रद्धा, पुलक, सुख, दुःख, उत्कण्ठा, व्याधि, व्रण, गौरव, शास्त्र, तरङ्ग, तिलक, चन्द्रक, अन्धकार, गर्व, मुकुर, हर्ष, उत्कर्ष, क्षुधा, ज्वर, रोग, रोमाञ्च, पण्डा, कज्जल, तृष, फल, श्रृंगार, अङ्कुर, कलङ्क, मूर्च्छा, प्रतिबिम्ब, दीक्षा, गर्ज आदि ।

2. तस्य भावस्त्वतलौ । ❑ पा० **5.1.119**

तल् (ता) प्रत्यय समूह के अर्थ में भी कुछ शब्दों से होता है[1], जैसे–

जन + तल् (ता) = जनता (जनानां समूहः – इस अर्थ में) ।

इसी प्रकार

ग्राम + तल् (ता) = ग्रामता

बन्धु + तल् (ता) = बन्धुता

सहाय + तल् (ता) = सहायता[2], ऐसे ही गजता ।

यत् (य)

होने वाला (तत्र भवः) इस अर्थ में शरीर के अवयववाची शब्दों से यत् (य) प्रत्यय होता है[3], जैसे–

दन्तेषु भवम् (दाँतों में होने वाला) इस अर्थ में शरीरावयव दन्त + यत् (य) दन्त्य, विभक्ति युक्त होने पर दन्त्यम् रूप बनता है । इसी प्रकार–

कण्ठ + य = कण्ठ्यम् (कण्ठे भवम्) ।

मुख + य = मुख्यम् (मुखे भवम्) ।

हित अर्थ में गो आदि कुछ शब्दों में यत् प्रत्यय होता है । जैसे–

गव्यम् (गोभ्यः हितम्) आदि ।

थाल् (था)

प्रकार अर्थ में किम् आदि सर्वनामों से थाल् (था) प्रत्यय होता है[4], जैसे–

तद्+ था = तथा (तेन प्रकारेण) । यद् + था = यथा (येन प्रकारेण)।

सर्व + था = सर्वथा, उभय + था = उभयथा ।

इदम् और किम् के उपरान्त थमु (थम्) होता है,[5] जैसे–

इदम् + थम् = इत्थम् = इत्थम् (अनेन एतेन वा प्रकारेण)

किम् + थम् = कथम् (केन प्रकारेण)

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1. ग्रामजनबन्धुभ्यस्तल् । ❑ पा0 4. 2.43
2. गजसहायाभ्यां चेति वक्तव्यम् (वार्तिक)
3. शरीरावयवाद्यत् । ❑ पा0 5.1. 6
4. प्रकारवचने थाल् । ❑ पा0 5.3. 23
5. इदमस्थमुः । किमश्च । ❑ पा0 5.3. 24, 25

सुन् (ईयस्)

अतिशय दिखलाने के लिए तरप् (तर) और ईयसुन्
। होते है[1], जैसे–

निष्पन्न शब्द	ईयसुन् (ईयस्) से निष्पन्न शब्द
लघुतरः	लघीयान्
गुरुतरः	गरीयान्
पटुतरः	पटीयान्

ठन् (इष्ठ)

एक का अतिशय दिखलाने के लिए तमप् (तम) और
लगते हैं [2], जैसे–

मप् से निष्पन्न रूप	इष्ठन् से निष्पन्न रूप
घुतमः	लघिष्ठः
टुतमः	पटिष्ठः

तमप् एवं इष्ठन् प्रत्यय लगने पर जिसकी विशेषता
ं षष्ठी या सप्तमी विभक्ति होती है, जैसे–
वा सुरेशः पटुतमः।
र इष्ठन् (इष्ठ) प्रत्यय केवल गुणवाचक शब्दों में ही
((तर) और तमप् (तम) सर्वत्र लगते हैं ।

रबीयसुनौ । ❑ पा० 5.3. 57

। ❑ पा० 5.3. 55

मयट् (मय)

खाने वाली वस्तुओं को छोड़कर अन्य वस्तुवाचक शब्दों से विकार तथा अवयव अर्थ में विकल्प से मयट् (मय) प्रत्यय होता है।[1] जैसे–

सुवर्ण + मयट् (मय) = सुवर्णमयम् (सुवर्ण का विकार अथवा अवयव) पक्ष में, सौवर्णम्।

इसी प्रकार वाङ्मयम्, अम्मयम् इत्यादि ।

वुञ् (अक)

धूम आदि शब्दों से 'तत्र भवः' आदि अर्थों में वुञ् (अक) प्रत्यय होता है[2]। जैसे–

धूमे भवः = धौमकः (धूम + वुञ् – अक)

तीर्थे भवः = तैर्थकः (तीर्थ + वुञ् – अक)

इसी प्रकार ग्रैष्मकम, राजन्यकः (राजन्यानां निवासो जनपदः) आदि उदाहरण समझना चाहिए ।

ख, खञ् (ईन)

1. ग्राम तथा कुल शब्दों से 'तत्र भवः' अर्थ में 'ख' (ईन) प्रत्यय होता है।[3] जैसे–

   ग्राम + ख (ईन) = ग्रामीणः (पक्ष में ग्राम्यः) ।

   कुल + ख (ईन) = कुलीनः ।

2. युष्मद्, अस्मद् शब्दों से सम्बन्धी अर्थ में खञ् (ईन) प्रत्यय होता है।[4]

   जैसे– मम अयम् – मामकीनः (अस्मद् + खञ् – ईन)

   तव अयम् – तावकीनः (युष्मद् + खञ् – ईन)[5]

   युवयोः, युष्माकम् अयम् – यौष्माकीणः (युष्मद् + खञ् – ईन)

   आवयोः, अस्माकम् अयम् – आस्माकीनः (आस्माकीनः + खञ् – ईन)

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1. नित्यं वृद्धशरादिभ्यः । ❑ पा० 4.3.144
2. धूमादिभ्यश्च । ❑ पा० 4.2.127
3. ग्रामाद्यखञौ । ❑ पा० 4. 2. 94 कुलात् खः । ❑ पा० 4.1.139
4. युष्मदस्मदोरन्यतरस्यां खञ्च। ❑ पा० 4.3.1
5. तवकममकावेकवचने । ❑ पा० 4.3.3

त्रल् (त्र)

1. सप्तमी के अर्थ में त्रल् प्रत्यय होता है ।[1]
2. त्रल् प्रत्यय से बना हुआ शब्द अव्यय होता है ।

त्रल् में त्र बचता है । जैसे –

किम् → (कु)+ त्रल् = कुत्र[4]

यत् → (य) + त्रल् = यत्र

तत् → (त) + त्रल् = तत्र

सर्व + त्रल् = सर्वत्र

उभय + त्रल् = उभयत्र

अन्य + त्रल् = अन्यत्र

बहु+ त्रल् = बहुत्र

ठक् (इक)

विभिन्न अर्थों में ठक् प्रत्यय होता है ।

'ठक्' में ठ बचता है । 'ठ' का इक् आदेश हो जाता है । जैसे–

बनाने अर्थ में →दधि + ठक् (इक्) = दाधिकम्

सवारी करने अर्थ में → हस्तिन् + ठक् (इक्) = हास्तिकः

आचरण अर्थ में → धर्म + ठक् (इक्) = धार्मिकः

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1. सप्तम्यास्त्रल् । ❑ पा0 5.3.10
2. कुतिहोः। ❑ पा0 7.2.104

अभ्यास

1. **निम्नलिखित में प्रकृति और प्रत्ययों को जोड़कर नवीन शब्द बनाइए–**

   वसुदेव + अण् (अ) । चित्रा + अण् (अ) । सर्व + त्रल् ।
   विद्या + मतुप् (वत्) । दण्ड + इनि (इन्) । धर्म + ठक् ।
   दुःख + इतच् (इत) । मित्र + तल् (ता) ।
   महत् + त्व। ओष्ठ + यत् (य) ।
   यद् + थाल् (था) । किम् + त्रल् ।

2. **निम्नलिखित में प्रकृति और प्रत्ययों को अलग कीजिए–**

   दाशरथिः, शैवः, यादवः, वैशाखः, वैयाकरणः, श्रीमान् (श्रीमत्), लक्ष्मीवान् (लक्ष्मीवत्), धनी, कुसुमितः, पवित्रता, विद्वत्ता, कण्ठ्यम्, सुवर्णमयम्, वैनतेयः, सौमित्रिः, षाण्मातुरः, पटीयान्, अन्यत्र, दाधिकम्, हास्तिकः ।

3. **निम्नलिखित को समझाइए–**

   तद्धित, भावार्थक तद्धित, इतच्, इष्ठन्, त्रल्, ठक् ।

4. **निम्नलिखित विग्रहों के आधार पर बनने वाले तद्धितान्त शब्द लिखिए–**

   क. न्यायम् अधीते   ख. अश्विन्या युक्तःमासः
   ग. पृथायाः अपत्यं पुमान्   घ. छत्रम् अस्ति अस्य
   ङ. लघोः भावः ।

5. **नीचे लिखे हुए शब्दों में जो कृदन्त हैं उन्हें 'क' भाग में और जो तद्धित हैं उन्हें 'ख' भाग में लिखिए–**

   लिखित, दुःखित, वैदिक, पावक, हस्ती, स्थायी, भव्य, गव्य, लघुता, कर्ता, तत्र, अन्यत्र।

   क. कृदन्त   ख. तद्धित

III. स्त्री प्रत्यय (Feminine Suffixes)

जिन प्रत्ययों को जोड़कर पुंलिङ्ग शब्दों का स्त्रीलिङ्ग रूप बनाया जाता है वे **स्त्री प्रत्यय** कहलाते हैं । ये मुख्यतः दो प्रकार के हैं–

1. आ (टाप्, डाप्, चाप्)
2. ई (ङीप्, ङीष्, ङीन्)

1. आ

सामान्यतः अकारान्त शब्दों से स्त्रीलिङ्ग बनाने के लिए आ (टाप्) प्रत्यय जोड़ा जाता है[1] ।

उदाहरण–

अज (बकरा)	अजा	सुत	सुता
कोकिल	कोकिला	चतुर	चतुरा
अश्व	अश्वा	क्षत्रिय	क्षत्रिया
बाल	बाला	कृष्ण	कृष्णा
शूद्र	शूद्रा	सरल	सरला
वैश्य	वैश्या	प्रथम	प्रथमा

आ जोड़ने से पूर्व यदि शब्द के अन्त में अक हो तो वह इक में बदल जाता है[2], जैसे–

बालक	बालिका	मूषक	मूषिका
पाचक	पाचिका	मामक	मामिका
अध्यापक	अध्यापिका	साधक	साधिका
शिक्षक	शिक्षिका	पाठक	पाठिका
नायक	नायिका	गायक	गायिका

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1. अजाद्यतष्टाप् । □ पा० 4.1.4
2. परन्तु ऐसा तभी होता है जब क किसी प्रत्यय का हो । अन्यथा शङ्क–शङ्का । यहाँ क धातु का है ।

2. ई

1. ऋकारान्त और नकारान्त पुंलिङ्ग शब्दों का स्त्रीलिङ्ग बनाने के लिए ई (ङीप्) प्रत्यय जोड़ा जाता है[1], जैसे–

कर्तृ	कर्त्री	दण्डिन्	दण्डिनी
दातृ	दात्री	गुणिन्	गुणिनी
धातृ	धात्री	तपस्विन्	तपस्विनी
कामिन्	कामिनी	मनोहारिन्	मनोहारिणी

वय की अवस्था (अन्तिम को छोड़कर) का ज्ञान कराने वाले अकारान्त शब्दों में ई (ङीप्) जोड़कर स्त्रीलिङ्ग रूप बनाया जाता है[2], जैसे–

कुमार – कुमारी किशोर – किशोरी

कुछ अकारान्त शब्दों में ई (ङीप्) जोड़कर स्त्रीलिङ्ग बनाया जाता है, जैसे–

भोगकर	भोगकरी (कर से अन्त होने वाले सभी शब्दों में ई लगती है)
अर्थकर	अर्थकरी
नद	नदी
देव	देवी

ऐसे अकारान्त जातिवाचक शब्द जिनकी उपधा (अन्तिम वर्ण से पूर्व का वर्ण) में य् न हो, उससे स्त्रीलिङ्ग बनाने के लिए ई (ङीष्) प्रत्यय[3] जोड़ा जाता है, जैसे–

ब्राह्मण	–	ब्राह्मणी	गोप	–	गोपी
मानुष	–	मानुषी	सिंह	–	सिंही
मृग	–	मृगी	व्याघ्र	–	व्याघ्री
भल्लूक	–	भल्लूकी	महिष	–	महिषी
शूकर	–	शूकरी	गन्धर्व	–	गन्धर्वी

1. ऋन्नेभ्यो ङीप् । ❑ पा0 4.1. 5
2. वयसि प्रथमे । ❑ पा0 4.1. 20
3. जातेरस्त्रीविषयादयोपधात्। ❑ 4.1. 63

उकारान्त गुणवाची शब्दों से स्त्रीलिङ्ग रूप बनाने के लिए विकल्प से ई (ङीष्) प्रत्यय जुड़ता है[1], जैसे–

मृदु मृद्वी	पक्ष् में	मृदुः
पटु पट्वी	”	पटुः
साधु साध्वी	”	साधुः
गुरु गुर्वी	”	गुरुः

द्विगु समास का अन्तिम शब्द यदि अकारान्त हो तो ई (ङीप्) प्रत्यय[2] लगता है, जैसे–

त्रिलोक – त्रिलोकी। पञ्चनल – पञ्चनली।

ऐसे प्रत्यय जिनके उकार या ऋकार का लोप होता है, जैसे–

मतुप्, वतुप्, ईयसुन्, क्तवतु, शतृ आदि से बने शब्दों का स्त्रीलिङ्ग रूप बनाने के लिए ई (ङीप्) प्रत्यय[3] जोड़ा जाता हे, जैसे–

श्रीमत्	श्रीमती	बुद्धिमत्	बुद्धिमती
भवत्	भवती	विद्यावत्	विद्यावती
लघीयस्	लघीयसी	गतवत्	गतवती

भ्वादि, अदादि और चुरादि गणीय धातुओं से बने शतृ (अत्) प्रत्ययान्त शब्दों का स्त्रीलिङ्ग रूप बनाने के लिए जब ई (ङीप्) जोड़ा जाता है, तो त् के पूर्व न् लग जाता है, जैसे–

गच्छत्	गच्छन्ती	चिन्तयत्	चिन्तयन्ती
वदत्	वदन्ती	भक्षयत्	भक्षयन्ती
नृत्यत्	नृत्यन्ती	दर्शयत्	दर्शयन्ती

जाया अर्थ में निम्नलिखित शब्दों से ई (ङीष्) जोड़ते समय ई से पूर्व आन् (आनुक्) जुड़ता है, जैसे–

इन्द्र	–	इन्द्राणी (इन्द्रस्य जाया)
वरुण	–	वरुणानी
भव	–	भवानी
शर्व	–	शर्वाणी

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1. वोतो गुणवचनात् । □ पा0 - 4.1. 44
2. द्विगोः। □ पा0 4 .1. 21
3. उगितश्च । □ पा0 4.1.6

रुद्र	–	रुद्राणी
मृड	–	मृडानी
आचार्य	–	आचार्यानी
मातुल	–	मातुलानी

कुछ शब्दों से स्त्रीलिङ्ग रूप बनाने के लिए आ और ई दोनों प्रत्यय जुड़ते हैं, किन्तु उनके अर्थ में भिन्नता आ जाती है, जैसे–

शूद्र	शूद्रा (जाति)	–	शूद्री (पत्नी)
आचार्य	आचार्या (जाति)	–	आचार्यानी (पत्नी)
क्षत्रिय	क्षत्रिया (जाति)	–	क्षत्रियाणी (पत्नी)
उपाध्याय	उपाध्याया (जाति)	–	उपाध्यायी, उपाध्यायानी (पत्नी)

3. ति

स्त्रीलिङ्ग बनाने के लिए युवन् शब्द में ति प्रत्यय[1] लगता है, जैसे–

युवन् – युवतिः

शतृ प्रत्ययान्त 'युवन्' शब्द का स्त्रीलिङ्ग रूप 'युवती' बनता है।

अभ्यास

1. **निम्नलिखित शब्दों का स्त्रीलिङ्ग बनाइए–**
   बाल, सरल, द्वितीय, नाटक, कारक, शिक्षक, कुमार, देव, मृदु, सिंह, श्रीमत्।
2. **निम्नलिखित शब्दों का पुंलिङ्ग बनाइए–**
   तपस्विनी, दात्री, युवतिः, सुता, साध्वी।
3. **निम्नलिखित शब्दों के अर्थ में अन्तर बताइए–**
   (क) शूद्रा / शूद्री
   ख) उपाध्याया / उपाध्यायानी

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[1] यूनस्तिः। ❑ पा० 4.1.77

ग) क्षत्रिया
क्षत्रियाणी

घ) आचार्या
आचार्यानी

4. निम्नलिखित अर्थों में बनने वाला स्त्री प्रत्ययान्त शब्द लिखिए–

(क) रूद्रस्य स्त्री,

(ख) मृडस्य स्त्री

(ग) चन्द्र इव मुखं यस्याः सा

(घ) या अन्नं पचति सा

(ङ) अष्टानाम् अध्यायानां समाहारः ।

षष्ठ अध्याय

अव्यय
(Indeclinables)

परिभाषा

संस्कृत में कुछ शब्द ऐसे हैं जिनके रूप सभी लिङ्गों, सभी वचनों एवं सभी विभक्तियों में समान होते हैं[1], वे **अव्यय** कहलाते हैं, जैसे – इदानीम्, अधुना, अत्र, तत्र आदि। इनके रूप कभी परिवर्तित नहीं होते।[2]

प्रकार

1. कुछ अव्यय क्रिया-विशेषण के रूप में प्रयुक्त होते हैं, जैसे – अकस्मात्, अद्य, अपरेद्युः, कुत्र आदि।
2. कुछ संयोजक का कार्य करते हैं; जैसे – च, वा, अथ, किन्तु आदि।
3. कुछ मनोविकार के सूचक होते हैं, जैसे – हन्त, हा, धिक् आदि। ये विस्मयसूचक अव्यय भी कहलाते हैं।

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1. "सदृशं त्रिषु लिङ्गेषु, सर्वासु च विभक्तिषु।
वचनेषु च सर्वेषु यन्न व्येति तदव्ययम्"॥ ❑ **सि० कौ० अव्यय प्रकरण**

2. न व्येति = विकारं न प्राप्नोति इति अव्ययम्।

4. कुछ अव्यय निपात कहलाते हैं, जैसे – खलु, तु, नु, किल आदि। ये अर्थ पर बल देने वाले होते हैं ।
5. इनके अतिरिक्त उपसर्गों[1] की भी गणना अव्यय में की जाती है, परन्तु लौकिक संस्कृत में इनका स्वतंत्र प्रयोग नहीं होता । ये दूसरे शब्दों से संयुक्त होकर उनके अर्थ को बदल देते हैं या बढ़ा देते हैं ।

अव्ययों का वाक्यों में प्रयोग

कुछ प्रमुख अव्ययों के वाक्यों में प्रयोग यहाँ प्रस्तुत है –

पुनः (बार-बार)	— विघ्नैः पुनःपुनरपि प्रतिहन्यमानाः प्रारब्धमुत्तमजनाः न परित्यजन्ति।
उच्चैः (जोर से)	— उच्चैः वद ।
नीचैः (नीचे)	— नीचैः उपरि गच्छति भाग्यपङ्क्तिः।
शनैः (धीरे)	— शनैः याहि ।
शनैः शनैः (धीरे-धीरे)	— शनैः शनैः गच्छ ।
अधः (नीचे)	— वृक्षस्य अधः पथिकः उपविष्टः ।
ऋते (विना)	— नहि परिश्रमाद् ऋते साफल्यम्।
युगपत् (एक साथ)	— पितापुत्रौ युगपद् एव समुपस्थितौ।
ह्यः (बीता हुआ कल)	— ह्यः सुरेशः ग्रामाद् आगतः ।
श्वः (आने वाला कल)	— अहं श्वः नगरं गमिष्यामि ।
सायम् (शाम)	— अस्माभिः सायं क्रीडितव्यम् ।
चिरम्, चिरेण (दीर्घकाल से)	— चिरं गतः सुरेशः, चिरेण आगता रमा।
ईषत् (थोड़ा, कुछ)	— ईषत् कार्यमपि त्वया न कृतम् ।
तूष्णीम् (चुपचाप)	— अध्यापकं दृष्ट्वा छात्रः तूष्णीं स्थितः।
सहसा (अचानक)	— सहसा तत्र सैनिकाः आगताः ।

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1. उपसर्ग 22 हैं – प्र, परा, अप, सम्, अनु, अव, निस्, निर्, दुस्, दुर्, वि, आङ्, नि, अधि, अपि, अति, सु, उत्, अभि, प्रति, परि, उप ।

मृषा (झूठ)	— मृषा वदति लोकोऽयं ताम्बूलं मुखभूषणम् । मुखस्य भूषणं पुसां स्यादेकैव सरस्वती ॥
मिथ्या (झूठ)	— मिथ्या न वक्तव्यम् ।
पुरा (प्राचीन काल में)	— आसीत् पुरा दिलीपो नाम राजा।
प्रायः (साधारणतया, प्रायेण)	— प्रायः भृत्याः नष्टधनं स्वामिनं त्यजन्ति।
मुहुः (बार–बार)	— सः मुहुः त्वाम् अपश्यत् ।
नूनम् (निश्चय ही)	— हरिः नूनं तव कार्यं करिष्यति ।
भूयः (बार–बार)	— हविषा कृष्णवर्त्मेव भूय एवाभिवर्धते।
खलु (निश्चय ही)	— मूर्खाः खलु दुर्बोध्याः ।
किल (निश्चय ही)	— इदं किलाव्याजमनोहरं वपुः ।
अद्य (आज)	— अद्य अहं विद्यालयं न गमिष्यामि।
अधुना (इस समय)	— अधुना सः पठति ।
कुत्र (कहाँ)	— त्वं कुत्र गच्छसि ?
उपरि (ऊपर)	— वृक्षस्य उपरि खगाः सन्ति ।
मा (मत)	— कोलाहलं मा कुरु ।
न (नहीं)	— मिथ्या न वक्तव्यम् ।
च (और)	— कृष्णः बलरामः च भ्रातरौ आस्ताम्।

प्रमुख अव्यय

प्रमुख अव्ययों की अर्थ सहित सूची अकारादि क्रम से यहाँ दी जा रही है।

अकस्मात्	= अचानक	आरात्	= समीप, दूर
अग्रतः	= सामने	आशु	= शीघ्र
अग्रे	= आगे	इतः	= इधर

अचिरम् = शीघ्र ही

अचिरात्, अचिरेण, अचिराय = अभी

अजस्त्रम् = निरन्तर

अतः = इसलिए

अतीव = अत्यधिक

अत्र = यहाँ

अथ = अनन्तर

अथ किम् = हाँ, और क्या

अद्य = आज

अधः = नीचे, नीचे की ओर

अधुना = इस समय

अन्तः = भीतर

अन्यत्र = दूसरी जगह

अन्यथा = नहीं तो

अपरम् = और भी

अपरेद्युः = दूसरे दिन

अभितः = चारों ओर

अमुत्र = वहाँ, परलोक में, ऊपर

अलम् = बस, पर्याप्त

असकृत् = बार–बार

असम्प्रति, असाम्प्रतम् = अनुचित

अहो = अहा !

अहोरात्रम् = दिन–रात

आम् = हाँ

इतस्ततः = इधर–उधर

इति = (समाप्ति-सूचक)

इत्थम् = इस प्रकार

इदानीम् = अब, इस समय

इव = सदृश, समान

इह = यहाँ

ईषत् = थोड़ा, कुछ, कम

उच्चैः = जोर से, ऊँचे

उभयतः = दोनों ओर

उषा = प्रातःकाल, उषा-काल में

ऋते = बिना

एकत्र = एक स्थान पर, इक्ट्ठे

एकदा = एक बार, एक समय

एव = ही

एवम् = ऐसा, इस प्रकार

कथम् = कैसे, क्यों

कथञ्चित् = जैसे–तैसे, कथमपि

कदा = कब

कदाचित् = कभी, किसी समय

किञ्चन, किञ्चित् = कुछ

किन्तु = परन्तु

किम् = क्या

किंवा = अथवा

किंल = अवश्य, वस्तुतः

कुतः = कहाँ से, कैसे

कुत्र	=	कहाँ, किस स्थान पर	ननु	=	ही, निश्चय से
कुत्रचित्	=	कहीं–कहीं पर	नमः	=	नमस्कार, प्रणाम
कृते	=	के लिए	नाना	=	अनेक प्रकार से
केवलम्	=	केवल, सिर्फ	नाम	=	नाम
क्व	=	कहाँ	निकषा	=	निकट
क्वचित्	=	कहीं	निकामम्	=	बहुत अधिक
खलु	=	अवश्य, निश्चय से	नीचैः	=	नीचे
			नूनम्	=	अवश्य
च	=	और	परम्	=	अनन्तर, इसके बाद
चिरम् चिराय चिरेण	=	देर तक	परश्वः	=	आने वाला परसों
चेत्	=	यदि	परितः	=	चारों ओर
जातु	=	कभी	परेद्युः	=	दूसरे दिन
झटिति	=	शीघ्र	पर्याप्तम्	=	पर्याप्त
ततः	=	तब	पश्चात्	=	पीछे
तत्र	=	वहाँ	पुनः	=	फिर
तथा	=	उस तरह	पुनः पुनः	=	बार–बार
तदा	=	तब	पुरः पुरतः पुरस्तात्	=	सामने
तदानीम्	=	उस समय			
तर्हि	=	तब			
तस्मात्	=	अतएव, इसलिए	पुरा	=	पहले, प्राचीन समय में
तावत्	=	तब तक	पूर्वेद्युः	=	पहले दिन
तिर्यक्	=	तिरछे	पृथक्	=	अलग
पृष्ठतः	=	पीछे	प्रतिदिनम्	=	प्रतिदिन
तूष्णीम्	=	चुप	प्रभृति	=	से लेकर
दिवा	=	दिन में	प्रसह्य	=	बलात्

दिष्ट्या	=	भाग्य से
दूरम्	=	दूर
द्विधा	=	दो तरह का
धिक्	=	धिक्कार
ध्रुवम्	=	अवश्य
न	=	नहीं
नक्तंदिवम्	=	रात–दिन
नक्तम्	=	रात्रि
प्राक्	=	पहले
प्रातः	=	प्रातःकाल, सबेरे
प्रायः	=	बहुधा
बहिः	=	बाहर
बहुधा	=	प्रायः
भूयः	=	बार–बार, अत्यधिक
मनाक्	=	थोड़ा, कम
मिथः	=	आपस में
मिथ्या	=	झूठ
मुहुः	=	बार–बार
मृषा	=	झूठ
यत्	=	कि
यतः	=	क्योंकि
यत्र	=	जहाँ
यथा	=	जैसे
यथा तथा	=	जैसे तैसे
यदा	=	जब
यदि	=	अगर
यावत्	=	जब तक
युगपत्	=	एक साथ
वरम्	=	अच्छा
विना	=	बिना, अतिरिक्त
वृथा	=	बेकार (व्यर्थ)
वै	=	अवश्य, निश्चय से
शनैः शनैः	=	धीरे-धीरे
श्वः	=	आगामी कल
सकृत	=	एक बार
सततम्	=	सदा
सदा	=	हमेशा, सर्वदा
सद्यः	=	तुरन्त
सपदि	=	तुरन्त
समन्ततः	=	चारों ओर
समया	=	समीप
समीचीनम्	=	ठीक
सम्यक्	=	ठीक प्रकार से
सर्वतः	=	सब ओर से
सर्वत्र	=	सभी जगह
सर्वथा	=	सब प्रकार से
सर्वदा	=	सदा
स्वैरम्	=	स्वेच्छापूर्वक
सह	=	साथ
सहसा	=	अचानक
सहितम्	=	साथ
साकम्	=	साथ
साक्षात्	=	प्रत्यक्ष
सामि	=	आधा

साम्प्रतम्	= अब, उचित	हा!	= शोकसूचक उद्गार
सायं	= शाम के समय	हि	= क्योंकि, अवश्य, वस्तुतः
सुष्ठु	= भलीभाँति	ह्यः	= बीता हुआ कल
स्वयम्	= अपने आप		
स्वस्ति	= कल्याण हो (आशीर्वादसूचक)		
हन्त!	= हर्ष और खेदसूचक		

टिप्पणी – तुमुन्, णमुल्, क्त्वा और ल्यप् प्रत्ययान्त कृदन्त भी अव्यय होते हैं, जैसे – गन्तुम्, स्मारं स्मारम्, दत्वा, आदाय आदि ।

अभ्यास

1. **अव्यय की परिभाषा और प्रकारों को कुछ उदाहरणों द्वारा स्पष्ट कीजिए।**
2. **निम्नलिखित अव्ययों का वाक्यों में प्रयोग कीजिए–**

शनैः शनैः	सायम्	मा
ऋते	नूनम्	कुत्र
ह्यः	अद्य	उपरि
पुनः	मिथ्या	अधुना
श्वः	पुरा	

3. **कोष्ठक में दिये हुए हिन्दी शब्दों से उपयुक्त संस्कृत अव्यय चुनकर रिक्त स्थानों में भरिए–**

(अ) ———— पाठं पठ । (जोर से)

(आ) राजपुरुषं दृष्ट्वा चोरः ———— स्थितः । (चुपचाप)

(इ) ———— ग्रामे एकः व्याघ्रः समागतः । (अचानक)

(ई) सुरेशः -----------परीक्षायाम् असफलोऽभवत् । (बार–बार)

(उ) ———— एव गुरुशिष्यौ आगतौ । (एक साथ)

(ऊ) ———— जीवतु । (काफी समय तक)

4. कोष्ठक में दिए गए अव्ययों में से उचित अव्यय चुनकर रिक्त स्थानों की पूर्ति कीजिए–

क. ————अहम् नाटकम् अपश्यम् (श्वः/ह्यः)

ख. विद्यालये,————अवकाशः वर्तते (श्वः/ अद्यः)

ग. अग्निः स्पर्शेन ————दहति (नूनम्/ कदाचित्)

घ. अश्वः ———— विपुलं पुच्छं वहति (पश्चात् / पुरस्तात्)

ङ. जलं प्रकृत्या ———— प्रवहति (नीचैः/ उच्चैः)

5. निम्नलिखित पदों में से अव्ययों को चुनिए–

नराय, चिराय, तत्र, यस्मात्, कथम्, कथाम्, तस्मिन्, यतः, सहसा, मनसा, मिथ्या, रथ्या ।

सप्तम अध्याय

कारक और विभक्ति

I. कारक (Case)

परिभाषा एवं भेद

किसी वाक्य में क्रिया के सम्पादन में जो सहायक हो, उसे **कारक** कहते हैं।[1]

उदाहरण–

हे छात्राः ! दशरथस्य पुत्रः रामः सीतायै लङ्कायां रावणं बाणेन हतवान्।

हे छात्रों ! दशरथ के पुत्र राम ने सीता के लिए लङ्का में रावण को बाण से मारा ।

इस वाक्य में 'हतवान्' (मारा) क्रिया के सम्पादन में निम्नलिखित शब्द साक्षात् सहायक हैं–

1. रामः – यह मारना क्रिया का कर्ता (सम्पादक) है ।
2. रावणं – यह मारना क्रिया का कर्म है ।
3. बाणेन – यह मारना क्रिया का करण है ।
4. सीतायै – यह मारना क्रिया का सम्प्रदान है ।
5. लङ्कायाम् – यह मारना क्रिया का अधिकरण (आधारभूत स्थान) है ।

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1. क्रियाऽन्वयि कारकम् ।

इन सबका क्रिया से सीधा सम्बन्ध है । अतएव ये पाँचों शब्द कारक हैं। किन्तु 'हे छात्राः' और 'दशरथस्य' – ये दोनों ऐसे पद हैं जिनका मारना क्रिया से साक्षात् सम्बन्ध नही हैं । अतएव ये कारक नहीं कहलाते हैं । इसी प्रकार एक छोटा वाक्य है –

वृक्षात् पत्रं पतति ।

इस वाक्य में 'पत्ति' क्रिया का सम्पादक 'पत्रम्' है । 'पतति' क्रिया वृक्ष से हो रही है। अतएव ' वृक्षात्' भी इस क्रिया के सम्पादन में सम्बद्ध है। इन सम्बन्धों के आधार पर संस्कृत में कारकों की संख्या छः ही मानी जाती है[1] –

कर्ता, कर्म, करण, सम्प्रदान, अपादान और अधिकरण । सम्बोधन और सम्बन्ध इनके अतिरिक्त हैं, किन्तु क्रिया से सीधा सम्बन्ध न होने के कारण इन्हें कारक नहीं माना जाता। अतः उपर्युक्त वाक्य में 'हे छात्राः' एवं 'दशरथस्य' कारक नहीं है । सभी कारकों का संक्षिप्त परिचय यहाँ प्रस्तुत है–

1. **कर्ता** – क्रिया को करने वाला **कर्ता** कहलाता है।[2] यह क्रिया के करने में स्वतन्त्र होता है,, जैसे – रमेशः पुस्तकं पठति ।

यहाँ 'पठति' क्रिया को करने वाल 'रमेशः' है । अतएव यह कर्ता कारक है ।

2. **कर्म** – क्रिया के सम्पादन में कर्ता का जो अभीष्टतम रहता है वह **कर्म** कारक है[3], जैसे –(i) छात्रः पुस्तकं पठति । यहाँ 'पठति' क्रिया के सम्पादन में 'पुस्तक' कर्ता का अभीष्टतम है । अतएव पुस्तकं कर्म कारक है ।

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1. कर्ता कर्म च करणं सम्प्रदानं तथैव च ।
अपादानाधिकरणे इत्याहुः कारकाणि षट् ॥
2. स्वतन्त्रः कर्ता । ❑ **पा0 1.4.54**
3. कर्तुरीप्सिततमं कर्म । ❑ **पा0 1.4.49**

(ii) बालकः पयसा ओदनं भुङ्क्ते । यहाँ कर्ता का अभीष्ट 'ओदनं' और 'पयस्' दोनों है। किन्तु अभीष्टतम केवल 'ओदनं' है । अतएव यह कर्म कारक है । वाक्य में कर्ता के बाद कर्म ही सबसे मुख्य कारक होता है ; क्योंकि क्रिया का फल इस पर आधारित होता है।

3. करण– क्रिया की सिद्धि में कर्ता का जो प्रमुख सहायक हो वह **करण** कारक कहलाता है[1], जैसे–

(i) जलेन मुखं प्रक्षालयति । (ii) रामः रावणं बाणेन हतवान् ।
यहाँ 'प्रक्षालयति' क्रिया के सम्पादन में कर्ता ' जल' की सहायता लेता है। दूसरे वाक्य में 'हतवान्' क्रिया के सम्पादन में कर्ता का सहायक 'बाण' है । अतएव ये दोनों करण कारक हैं ।

4. सम्प्रदान – जिसको कोई वस्तु दी जाती है या जिसके लिए कोई कार्य किया जाता है वह **सम्प्रदान** कारक कहलाता है[2], जैसे–
राजा निर्धनाय धनं ददाति ।

यहाँ 'ददाति' क्रिया निर्धन के लिए की गई है अर्थात् धन निर्धन को दिया गया है । अतएव 'निर्धन' सम्प्रदान कारक है । इसी प्रकार –

पिता **पुत्राय** फलम् आनयति ।
यहाँ फल लाने का कार्य पुत्र के लिए हुआ है । अतएव 'पुत्राय' सम्प्रदान कारक है ।

5. अपादान– जिससे कोई वस्तु अलग हो, वह **अपादान** कारक कहलाता है[3], जैसे – **वृक्षात्** पत्रं पतति । यहाँ 'पतति' क्रिया के सम्पादन में वृक्ष से पत्र अलग हो रहा है । अतएव वृक्ष अपादान कारक है । इसी प्रकार – सः ग्रामाद् आगच्छति, आदि ।

6. अधिकरण – क्रिया के सम्पादन में जो आधार होता है, वह **अधिकरण** कहलाता है, जैसे 'स्थाल्यां तण्डुलं पचति' । इस वाक्य में 'पचति' क्रिया का आधार स्थाली है, अतः यह अधिकरण कारक है । इसी प्रकार – रामः आसने उपविशति, आदि ।

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1. साधकतमं करणम् । ❑ पा0 **1.4.42**
2. कर्मणा यमभिप्रैति स सम्प्रदानम् । ❑ पा0 **1.4.32**
3. ध्रुवमपायेऽपादानम् । ❑ पा0 **1.4.24**

विभक्तियों के प्रयोग के प्रमुख नियम

कारक विभक्ति एवं उपपद विभक्ति के प्रयोग के प्रमुख नियम निम्नलिखित हैं–

1. प्रथमा विभक्ति (Nominative case)

1. कर्तृवाच्य के कर्ता कारक में प्रथमा विभक्ति होती है, जैसे–
छात्रः पुस्तकं पठति ।
2. कर्मवाच्य के कर्म में प्रथमा विभक्ति होती है, जैसे–
मया ग्रन्थः पठ्यते ।
3. सम्बोधन में प्रथमा विभक्ति होती है[1], जैसे–
हे बालकाः, यूयं कुत्र गच्छथ ?
4. किसी संज्ञादि शब्द (प्रातिपदिक) के अर्थ, लिङ्ग, वचन एवं परिमाण को प्रकट करने के लिए प्रथमा विभक्ति का प्रयोग होता है[2], जैसे– गोविन्दः, वृक्षः, लता आदि । विभक्ति लगने से पूर्व कोई भी शब्द संस्कृत में प्रयोग की दृष्टि से निरर्थक होता है ।
5. इति शब्द के योग में प्रथमा विभक्ति होती है, जैसे–
जनाः इमं रमेश इति कथयन्ति ।

2. द्वितीया विभक्ति (Accusative case)

1. कर्तृवाच्य के कर्म में द्वितीया विभक्ति होती है[3], जैसे–
सः **ग्रामं** गच्छति । राजा **शत्रुं** जयति ।
2. निरन्तरता का अर्थ प्रकट करने के लिए समयवाचक और मार्गवाचक शब्दों में द्वितीया विभक्ति होती है,[4] जैसे–

क्रोशं कुटिला नदी ।	लगातार कोस तक नदी टेढ़ी है ।
मासम् अधीते ।	लगातार महीने भर से पढ़ता है ।
योजनं पर्वतः ।	लगातार योजन तक पर्वत है ।

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1. सम्बोधने च । ❑ पा0 **2.3.47**
2. प्रातिपदिकार्थलिङ्गपरिमाणवचनमात्रे प्रथमा । ❑ **पा0 2.3.46**
3. कर्मणि द्वितीया । ❑ **पा0 2.3.2**
4. कालाध्वनोरत्यन्तसंयोगे । ❑ **पा0 2.3.5**

3. शीङ् (सोना) स्था (ठहरना) तथा आस् (बैठना) धातुओं के पूर्व यदि अधि उपसर्ग लगा हो तो इन क्रियाओं के आधार कर्म[1] बन जाते हैं और इनमें द्वितीया विभक्ति होती है, जैसे–
(i) शय्याम् अधितिष्ठति। (ii) हरिः शय्याम् अधिशेते। (iii) नृपः सिंहासनम् अध्यास्ते।
4. विश् धातु के पूर्व 'अभि' 'नि' उपसर्ग लगने पर इसके आधार कर्म बन[2] जाते हैं और इनमें द्वितीया होती है, जैसे–
सन्मार्गम् अभिनिविशते। (वह अच्छे मार्ग का अनुसरण करता है)
5. वस् धातु के पूर्व 'उप' 'अनु' 'अधि' 'आङ्' में से किसी उपसर्ग के लगने पर क्रिया का आधार कर्म[3] बनता है और उसमें द्वितीया विभक्ति होती है, जैसे–
हरिः वैकुण्ठम् उपवसति*, अनुवसति, अधिवसति, आवसति वा।

उपपद विभक्ति – अन्तरा (बीच में) अन्तरेण (बिना, छोड़कर) अभितः (चारों ओर), परितः (सब ओर), समया (समीप), निकषा (समीप), हा (हाय), प्रति (ओर, तरफ), उभयतः (दोनों ओर), सर्वतः (सब ओर), धिक् (धिक्कार), उपर्युपरि (सबसे ऊपर), अधोऽधः (सबसे नीचे), अध्यधि (समीप देश में), ऋते (बिना) इत्यादि अव्ययों के योग में द्वितीया विभक्ति[4] होती है, जैसे–
(i) **गङ्गां यमुनां** चान्तरा प्रयागः।
(ii) **परिश्रमम्** अन्तरेण कुतो विद्या।
(iii) **राजानम्** अभितः परिजनाः।
(iv) **नगरं** परितः जलम्।

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1. अधिशीङ्स्थासां कर्म। ❑ पा० 1.4.46
2. अभिनिविशश्च। ❑ पा० 1.4.47
3. उपान्वध्याङ्वसः। ❑ पा० 1.4.48

* उपवास करने के अर्थ में उपवस् का आधार कर्म नहीं होता, अपितु अधिकरण होता है, जैसे वने उपवसति (वन में उपवास करता है)।

4. अन्तराऽन्तरेण युक्ते। ❑ पा० 2.3.4
अभितः परितः समया निकषा हा प्रतियोगेऽपि। – वा०
उभसर्वतसोः कार्याधिगुपर्यादिषु त्रिषु।
द्वितीयाऽऽम्रेडितान्तेषु ततोऽन्यत्रापि दृश्यते॥ – वा०

(v) **ग्रामं** समया उद्यानम् वर्तते ।

(vi) **विद्यालयं** निकषा वाटिका ।

(vii) **दीनं** प्रति दया कार्या ।

(viii) उभयतः **नदीं** ग्रामः ।

(ix) सर्वतः **अध्यापकं** छात्राः ।

(x) धिक् **कृपणम्** ।

(xi) ऋते **ज्ञानं** सुखं नैव। आदि।

3. तृतीया विभक्ति (Instrumental case)

निम्नलिखित में तृतीया विभक्ति[1] होती है–

1. करण कारक में, जैसे–
   (i) रामः **रावणं** बाणेन हतवान् ।
   (ii) अहं **लेखन्या** पत्रं लिखामि ।
2. भाववाच्य एवं कर्मवाच्य के कर्ता में, जैसे–
   (i) **तेन** हसितम् । (भाव0) (ii) मया **रामायणं** पठ्यते । (कर्म0)
   उपपद विभक्ति – जिस विकृत अंग में विकार हो, उसके वाचक शब्द[2] में, जैसे–
   अक्ष्णा काणः । **पादेन** खञ्जः । **कर्णाभ्यां** बधिरः ।
3. कारण (हेतु) बोधक शब्दों में[3], जैसे–
   विद्यया यशः । **परिश्रमेण** धनम् ।
4. फल प्राप्ति (या कार्य की पूर्णता) के अर्थ में कालसातत्यवाची तथा मार्गसातत्यवाची शब्दों[4] में जैसे–
   (i) सः **मासेन** इमं ग्रन्थं पठितवान् । एक महीने में लगातार उसने यह ग्रन्थ पढ़ लिया है।
   (ii) **सप्तभिः दिनैः** नीरोगः जातः ।
   (iii) **क्रोशेन** पुस्तकं पठितवान् ।

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1. कर्तृकरणयोस्तृतीया । ☐ **पा0 2.3.18**
2. येनाङ्गविकारः । ☐ **पा0 2.3.23**
3. हेतौ । ☐ **पा0 2.3.23**
4. अपवर्गे तृतीया। ☐ **पा0 2.3.6**
   (अपवर्गः फलप्राप्तिः)

5. साथ अर्थवाले सह, साकं, सार्धं, समं आदि अव्यय शब्दों[1] के योग में अप्रधानकर्ता में, जैसे–
   (i) **गुरुणा** सह शिष्यः आगच्छति ।
   (ii) **मित्रैः** सार्धं गच्छ ।
   (iii) **सीतया** साकं रामः वनं गतः ।
   (iv) **फलैः** समं दुग्धं पिब ।
6. पृथक्, विना, नाना– शब्दों[2] के योग में द्वितीया, तृतीया अथवा पञ्चमी में से कोई भी विभक्ति होती है, जैसे–
   जलं (जलेन, जलात् वा) विना कोऽपि न जीवति ।
   पृथक् रामं (रामेण, रामात् वा) न कोऽपि रक्षकः ।
   धनं (धनेन धनात् वा) नाना न सुखम् ।

4. चतुर्थी विभक्ति (Dative case)

1. सम्प्रदान कारक में चतुर्थी विभक्ति होती है[3], जैसे–
   गुरुः शिष्याय ज्ञानं ददाति ।
2. रुच् (अच्छा लगना) तथा इसके समानार्थक धातुओं के योग में प्रसन्न होने वाला (या सन्तुष्ट होने वाला) सम्प्रदान कहलाता है, और उसमें चतुर्थी विभक्ति होती है[4], जैसे–
   बालकाय मिष्टान्नं रोचते ।
3. स्पृह् (इच्छा करना) धातु के योग में जिस व्यक्ति या वस्तु की इच्छा की जाती है वह सम्प्रदान संज्ञक होता है और उसमें चतुर्थी विभक्ति होती है।[5] जैसे–
   (i) **पुष्पेभ्यः** स्पृहयति । यह फूलों को चाहता है ।
   (ii) **फलेभ्यः** स्पृहयति ।

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1. सहयुक्तेऽप्रधाने । ❑ **पा0 2.3.19**
2. पृथग्विनानानाभिस्तृतीयाऽन्यतरस्याम् । ❑ **पा0 2.3.32**
3. चतुर्थी सम्प्रदाने । ❑ **पा0 2.3.13**
4. रुच्यर्थानां प्रीयमाणः । ❑ **पा0 1.4.33**
5. स्पृहेरीप्सितः । ❑ **पा0 1.4.36**

4. धारि {धारयति = धारता है (ऋण के रूप में धारण करता है)} के प्रयोग होने पर जिससे उधार लेता है, वह सम्प्रदान कहलाता है और उसमें चतुर्थी विभक्ति होती है[1], जैसे–
मोहनः **देवदत्ताय** शतं धारयति ।
5. जिसके लिए कोई कार्य किया जाता है, उस प्रयोजन वाचक शब्द में चतुर्थी विभक्ति होती है[2], जैसे – (i) **मुक्तये** हरिं भजति।
(ii) **यूपाय** दारु ।

उपपद विभक्ति–

1. नमः, स्वस्ति, स्वाहा, स्वधा, अलम् और वषट् के योग में चतुर्थी विभक्ति होती है[3], जैसे–
   (i) **गुरवे** नमः ।
   (ii) **प्रजाभ्यः** स्वस्ति ।
   (iii) **अग्नये** स्वाहा ।
   (iv) **पितृभ्यः** स्वधा ।
   (v) **दैत्येभ्यो** हरिः अलम् ।
   (vi) **इन्द्राय** वषट् ।
2. क्रुध्, द्रुह्, ईर्ष्य् तथा असूय् इन धातुओं के तथा इन्हीं अर्थवाली अन्य धातुओं के योग में जिसके प्रति क्रोध आदि होता है उसके वाचक शब्द में चतुर्थी विभक्ति होती है[4], जैसे–
प्रभुः **सेवकाय** क्रुध्यति । खलः **सज्जनेभ्यः** असूयति, द्रुह्यति, ईर्ष्यति वा।

5. पञ्चमी विभक्ति (Ablative case)

1. अपादान कारक[5] में पञ्चमी विभक्ति होती है, जैसे–
   (i) वृक्षात् फलानि पतन्ति ।
   (ii) छात्रः विद्यालयाद् आगच्छति ।

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1. धारेरुत्तमर्णः । ☐ **पा0 1.4.35**
2. तादर्थ्ये चतुर्थी वाच्या । ☐ **वा0**
3. नमःस्वस्तिस्वाहास्वधाऽलंवषड्योगाच्च । ☐ **पा0 2.3.16**
4. क्रुधद्रुहेर्ष्यासूयार्थानां यं प्रति कोपः । ☐ **पा0 1.4.37**
5. अपादाने पञ्चमी । ☐ **पा0 2.3.28**

2. भय एवं रक्षा अर्थवाली (भी एवं त्रा) धातुओं के योग में जो भय एवं रक्षा का हेतु है वह अपादान संज्ञक होता है तथा उसमें पञ्चमी विभक्ति होती है[1], जैसे–

   (i) सः पापाद् बिभेति ।

   (ii) सः चौरात् त्रायते

3. जिससे नियमपूर्वक विद्या ग्रहण की जाय, वह अपादान संज्ञक होता है और उसमें पञ्चमी विभक्ति होती है[2], जैसे–

   छात्रः **अध्यापकात्** संस्कृतं पठति ।

4. जहाँ से कोई वस्तु उत्पन्न होती है वह मूल कारण अपादान संज्ञक होता है[3], और उसमें पञ्चमी विभक्ति होती है, जैसे–

   (i) **गोमयाद्** वृश्चिको जायते ।

   (ii) **कामात्** क्रोधोऽभिजायते ।

   (iii) गङ्गा **हिमालयात्** प्रभवति ।

उपपद विभक्ति – 1. अन्य, इतर तथा इनके अर्थों वाले दूसरे शब्द, आरात् (दूर या समीप), ऋते (विना) आदि शब्दों के योग में पञ्चमी विभक्ति होती है[4], जैसे–

कृष्णाद् अन्यः । आरात् **ग्रामात्** । ऋते ज्ञानान्न मुक्तिः । **ग्रीष्मात्** पूर्वः वसन्तः आदि ।

2. प्रभृति, आरभ्य, बहिः, अनन्तरम्, ऊर्ध्वम्, परम् आदि शब्दों के योग में भी पञ्चमी होती है[2], जैसे–

तस्मात् **दिनात्** प्रभृति, सः **नगरात्** बहिः अगच्छत्, आदि ।

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1. भीत्रार्थानां भयहेतुः । □ **पा० 1.4.25**

2. आख्यातोपयोगे। □ **पा० 1.4.29**

3. जनिकर्तुः प्रकृतिः । भुवः प्रभवः । □ **पा० 1 . 4 . 30,31**

4. अन्यारादितरर्तेदिक्शब्दाञ्चूत्तरपदाजाहियुक्ते । □ **पा० 2.3.29**

6. षष्ठी विभक्ति (Genitive case)

1. सम्बन्ध में षष्ठी विभक्ति होती है[1], जैसे–

राज्ञः पुरुषः । पितुः पुत्रः । मृत्तिकायाः घटः ।

उपपद विभक्ति – 1. जब किसी समूह में से गुण, क्रिया आदि के आधार पर किसी एक को अलग किया जाय, तब समूह में षष्ठी या सप्तमी होती है[2], जैसे–

कवीनां (कविषु वा) कालिदासः श्रेष्ठः ।

छात्राणां (छात्रेषु वा) गोपालः चतुरः ।

2. उपरि, पश्चात्, अधस्तात्, अधः, पुरस्तात्, पुरः आदि शब्दों के योग में षष्ठी विभक्ति होती है, जैसे–

वृक्षस्य अधः (अधस्तात् वा) एकः पथिकः आसीत् । **भवनस्य** उपरि । **गृहस्य** उपरि। **विद्यालयस्य** पुरः (पुरस्तात् वा) **तव** पश्चात् आदि ।

7. सप्तमी विभक्ति (Locative case)

1. अधिकरण कारक में सप्तमी विभक्ति होती है[3], जैसे–
   (i) **स्थाल्याम्** ओदनं पचति ।
   (ii) **वृक्षे** पत्राणि सन्ति ।
2. जब एक क्रिया के होने पर दूसरी क्रिया का होना वर्णित हो तो पहले होने वाली क्रिया में तथा उस क्रिया के कर्ता में भी सप्तमी विभक्ति होती है[4], जैसे–
   (i) **सूर्ये** अस्तं गते सर्वे गृहं गताः ।
   (ii) **रामे** वनं गते दशरथः स्वर्गं प्रयातः ।

3. जहाँ अनादर का भाव प्रकट हो वहाँ क्रियार्थक शब्दों में षष्ठी या सप्तमी विभक्ति होती है[5], जैसे–

रूदति (रूदतः वा) परिजने (परिजनस्य वा) सः गृहम् अत्यजत् ।

रूदति (रुदतः वा) बालके (बालकस्य वा) पिता कार्यालयं गतः ।

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1. षष्ठी शेषे । ☐ **पा0 2.3.50**
2. यतश्च निर्धारणम् । ☐ **पा0 2.3.41**
3. सप्तम्यधिकरणे च । ☐ **पा0 2.3.36**
4. यस्य च भावेन भावलक्षणम् । ☐ **पा0 2.3.37**
5. षष्ठी चानादरे । ☐ **पा0 2.3.38**

अभ्यास

1. **कारक किसे कहते हैं ? संस्कृत में कितने कारक हैं ?**
2. **निम्नलिखित का लक्षण एवं उदाहरण लिखिए–**
   कर्म, सम्प्रदान, अपादान और अधिकरण ।
3. **निम्नलिखित के योग में कौन-कौन-सी विभक्तियाँ होती हैं, वाक्यप्रयोग द्वारा बताइए–**
   सह, नमः, विना, ऋते, अधोऽधः, इति ।
4. **कोष्ठ में दिए गए शब्दों से उचित विभक्ति लगाकर रिक्त स्थानों को भरिए–**
   (अ) सुरेशः ———— अधिशेते । (शय्या)
   (आ) हरिः ———— अधितिष्ठति । (वैकुण्ठ)
   (इ) राजा ———— अध्यास्ते । (सिंहासन)
   (ई) ज्ञानं भारः ———— विना । (क्रिया)
   (उ) जनाः तं ———— इति कथयन्ति । (रमेश)
   (ऊ) परितः ———— परिखा । (नगर)
   (ऋ) अलं ———— । (विवाद)
5. **निम्नलिखित वाक्यों के स्थूलाक्षर पदों में कौन-सी विभक्ति है?**
   क. प्रजापालनं **राज्ञः** कार्यं वर्तते ।
   (द्वितीया/षष्ठी/पञ्चमी)
   ख. कविः **छन्दांसि** रचयति ।
   (द्वितीया/प्रथमा)
   ग. महाकविः सूरदासः **चक्षुर्भ्याम्** अन्धः आसीत् ।
   (चतुर्थी/पञ्चमी/तृतीया)
   घ. प्रेम्णैव **यूनोः** जीवनं सुखाय कल्पते ।
   (षष्ठी/सप्तमी)
   ङ. स्वयं दासाः **तपस्विनः** ।
   (प्रथमा/द्वितीया/पञ्चमी/षष्ठी)

6. कोष्ठक में दिए गए पदों में से उचित पद चुनकर रिक्त स्थानों की पूर्ति कीजिए–

क. छात्राः ——— व्याकरणं पठन्ति । (अध्यापकेन/अध्यापकात्)

ख. ——— उभयतः ग्रामौ स्तः । (पर्वतम्/पर्वतस्य)

ग. ग्रीष्मे गङ्गास्नानं ——— न रोचते ? (कस्य/कस्मै)

घ. बालकः ——— बिभेति । (व्याघ्रात् /व्याघ्रेण)

ङ. प्रायो मातरः अपराधेऽपि ——— न कुप्यन्ति । (पुत्रेभ्यः/पुत्रेषु)

अष्टम अध्याय

समास
(Compound)

समास की परिभाषा

जब दो या दो से अधिक पद अपनी विभक्तियों को छोड़कर परस्पर मिलकर एक हो जाते हैं, तब उनका यह मेल **समास** कहलाता है।[1] जैसे सभायाः पतिः– सभापतिः। यहाँ सभायाः (ङस्) पतिः (सु) ये दो शब्द मिलते हैं और इनकी विभक्तियों का लोप हो जाता है। समास शब्द का अर्थ है **समसनम्– सम्यक् असनम् (क्षेपणम्)**। अर्थात् पदों से सम्बद्ध विभक्तियों को हटाकर अनेक पदों का एक पद बन जाना समास कहलाता है। समस्त पद के साथ पुनः विभक्ति का आगमन होता है। विभक्तियों के अतिरिक्त जो समुच्चय द्योतक **च** आदि आते हैं, वे भी समास होने पर लुप्त हो जाते हैं, जैसे– रामश्च लक्ष्मणश्च– रामलक्ष्मणौ। यहां दोनों पदों की विभक्तियों के साथ आये हुए 'च' का भी लोप हो जाता है। कहीं-कहीं पदों के बीच की विभक्तियों का लोप नहीं होता। जैसे– वनेचरः, युधिष्ठिरः आदि। ऐसे समासों को अलुक् समास कहते हैं।

विग्रह

समस्त-पद को तोड़कर उसको पहले का रूप दे देना **विग्रहवाक्य** कहलाता है। पारिभाषिक शब्दावली में समस्त पदों के अर्थ को प्रकट करने

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1. सम (भली प्रकार) + अस् (फेंकनाःरखना) + घञ् (अ) = समासः = संक्षेप।

वाला वाक्य **विग्रहवाक्य** कहलाता है[1], जैसे– उपर्युक्त सभापति का विग्रह है – सभायाः पतिः। इसी प्रकार नरपतिः समास का विग्रह वाक्य है– नराणां पतिः।

विग्रह दो प्रकार के होते हैं–

1. **लौकिक विग्रह-**

जब विग्रह करने पर पद विभक्ति के साथ रहते हैं और व्यवहार के योग्य होते हैं, तब उसे **लौकिक** विग्रह कहते हैं, जैसे– सभायाः पतिः।

2. **अलौकिक विग्रह-**

जब विग्रह वाक्य में प्रकृति और प्रत्यय को पृथग्-पृथग् दिखाया जाता है तब वे लोक व्यवहार के योग्य नहीं रहते इसे **अलौकिक** विग्रह कहते हैं। **अलौकिक** विग्रह में ही समास होता है।

सभा + ङस्, पति + सु

सन्धि और समास में अंतर

1. सन्धि में वर्णों का मेल होता है और समास में पदों का।
2. सन्धि वर्णों के अतिशय सामीप्य में होती है, किन्तु समास जिन पदों में होगा उनमें परस्पर अन्वय की विवक्षा रहती है। इसके अभाव में शाब्दिक सामीप्य होने पर भी समास नहीं होता, जैसे- पुरुषो राज्ञो भार्या च देवदत्तस्य। यहाँ परस्पर अन्वय विवक्षित न होने के कारण समास नहीं हो सकता, किन्तु सन्धि होती है। पुरुषो एवं राज्ञो में विसर्ग को ओ सन्धि के कारण हुआ है। सन्धि के लिए किसी प्रकार का अन्वय अपेक्षित नहीं है।
3. समास होने पर सन्धि अवश्य होती है, किन्तु सन्धि होने पर समास अनिवार्य नहीं है। "सूर्यस्य उदयः– सूर्योदयः" यहाँ "सूर्य उदयः" नहीं लिख सकते। सन्धि करनी ही पड़ेगी।

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1. वृत्त्यर्थावबोधकं वाक्यं विग्रहः। ☐ **सह सुपा पा० - 2.1.4.** ल०सि०कौ०सू०वृत्ति।

समास के भेद

समास दो या अधिक पदों के बीच हुआ करता है। इन पदों की प्रधानता के आधार पर समास के मुख्य चार भेद किए जाते हैं– अव्ययीभाव, तत्पुरुष, द्वन्द्व, और बहुब्रीहि। तत्पुरुष के दो उपभेद हैं – कर्मधारय और द्विगु। इस प्रकार समास की संख्या सामान्यतया छः मानी जाती है*।

1. अव्ययीभाव

जिस समास का प्रायः पूर्वपद प्रधान होता है और समस्त पद अव्यय बन जाता है, वह **अव्ययीभाव** समास (Adverbial compound) कहलाता है।[1] इसमें प्रथम पद प्रायः अव्यय और द्वितीय पद कोई संज्ञा शब्द होते हैं। समस्त पद अव्यय होता है और नपुंसकलिङ्ग एकवचन के तुल्य प्रयुक्त होता है, जैसे– **यथाशक्ति** कार्यं करोति। अर्थात् शक्तिम् अनतिक्रम्य (शक्ति के अनुसार) कार्यं करोति। यहाँ यथा का अर्थ अनतिक्रम्य है और यही पद प्रधान है । इस कारण से यह अव्ययीभाव समास माना जाता है।[2] अव्ययीभाव समास निम्नलिखित अर्थों में होता है–

1. विभक्ति अर्थ में

हरौ इति – अधिहरि (हरि के विषय में) यहाँ सप्तमी विभक्ति के अर्थ में प्रयुक्त अधि का हरि के साथ समास हुआ है । इसी प्रकार अध्यात्मम् (आत्मनि इति), अधिगङ्गम् (गङ्गायाम् इति), अधिगृहम् (गृहे इति) ।

टिप्पणी– (अ) अव्ययीभाव समास होने पर समस्त पद के अन्तिम दीर्घ स्वर का ह्रस्व, ए, ऐ का इ तथा ओ, औ का उ हो जाता है।[3]

अधि + गङ्गा = अधिगङ्गा— अधिगङ्गम् । इसी प्रकार
उप + नदी = उपनदि (नद्याः समीपम्) ।
उप + वधू = उपवधु (वध्वाः समीपम्),
उप + गो = उपगु, (गोः समीपम्)
उप + नौ = उपनु (नावः समीपम्) आदि ।

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* द्वन्द्वो द्विगुरपि चाहं मद्गेहे नित्यमव्ययीभावः।
तत्पुरुष कर्मधारय येनाहं स्याम्बहुव्रीहिः ।। ❑ **सुभाषितरत्नभाण्डागार**

1. पूर्वपदार्थप्रधानोऽव्ययीभावः। ❑ **सि0 कौ0 सर्वसमास शेषप्रकरण**

2. अव्ययं विभक्ति–समीप–समृद्धिव्यृद्ध्यर्थाभावात्यया– सम्प्रित–शब्दप्रादुर्भाव–पश्चाद्यथानुपूर्व्ययौगपद्य–सादृश्य–सम्पत्ति–साकल्यान्तवचनेषु। ❑ **पा0 2.1.6**

3. ह्रस्वो नपुंसके प्रातिपदिकस्य। ❑ **पा0 1.2.47**

टिप्पणी– (आ) अव्ययीभाव समास होने पर समासान्त पद यदि अन् से अन्त होने वाला हो तो अन् का लोप हो जाता है और उसके स्थान पर समासान्त[1] टच् (अ)प्रत्यय जुड़ता है, जैसे– अधि + आत्मन् = अध्यात्म· अध्यात्मम्। इसी प्रकार उपराजम् आदि।

2. **समीप अर्थ में**

गङ्गायाः समीपम् = उपगङ्गम्

कृष्णस्य समीपम् = उपकृष्णम्

यमुनायाः समीपम् = उपयमुनम्

3. **समृद्धि अर्थ में**

पाञ्चालानां समृद्धिः = सुपाञ्चालम्

मद्राणां समृद्धिः = सुमद्रम्

4. **व्यृद्धि (ऋद्धि का नाश) अर्थ में**

यवनानां व्यृद्धिः (विगता ऋद्धिः) दुर्यवनम् (यवनों की दीनता)

5. **अभाव अर्थ में**

जनानाम् अभावः = निर्जनम्

मक्षिकाणाम् अभावः = निर्मक्षिकम्

विघ्नानाम् अभावः = निर्विघ्नम्

6. **अत्यय (ध्वंस) अर्थ में**

हिमस्य अत्ययः = अतिहिमम् (हिम की समाप्ति)

इसी प्रकार अतियौवनम्, अतिवसन्तम्, अतिमात्रम् ।

7. **असम्प्रति (वर्तमान काल में अनुचित, अयोग्य) अर्थ में**

निद्रा सम्प्रति न युज्यते = अतिनिद्रम्

(निद्रा के अनुपयुक्त काल में)

8. **शब्द-प्रादुर्भाव (शब्द प्रकाश) अर्थ में**

हरिशब्दस्य प्रकाशः = इतिहरि (हरि शब्द का उच्चारण)

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1. अनश्च। ☐ **पा0 5.4.108**

9. **पश्चात् अर्थ में**

रथस्य पश्चात् = अनुरथम् (रथ के पीछे)

विष्णोः पश्चात् = अनुविष्णु

चैत्रमासस्य पश्चात् = अनुचैत्रमासम्

10. **यथा के अर्थ में**

यथा के चार अर्थ हैं

(अ) योग्यता – रूपस्य योग्यम् = अनुरूपम्, अनुगुणम्।

(आ) वीप्सा – दिने दिने = प्रतिदिनम्, प्रत्येकम्, प्रत्यहम्, प्रतिक्रमम्।

(इ) पदार्थानतिवृत्ति – शक्तिमनतिक्रम्य = यथाशक्ति, यथाविधि, यथाक्रमम्।

(ई) सादृश्य (समानता) – हरेः सादृश्यम् = सहरि

11. **आनुपूर्व्य (क्रम) अर्थ में**

ज्येष्ठस्यानुपूर्व्येण = अनुज्येष्ठम् (ज्येष्ठ के क्रम से)।

क्रमस्यानुपूर्व्येण = अनुक्रमम् (क्रम के अनुसार) ।

12. **यौगपद्य (साथ-साथ) अर्थ में**

चक्रेण युगपत् = सचक्रम् (चक्र के साथ)

13. **सादृश्य अर्थ में**

सदृशः संख्या = ससखि

(यहाँ सादृश्य गौण है, सहरि में सादृश्य मुख्य था) ।

14. **सम्पत्ति अर्थ में**[1]

क्षत्राणां सम्पत्तिः = सक्षत्रम् (क्षत्रियों की सम्पत्ति)

15. **साकल्य (सम्पूर्ण, अशेष) अर्थ में**

तृणमपि अपरित्यज्य = सतृणम्।

16. **अन्त (तक) के अर्थ में**

महाभाष्यपर्यन्तम् = समहाभाष्यम्।

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1. धन की ज्यों की त्यों स्थिति सम्पत्ति या ऋद्धि है तथा सम्पत्ति की वृद्धि समृद्धि है।

मर्यादा* और **अभिविधि**** के अर्थ में आङ् (आ) के साथ विकल्प से अव्ययीभाव समास होता है।[1] समास न होने पर पञ्चमी विभक्ति होती है, जैसे–

आ मुक्तेः = आमुक्ति (मुक्ति पर्यन्त)।

इसी प्रकार आबालेभ्यः = आ बालम्। आ समुद्रेभ्यः = आसमुद्रम्।

बहिः, प्राञ्च् (अञ्च् धातु से निष्पन्न) शब्दों के साथ विकल्प से अव्ययीभाव समास होता है, जैसे[2]–

वनाद् बहिः = बहिर्वनम्, बहिर्वनात्। इसी प्रकार – प्राग्वनम्, प्राग्वनात्, प्राग्ग्रामम्, प्राग्ग्रामात् आदि।

अभिमुख अर्थ में अभि और प्रति के साथ समास होता है[3], जैसे–

अग्नेः अभिमुखम् = अभ्यग्नि (अग्नि की ओर)।

अग्निं प्रति = प्रत्यग्नि (अग्नि की ओर)।

2. तत्पुरुष

जिस समास में प्रायः उत्तर पद का अर्थ प्रधान रहता है, उसे **तत्पुरुष** समास कहते हैं[4], जैसे– राष्ट्रस्य पतिः = राष्ट्रपतिः। यहाँ उत्तर पद **पतिः** मुख्य है। क्योंकि राष्ट्रपति भाषण दे रहे हैं, यहाँ क्रिया से साक्षात् सम्बन्ध पति का है। राष्ट्र का नहीं। अतएव उत्तर पद की प्रधानता है। इस समस्त पद के लिङ्ग, वचन आदि उत्तर पद के समान ही होते हैं।

तत्पुरुष के भेद – तत्पुरुष समास के पूर्व पद एवं उत्तर पद में विभक्ति की समानता के आधार पर इसके दो भेद किये जाते हैं–

1. **व्यधिकरण तत्पुरुष** – जिसमें पूर्व पद तथा उत्तर पद की विभक्ति समान नहीं हो, जैसे– राष्ट्रस्य पतिः – राष्ट्रपतिः। यहाँ प्रथम पद षष्ठ्यन्त है और द्वितीय पद प्रथमान्त।

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* तेन विना (excluding)

** तेन सहितम् (including)

1. आङ् मर्यादाभिविध्योः। ❑ **पा0 2.1.13**
2. अपपरिबहिरञ्चवः पञ्चम्या। ❑ **पा0 2.1.12**
3. लक्षणेनाभिप्रती आभिमुख्ये। ❑ **पा0 2.1.14**
4. उत्तरपदार्थप्रधानस्तत्पुरुषः। ❑ **सि0कौ0सर्वसमास शेषप्रकरण**

2. **समानाधिकरण तत्पुरुष** – जिसमें पूर्व पद और उत्तर पद दोनों की विभक्ति समान हो। जैसे– नीलम् कमलम् – नीलकमलम्। यहाँ दोनों पद प्रथमान्त हैं। व्यधिकरण तत्पुरुष में पूर्व पद द्वितीया से सप्तमी तक की किसी विभक्ति के साथ रहता है। इसके आधार पर इस समास के छः भेद किए जाते हैं–

(i) **द्वितीया तत्पुरुष**[1]

दुःखम् अतीतः	= दुःखातीतः।
कृष्णं श्रितः	= कृष्णाश्रितः।
शोकं पतितः	= शोकपतितः।
ग्रामं गतः	= ग्रामगतः।
सुखं प्राप्तः	= सुखप्राप्तः।
कष्टम् आपन्नः	= कष्टापन्नः।

(ii) **तृतीया तत्पुरुष**[2]

शङ्कुलया खण्डः	= शङ्कुलाखण्डः।
अग्निना दग्धः	= अग्निदग्धः।
व्यवहारेण कुशलः	= व्यवहारकुशलः।
मासेन पूर्वः	= मासपूर्वः[3]।
पित्रा समः	= पितृसमः।
नखैः भिन्नः	= नखभिन्नः[4]।
हरिणा त्रातः	= हरित्रातः।

(iii) **चतुर्थी तत्पुरुष**[5]

यूपाय दारु	= यूपदारु।
भूताय बलिः	= भूतबलिः।
स्नानाय इदम्	= स्नानार्थम्।
गवे हितम्	= गोहितम्।

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1. द्वितीया श्रितातीतपतितगतात्यस्तप्राप्तापन्नैः। ❑ पा0 2.1.24
2. तृतीया तत्कृतार्थेन गुणवचनेन। ❑ पा0 2.1.30
3. पूर्वसदृशसमोनार्थकलहनिपुणमिश्रश्लक्ष्णैः। ❑ पा0 2.1.31
4. कर्तृकरणे कृता बहुलम्। ❑ पा0 2.1.32
5. चतुर्थी तदर्थार्थबलिहितसुखरक्षितैः। ❑ पा0 2.1.36

छात्राय अयम्	= छात्रार्थम् (ग्रन्थः) ।
गवे रक्षितम्	= गोरक्षितम् ।
तस्मै इदम्	= तदर्थम् ।
गवे सुखम्	= गोसुखम् ।

(iv) **पञ्चमी तत्पुरुष**[1]

चोराद् भयम्	= चोरभयम् ।
सिंहाद् भीतः	= सिंहभीतः ।
रोगात् मुक्तः	= रोगमुक्तः ।

(v) **षष्ठी तत्पुरुष**[2]

राज्ञः पुरुषः	= राजपुरुषः ।
विद्यायाः आलयः	= विद्यालयः ।
सुराणाम् ईशः	= सुरेशः ।

(vi) **सप्तमी तत्पुरुष**[3]

अध्ययने कुशलः	= अध्ययनकुशलः ।
काव्ये निपुणः	= काव्यनिपुणः ।
कार्ये दक्षः	= कार्यदक्षः ।
सभायां पण्डितः	= सभापण्डितः ।

नञ् तत्पुरुष

उपर्युक्त भेदों के अतिरिक्त तत्पुरुष का एक अन्य भेद है **नञ् तत्पुरुष**। जब **न** का किसी संज्ञा शब्द के साथ समास होता है तब वह नञ् तत्पुरुष कहलाता है[4], जैसे–

न धार्मिकः	=	अधार्मिकः।	न सत्यम्	=	असत्यम्।
न सुखम्	=	असुखम्।	न आदिः	=	अनादिः।
न अन्तः	=	अनन्तः।	न इष्टम्	=	अनिष्टम्।
न उपकारः	=	अनुपकारः।	न अर्थः	=	अनर्थः।

1. पञ्चमी भयेन । ❑ **पा0 2.1.37**
2. षष्ठी । ❑ **पा0 2.2.8**
3. सप्तमी शौण्डैः । ❑ **पा0 2.1.40**
4. नञ् । ❑ **पा 2.2.6**

टिप्पणी– नञ् समास का न जब किसी व्यञ्जन वर्ण से मिलता है तब न् का लोप हो जाता है और **अ** शेष रह जाता है तथा जब किसी स्वर के साथ मिलता है तब **अन्**[1] में परिवर्तित हो जाता है ।

समानाधिकरण तत्पुरुष (कर्मधारय)

तत्पुरुष समास में विग्रह वाक्य में पूर्व पद एवं उत्तर पद की विभक्ति जब समान रहती है तब वह **समानाधिकरण तत्पुरुष** कहलाता है। इसके दोनों पद प्रथमा विभक्ति में होते हैं। यथासंभव लिङ्ग और वचन भी समान होते हैं। इसे **कर्मधारय** समास कहते हैं।[2] जैसे–

नीलं कमलम् = नीलकमलम्। पीतम् अम्बरम् = पीताम्बरम्।

कर्मधारय समास के निम्नलिखित रूप हैं–

1. विशेषण-विशेष्य कर्मधारय

शुभं कार्यम्	= शुभकार्यम्।	नीलम् उत्पलम्	= नीलोत्पलम्।
विशालः वृक्षः	= विशालवृक्षः।	सन् जनः	= सज्जनः।
महान् जनः	= महाजनः।	महत् काव्यम्	= महाकाव्यम्।
महान् पुरुषः	= महापुरुषः।		

2. उपमानोपमेय कर्मधारय

घन इव श्यामः = घनश्यामः (उपमान पूर्वपद) ।
कमलम् इव नयनम् = कमलनयनम् ।
चन्द्र इव मुखम् = चन्द्रमुखम् ।
पुरुषः व्याघ्र इव = पुरुषव्याघ्रः (उपमानोत्तर पद)
कुछ अन्य कर्मधारय
विद्या एव धनम् = विद्याधनम्
आदौ सुप्तः पश्चात् उत्थितः = सुप्तोत्थितः।

द्विगु

जब कर्मधारय में पहला पद संख्यावाची हो तब वह समास **द्विगु** समास कहलाता है।[3] यह समास प्रायः समाहार (समूह) अर्थ में होता है। विग्रह में प्रायः षष्ठी विभक्ति का प्रयोग किया जाता है, जैसे–

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1. नलोपो नञः । ☐ पा0 - 6.3.73
तस्मान्नुडचि। ☐ पा0 6.3.74
2. तत्पुरुषः समानाधिकरणः कर्मधारयः । ☐ पा0 1.2.42
3. संख्यापूर्वो द्विगुः। ☐ पा0 2.1.52

त्रायाणां लोकानां समाहारः = त्रिलोकी।
पञ्चानां वटानां समाहारः = पञ्चवटी।
सप्तानां शतानां समाहारः = सप्तशती।
अष्टानां अध्यायानां समाहारः = अष्टाध्यायी।
त्रयाणां भुवनानां समाहारः = त्रिभुवनम्।
सप्तानां दिनानां समाहारः = सप्तदिनम्।

3. द्वन्द्व

जिस समास में पूर्व और उत्तर दोनों पद प्रधान होते हैं या उनके समूह का प्रधानत्व रहता है, वह **द्वन्द्व** समास[1] कहलाता है। विग्रह में प्रत्येक पद के साथ 'च' प्रयोग होता है, जैसे–

रामश्च लक्ष्मणश्च = रामलक्ष्मणौ।
युधिष्ठिरश्च भीमश्च अर्जुनश्च = युधिष्ठिरभीमार्जुनाः।
द्वन्द्व समास तीन प्रकार का होता है

1. **इतेरत्तर योग द्वन्द्व** – समास में आए सभी पदों का योग (क्रियादि के साथ सम्बन्ध) एक साथ होता है। सभी पद अपना प्रधानत्व और व्यक्तित्व रखते हैं। समस्त पद में संख्या के अनुसार द्विवचन या बहुवचन होता है, किन्तु लिङ्ग परवर्ती-पद के अनुसार होता है।[2]

पार्वती च परमेश्वरः च = पार्वतीपरमेश्वरौ।
धर्मश्च अर्थश्च कामश्च मोक्षश्च = धर्मार्थकाममोक्षाः।
माता च पिता च = पितरौ, मातापतरौ।
पुत्रश्च कन्या च = पुत्रकन्ये।
धनञ्च जनश्च यौवनञ्च = धनजनयौवनानि।
कन्दं च मूलं च फलं च = कन्दमूलफलानि।
द्वौ च दश च = द्वादश।
त्रयश्च विंशतिश्च = त्रयोविंशतिः।
अष्ट च चत्वांरिशत् च = अष्टचत्वारिंशत्, अष्टाचत्वारिंशत्।

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1. उभयपदार्थप्रधानो द्वन्द्वः। ❑ **सि०कौ० सर्वसमास शेषप्रकरण।**
चार्थे द्वन्द्वः। ❑ **पा०- 2.2.29**
2. परवल्लिङ्गं द्वन्द्वतत्पुरुषयोः। ❑ **पा० 2.4.26**

2. **समाहार द्वन्द्व** – जिस द्वन्द्व समास में समूह का अर्थ प्रधान रहता है, वह **समाहार द्वन्द्व** कहलाता है। इसके साथ सदा एकवचन और नपुंसकलिङ्ग ही होता है, जैसे –

हस्तौ च पादौ च इत्येतेषां समाहारः = हस्तपादम्।
अहिश्च नकुलश्च तयोः समाहारः = अहिनकुलम्।
आहारश्च निद्रा च भयञ्च इत्येतेषां समाहारः = आहारनिद्राभयम्।

3. **एकशेष द्वन्द्व**– जिस इतरेतर द्वन्द्व समास में एक ही पद शेष रह जाए और अन्य पदों का लोप हो जाए, वह **एकशेष** कहलाता है । विग्रह में आए पदों की संख्या के अनुसार लिङ्ग और वचन होते हैं, जैसे–

बालकश्च बालकश्च बालकश्च = बालकाः।
फलञ्च फलञ्च फलञ्च = फलानि।

पुंलिङ्ग और स्त्रीलिङ्ग शब्दों का समास होने पर पुंलिङ्ग शब्द ही शेष रहता है –

हंसी च हंसश्च = हंसौ।
माता च पिता च = पितरौ।
स्वसा च भ्राता च = भ्रातरौ।
दुहिता च पुत्रश्च = पुत्रौ।

द्वन्द्व समास बनाने के कुछ नियम–

1. द्वन्द्व में इकारान्त शब्द को पहले रखा जाता है[1], जैसे–
   हरिश्च हरश्च = हरिहरौ।

2. जिस शब्द का पहला अक्षर स्वर हो और अन्त में अ हो समास में उसका पूर्व प्रयोग होता है[2], जैसे–
   इन्द्रश्च अग्निश्च = इन्द्राग्नी।

जिस शब्द में स्वर की संख्या कम हो उसका पूर्व प्रयोग होता है[3], जैसे–
शिवश्च केशवश्च = शिवकेशवौ।

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1. द्वन्द्वे घि। ❑ पा0 **2.2.32**
2. अजाद्यदन्तम् । ❑ पा0 **2.2.33**
3. अल्पाच्तरम्। ❑ पा0 **2.2.34**

4. बहुव्रीहि

जिस समास में न तो पूर्व पद प्रधान होता है और न उत्तर पद, अपितु कोई अन्य पद प्रधान होता है वह **बहुव्रीहि** समास कहलाता है[1]* । वह समस्त पद किसी दूसरे पद का विशेषण हो जाता है, जैसे–

पीतम् अम्बरं यस्य सः = पीताम्बरः (विष्णु)

यहाँ **पीतम्** और **अम्बरम्** का समास हुआ है, परन्तु इनमें किसी का भी अपना अर्थ यहाँ प्रधान नहीं है। यहाँ दोनों पद समस्त होने पर अन्य पदार्थ विष्णु की विशेषता बतलाते हैं। अतएव **पीताम्बरः** समस्त पद विष्णु अर्थ का बोध कराता है।

इसी प्रकार लम्बोदरः (लम्बम् उदरं यस्य सः) का अर्थ न लम्बा है और न उदर, किन्तु दोनों पद समस्त होकर एक अन्य पदार्थ गणेश का अर्थ देते है। इसलिए **लम्बोदर** का अर्थ गणेशजी होता है।

बहुव्रीहि समास में अधिकांशतः दोनों पद प्रथमा विभक्ति में होते हैं, जैसे–

पीतम् अम्बरम् यस्य सः।

इसे **समानाधिकरण**– (समान विभक्ति वाला अर्थात् प्रथमान्त पदों वाला) बहुव्रीहि कहते हैं । विग्रह में प्रयुक्त यत् शब्द की विभक्ति के अनुसार पुनः द्वितीया से सप्तमी पर्यन्त उसके छः भेद होते हैं, जैसे–

प्राप्तम् उदकं यं सः	=	प्राप्तोदकः (ग्रामः) द्वितीया समानाधिकरण बहुव्रीहि।
जितानि इन्द्रियाणि येन सः	=	जितेन्द्रियः (पुरुषः) तृ0समा0 बहु0।
दत्तं धनं यस्मै सः	=	दत्तधनः (ब्राह्मण) च0 समा0 बहु0।
निर्गतं धनं यस्मात् सः	=	निर्धनः (पुरुषः) पं0 समा0 बहु0।
महान्तौ बाहू यस्य सः	=	महाबाहुः ष0समा0बहु0।
वीराः पुरुषा यस्मिन् (ग्रामे) सः	=	वीरपुरुषो (ग्रामः) स0समा0बहु0।

1. अन्यपदार्थप्रधानो बहुव्रीहिः । ❑ **सि0 कौ0 सर्वसमास शेषप्रकरण**

* बहुव्रीहि पद का अर्थ है–

बहुः व्रीहिः (धान्यं) यस्य सः बहुव्रीहि। यहाँ प्रथम शब्द दूसरे शब्द व्रीहि का विशेषण है और दोनों किसी अन्य शब्द के विशेषण हैं।

ऐसे भी कुछ बहुव्रीहि समास होते हैं जिनके पूर्व और उत्तर पदों में एक प्रथमान्त होता है और दूसरा सप्तम्यन्त। वे **व्यधिकरण बहुव्रीहि** कहलाते हैं, ज़ैसे–

चक्रं पाणौ यस्य सः = चक्रपाणिः (विष्णु)

शूलं पाणौ यस्य सः = शूलपाणिः (शिव)

रघुकुले जन्म यस्य सः = रघुकुलजन्मा (रामचन्द्रः)

सह (साथ) अर्थ में तृतीयान्त के साथ बहुव्रीहि समास होता है इसे **तुल्ययोग बहुव्रीहि** कहते हैं। यहाँ **सह** के स्थान में **स** आदेश हो जाता है। जैसे–

वत्सेन सह (सहिता) सवत्सा (गौः)।

पत्न्या सह वर्तमानः सपत्नीकः (वसिष्ठः)।

बहुव्रीहि के कुछ समस्तपदों में **इव** का अर्थ छिपा होता है। वह **उपमान वाचक बहुव्रीहि** कहलाता है, जैसे–

चन्द्र इव मुखं यस्याः सा = चन्द्रमुखी।

पाषाणवत् हृदयं यस्य सः = पाषाणहृदयः।

अलुक् समास

समास में कुछ ऐसे भी प्रयोग मिलते हैं, जिनके **प्रथम पद** की विभक्ति का लोप नहीं होता है। वे **अलुक्** समास कहलाते हैं, जैसे–

आत्मने पदम् = आत्मनेपदम्, परस्मै पदम् = परस्मैपदम् (चतुर्थी विभक्ति का अलुक् समास)। देवानां प्रियः = देवानांप्रियः। सरसि जायते = सरसिजम्। मनसि जायते = मनसिजः। युधि स्थिरः = युधिष्ठिरः। अन्ते वसति यः = अन्तेवासी। खे चरति = खेचरः। कण्ठे कालः यस्य सः = कण्ठेकालः (सप्तमी का अलुक्)।

नवीन शब्दों से ऐसे समास बनाकर प्रयोग नहीं किए जाते हैं।

अभ्यास

1. समास किसे कहते हैं? इसके प्रमुख भेदों के नाम लिखिए तथा प्रत्येक का एक-एक उदाहरण दीजिए।
2. विग्रह से आप क्या समझते हैं?
3. सन्धि और समास में क्या अन्तर है?
4. निम्नलिखित समस्त पदों का विग्रह कीजिए–

निर्जनम्	सुखप्राप्तः	
अनुवनम्	प्रतिदिनम्	
घनश्यामः	प्रत्येकम्	
त्रिभुवनम्	शोकमग्नः	
तदर्थम्	अष्टाध्यायी	
यथाविधि	असत्यम्	चक्रपाणिः
पार्वतीपरमेश्वरौ	अनादिः	जितेन्द्रियः

5. इन पदों में समास कीजिए और उनके नाम लिखिए–

गृहं गृहम्	सन् जनः
शक्तिमनतिक्रम्य	महान् पुरुषः
राज्ञः पुरुषः	कमलम् इव नयनम्
नीलं कमलम्	न उपस्थितः
त्रयाणां लोकानां समाहारः	मात्रा समः
छात्राय इदम्	भार्यया सह
पुत्रश्च दुहिता च	विद्यया विहीनः
हस्तौ च पादौ च तेषां समाहारः	रमाया ईशः
फलञ्च फलञ्च फलञ्च	दश आननानि यस्य सः
माता च पिता च	द्वौ च दश च

6. निम्नलिखित वाक्यों के स्थूलाक्षर पदों में जो समास सही हैं उन्हें कोष्ठक में ✓ इस चिह्न से चिह्नित कीजिए–

क. कदाचिदहं **पीताम्बरम्** अपि परिदधे। (बहुव्रीहिः/कर्मधारयः)

ख. आकाशः **अनादिः अनन्तः** च अस्ति। (नञ्तत्पुरुषः/बहुव्रीहि)

ग. **निर्धनं** जनं न कोऽपि आद्रियते। (बहुव्रीहिः/अव्ययीभावः)

घ. **षड्रसं** भोजनं प्रशस्यते। (द्विगुः/बहुव्रीहि)

ङ. कविषु कालिदासः हंसेषु **राजहंस** इव शोभते।
(अव्ययीभावः/तत्पुरुषः)

7. 'क' भाग में समस्तपद दिए गए हैं और 'ख' भाग में समासों के नाम दिए गए हैं। दोनों को सही ढंग से जोड़िए–

क	ख
अधिगङ्गम्	कर्मधारयः
दुःखातीतः	एकशेषः
सज्जनः	बहुव्रीहिः
पितरौ	अव्ययीभावः
त्रिलोकी	द्विगुः
अष्टादशः	द्वन्द्वः
भ्वादिः	तत्पुरुषः

नवम अध्याय

छन्द

(Metres)

परिचय

पद्य लिखते समय अक्षरों की एक निश्चित व्यवस्था रखनी पड़ती है। यह व्यवस्था **छन्द** या **वृत्त** कहलाती है।

वृत्त के भेद

प्रायः प्रत्येक श्लोक के चार भाग होते हैं जो **पाद** या **चरण** कहलाते हैं। जिस वृत्त के चारों चरणों में बराबर अक्षर हों वे **समवृत्त** कहलाते हैं। जिसके प्रथम और तृतीय तथा द्वितीय और चतुर्थ चरण अक्षरों की दृष्टि से समान हों, वे **अर्धसमवृत्त** हैं। जिसके चारों चरणों में अक्षरों की संख्या समान न हों वे **विषमवृत्त** कहे जाते हैं।

गुरु-लघु व्यवस्था

छन्द की व्यवस्था वर्णों पर आधारित रहती है – जिनमें स्वर वर्ण प्रमुख रहते हैं। ये वर्ण छन्द की दृष्टि से दो प्रकार के होते हैं – **लघु** एवं **गुरु**। सामान्यतः ह्रस्व स्वर लघु होता है और दीर्घ स्वर गुरु। किन्तु कुछ परिस्थितियों में ह्रस्व स्वर लघु न होकर गुरु माना जाता है। छन्द में गुरु-लघु व्यवस्था का नियम इस प्रकार है –

अनुस्वारयुक्त, दीर्घ, विसर्गयुक्त, तथा संयुक्त वर्ण के पूर्व के वर्ण गुरु होते हैं। शेष सभी वर्ण लघु होते हैं। छन्द के किसी पाद का अन्तिम वर्ण लघु होने पर भी आवश्यकतानुसार गुरु मान लिया जाता है–

सानुस्वारैश्च दीर्घश्च विसर्गी च गुरुर्भवेत् ।
वर्णः संयोगपूर्वश्च तथा पादान्तगोऽपि वा ॥

-छन्दोमञ्जरी

गुरु एवं लघु के लिए निम्नलिखित चिह्न प्रयुक्त होते है –

गुरु ऽ अथवा ◡

लघु । अथवा –

गुरु एवं लघु व्यवस्था को एक उदाहरण से स्पष्ट किया जा सकता है–

।	ऽ	।	ऽ	ऽ	।	।	ऽ	।	ऽ	।
त्व	मे	व	मा	ता	च	पि	ता	त्व	मे	व ।

गण-व्यवस्था

तीन वर्णों का एक **गण** माना जाता है। गुरु लघु के क्रम से गण आठ प्रकार के होते हैं–

भ-गण ऽ।।	य-गण ।ऽऽ	म-गण ऽऽऽ
ज-गण ।ऽ।	र-गण ऽ।ऽ	न-गण ।।।
स-गण ।।ऽ	त-गण ऽऽ।	

इसका नियम इस प्रकार है–

भगण आदि-गुरु, जगण मध्य-गुरु तथा सगण अन्त-गुरु होते हैं। यगण आदि-लघु, रगण मध्य-लघु और तगण अन्त-लघु होते हैं। मगण में सभी गुरु और नगण में सभी वर्ण लघु होते हैं।

आदिमध्यावसानेषु भजसा यान्ति गौरवम्।
यरता लाघवं यान्ति मनौ तु गुरुलाघवम् ॥

– छन्दोमञ्जरी (सुषमा टीका)

यति-व्यवस्था

छन्द में जिस–जिस स्थान पर किञ्चिद् विराम होता है, उसको **'यति'** कहते हैं। **विच्छेद, विराम, विरति** आदि इसके नामान्तर हैं।

यतिर्जिह्वेष्टविश्रामस्थानं कविभिरुच्यते ।
सा विच्छेदविरामाद्यैः पदैर्वाच्या निजेच्छया॥

– छन्दोमञ्जरी, 1-12

उदाहरण–

अनाघ्रातं पुष्पं /किसलयमलूनं कररुहै/
रनाविद्धं रत्नं / मधु नवमनास्वादितरसम्/।
अखण्डं पुण्यानां/ फलमिव च तद्रूपमनघं/
न जाने भोक्तारं/कमिह समुपस्थास्यति विधिः/।।

– अभिज्ञानशाकुन्तलम्,2/10

उपर्युक्त श्लोक के प्रत्येक चरण में छठे अक्षर और सत्रहवें अक्षर के बाद यति दिखायी गयी है।

प्रमुख छन्द

अब कुछ प्रमुख छन्दों के लक्षण एवं उदाहरण प्रस्तुत किये जाते हैं–

1. अनुष्टुप् या श्लोक

(आठ अक्षरों वाला समवृत्त)

लक्षण–इस छन्द के प्रत्येक चरण में आठ अक्षर होते हैं जिनमें पाँचवाँ अक्षर लघु तथा छठा अक्षर गुरु होता है। सातवाँ अक्षर पहले और तीसरे चरण में गुरु होता है,किन्तु दूसरे और चौथे चरण में लघु। संस्कृत में लक्षण* एवं उदाहरण–

		।		ऽ		ऽ		
श्लोके षष्ठं		**गु**	/	**रु**	/	**ज्ञे**	/	**यं**
		।		ऽ		।		
सर्वत्र ल	/	**घु**	/	**प**	/	**ञ्च**	/	**मम्।**
		।		ऽ		ऽ		
द्विचतुष्पा	/	**द**	/	**यो**	/	**र्ह्र**	/	**स्वं**
		।		ऽ		।		
सप्तमं दी	/	**र्घ**	/	**म**	/	**न्य**	/	**योः।।**

– श्रुतबोध, 10

* संस्कृत में छन्दों के लक्षण उदाहरण का भी कार्य करते हैं ।

एक प्रसिद्ध उदाहरण–

वागर्थाविव सम्पृक्तौ, वागर्थप्रतिपत्तये।
5 6 7 5 6 7
जगतः पितरौ वन्दे,, पार्वतीपरमेश्वरौ ॥ – रघुवंशम्, 1/1
5 6 7 567

2. इन्द्रवज्रा (त, त, ज, ग, ग)

(ग्यारह अक्षर वाला समवृत्त)

जिस छन्द के प्रत्येक चरण में दो तगण, एक जगण और दो गुरु वर्ण क्रम से हों वह **इन्द्रवज्रा** कहलाता है। संस्कृत में लक्षण एवं उदाहरण–

त त ज गुरु गुरु
S S I S S I I S I S S
स्या दि न्द्र / व ज्रा य/ दि तौ ज/ गौ गः

– वृत्तरत्नाकर : 3/30

अन्य उदाहरण-

त त ज ग ग
स्वर्गच्यु / तानामि / ह जीव / लो / के
चत्वारि/ चिह्नानि/ वसन्ति/दे/हे।
दानप्र/ संगो म/ धुरा च/वा/णी
देवार्च/ नं पण्डि/ ततर्प/ण/ञ्च ॥

3. उपेन्द्रवज्रा (ज,त,ज,ग,ग) (ग्यारह अक्षरों का समवृत्त)

जिसके प्रत्येक चरण में क्रमशः एक जगण, एक तगण, एक जगण और दो गुरु अक्षर होते हैं, वह छन्द **उपेन्द्रवज्रा** कहलाता है।

संस्कृत में लक्षण एवं उदाहरण–

ज त ज ग ग
I S I S S I I S I S S
उ पे न्द्र व ज्रा ज त जा स्त तो गौ

– वृत्तरत्नाकर, 3/31

ज	त	ज	ग	ग
प्रजाः प्र /	जाः स्वा इ /	व तन्त्र /	यित्वा	
निषेव /	तेऽशान्त /	मना वि /	विक्तम्।	
यूथानि /	संचार्य /	रविप्र /	तप्तः	
शीतं दि /	वा स्थान /	मिव द्वि /	पेन्द्रः॥	

—अभिज्ञानशाकुन्तलम्, 5/5

4. उपजाति

(ग्यारह अक्षरों वाला समवृत्त)

जिस छन्द में इन्द्रवज्रा तथा उपेन्द्रवज्रा के चरणों का मिश्रण होता है, यह **उपजाति** छन्द कहलाता है। संस्कृत में लक्षण एवं उदाहरण—

ज	त	ज	ग	ग	= उपेन्द्रवज्रा
अनन्त/	रोदीरि/	त लक्ष्म/	भा	जौ	
त	त	ज	ग	ग	= इन्द्रवज्रा
पादौ य/	दीयावु/	पजात/	यस्ताः।		

इत्थं किलान्यास्वपि मिश्रितासु,
वदन्ति जातिष्विदमेव नाम ॥

—वृत्तरत्नाकर, 3/32

एक प्रसिद्ध उदाहरण—

त	त	ज	ग ग	= इन्द्रवज्रा
अस्त्युत्त/	रस्यां दि/	शि देव/	तात्मा	
ज	त	ज	ग ग	= उपेन्द्रवज्रा
हिमाल/	यो नाम /	नगाधि/	राजः।	

पूर्वाप/रौ तोय/ निधी व/ गाह्य
स्थितः पृथिव्या इव मानदण्डः॥

—कुमारसम्भवम्, 1/1

5. **वंशस्थ** (ज, त, ज, र)

(बारह अक्षरों वाला समवृत्त)

जिस छन्द के प्रत्येक पाद में क्रमशः जगण, तगण, जगण, रगण हों वह **वंशस्थ** छन्द कहलाता है।

संस्कृत में लक्षण एवं उदाहरण–

ज त ज र

। S । S S । । S । S । S

ज तौ तु वं श स्थ मु दी रि . तं ज रौ ।

–वृत्तरत्नाकर, 3/47

एक प्रसिद्ध उदाहरण–

।S। SS। ।S । S ।S

भवन्ति नम्रास्त रवः फलो द्गमै-
र्नवाम्बुभिर्दूरविलम्बिनो घनाः।
अनुद्धताः सत्पुरुषाः समृद्धिभिः
स्वभाव एवैष परोपकारिणाम् ॥

–अभिज्ञानशाकुन्तलम् 5/12

6. वसन्ततिलका (त, भ, ज, ज, ग, ग)

(चौदह अक्षरों वाला समवृत्त)

जिसके प्रत्येक चरण में क्रमशः तगण, भगण, जगण, जगण, एवं दो गुरु वर्ण हों, वह छन्द **वसन्ततिलका** कहलाता है।

संस्कृत में लक्षण एवं उदाहरण–

त भ ज ज ग ग

S S । S । । । S । । S । S S

उक्ता व/ सन्तति/ लका त/ भजा ज/ गौ गः ।

–वृत्तरत्नाकरः, 3/78

त भ ज ज ग ग / (ल पदान्त= ग)

पापान्नि / वारय / ति योज / यते हि / ताय
गुह्यं निगूहति गुणान्प्रकटीकरोति।
आपद्गतं च न जहाति ददाति काले
सन्मित्रलक्षणमिदं प्रवदन्ति सन्तः ॥

–भर्तृहरिनीतिशतकम्, 73

7. मालिनी (न,न,म,य,य)

(पन्द्रह अक्षरों वाला समवृत्त)

जिसके प्रत्येक चरण में क्रमशः दो नगण, एक मगण तथा दो यगण, हों, वह छन्द **मालिनी** कहलाता है। इसमें पहली यति (विराम) आठवें वर्ण के बाद और दूसरी यति पन्द्रहवें वर्ण के बाद होती है।

संस्कृत में लक्षण एवं उदाहरण-

न न म य य

। । । । । । ऽऽ ऽ । ऽ ऽ । ऽ ऽ

न न म य य यु तेयं मा लि नी भो गि लो कैः*।

–वृत्तरत्नाकरः,3/84

न न म य य

सरसि/जमनु/विद्धं शै/ वलेना/ पि रम्यं

मलिन/मपि हि/ मां शोर्ल/क्ष्म लक्ष्मीं/ तनोति/

इयम/धिकम/नोज्ञा व/ल्कलेना/पि तन्वी

किमिव/ हि मधु/राणां म/ण्डनं ना /कृतीनाम्।

–अभिज्ञानशाकुन्तलम्,1/20

8. शिखरिणी (य म न स भ ल ग)

(सत्रह अक्षरों वाला समवृत्त)

जिसके प्रत्येक चरण में क्रमशः यगण,मगण, नगण, सगण, भगण तथा एक लघु और एक गुरु वर्ण हों, वह **शिखरिणी** छन्द कहलाता है। छठे और सत्रहवें वर्ण के बाद इसमें यति होती है। संस्कृत में लक्षण एवं उदाहरण–

य म न स भ ल ग

।ऽ ऽऽऽ ऽ ।। । । ।ऽऽ । ।।ऽ

रसै रुद्रैश्छिन्ना य म न स भलागः शिखरिणी।

–वृत्तरत्नाकरः,3/90

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* छन्दः शास्त्र में संख्या के लिए कपिपय विशिष्ट शब्दों के प्रयोग हुए हैं, जैसे– भोग = 8, लोक = 7, रस = 6, रुद्र = 11, सूर्य = 12, अश्व = 7 आदि।

एक प्रसिद्ध उदाहरण–

य म न स भ ल ग
अनाघ्रा/तं पुष्पं/ किसल/ यमलू/ नं कर/ रु है-
रनाविद्धं रत्नं मधु नवमनास्वादितरसम् ।
अखण्डं पुण्यानां फलमिव च तद्रूपमनघं
न जाने भोक्तारं कमिह समुपस्थास्यति विधिः॥

–अभिज्ञानशाकुन्तलम् , 2/10

9. मन्दाक्रान्ता

(सत्रह अक्षरों वाला समवृत्त)

मगण, भगण, नगण, दो तगणों और दो गुरुओं से **मन्दाक्रान्ता** छन्द होता है। इसमें चौथे अक्षर के बाद पहली यति, छठे अक्षर के बाद दूसरी यति तथा आठवें अक्षर के बाद तीसरी यति होती है। संस्कृत में लक्षण एवं उदाहरण–

म भ न त त ग ग
S S S S I I I I I S S I S S I S S
म न्दा क्रा न्ताम्बुधि र स न गै र्मो भ नौ तौ ग युग्मम्

–छन्दोमञ्जरी, 2/17

एक अन्य उदाहरण–

म भ न त त ग ग
S S S S I I I I I S S I S S I S S
धूमज्यो/ तिः सलि/ ल म रु/तां सन्नि/ पातः क्व/ मे घः
सन्देशा/ र्थाः क्वप/ टुकर / णैःप्राणि/ भिः प्राप / णीयाः।
इत्यौत्सु/ क्यादप/ रिगण/ य न्गुह्य/ क स्तं य / याचे
कामार्ता/ हि प्रकृ/ तिकृप/ णा श्चेत/ ना चेत/ नेषु॥

–मेघदूतम्, (पूर्वमेघः, 5)

10. शार्दूलविक्रीडितम् (म स ज स त त ग)

(उन्नीस अक्षरों वाला समवृत्त)

जिस छन्द के प्रत्येक पाद में क्रमशः मगण, सगण, जगण, सगण, दो तगण एवं एक गुरु वर्ण हो वह **शार्दूलविक्रीडित** छन्द कहलाता है। इसमें बारहवें अक्षर के बाद पहली यति और उन्नीसवें अक्षर के बाद दूसरी यति होती है। संस्कृत में लक्षण एवं उदाहरण–

म स ज स त त ग

S S S I I S I S I I I I S I I S S I S

सू र्या श्वै/ र्यदि मः/ स जौ स/ त त गाः/ शा र्दू ल /वि क्री डि तम्

—छन्दोमञ्जरी, 2/19

एक अन्य उदाहरण—

पातुं न प्रथमं व्यवस्यति जलं युष्मास्वपीतेषु या
नादत्ते प्रियमण्डनाऽपि भवतां स्नेहेन या पल्लवम्।
आद्ये वः कुसुमप्रसूतिसमये यस्या भवत्युत्सवः
सेयं याति शकुन्तला पतिगृहं सर्वैरनुज्ञायताम्।।

—अभिज्ञानशाकुन्तलम्,4/9

अभ्यास

1. नीचे लिखे गणों के सामने नमूने के अनुसार उनके गुरु लघु अक्षरों को चिह्नों में लिखिए—

नमूना-	भगण	S I I	मगण	....
	यगण	......	नगण	....
	रगण	......	तगण	....
	सगण	......	जगण	....

2. निम्नलिखित श्लोक के अक्षरों के ऊपर गुरु-लघु का चिह्न लगाकर उनको गणों में विभक्त कीजिए—

इदं किलाऽव्याजमनोहरं वपु—
स्तपः क्षमं साधयितुं य इच्छति।
ध्रुवं स नीलोत्पलपत्रधारया
शमीलतां छेत्तुमृषिर्व्यवस्यति।।

3. निम्नलिखित छन्दों के लक्षण उदाहरण के साथ लिखिए—
उपजाति,मालिनी, शिखरिणी, वसन्ततिलका, मन्दाक्रान्ता।

4. **अनुष्टुप् तथा वसन्ततिलका छन्द का एक एक उदाहरण दीजिए।**

5. **टिप्पणी लिखिए–**

   समवृत्त, गुरु, लघु।

6. **कोष्ठक में से उचित छन्दों को चुनकर निम्नलिखित पंक्तियों के सामने लिखिए–**

   (वसन्ततिलका, उपजाति, अनुष्टुप्, मालिनी, शिखरिणी, मन्दाक्रान्ता)

   (क) ते मर्त्यलोके भुवि भारभूता
   मनुष्यरूपेण मृगाश्चरन्ति।

   (ख) कुपुत्रो जायेत क्वचिदपि कुमाता न भवति।

   (ग) रघुपतिवरदूतं वातजातं नमामि।

   (घ) उद्योगिनं पुरुषसिंहमुपैति लक्ष्मीः।

   (ङ.) दृष्टिपूतं न्यसेत् पादं वस्त्रपूतं पिबेज्जलम्।
   सत्यपूतां वदेद् वाचं मनःपूतं समाचरेत् ।

   (च) याच्ञा मोघा वरमधिगुणे नाधमे लब्धकामा ।

7. **नीचे दिए गए नमूने के आधार पर निम्नलिखित शब्दों के गण चिह्न लिखिए–**

		शब्द	गणचिह्न
नमूना–		मन्दं मन्दं याति	SSSSSI
	(क)	भारविः	....
	(ख)	मित्रपक्षपातः	....
	(ग)	शीलेन प्रमदा	....
	(घ)	दुःखितः	....
	(ङ.)	संसारसागरः	....

दशम अध्याय

अलङ्कार

परिभाषा

लोक में जिस प्रकार आभूषण आदि शरीर की शोभा बढ़ाने में सहायक होते हैं उसी प्रकार काव्य में अनुप्रास, उपमा आदि उसकी चारुता की अभिवृद्धि करते हैं और वे **अलङ्कार** कहलाते हैं । अलङ्कार वह है जो अलङ्कृत करे **(अलङ्करोति इति अलङ्कारः)** । यहाँ यह ध्यान रखना चाहिए कि अलङ्कार शोभा को उत्पन्न नहीं कर सकते, अपितु उसकी अभिवृद्धि मात्र करते हैं।

शब्दालङ्कार और अर्थालङ्कार

शब्द और अर्थ काव्य के शरीर माने गए हैं । अतएव काव्य शरीर का अलङ्करण भी शब्द एवं अर्थ दोनों ही रूपों में होता है । जो अलङ्कार केवल शब्द की चारुता की अभिवृद्धि करते हैं वे शब्द पर आश्रित रहने के कारण **शब्दालङ्कार** कहे जाते हैं, जैसे– **अनुप्रास, यमक** आदि । जो अलङ्कार अर्थ की मनोहरता की अभिवृद्धि करते हैं, वे अर्थ पर आश्रित होने के कारण **अर्थालङ्कार** कहे जाते हैं, जैसे– **उपमा, रूपक** आदि । शब्द विशेष को हटा कर उसी अर्थ वाले दूसरे शब्द के रखने पर भी वहाँ अलङ्कार बना रहता है।

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1. उपकुर्वन्ति तं सन्तं येऽङ्गद्वारेण जातुचित् ।
हारादिवदलङ्कारास्तेऽनुप्रासोपमादयः ।। ❑ **काव्यप्रकाशः, 8.67**

कुछ अलङ्कार ऐसे होते हैं जो शब्द और अर्थ दोनों पर आश्रित रहते हैं, वे **उभयालङ्कार** कहे जाते हैं, जैसे– **श्लेष** ।

कुछ प्रमुख अलङ्कारों के लक्षण एवं उदाहरण यहाँ प्रस्तुत हैं–

I. शब्दालङ्कार

1. अनुप्रास

समान वर्णों की आवृत्ति अनुप्रास[1] है, जैसे–

हंसो यथा राजतपञ्जरस्थः
सिंहो यथा मन्दरकन्दरस्थः ।
वीरो यथा गर्वितकुञ्जरस्थः
चन्द्रोऽपि बभ्राज तथाम्बरस्थः ॥

–वाल्मीकिरामायणम्, सुन्दरकाण्डम् 5.4

यहाँ थ, न्द, र – वर्णों की आवृत्ति के कारण अनुप्रास अलङ्कार होता है। अनुप्रास शब्द का अर्थ है – रसानुकूल वर्णों की चमत्कार योजना।[2] इसके कई भेद है ।

2. यमकम्

जब वर्ण समूह की उसी क्रम से पुनरावृत्ति की जाय, किन्तु आवृत्त वर्ण-समुदाय या तो भिन्नार्थक हो या अंशतः अथवा पूर्णतः निरर्थक, तब वह **यमक** अलङ्कार कहलाता है।[3] समानार्थक पदों की आवृत्ति को यमक नहीं कहा जा सकता । उदाहरण–

नवपलाशपलाशवनं पुरः
स्फुटपरागपरागतपङ्कजम् ।
मृदुलतान्त-लतान्तमलोकयत्
स सुरभिं सुरभिं सुमनोभरैः* ॥

– शिशुपालवधम् 6. 2

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1. वर्णसाम्यमनुप्रासः । ❑ **काव्यप्रकाशः 9.79**

2. रसाद्यनुगतः प्रकृष्टो न्यासोऽनुप्रासः । ❑ **काव्यप्रकाशः 9.78**

3. सत्यर्थे पृथगर्थायाः स्वरव्यञ्जनसंहतेः ।
क्रमेण तेनैवावृत्तिर्यमकं विनिगद्यते ॥ ❑ **साहित्यदर्पणम् 10.8**

* जिसमें पलाशों (ढाकों) का वन नये पलाशों (पत्तों) से युक्त हो गया है, कमल बढ़े हुए पराग (= पुष्परज) से परागत (= व्याप्त) हो गये हैं, लतान्त (लताओं के प्रान्त) मृदुल (= कोमल) और तान्त (= विस्तृत या झुके हुए) हो गये हैं, पुष्पों से सुरभि (= सुगन्धित) सुरभि (वसन्त ऋतु) को उसने (श्रीकृष्ण ने रैवतक पर्वत पर) देखा ।

यहाँ **पलाश पलाश** और **सुरभिं सुरभिं** इनमें दोनों पद सार्थक हैं । प्रथम पलाश का अर्थ है – पत्ता, द्वितीय पलाश का अर्थ है – वृक्षविशेष (ढाक)। इसी प्रकार प्रथम **सुरभि** का अर्थ है सुगन्धित और द्वितीय का अर्थ है वसन्त ऋतु । इस प्रकार ये सार्थक पद भिन्नार्थक हैं । अतएव इनकी आवृत्ति से यहां यमक अलङ्कार है । लतान्त लतान्त में पहला निरर्थक है, क्योंकि इसका **ल** पूर्ववर्ती शब्द **मृदुल** से मिला है । **पराग पराग** में दूसरा पद निरर्थक है, क्योंकि इसमें अगले **गत** शब्द का **ग** मिलाया गया है, अतएव यहाँ भी पदों की आवृत्ति से **यमक** अलङ्कार हुआ है ।

3. श्लेष

पद या पदसमुदाय द्वारा अनेक अर्थों का कथन **श्लेष** अलङ्कार कहलाता है।[1] जैसे– **उच्चरद्भूरि कीलालः शुशुभे वाहिनीपतिः ।**

जिसके शरीर से अधिक मात्रा में रक्त निकला वह सेनापति शोभित हुआ । पक्ष में– जिससे अधिक मात्रा में जल उछलता है वह समुद्र शोभित हुआ । यहाँ कीलाल तथा वाहिनीपति शब्दों में अनेक अर्थ होने के कारण **श्लेष** अलङ्कार होता है (कीलाल = रूधिर/जल ; वाहिनीपति = सेनापति/समुद्र) ।

श्लेष अर्थालङ्कार भी होता है । जब शब्द के परिवर्तन कर देने पर भी श्लेषत्व बना रहता है तब वह श्लेष अर्थालङ्कार होता है, जैसे–

स्तोकेनोन्नतिमायाति स्तोकेनायात्यधोगतिम् ।
अहो सुसदृशी वृतिस्तुलाकोटेः खलस्य च ॥[2] **– पञ्चतन्त्रम्, 1.150**

यहाँ **उन्नति** शब्द का अर्थ है ऊपर उठना और अभ्युदय । **अधोगति** शब्द का अर्थ है नीचे जाना और अपकर्ष । अत एव इन पदों में श्लेष है, इनके पर्याय शब्द रख देने पर भी यहाँ श्लेष बना रहता है । अत एव यह श्लेष अर्थालङ्कार है ।

श्लेष के अनेक भेद-प्रभेद हैं जिनका उल्लेख यहाँ अपेक्षित नहीं है ।

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1. श्लिष्टैः पदैरनेकार्थाभिधाने श्लेष इष्यते । □ **साहित्यदर्पणम् 10.11**
2. थोड़े में उन्नति को प्राप्त होता है और थोड़े में ही नीचे गिर जाता है । अहो! तराज़ू का पलड़ा और दुष्ट, इन दोनों का कैसा समान स्वभाव है !

II. अर्थालङ्कार

1. उपमा

दो वस्तुओं में भेद रहने पर भी जब उनका साधर्म्य (समानता) प्रतिपादित किया जाए, तब वह **उपमा** अलङ्कार होता है[1], जैसे–

कमलमिव मुखं मनोज्ञमेतत् । यहाँ मुख की उपमा कमल से दी गई है । उपमा अलङ्कार में चार उपादान होते हैं–

1) उपमान (जिससे उपमा दी जाये), जैसे – **कमलम्**

2) उपमेय (जिसकी उपमा दी जाये), जैसे – **मुखम्**

3) समान धर्म जैसे **मनोज्ञं** (मनोज्ञता, सुन्दरता)

4) उपमानवाची शब्द जैसे **इव** (यथा, वत्, तुल्य, सम आदि) ।

जहाँ इन चारों का स्पष्ट उल्लेख हो वह **पूर्णोपमा** कहलाती है, जैसे उपर्युक्त उदाहरण में । जहाँ इनमें से कुछ लुप्त रहते हैं वह **लुप्तोपमा** कहलाती है । उपमा के भेद-प्रभेद अनेक हैं।

2. रूपक

अतिशय सादृश्य के कारण जहाँ उपमेय को उपमान का ही रूप दे दिया जाये, वहाँ **रूपक** अलङ्कार होता है।[2] जैसे–

मुखं चन्द्र – यहाँ मुख उपमेय को चन्द्र उपमान का रूप दिया है ।

3. उत्प्रेक्षा

उपमेय की उपमान रूप में संभावना **उत्प्रेक्षा** अलङ्कार है[3] ।

उदाहरण –

लिम्पतीव तमोऽङ्गानि वर्षतीवाञ्जनं नभः ।
असत्पुरुषसेवेव दृष्टिर्विफलतां गता ॥ * – मृच्छकटिकम्, 1.34

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1. साधर्म्यमुपमा भेदे । □ **काव्यप्रकाशः, 10.87**

2. तद्रूपकमभेदो य उपमानोपमेययोः।□ **काव्यप्रकाशः, 10.93**

3. सम्भावनमथोत्प्रेक्षा प्रकृतस्य समेन यत् । □ **काव्यप्रकाशः, 10.92**
प्रकृतस्य = उपमेयस्य । समेन = उपमानेन

* (वर्षाकाल की रात्रि के समय) अन्धकार मानो अङ्गों को लीप रहा है, आकाश मानो काजल की वृष्टि कर रहा है और दुष्ट पुरुष की सेवा के समान मानो दृष्टि विफल हो गयी है ।

यहाँ अन्धकार का फैलना रूप उपमेय की लेपन आदि उपमान के रूप में सम्भावना की गई है। अतएव उत्प्रेक्षा अलङ्कार है।

उत्प्रेक्षा वाचक शब्द हैं – **मन्ये, शङ्के, ध्रुवम्, प्रायः, नूनम्, इव**[1], आदि। इनमें **इव** का प्रयोग उपमा में भी होता है। अन्तर यह है कि इव शब्द जब उत्प्रेक्षा का वाचक होता है तब क्रिया के साथ प्रयुक्त होता है और जब उपमा का वाचक होता है तब संज्ञा के साथ।

4. अर्थान्तरन्यास

मुख्य अर्थ का समर्थन करने वाले दूसरे वाक्यार्थ (अर्थान्तर) का प्रतिपादन (न्यास) **अर्थान्तरन्यास** कहलाता है।[2] जैसे– **हनूमानब्धिमतरद् दुष्करं हि महात्मनाम्** ।

हनूमानब्धिमतरत् (हनुमान जी ने समुद्र पार किया) मुख्य वाक्य है। इसका समर्थन **दुष्करं हि महात्मनाम्** इस अगले वाक्य द्वारा किया गया है। अतः यहाँ अर्थान्तरन्यास अलङ्कार है।

5. अतिशयोक्ति

अध्यवसाय के सिद्ध होने पर **अतिशयोक्ति** अलंकार होता है[3], तात्पर्य यह है कि जहाँ विषय (उपमेय) का निगरण करके (विषय को विषयी में विलीन करके) विषयी (उपमान) के साथ उसका अभेद ज्ञान है, उसे **अतिशयोक्ति** अलंकार कहते हैं।[4] उदाहरण –

कथमुपरि कलापिनः कलापो
विलसति तस्य तलेऽष्टमीन्दुखण्डम् ।
कुवलययुगलं ततो विलोलं
तिलकुसुमं तदधः प्रवालमस्मात् ॥

– साहित्यदर्पणम् 10/47

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1. मन्ये शङ्के ध्रुवं प्रायो नूनमित्येवमादयः ।
उत्प्रेक्षा व्यज्यते शब्दैरिवशब्दोऽपि तादृशः ॥ □ **काव्यादर्शः, 2.234**

2. भवेदर्थान्तरन्यासोऽनुषक्तार्थान्तराभिधा । □ **चन्द्रालोकः, 5. 66**

3. सिद्धत्वेऽध्यवसायस्यातिशयोक्तिर्निगद्यते। □ **साहित्यदर्पणम्, 10/46**

4. विषयनिगरणेनाभेदप्रतिपत्तिर्विषयिणोऽध्यवसायः। □ **साहित्यदर्पणम्, 10/46**

अर्थात् कैसा आश्चर्य है ! सबसे ऊपर मयूर का कलाप (पिच्छ) है, उसके नीचे अष्टमी का चन्द्रमा विराजमान है । उसके नीचे दो चञ्चल नीले कमल हैं । उसके नीचे तिल का फूल और उसके नीचे सुन्दर मूंगे का खण्ड सुशोभित है ।

प्रस्तुत पद्य में कामिनी के केशपाश का मयूरपिच्छ के रूप में, ललाट (मस्तक) का अष्टमी के चन्द्रमा के रूप में, दोनों नेत्रों को दो हिलते हुए नीले कमलों के रूप में, नासिका का तिलपुष्प के रूप में और अधरोष्ठ का मूंगे के रूप में विलय के साथ अभेद ज्ञान हो रहा है । अतः यहाँ **अतिशयोक्ति** अलंकार है ।

6. व्याजस्तुति

जहाँ देखने में निन्दा प्रतीत हो पर वास्तव में स्तुति हो या फिर देखने में स्तुति प्रतीत हो परन्तु वास्तव में निन्दा हो वहाँ **व्याजस्तुति** अलंकार होता है।[1]

उदाहरण–

हित्वा त्वामुपरोधवन्ध्यमनसां मन्ये न मौलिः परो
लज्जावर्जनमन्तरेण न रमामन्यत्र संदृश्यते ।
यस्त्यागं तनुतेतरां मुखशतैरेत्याश्रितायाः श्रियः
प्राप्य त्यागकृतावमाननमपि त्वय्येव यस्याः स्थितिः ॥

–काव्यप्रकाशः, 10.169

अर्थात् राजन् ! मुझे तो यही स्पष्ट लग रहा है कि आपको छोड़कर न तो आश्रितों के अनुरोध से रिक्तहृदय आश्रयदाताओं का कोई दूसरा शिरोमणि है और न लक्ष्मी को छोड़कर कहीं अन्यत्र (स्त्री जाति में) कोई निर्लज्जता दिखाई देती है क्योंकि आप तो ऐसे ठहरे कि नानाविध उपायों से स्वाश्रिता लक्ष्मी के अनवरत परित्याग (दान) से अपमानित होकर भी लक्ष्मी सदा आप ही के साथ रहना चाहती है ।

यहाँ राजा की आपाततः निन्दा उसके महादान या लक्ष्मी–समृद्धि की स्तुति (प्रशंसा) में परिणत हो रही है । अतः **व्याजस्तुति** अलंकार है ।

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1. अ. व्याजस्तुतिर्मुखे निन्दा स्तुतिर्वा रुढिरन्यथा । ❑ **काव्यप्रकाशः10.112**
   आ. उक्ता व्याजस्तुतिः पुनः ।
   निन्दास्तुतिभ्यां वाच्याभ्यां गम्यत्वे स्तुतिनिन्दयोः ॥ ❑ **साहित्यदर्पणम् 10.60**

7. अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा

अप्रस्तुत (अप्राकरणिक) की ऐसी प्रशंसा (कथन) जो कि प्रस्तुत अर्थ के ज्ञान का निमित्त हुआ करती है, **अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा** अलङ्कार है।[1] उदाहरण–

पादाहतं यदुत्थाय मूर्धानमधिरोहति ।
स्वस्थादेवापमानेऽपि देहिनस्तद्वरं रजः ॥ –साहित्यदर्पणः, 10.59

अर्थात् अपना अपमान होने पर भी चुप बैठे रहने वाले मनुष्यों से तो वह धूल ही अच्छी है जो ठोकर लगने पर ठोकर मारने वाले के सिर पर पहुंचती है – यह कृष्ण के प्रति बलराम की उक्ति है । शिशुपाल के अपमानों को सहन करने वाले हम लोगों की अपेक्षा धूल ही अच्छी है – यह विशेष यहाँ प्रस्तुत है । परन्तु सामान्य देही (मनुष्य) का अभिधान किया है। इस प्रकार अप्रस्तुत सामान्य देही से प्रस्तुत विशेष कृष्ण, बलराम आदि का ज्ञान होने के कारण यहाँ **अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा** अलङ्कार है।

अभ्यास

1. **अलङ्कार किसे कहते हैं ?**
2. **शब्दालङ्कार और अर्थालङ्कार में क्या अन्तर है ? उदाहरण देकर स्पष्ट कीजिए ।**
3. **निम्नलिखित अलङ्कारों के लक्षण और उदाहरण लिखिए–**
   यमक, अनुप्रास, रूपक, उपमा, व्याजस्तुति, अतिशयोक्ति ।
4. **श्लेष को आप शब्दालङ्कार मानते हैं या अर्थालङ्कार ? उदाहरण देकर समझाइए।**

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1. अप्रस्तुतात्प्रस्तुतं चेत् गम्यते पञ्चधा ततः ॥
अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा स्यात् । ❑ **साहित्यदर्पणः 10. 59**
(अप्रस्तुतस्य कथनात् प्रस्तुततस्य कथनम् इति निष्कृष्टोऽर्थः)

5. 'क' भाग में कुछ पङ्क्तियाँ दी गई हैं और 'ख' भाग में अलङ्कारों के नाम दिए गए हैं, उनमें से जो जहाँ उचित है, जोड़िए–

	(क)	(ख)
(अ)	पयः पानं भुजङ्गानां केवलं विषवर्धनम् । उपदेशो हि मूर्खाणां प्रकोपाय न शान्तये ॥	श्लेषः
(आ)	कमले कमला शेते हरः शेते हिमालये । क्षीराब्धौ च हरिः शेते मन्ये मत्कुणशङ्कया ॥	अर्थान्तरन्यासः
(इ)	वैनतेयसमो राजा विनतानन्दवर्धनः ।	यमकम्
(ई)	कुमारा माराभिरामा रामाद्यपौरुषा रुषा भस्मीकृतारयो रयोपहसितसमीरणा रणाभियानेन यानेन महाशंस राजानमकार्षुः ।	अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा
(उ)	पादाहतं यदुत्थाय मूर्धानमधिरोहति । स्वस्थादेवापमानेऽपि देहिनस्तद्वरं रजः ॥	उत्प्रेक्षा

परिशिष्ट I

संख्यावाची शब्दों की सूची

अङ्क	संख्या	पूरणी संख्या पुंलिङ्ग तथा नपुं०	स्त्रीलिङ्ग
1.	एक	प्रथम (प्रथमः, प्रथमम्)	प्रथमा
2.	द्वि	द्वितीय	द्वितीया
3.	त्रि	तृतीय	तृतीया
4.	चतुर्	चतुर्थ, तुरीय, तुर्य	चतुर्थी, तुरीया, तुर्या
5.	पञ्चन्	पञ्चम	पञ्चमी
6.	षष्	षष्ठ	षष्ठी
7.	सप्तन्	सप्तम	सप्तमी
8.	अष्टन्	अष्टम	अष्टमी
9.	नवन्	नवम	नवमी
10.	दशन्	दशम	दशमी
11.	एकादशन्	एकादश	एकादशी
12.	द्वादशन्	द्वादश	द्वादशी
13.	त्रयोदशन्	त्रयोदश	त्रयोदशी
14.	चतुर्दशन्	चतुर्दश	चतुर्दशी
15.	पञ्चदशन्	पञ्चदश	पञ्चदशी
16.	षोडशन्	षोडश	षोडशी
17.	सप्तदशन्	सप्तदश	सप्तदशी
18.	अष्टादशन्	अष्टादश	अष्टादशी
19.	नवदशन्	नवदश	नवदशी
	एकोनविंशति	एकोनविंश, एकोनविंशतितम	एकोनविंशी, एकोनविंशतितमी
	ऊनविंशति	ऊनविंश, ऊनविंशतितम	ऊनविंशी, ऊनविंशतितमी
	एकान्नविंशति	एकान्नविंश, एकान्नविंशतितम	एकान्नविंशी, एकान्नविंशतितमी

20. विंशति	विंश, विंशतितम	विंशी, विंशतितमी
21. एकविंशति	एकविंश, एकविंशतितम	एकाविंशी/ एकविंशततमी
22. द्वाविंशति	द्वाविंश, द्वाविंशतितम	द्वाविंशतितमी
23. त्रयोविंशति	त्रयोविंश त्रयोविंशतितम	त्रयोविंशी त्रयोविंशतितमी
24. चतुर्विंशति	चतुर्विंश चतुर्विंशतितम	चतुर्विंशी चतुर्विंशतितमी
25. पञ्चविंशति	पञ्चविंश पञ्चविंशतितम	पञ्चविंशी पञ्चविंशतितमी
26. षड्विंशति	षड्विंश, षड्विंशतितम	षड्विंशी, षड्विंशतितमी
27. सप्तविंशति	सप्तविंश सप्तविंशतितम	सप्तविंशी सप्तविंशतितमी
28. अष्टाविंशति	अष्टाविंश अष्टाविंशतितम	अष्टाविंशी अष्टाविंशतितमी
29. नवविंशति	नवविंश नवविंशतितम	नवविंशी नवविंशतितमी
ऊनत्रिंशत्	ऊनत्रिंश ऊनत्रिंशत्तम	ऊनत्रिंशी ऊनत्रिंशत्तमी
एकान्नत्रिंशत्	एकान्नत्रिंश एकान्नत्रिंशत्तम	एकान्नत्रिंशी एकान्नत्रिंशत्तमी
एकोनत्रिंशत्	एकोनत्रिंश एकोनत्रिंशत्तम	एकोनत्रिंशी एकोनत्रिंशत्तमी
30. त्रिंशत्	त्रिंश त्रिंशत्तम	त्रिंशी त्रिंशत्तमी
31. एकत्रिंशत्	एकत्रिंश एकत्रिंशत्तम	एकत्रिंशी एकत्रिंशत्तमी

32. द्वात्रिंशत्	द्वात्रिंश	द्वात्रिंशी
	द्वात्रिंशत्तम	द्वात्रिंशत्तमी
33. त्रयस्त्रिंशत्	त्रयस्त्रिंश	त्रयस्त्रिंशी
	त्रयस्त्रिंशत्तम	त्रयस्त्रिंशत्तमी
34. चतुस्त्रिंशत्	चतुस्त्रिंश	चतुस्त्रिंशी
	चतुस्त्रिंशत्तम	चतुस्त्रिंशत्तमी
35. पञ्चत्रिंशत्	पञ्चत्रिंश	पञ्चत्रिंशी
	पञ्चत्रिंशत्तम	पञ्चत्रिंशत्तमी
36. षट्त्रिंशत्	षट्त्रिंश	षट्त्रिंशी
	षट्त्रिंशत्तम	षट्त्रिंशत्तमी
37. सप्तत्रिंशत्	सप्तत्रिंश	सप्तत्रिंशी
	सप्तत्रिंशत्तम	सप्तत्रिंशत्तमी
38. अष्टात्रिंशत्	अष्टात्रिंश	अष्टात्रिंशी
	अष्टात्रिंशत्तम	अष्टात्रिंशत्तमी
39. नवत्रिंशत्	नवत्रिंश	नवत्रिंशी
	नवत्रिंशत्तम	नवत्रिंशत्तमी
एकोनचत्वारिंशत्	एकोनचत्वारिंश	एकोनचत्वारिंशी
	एकोनचत्वारिंशत्तम	एकोनचत्वारिंशत्तमी
ऊनचत्वारिंशत्	ऊनचत्वारिंश	ऊनचत्वारिंशी
	ऊनचत्वारिंशत्तम	ऊनचत्वारिंशत्तमी
एकान्नचत्वारिंशत्	एकान्नचत्वारिंश	एकान्नचत्वारिंशी
	एकान्नचत्वारिंशत्तम	एकान्नचत्वारिंशत्तमी
40. चत्वारिंशत्	चत्वारिंश	चत्वारिंशी
	चत्वारिंशत्तम	चत्वारिंशत्तमी
41. एकचत्वारिंशत्	एकचत्वारिंश	एकचत्वारिंश
	एकचत्वारिंशत्तम	एकचत्वारिंशत्तमी
42. द्वाचत्वारिंशत्	द्वाचत्वारिंश	द्वाचत्वारिंशी
	द्वाचत्वारिंशत्तम	द्वाचत्वारिंशत्तमी
	द्विचत्वारिंश	द्विचत्वारिंशी
	द्विचत्वारिंशत्तम	द्विचत्वारिंशत्तमी

43.	त्रयश्चत्वारिंशत्	त्रयश्चत्वारिंश	त्रयश्चत्वारिंशी
		त्रयश्चत्वारिंशत्तम	त्रयश्चत्वारिंशत्तमी
	त्रिचत्वारिंशत्	त्रिचत्वारिंश	त्रिचत्वारिंशी
		त्रिचत्वारिंशत्तम	त्रिचत्वारिंशत्तमी
44.	चतुश्चत्वारिंशत्	चतुश्चत्वारिंश	चतुश्चत्वारिंशी
		चतश्चत्वारिंशत्तम	चतुश्चत्वारिंशत्तमी
45.	पञ्चचत्वारिंशत्	पञ्चचत्वारिंश	पञ्चचत्वारिंशी
		पञ्चचत्वारिंशत्तम	पञ्चचत्वारिंशत्तमी
46.	षट्चत्वारिंशत्	षट्चत्वारिंश	षट्चत्वारिंशी
		षट्चत्वारिंशत्तम	षट्चत्वारिंशत्तमी
47.	सप्तचत्वारिंशत्	सप्तचत्वारिंश	सप्तचत्वारिंशी
		सप्तचत्वारिंशत्तम	सप्तचत्वारिंशत्तमी
48.	अष्टाचत्वारिंशत्	अष्टाचत्वारिंश	अष्टाचत्वारिंशी
		अष्टाचत्वारिंशत्तम	अष्टाचत्वारिंशत्तमी
49.	नवचत्वारिंशत्	नवचत्वारिंश	नवचत्वारिंशी
		नवचत्वारिंशत्तम	नवचत्वारिंशत्तमी
	एकोनपञ्चाशत्	एकोनपञ्चाश	एकोनपञ्चाशी
		एकोनपञ्चाशत्तम	एकोनपञ्चाशत्तमी
	ऊनपञ्चाशत्	ऊनपञ्चाश	ऊनपञ्चाशी
		ऊनपञ्चाशत्तम्	ऊनपञ्चाशत्तमी
	एकान्नपञ्चाशत्	एकान्नपञ्चाश	एकान्नपञ्चाशी
		एकान्नपञ्चाशत्तम्	एकान्नपञ्चाशत्तमी
50.	पञ्चाशत्	पञ्चाश	पञ्चाशी
		पञ्चाशत्तम	पञ्चाशत्तमी
51.	एकपञ्चाशत्	एकपञ्चाश	एकपञ्चाशी
		एकपञ्चाशत्तम	एकपञ्चाशत्तमी
52.	द्वापञ्चाशत्	द्वापञ्चाश	द्वापञ्चाशी
		द्वापञ्चाशत्तम	द्वापञ्चाशत्तमी
	द्विपञ्चाशत्	द्विपञ्चाश	द्विपञ्चाशी
		द्विपञ्चाशत्तम	द्विपञ्चाशत्तमी

53.	त्रयःपञ्चाशत्	त्रयःपञ्चाश	त्रयःपञ्चाशी
		त्रयःपञ्चांशत्तम	त्रयःपञ्चाशत्तमी
	त्रिपञ्चाशत्	त्रिपञ्चाश	त्रिपञ्चाशी
		त्रिपञ्चाशत्तम	त्रिपञ्चाशत्तमी
54.	चतुःपञ्चाशत्	चतुःपञ्चाश	चतुःपञ्चाशी
		चतुःपञ्चाशत्तम	चतुःपञ्चाशत्तमी
55.	पञ्चपञ्चाशत्	पञ्चपञ्चाश	पञ्चपञ्चाशी
		पञ्चपञ्चाशत्तम	पञ्चपञ्चाशत्तमी
56.	षट्पञ्चाशत्	षटपञ्चाश	षट्पञ्चाशी
		षट्पञ्चाशत्तम	षट्पञ्चाशत्तमी
57.	सप्तपञ्चाशत्	सप्तपञ्चाश	सप्तपञ्चाशी
		सप्तपञ्चाशत्तम	सप्तपञ्चाशत्तमी
58.	अष्टापञ्चाशत्	अष्टापञ्चाश	अष्टापञ्चाशी
		अष्टापञ्चाशत्तम	अष्टापञ्चाशत्तमी
	अष्टपञ्चाशत्	अष्टापञ्चाश	अष्टापञ्चाशत्तमी
		अष्टपञ्चाशत्तम	अष्टपञ्चाशी
59.	नवपञ्चाशत्	नवपञ्चाश	नवपञ्चाशी
		नवपञ्चाशत्तम	नवपञ्चाशत्तमी
	एकोनषष्टि	एकोनषष्टितम	एकोनषष्टितमी
	ऊनषष्टि	ऊनषष्टितम	ऊनषष्टितमी
	एकान्नषष्टि	एकान्नषष्टितम	एकान्नषष्टितमी
60.	षष्टि	षष्टितम	षष्टितमी
61.	एकषष्टि	एकषष्ट	एकषष्टी
		एकषष्टितम	एकषष्टितमी
62.	द्वाषष्टि	द्वाषष्ट	द्वाषष्टी
		द्वाषष्टितम	द्वाषष्टितमी
	द्विषष्टि	द्विषष्ट	द्विषष्टी
		द्विषष्टितम	द्विषष्टितमी

63. त्रयःषष्टि	त्रयःषष्ट	त्रयःषष्टी
	त्रयःषष्टितम	त्रयःषष्टितमी
त्रिषष्टि	त्रिषष्ट	त्रिषष्टी
	त्रिषष्टितम	त्रिषष्टितमी
64. चतुःषष्टि	चतुःषष्ट	चतुःषष्टी
	चतुःषष्टितम	चतुःषष्टितमी
65. पञ्चषष्टि	पञ्चषष्ट	पञ्चषष्टी
	पञ्चषष्टितम	पञ्चषष्टितमी
66. षट्षष्टि	षट्षष्ट	षट्षष्टी
	षट्षष्टितम	षट्षष्टितमी
67. सप्तषष्टि	सप्तषष्ट	सप्तषष्टी
	सप्तषष्टितम	सप्तषष्टितमी
68. अष्टाषष्टि	अष्टाषष्ट	अष्टाषष्टी
	अष्टाषष्टितम	अष्टाष्टितमी
अष्टषष्टि	अष्टषष्ट	अष्टषष्टी
	अष्टषष्टितम	अष्टषष्टितमी
69. नवषष्टि	नवषष्ट	नवषष्टी
	नवषष्टितम	नवषष्टितमी
एकोनसप्तति	एकोनसप्ततितम	एकोनसप्ततितमी
ऊनसप्तति	ऊनसप्ततितम	ऊनसप्ततितमी
एकान्नसप्तति	एकान्नसप्ततितम	एकान्नसप्ततितमी
70. सप्तति	सप्ततितम	सप्ततितमी
71. एकसप्तति	एकसप्तत	एकसप्तती
	एकसप्ततितम	एकसप्ततितमी
72. द्वासप्तति	द्वासप्तत	द्वासप्तती
	द्वासप्ततितम	द्वासप्ततितमी
द्विसप्तति	द्विसप्तत	द्विसप्तती
	द्विसप्ततितम	द्विसप्ततितमी
73. त्रयस्सप्तति	त्रयस्सप्तत	त्रयस्सप्तती
	त्रयस्सप्ततितम	त्रयस्सप्ततितमी

	त्रिसप्तति	त्रिसप्तत	त्रिसप्तती
		त्रिसप्ततितम	त्रिसप्ततितमी
74.	चतुस्सप्तति	चतुस्सप्तत	चतुस्सप्तती
		चतुस्सप्ततितम	चतुस्सप्ततितमी
75.	पञ्चसप्तति	पञ्चसप्तत	पञ्चसप्तती
		पञ्चसप्ततितम	पञ्चसप्ततितमी
76.	षट्सप्तति	षट्सप्तत	षट्सप्तती
		षट्सप्ततितम	षट्सप्ततितमी
77.	सप्तसप्तति	सप्तसप्तत	सप्तसप्तती
		सप्तसप्ततितम	सप्तसप्ततितमी
78.	अष्टासप्तति	अष्टासप्तत	अष्टासप्तती
		अष्टासप्ततितम	अष्टासप्ततितमी
	अष्टसप्तति	अष्टसप्तत	अष्टसप्तती
		अष्टसप्ततितम	अष्टसप्ततितमी
79.	नवसप्तति	नवसप्तत	नवसप्तती
		नवसप्ततितम	नवसप्ततितमी
	एकोनाशीति	एकोनाशीतितम	एकोनाशीतितमी
	ऊनाशीति	ऊनाशीतितम	ऊनाशीतितमी
	एकान्नशीति	एकान्नाशीतितम	एकान्नाशीतितमी
80.	अशीति	अशीतितम	अशीतितमी
81.	एकाशीति	एकाशीत	एकाशीती
		एकाशीतितम	एकाशीतितमी
82.	द्व्यशीति	द्व्यशीत	द्व्यशीती
		द्व्यशीतितम	द्व्यशीतितमी
83.	त्र्यशीति	त्र्यशीत	त्र्यशीती
		त्र्यशीतितम	त्र्यशीतितमी
84.	चतुरशीति	चतुरशीत	चतुरशीती
		चतुरशीतितम	चतुरशीतितमी
85.	पञ्चाशीति	पञ्चाशीत	पञ्चाशीती
		पञ्चाशीतितम	पञ्चाशीतितमी

86.	षडशीति	षडशीत	षडशीती
		षडशीतितम	षडशीतितमी
87.	सप्ताशीति	सप्तांशीत	सप्ताशीती
		सप्ताशीतितम	सप्ताशीतितमी
88.	अष्टाशीति	अष्टाशीत	अष्टाशीती
		अष्टाशीतितम	अष्टाशीतितमी
89.	नवाशीति	नवाशीत	नवाशीती
		नवाशीतितम	नवाशीतितमी
	एकोननवति	एकोननवतितम	एकोननवतितमी
	ऊननवति	ऊननवतितम	ऊननवतितमी
	एकान्ननवति	एकान्ननवतितम	एकान्ननवतितमी
90.	नवति	नवतितम	नवतितमी
91.	एकनवति	एकनवत	एकनवती
		एकनवतितम	एकनवतितमी
92.	द्वानवति	द्वानवत	द्वानवती
		द्वानवतितम	द्वानवतितमी
	द्विनवति	द्विनवत	द्विनवती
		द्विनवतितम	द्विनवतितमी
93.	त्रयोनवति	त्रयोनवत	त्रयोनवती
		त्रयोनवतितम	त्रयोनवतितमी
	त्रिनवति	त्रिनवत	त्रिनवती
		त्रिनवतितम	त्रिनवतितमी
94.	चतुर्नवति	चतुर्नवत	चतुर्नवती
		चतुर्नवतितम	चतुर्नवतितमी
95.	पञ्चनवति	पञ्चनवत	पञ्चनवती
		पञ्चनवतितम	पञ्चनवतितमी
96.	षण्णवति	षण्णवत	षण्णवती
		षण्णवतितम	षण्णवतितमी
97.	सप्तनवति	सप्तनवत	सप्तनवती
		सप्तनवतितम	सप्तनवतितमी

98.	अष्टानवति	अष्टानवत	अष्टानवती
		अष्टानवतितम	अष्टानवतितमी
	अष्टनवति	अष्टनवत	अष्टनवती
		अष्टनवतितम	अष्टनवतितमी
99.	नवनवति	नवनवत	नवनवती
		नवनवतितम	नवनवतितमी
	एकोनशत (नपुं0)	एकोनशततम	एकोनशततमी
100.	शत	शततम	शततमी
200.	द्विशत	द्विशततम	द्विशततमी
300.	त्रिशत	त्रिशततम	त्रिशततमी
400.	चतुश्शत	चतुश्शततम	चतुश्शततमी
500.	पञ्चशत	पञ्चशततम	पञ्चशततमी
1000.	सहस्त्र	सहस्त्रतम	सहस्त्रतमी
10,000.	अयुत (नपुं0)		
1,00,000.	लक्ष (नपुं0) अथवा लक्षा (स्त्री0)		

दस लाख – प्रयुत (नपुं0)
करोड़ – कोटि (स्त्री0)
दस करोड़ – अर्बुद (नपुं0)
अरब – अब्ज (नपुं0)
दस अरब – खर्व (पुं0, नपुं0)
खरब – निखर्व (पुं0, नपुं0)
दस खरब – महापद्म (नपुं0)
नील – शङ्कु (पुं0)
दस नील – जलधि (पुं0)
पद्म – अन्त्य (नपुं0)
दस पद्म – मध्य (नपुं0)
शङ्ख – परार्ध (नपुं0)

परिशिष्ट II

प्रमुख धातु सूची

(अकारादि क्रम से)

मूल धातु	परिवर्तित रूप (सार्वधातुक लकारों में)	अर्थ	गण*	पद रूप (लट् प्र0 पु0, एकव0)	** सेट् या अनिट्
अद्		खाना	2	प0 अत्ति	
अश्		प्राप्त करना	5	आ0 अश्नुते	
अश्		खाना	9	प0 अश्नाति	
अस्		होना, रहना	2	प0 अस्ति	
अर्च्		पूजा करना	1	प0 अर्चति	सेट्
				10	उ 0
अर्चयति, अर्चयते					
(प्र +) आप्		पाना	5	प0 आप्नोति	
आस्		बैठना	2	आ0 आस्ते	सेट्
इण्		जाना	2	प0 एति	
अधि + इङ्		अध्ययन करना	2	आ0 अधीते	
इष्	(इच्छ्)	चाहना	6	प0 इच्छति	वेट्
ईक्ष्		देखना	1	आ0 ईक्षते	
ऋच्छ्		जाना	6	प0 ऋच्छति	
एध्		बढ़ना	1	आ0 एधते	
कम्		चाहना	1	आ0 कामयते	सेट्
कस्		जाना	1	प0 कसति	सेट्
कथ		कहना	10	उ0 कथयति, कथयते	सेट्

* 1. भ्वादि 2. अदादि 3. जुहोत्यादि 4. दिवादि 5. स्वादि 6. तुदादि 7. रुधादि 8. तनादि 9. क्र्यादि और 10. चुरादि।

** अनिर्दिष्ट धातुएँ अनिट् हैं।

कुप्	क्रोध करना	4	प0	कुप्यति	सेट्
कूज्	कूजना	1	प0	कूजति	सेट्
कृ	करना	8	उ0	करोति, कुरुते	
कृत्	काटना	6	प0	कृन्तति	
कृष्	खींचना	1	प0	कर्षति	
कृष्	जोतना	6	उ0	कृषति, कृषते	
कॄ (विक्षेपे)	फैलाना/ बिखेरना	6	प0	किरति	सेट्
क्री	खरीदना	9	उ0	क्रीणाति, क्रीणीते	
क्रीड्	खेलना	1	प0	क्रीडति	सेट्
क्षिप्	फेंकना	6	उ0	क्षिपति, क्षिपते	
खाद्	खाना	1	प0	खादति	
गद्	कहना	1	प0	गदति	
गम् (गच्छ्)	जाना	1	प0	गच्छति	
गुह्	छिपाना	1	उ0	गूहति, गूहते	
गै	गाना	1	प0	गायति	
ग्रन्थ्	बाँधना	9	प0	ग्रथ्नाति	
ग्रह्	लेना	9	उ0	गृह्णाति, गृह्णीते	
घुष्	शब्द करना	1	प0	घोषति	
घ्रा (जिघ्र्)	सूँघना	1	प0	जिघ्रति	
चर्	चलना	1	प0	चरति	
पाल्	पालना	10	उ0	पालयति, पालयते	सेट्
चल्	चलना	1	प0	चलति	
चि	इकट्ठा करना	5	उ0	चिनोति, चिनुते	
चिन्त्	सोचना	10	उ0	चिन्तयति, चिन्तयते	
चुर्	चुराना	10	उ0	चोरयति, चोरयते	सेट्
छिद्	काटना	7	उ0	छिनत्ति, छिन्ते	
जन्	पैदा होना	4	आ0	जायते	सेट्
जागृ	जागना	2	प0	जागर्ति	सेट्
जि*	जीतना	1	प0	जयति	
जीव्	जीना	1	प0	जीवति	सेट्
ज्ञा	जानना	9	उ0	जानाति, जानीते	

* वि0 और परा0 के साथ आत्मनेपद होता है

आ+ज्ञा	आज्ञा करना	10	उ0 आज्ञापयति, आज्ञापयते	
तन्	फैलाना	8	उ0 तनोति, तनुते	सेट्
तप्	तपना	1	प0 तपति	
तुद्	कष्ट देना	6	उ0 तुदति, तुदते	
तृप्	तृप्त होना	4	प0 तृप्यति	
तृ	तैरना, पार करना	1	प0 तरति	
त्रुट्	तोड़ना	6	प0 त्रुटति/त्रुट्यति	
त्रुट्	फाड़ना	10	आ0 त्रोटयते	
त्यज्	छोड़ना	1	प0 त्यजति	
त्रस्	काँपना	1	प0 त्रसति	
		4	प0 त्रस्यति	
त्वर्	शीघ्रता करना	1	आ0 त्वरते	
दंश्	काटना	1	प0 दशति	
दह्	जलाना	1	प0 दहति	
दा	देना	3	उ0 ददाति, दत्ते	
दाण् (यच्छ)	देना	1	प0 यच्छति	
दिव्	खेलना, जुआ खेलना	4	प0 दीव्यति	सेट्
दृश् (पश्य्)	देखना	1	प0 पश्यति	
द्विष्	द्वेष करना	2	उ0 द्वेष्टि, द्विष्टे	
धा	रखना, धारण करना	3	उ0 दधाति, धत्ते	
धाव्	दौड़ना	1	उ0 धावति, धावते	सेट्
ध्मा (धम्)	फूँकना (साँस से फूँक कर बजाना)	1	प0 धमति	
नद्	शब्द करना	1	प0 नदति	
नम्	प्रणाम करना, झुकना	1	प0 नमति	
नश्	नष्ट होना	4	प0 नश्यति	
नी	ले जाना	1	उ0 नयति, नयते	
पच्	पकाना	1	उ0 पचति, पचते	
पठ्	पढ़ना	1	प0 पठति	

पत्	गिरना	1	प०	पतति	
पद्	जाना, पाना	4	आ०	पद्यते	
पा (पिब्)	पीना	1	प०	पिबति	
पा	रक्षा करना	2	प०	पाति	
पूज्	पूजा करना	10	उ०	पूजयति, पूजयते	सेट्
पू	पवित्र करना	9	उ०	पुनाति, पुनीते	सेट्
प्रच्छ् (पृच्छ्)	पूछना	6	प०	पृच्छति	
प्रथ्	प्रसिद्ध होना	10	उ०	प्राथयति, प्राथयते	सेट्
फल्	फलना, सफल होना; फटना, फाड़ना	1	प०	फलति	
बन्ध्	बाँधना	9	प०	बध्नाति	
बन्ध्	”	10	उ०	बन्धयति, बन्धयते	
बुध्	जानना	1	प०	बोधति,	
		4	आ०	बुध्यते	
ब्रू	कहना	2	उ०	ब्रवीति, ब्रूते/आह	सेट्
भक्ष्	खाना	1	उ०	भक्षति, भक्षते	
		10	उ०	भक्षयति, भक्षयते ।	सेट्
भज्	सेवा करना	1	उ०	भजति, भजते	
भा	चमकना	2	प०	भाति	
भिद्	तोड़ना, फोड़ना	7	उ०	भिनत्ति, भिन्ते	
भी	डरना	3	प०	बिभेति	
भुज्	भोगना	7	प०	भुनक्ति	
	खाना		आ०	भुङ्क्ते	
भू	होना, उत्पन्न होना	1	प०	भवति	सेट्
भृ	भरना	1	उ०	भरति, भरते	
	पालन पोषण करना धारण करना	3	उ०	बिभर्ति, बिभृते	
मन्थ्	मथना	1,9	प०	मन्थति, मथ्नाति	
मिल्	मिलना	6	उ०	मिलति, मिलते	सेट्

मुच्	छोड़ना, मुक्त करना, त्यागना,	6	उ0	मुञ्चति, मुञ्चते	
मुद्	प्रसन्न होना	1	आ0	मोदते	सेट्
मुद्	मिलाना	10	उ0	मोदयति, मोदयते	
यज्	पूजा करना	1	उ0	यजति, यजते	
या	जाना	2	प0	याति	
याच्	माँगना	1	उ0	याचति, याचते	सेट्
रक्ष्	रक्षा करना	1	प0	रक्षति	
(आ+) रभ्	आरंभ करना	1	आ0	रभते	
रम्	क्रीड़ा करना	1	आ0	रमते	
वि+रम्	विश्राम करना	1	प0	विरमति	
राज्	चमकना	1	उ0	राजति, राजते	
रुद्	रोना	2	प0	रोदिति	सेट्
रुध्	रोकना	7	उ0	रुणद्धि, रुन्धे	
रुह्	उत्पन्न होना	1	प0	रोहति	
लभ्	प्राप्त करना, पाना	1	आ0	लभते	
लिख्	लिखना	6	प0	लिखति	सेट्
लू	काटना, पृथक् करना	9	उ0	लुनाति, लुनीते	सेट्
वच्	कहना	2	प0	वक्ति	
वद्	कहना	1	प0	वदति	सेट्
वप्	बोना काटना	1	उ0	वपति, वपते	
वस्	रहना	1	प0	वसति	
वह्	ढोना	1	उ0	वहति, वहते	
विद्	जानना	2	प0	वेत्ति	सेट्
विद्	पाना	6	उ0	विन्दति, विन्दते	
वृत्	होना	1	आ0	वर्तते	सेट्
वृध्	बढ़ना	1	आ0	वर्धते	सेट्
व्रज्	जाना	1	प0	व्रजति	सेट्
शंस्	कहना, प्रशंसा करना	1	प0	शंसति, प्रशंसति	

शक्	सकना, सहना	5	प0	शक्नोति	
शङ्क्	डरना, शङ्का करना	1	आ0	शङ्कते	सेट्
शम्	शान्त होना	4	प0	शाम्यति	
शास्	पढ़ाना, शिक्षा देना, शासन करना	2	प0	शास्ति	सेट्
शी	सोना	2	आ0	शेते	सेट्
शुच्	शोक करना	1	प0	शोचति	
श्रु	सुनना	1	प0	शृणोति	
शुभ्	चमकना, प्रसन्न होना	1	आ0	शोभते	सेट्
सद् (सीद्)	दुःखी होना	6	प0	सीदति	
सह्	सहन करना	1	आ0	सहते	
सिच्	सींचना	6	उ0	सिञ्चति, सिञ्चते	
सू	जन्म देना	2,4	आ0	सूते, सूयते	
सृज्	बनाना	6	प0	सृजति	
सृप्	रेंगना	1	प0	सर्पति	
सेव्	सेवा करना	1	आ0	सेवते	सेट्
स्तम्भ्	रोकना	1	आ0	स्तम्भते	
	अवलंब देना	9	प0	स्तभ्नाति	
स्तु	स्तुति करना	2	उ0	स्तौति, स्तुते	
स्तृ	ढँकना	5	उ0	स्तृणोति, स्तृणुते	
स्था (तिष्ठ्)	रुकना, प्रतीक्षा करना, होना, पास रहना	1	प0	तिष्ठति	
स्पृश्	छूना	6	प0	स्पृशति	
स्मि	मुस्कराना	1	आ0	स्मयते	
स्मृ	स्मरण करना	1	प0	स्मरति	
स्पन्द्	टपकना	1	आ0	स्पन्दते	
स्रु	बहना, टपकना	1	प0	स्रवति	

स्वज्	आलिंगन करना	1	आ0 स्वजते	
स्वप्	सोना	2	प0 स्वपिति	
हन्	मारना	2	प0 हन्ति	
हा	छोड़ना	3	प0 जहाति	
हिंस्	हिंसा करना	7	प0 हिनस्ति	
हु	हवन करना	3	प0 जुहोति	
हृ	हरण करना, लेना, जीतना	1	उ0 हरति, हरते	
हृष्	प्रसन्न होना	4	प0 हृष्यति	सेट्
ह्री	लज्जित होना	3	प0 जिह्रेति	
आ+ ह्वे	पुकारना (स्पर्धा)	1	उ0 ह्वयति, ह्वयते, आह्वयति, आह्वयते	

परिशिष्ट III

पारिभाषिक शब्दावली

अनुनासिक — मुख के साथ नासिका की सहायता से उच्चरित होने वाला वर्ण **अनुनासिक** कहलाता है। **(मुखनासिकावचनोऽनुनासिकः । पा0 1.1.8)** जैसे – ङ्,ञ्,ण्,न् एवं म् ।

आगम — शब्द या धातु के प्रारम्भ,मध्य या अन्त में जो अक्षर जुड़ जाता है उसे **आगम** कहते हैं, जैसे– अभवत् में अ, भविष्यत् में इ और फलानि में न् आगम हैं। किसी अक्षर का आगम होने पर उससे सम्बद्ध अन्य वर्ण का नाश नहीं होता है । अतएव कहा गया है, **मित्रवदागमः** ।

आदेश — ज़ब किसी वर्ण के स्थान में कोई दूसरा वर्ण आ जाता है तब वह **आदेश** कहलाता है, जैसे– इति+आदि = इत्यादि में इ के स्थान में य् का आदेश हुआ है ।

आदेश शत्रुवत् होता है । वह जिसके स्थान पर आता है उसे मारकर स्वयं उसके स्थान में बैठ जाता है **(शत्रुवदादेशः)** ।

उपधा — किसी शब्द के अन्तिम वर्ण के ठीक पहले वाले वर्ण को **उपधा** कहते हैं । **(अलोऽन्त्यात् पूर्व उपधा । पा0 1.1.65)**

जैसे– राजन् शब्द में ज का अ उपधा है ।

उपपद विभक्ति — देखिए– कारक विभक्ति ।

उपसर्ग — प्र आदि क्रिया के योग में **उपसर्ग** कहलाते हैं **(उपसर्गाः क्रियायोगे । पा0 1.4.59),**

जैसे– प्रणमति । प्रादि निम्नलिखित हैं– प्र, परा, अप, सम्, अनु, अव, निस्, निर्, दुस्, दुर्, वि, आङ्, नि, अधि, अपि, अति, सु, उत्, अभि, प्रति, परि और उप।

कारक विभक्ति क्रिया को आधार बनाकर संज्ञादि शब्दों में जो विभक्ति होती है, उसे **कारक विभक्ति** कहते हैं। जैसे– **गुरुः शिष्याय ज्ञानं ददाति** । यहाँ देना क्रिया शिष्य के लिए हुई है जिस कारण यह संप्रदान कारक है। अतएव इसमें चतुर्थी विभक्ति हुई है।

किसी पद विशेष का आश्रय लेकर होने वाली विभक्ति **उपपद विभक्ति** कहलाती है, जैसे– **गुरवे नमः** में चतुर्थी विभक्ति उपपद विभक्ति है, क्योंकि यह **नमः** पद के कारण हुई है ।

गुण अ, ए और ओ को **गुण** कहते हैं । **(अदेङ्गुणः । पा0 1.1.2)**

तिङन्त तिङ् (लकारों के प्रत्यय) जोड़ने से धातु का जो रूप बनता है वह **तिङन्त** कहलाता है, जैसे– भवति, गच्छति आदि । तिङ् प्रत्यय निम्नलिखित अठारह हैं जो विभिन्न लकारों के अर्थ को प्रकट करने के लिए धातु में जोड़े जाते हैं–

तिप्, तस्, झि, सिप्, थस्, थ, मिप्, वस्, मस्, त, आताम् झ, थास्, आथाम्, ध्वम्, इट्, वहि, महिङ् । **(पा0 3.4.78)**

इनमें प्रथम नौ प्रत्यय परस्मैपद के हैं और अन्तिम नौ आत्मनेपद के ।

निपात च, वा, ह, एव, एवम्, नूनम्, शश्वत्, युगपद् आदि अव्यय **निपात** कहलाते हैं । **(चादयोऽसत्त्वे। पा0 1.4.57)**

निष्ठा

क्त (त) और क्तवतु (तवत्) प्रत्ययों को **निष्ठा** कहते हैं ।

(क्तक्तवतू निष्ठा । पा0 1.1.26) ये प्रत्यय भूत काल के अर्थ में होते हैं । गतः, गतवान्, तीर्णः, तीर्णवान् ।

सुप् (सु औ जस् आदि कारक विभक्ति) या तिङ् (तिप् तस् झि आदि धातुओं में लगने वाले लकारों के प्रत्यय) से युक्त शब्द पद कहलाता है ।

(सुप्तिङन्तं पदम् । पा0 1.4.14) जैसे–

बालकः पठति, इसमें बालकः सुबन्त पद है और पठति तिङन्त पद । संस्कृत में कोई भी शब्द पद बनने के बाद ही प्रयोग के योग्य होता है ।

प्रकृति

शब्द या धातु जिससे कोई प्रत्यय जुड़ता है उसे **प्रकृति** कहते हैं,

जैसे– रामः पठति । यहाँ रामः में राम प्रकृति है और पठति में पठ् ।

प्रगृह्य

i) ईकारान्त, ऊकारान्त तथा एकारान्त द्विवचनान्त पद **प्रगृह्य** कहलाते हैं ।

(ईदूदेद्द्विवचनं प्रगृह्यम् । पा0 1.1.11)

जैसे– मुनी, साधू, लते ।

ii) अदस् शब्द का मकार से युक्त ईकारान्त, ऊकारान्त रूप अमी, अमू भी **प्रगृह्य** संज्ञक होते हैं । **(अदसो मात् । पा0 1.1.12)**

प्रत्याहार

जो वर्णों को संक्षेप में बतला दे वह **प्रत्याहार** कहलाता है ।

(प्रत्याह्रियन्ते संक्षिप्यन्ते वर्णाः यत्र असौ प्रत्याहारः।)

जैसे– अ इ उ ण् ऋ ऌ क्– में अ से लेकर क् के पहले तक के सभी वर्णों को अक् द्वारा बतलाया जाता है । अतः यह प्रत्याहार है ।

प्रत्याहार पाणिनि-व्याकरण का मूलाधार है । पाणिनि ने निम्नलिखित चौदह माहेश्वर सूत्रों के आधार पर लगभग 44 प्रत्याहारों की कल्पना की जिससे उनके व्याकरण में अत्यन्त संक्षिप्तता आ सकी–
अ इ उ ण् ।1। ऋ लृ क् ।2। ए ओ ङ् ।3। ऐ औ च् ।4। ह य व र ट् ।5। ल ण् ।6। ञ म ङ ण न म् ।7। झ भ ञ् ।8। घ ढ ध ष् ।9। ज ब ग ड द श् ।10। ख फ छ ठ थ च ट त व् ।11। क प य् ।12। श ष स र् ।13। ह ल् ।14।
उपर्युक्त किसी भी सूत्र के अन्तिम हलन्त वर्ण के साथ उसके पहले के किसी भी वर्ण को मिलाकर प्रत्याहार बनाया जाता है– **आदिरन्त्येन सहेता। पा0 1.1.71**
प्रत्याहार–सूत्र के वर्णों में अन्तिम हलन्त वर्ण की गिनती नहीं होती, जैसे– अक् प्रत्याहार में अ इ उ ऋ लृ– इन वर्णों को ही गिना जाता है। यहाँ सूत्र के अन्त में स्थित क् और ण् को इसमें नहीं गिना जाता है ।

प्रातिपदिक

i) धातु और प्रत्यय को छोड़कर सभी अर्थयुक्त शब्द **प्रातिपदिक** कहलाते हैं। (**अर्थवदधातुरप्रत्ययः प्रातिपदिकम् । पा0 1.2.45**) जैसे– बालक, फल आदि।
ii) कृदन्त, तद्धितान्त और समास भी **प्रातिपदिक** कहलाते हैं
(**कृत्तद्धितसमासाश्च। पा0 1.2.46**), जैसे– पाठक(कृदन्त), दाशरथि (तद्धितान्त), राजपुरुष (समास) ।

विकरण

धातु में लकारों के तिङ् प्रत्यय लगने के पूर्व उनके बीच में होने वाले शप्, श्यन् आदि उपप्रत्यय को **विकरण** कहते हैं । विकरण के भेद के कारण ही धातुएँ दस गणों में विभक्त हुई हैं ।

विभाषा जहाँ किसी कार्य के होने या न होने–दोनों की स्थिति हो, उसे **विभाषा** कहते हैं । (**न वेति विभाषा । पा0 1.1.44**) इस को **'विकल्प'** या **'वा'** भी कहते हैं ।

वृद्धि आ, ऐ और औ को **'वृद्धि'** कहते हैं । (**वृद्धिरादैच्। पा0 1.1.1**)

सवर्ण जिन वर्णों के मुखगत उच्चारण स्थान और आभ्यन्तर प्रयत्न समान होते हैं, वे आपस में **सवर्ण** कहलाते हैं ।

(**तुल्यास्यप्रयत्नं सवर्णम् । पा0 1.1.9**) जैसे– क् और ग् । दोनों का उच्चारण स्थान 'कण्ठ' है और आभ्यन्तर प्रयत्न 'स्पृष्ट' । इसी प्रकार अ और आ, इ और ई, क् और ख् सवर्ण हैं । अ और ह् परस्पर सवर्ण नहीं हैं, क्योंकि दोनों का उच्चारण स्थान कण्ठ है, किन्तु आभ्यन्तर प्रयत्न भिन्न–भिन्न हैं । अ विवृत है तो ह् ईषद्विवृत । विभिन्न वर्णों के आभ्यन्तर प्रयत्न और मुखगत उच्चारण स्थान इस प्रकार है–

आभ्यन्तर प्रयत्न बोधक चक्र

स्पृष्ट	ईषत्स्पृष्ट	विवृत	ईषद्विवृत	संवृत*
क् ख् ग् घ् ङ्	य्	अ ए	श्	अ
च् छ् ज् झ् ञ्	र्	इ ऐ	ष्	(प्रयोग दशा
ट् ठ् ड् ढ् ण्	ल्	उ ओ	स्	में मात्र
त् थ् द् ध् न्	व्	ऋ औ	ह्	ह्रस्व अ)
प फ् ब् भ् म्		लृ		

* सवर्णसंज्ञा के लिए **संवृत** भेद की अपेक्षा नहीं है । क्योंकि प्रक्रिया काल में **'अ' विवृत** ही माना जाता है ।

मुखगत उच्चारण स्थान बोधक चक्र

कण्ठ	तालु	ओष्ठ	मूर्धा	न्त	नासिका	कण्ठतालु	कण्ठोष्ठ	दन्तोष्ठ	जिह्वामूल	उपध्मानीय
अ	इ	उ	ऋ	लृ	ङ्	ए	ओ	व्	≍क	प
क्	च्	प्	ट्	त्	ञ्	ऐ	औ		≍ख	फ
ख्	छ्	फ्	ठ्	थ्	ण्					
ग्	ज्	ब्	ड्	द्	न्					
घ्	झ्	भ्	ढ्	ध्	म्					
ङ्	ञ्	म्	ण्	न्	अनुस्वार (–)					
ह्	य्	≍प्	र्	ल्						
विसर्ग (:)	श्	≍फ	ष्	स्						

संयोग

दो या अधिक व्यञ्जन जब बीच में बिना किसी स्वर के व्यवधान के मिलते हैं तो उन्हें **संयोग** कहते हैं। **हलोऽनन्तराः संयोगः । पा० 1.1.7)** जैसे मित्रम् के त्र (त् + र् + अ) में त् र् तथा राष्ट्रम् के ष्ट्र में ष् ट् र् संयोग हैं ।

संहिता

वर्णों की अत्यन्त समीपता (अर्थात् अव्यवहित उच्चारण) को **संहिता** कहते हैं **(परः सन्निकर्षः संहिता । पा० 1.4.109)** जैसे– इ न् द् उ : (विसर्ग) जब अव्यवहित रूप में उच्चरित होते हैं तब इनका स्वरूप इन्दुः पद के रूप में प्रकट होता है । एक पद में, समास में, धातु और उपसर्ग के योग में संहिता अनिवार्य है । किन्तु वाक्य के दो पदों के बीच यह वक्ता की इच्छा पर निर्भर करता है कि वह (प्रथम पद के अन्तिम वर्ण और दूसरे पद के प्रथम वर्ण में) संहिता करे या न करे । जैसे– 'भाति इन्दुः' में संहिता करने पर 'भातीन्दुः' रूप

बनता है। परन्तु यह वक्ता की इच्छा पर आधारित है। संहिता कहाँ अनिवार्य और कहाँ ऐच्छिक होती है। इसके लिए प्रसिद्ध श्लोक है–

संहितैकपदे नित्या नित्या धातूपसर्गयोः ।
नित्या समासे वाक्ये तु सा विवक्षामपेक्षते ॥

संहिता होने पर ही सन्धि होती है।

सम्प्रसारण

य्, व्, र्, ल् के स्थान पर क्रमशः इ, उ, ऋ, लृ का होना **सम्प्रसारण** कहलाता है। (**इग्यणः सम्प्रसारणम् । पा0 1.1.45**)

सुबन्त

सुप् (कारक विभक्ति) से अन्त होने वाले पद **सुबन्त** कहलाते हैं, जैसे– रामः, अहम् आदि। सुप् के अन्तर्गत निम्नलिखित इक्कीस प्रत्यय आते हैं–

सु औ जस् अम् औट् शस्, टा भ्याम् भिस्, ङे भ्याम् भ्यस्, ङसि भ्याम् भ्यस्, ङस्, ओस् आम्, ङि ओस् सुप्। (**पा0 4.1.1**)

सेट्

कुछ धातुओं में प्रत्यय लगने से पूर्व इट् (इ) का आगम होता है। ऐसे धातुओं को **सेट्** धातु कहते हैं। जैसे–

पठ्– पठितः, लिख् – लेखितुम् आदि।

जिन धातुओं में इट् का आगम नहीं होता है, वे **अनिट्** कहलाते हैं, जैसे –

कृ – कृतः, गम्–गतः आदि।

परिशिष्ट IV

प्रमुख ग्रन्थ-सूची

(क) व्याकरणग्रन्थ

	पुस्तक	लेखक	प्रकाशक
1.	अष्टाध्यायी	पाणिनि	चौखम्बा विद्याभवन, वाराणसी ।
2.	हायर संस्कृत ग्रामर	मोरेश्वर रामचन्द्र काले (डॉ0 कपिलदेव द्विवेदी-अनुवादक)	रामनारायण लाल, बेनी प्रसाद इलाहाबाद (211002)
3.	काशिका	जयादित्यवामन (न्यास पदमञ्जरी संहिता)	चौखम्बा संस्कृत विद्याभवन, वाराणसी ।
4.	पातञ्जलं महाभाष्यम्	पतञ्जलि	मोतीलाल बनारसीदास, दिल्ली, वाराणसी, पटना ।
5.	प्रौढमनोरमा	श्री भट्टोजिदीक्षित	चौखम्बा विद्याभवन, वाराणसी ।
6.	प्रौढ रचनानुवाद कौमुदी	डॉ0 कपिलदेव द्विवेदी	विश्वविद्यालय प्रकाशन, चौक वाराणसी ।

7.	बृहद् अनुवाद चन्द्रिका	श्री चक्रधर नौटियाल 'हंस'	मोतीलाल बनारसीदास, दिल्ली, वाराणसी, पटना ।
8.	मध्यसिद्धान्तकौमुदी	श्री वरदराज (सम्पा0 पं0 विश्वनाथ शास्त्री)	मोतीलाल बनारसीदास, दिल्ली ।
9.	रूपचन्द्रिका	पं0 रामचन्द्र झा	चौखम्बा सं0 सिरीज औफिस, वाराणसी ।
10.	लघुसिद्धान्तकौमुदी	श्री वरदराज सम्पा0 पं0 विश्वनाथ शास्त्री	मोतीलाल बनारसीदास, दिल्ली, वाराणसी, पटना ।
11.	लघुशब्देन्दुशेखर	श्री नागोजिभट्ट	चौखम्बा विद्याभवन, वाराणसी ।
12.	वैयाकरण-सिद्धान्तकौमुदी	श्री भट्टोजिदीक्षित	खेमराज, बम्बई ।
	(क) तत्त्वबोधिनी टीका		
	(ख) बालमनोरमा टीका	श्री वासुदेव दीक्षित सम्पा0 म0म0पं0 गिरिधर शर्मा म0म0पं0 परमेश्वरानन्द	मोतीलाल बनारसीदास, दिल्ली, वाराणसी, पटना ।
13.	व्याकरणचन्द्रोदय	श्री चारूदेव शास्त्री	मोतीलाल बनारसीदास, दिल्ली, वाराणसी, पटना ।
14.	व्याकरण प्रदीप	कु0 उषा अग्रवाल	सुल्तान चन्द्र एण्ड सन्स, दरियागंज, दिल्ली
15.	संस्कृत व्याकरण प्रवेशिका	डा0 बाबूराम सक्सेना	साहित्य संस्थान, 28 (44) लाउदर रोड़, इलाहाबाद ।

16.	संस्कृत व्याकरण प्रवेशिका	डा0 आर्थर ए0 मैकडान अनुवादक–डा0 कपिलदेव द्विवेदी	मोतीलाल बनारसीदास, दिल्ली, वाराणसी, पटना ।
17.	संस्कृत व्याकरणोदय	प्रो0 जयमन्त मिश्र	चौखम्बा विद्याभवन, वाराणसी ।

(ख) छन्दः ग्रन्थ

1.	छन्दोमञ्जरी	श्री गङ्गादास	चौखम्बा सं0 सिरीज, वाराणसी ।
2.	वृत्तरत्नाकर	श्री केदार भट्ट	मेहरचन्द लक्ष्मनदास, दिल्ली ।
3.	श्रुतबोध	महाकवि कालिदास	चौखम्बा सं0 सिरीज, वाराणसी ।

(ग) अलङ्कारग्रन्थ

1.	अलङ्कारमञ्जरी	श्री नारायण खिस्ते	चौखम्बा सं0 सिरीज, वाराणसी ।
2.	काव्यप्रकाश	मम्मट (व्याख्याकार) आचार्य विश्वेश्वर	ज्ञानमण्डल लिमिटेड, वाराणसी ।
3.	कुवलयानन्द	श्री अप्पय्य दीक्षित	चौखम्बा संस्कृत सिरीज, वाराणसी
4.	चन्द्रालोक	पीयूषवर्ष जयदेव	मोतीलाल बनारसीदास, दिल्ली, वाराणसी, पटना।
5.	साहित्यदर्पण	श्री विश्वनाथ कविराज	चौखम्बा विद्याभवन, वाराणसी ।

It is difficult to eradicate the belief that the forms in which we think are identical with the thought itself, and it is only linguistic science that enables us to see that many of the forms of grammar which we imagine necessary and universal are after all but accidental and restricted in use. The cases of Latin and Greek do not exist in the majority of languages; the Polynesian dialects have no true verbs; and the Eskimaux get on well enough without the 'parts of speech' that figure so largely in our. own grammars. The distinction made by writers on logic between such words as 'redness' and 'red' is a distinction that would have been unintelligible to the Tasmanian; 'red' in fact, has no sense unless we supply 'colour,' and 'red colour' is really the same as 'redness.'

SAYCE, *Introduction to the Science of Language,* p. 328

But we need not go to vanished Tasmanians to learn how muddled Mill is about this. All our everyday experience with English depends upon our refusal to take syntax as Mill would have us take it. Syntax classifies the patterns in which we put our words together, not the forms in which we think. We use one word pattern with many different thought-forms; and, conversely, can put one thought form into many different word patterns.

Socrates is wise
Wisdom belongs to Socrates

are two different word patterns; the same form of thought might use either.

I shrink from labouring this point. ('It is laboured and therefore vague,' wrote one of my protocolists!) Everybody knows it perfectly well—until he begins to write about Grammar or Logic. More strictly, until he begins what is called 'analysis.' *Then* the danger of supposing that we are making 'the forms of language correspond with the forms of thought' becomes enormous, and persists in spite of the most arduous reflection. My example, 'Socrates is wise,' may remind us of the scope of the enticements which follow. Half the history of Western Philosophy turns upon supposing that 'Socrates' and 'wise,' since they behave differently in our word patterns, must have meanings of different orders, the one a particular, the other a universal. (See Part Three, Chapters XXI and XXII below.) The troubles, indeed, that Mill's mistake entails are so extensive and enduring that any efforts which might

do anything to mitigate them, or reduce the probability of the mistake, would be justified.

(2) What does Mill here mean by 'logic'? His confusion between the forms of language and the forms of thought infects his use of 'logic' too. 'The distinctions between the various parts of speech . . .' and so on, that he is talking about, are, of course, sometimes used to mark distinctions of thought; but, often and rightly, are not. They do not mark them in themselves. By being a noun, not a verb, a word does not settle anything about what it stands for, or about the form of the thought which uses it. The pretence to the contrary that haunts traditional teaching is one of the greatest removable obstacles to intelligence. Our whole treatment of how words work is vitiated by it. As Bloomfield says:

> The school grammar tells us, for instance, that a noun is 'the name of a person, place, or thing. This definition presupposes more philosophical and scientific knowledge than the human race can command, and implies, further, that the form-classes of a language agree with the classifications that would be made by a philosopher or scientist. Is *fire*, for instance, a thing? For over a century physicists have believed it to be an action or process rather than a thing; under this view, the verb *burn* is more appropriate than the noun *fire*.
>
> *Language*, p. 266

He may be restricting the sense of *thing* a little arbitrarily here, as Jespersen did in the passage I cited early in this Part. But most school-grammars do so too, which justifies him and also explains Jespersen's odd observation. He goes on:

> Class-meanings, like all other meanings, elude the linguist's power of definition, and in general do not coincide with the meanings of strictly defined technical terms. To accept definitions of meaning, which at best are makeshifts, in place of an identification in formal terms, is to abandon scientific discourse.

This pours out the baby with the bath-water; calls for better bread than was ever baked from flour; closes the eye because vision is not complete. I do not think that a deeper inquiry into the conditions of 'scientific discourse,' or any other discourse, would let it pass. But the first point is obviously right and extremely important. Not so much, I would say, because to mix in crude class-meanings interferes with the establishment of 'identifications in

formal terms,' however much that may be regretted, as because the translation of supposed class-meanings back into forms of thought is so disastrous. It produces a bastard logic which behaves with ordinary language as though the preparatory work on the structure of the thought that is to be manipulated had already been done. But ordinary language does not do this work. Mill, here, seems to be thinking that Latin could automatically guarantee the validity of the argument entrusted to it—as mathematics sometimes can. He has forgotten what ordinary language must be like when he writes, 'if we fail to attend precisely and accurately to any of these [distinctions in thought] we cannot avoid committing a solecism in language.' That is not true of any language that anyone has ever had the use of for ordinary affairs. No language ever has been, or ever, in all probability, will be, fitted with such vagary alarms! In all languages, sentences that are muddled in thought may be irreproachable in syntax, and, conversely, perfectly clear thought may be impossible syntax. We have only to write, 'The sky blues me,' as we write, 'The sun warms me,' to prove it. There is no difference in this between Latin and English or French. If Mill had tried to write his paragraph in Latin, would solecisms at every turn have revealed his inattention to the most important distinctions in the subject? 'Incomparable superiority,' whether as an English phrase or a Latin, rings no warning bell, for nobody takes it in the literal way that Mill's doctrine would require. His 'logic' here is just that miscegenation between language and thought which breeds most of our errors.

(3) But he says, 'The most elementary part of logic.' Could Mill turn on me with this qualification? Am I misrepresenting him? What does this 'elementary' mean? Perhaps, as in 'elementary' arithmetic, it means 'easy, suited to beginners.' Grammar has nearly always been supposed to be *that*. It might mean 'requiring only a slight study in order to be understood'; but the oldest hands at grammar do not pretend to have arrived there. It might mean, 'using only the simplest and most obvious logical distinctions'; but this sort of grammar uses and mixes the most complex and obscure of them. It might mean, 'at an early stage of development'; as in 'elementary organisms.' These distinctions that the grammatical forms seem to make may be this last, and Mill may be saying so.

(4) By calling grammar 'The beginning of the analysis of the thinking process' Mill may mean that (a) in the *individual's* reflection and/or (b) in the *history of the users of a language,* these distinctions represent first steps in the analysis of thought. If so, a very large question is raised. Possibly the comparative history of languages may have important things to tell us, after many days, about the early history of the development of thought. But thought, if we contrast this with grammatical theory, was never tied to linguistic categories. Its attempts to picture itself did not control it. But we have not to speculate further about that here; our business is with these grammatical forms as guides *in the individual's* first efforts to analyze the thinking process in himself, and, on that, it will be enough now to say that the sooner he dismisses these guides the better.

A further remark about 'analysis' may help to bring out the danger. There is a sense in which we are all, as owners of digestive systems, marvellously expert analytic organic chemists. So thought, in the practical handling of language, performs endless astonishing feats of analysis. But, as the laboratory chemist, until recently, would have made a very poor showing if he had to write out the chemical reactions which digestion effects, so the explicit analytic study of meanings lags sadly behind our skill. Traditional grammar has attempted to impose, on the working of language, some crude ('elementary'?) early theories. They do not apply, but in the absence of better information they have easily been made to seem applicable. Moreover the crude theories have great *philosophic* prestige, the result, so a cynic avers, of a very ancient bargain between grammar and logic to conceal one another's defects. Mill's doctrine here presents explicitly and theoretically what has been the practice, sometimes witting, often unwitting, of a majority of those who have thought about language ever since Plato's *Cratylus.* As being, for too many students of language, the only conceivable alternative to the Usage Doctrine, it is worth examining. But the right alternative is to discard both doctrines, study our skill more thoroughly and improve it by eliminating obstructions and providing more encouraging modes of exercise.

Mill is not alone in his conception of Latin and Greek as *the* logical languages—nor the last to be led astray by excessive ven-

eration for the fashion in which he had happened to be taught himself. It will be only fair to append a passage from another distinguished teacher, who seems to be still more at sea about syntax.

> The position of the French and German people with regard to the mother tongue is very different educationally from the position of the English with regard to their mother tongue, for the simple reason that the English instinct for language is on the whole more slovenly, more slipshod, and less sensitive than in any other European country. English has divested itself of accidence, and has done the most that any language can to divest itself of syntax. Consequently, training in English is less effectual as an educational instrument than in French or German. The natural insensitiveness of the English mind to the graces and delicacies of language has been very largely redeemed and helped by the fidelity of the English to classical training. The greatness of our literature and poetry rests much on the fidelity of the English people to classical training in Latin and Greek, and it is an implement of education with which we can very little afford to dispense.
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> DR RANDALL (Head Master of Charterhouse), *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution* for 1905, p. 655.

Comment is perhaps unnecessary: but 'divested itself of accidence' is hardly happy. If the writer is serious, he should not, for even a moment, be suggesting that accidence is like a dress. And the least acquaintance with the comparative study of languages—which, after all, is what he is talking about—would show that Chinese, for example, has very much less syntax than English. As for 'the natural insensitiveness of the English mind' and so on; that seems merely abuse. What sort of comparative observation could be supposed to attest it? If the Doctor's indignation is based on his own experience in the class-room, might it not equally be the teaching of English that is at fault? We may admit that we can very little afford to dispense with classical training if we do not develop English implements of education to take its place.

> We have got to face the task of reconstructing our grammar because owing to the transformation which modern languages have undergone on the formal side, our grammatical categories no longer in any way correspond with the permanent logical categories, and now that

formal distinctions are fast disappearing logical considerations are fast becoming all important in the analysis of our speech.

PROFESSOR ALLEN MAWER, 'The Problem of Grammar in the Light of Modern Linguistic Thought,' p. 12. *English Association Publications.*

With this (apart from 'no longer' perhaps) we are, and can feel that we are, in a new world.

But back to Mill. His sentence, 'The principles and rules of grammar are the *means* by which the forms of language are made to correspond with the universal forms of thought,' needs turning round to: 'The rules of grammar are the means by which grammarians have attempted to make the forms of thought correspond with the forms of language!' Modern philosophers, Wittgenstein and the Viennese School, the logical positivists, for example, taking a much deeper dive than Mill into the subject, are endeavouring with some success to reduce logic to the fundamental grammar of a perfect language. They too would say that the laws of thought are the rules of language, though they would not mean by this at all what Mill meant here.

'Rule,' of course, is the word most profitable to study. We have glanced above (pp. 229-232) at some of its ambiguities and noted the importance, for every branch of teaching, of clearing our ideas about rules as far as possible. The sense in which the laws of thought, the right working of intelligence, may profitably be regarded as the rules of an ideal language can be approached from all the main everyday uses of 'rule.' These are:

(1) A prescription or command issued by an authority. Extend this by admitting that we are all under the command of existence.
(2) An agreement, such as anyone joining a Club makes, to abide by certain understandings as to what shall and shall not be done. Joining the company of speakers of English, we will speak so. Extending it, joining the company of the sane, we will think so, and have our advantage in so doing.
(3) An observed uniformity, an empirical law of events, what is seen to happen—a segment of the operation of (1) as apprehended by us.

Taken superficially these seem very different and are the positions from which the traditional philosophies—Rationalism, Prag-

matism and Empiricism—have battled with one another. Taken more deeply, it becomes very difficult to distinguish between them, especially if we do not forget, in considering them, to *ask* (we shall not answer it, for they are the attempted answers) how we come to consider them, what we are doing, or what is being done in us, when we consider. Taken so, we approach a sense for 'rule' which includes them all[1] and is that in which the necessities (as distinguished from the accidents) of language and the necessities of thought seem to be the same.

But this is a long way from Mill's paragraph, though not so far from some pages in his *Logic*. I put it in here because a feeling that there may be, in a deep sense, a real identity between the forms of thought and the forms of language, lends plausibility to a doctrine of correspondence between them that no modern grammarian has the least difficulty in utterly demolishing. The identity, though, would have to do with the grammar of an imaginary language which no one has ever written or talked. Some mathematical notations approximate to it. But the correspondence Mill is talking about has to do with the different tricks of different extant languages. It has to do with 'mine square tables is brown,' not with 'my round table is square.' The first breaks the Club Rules, the second may break the fundamental grammar which may be thought to be identical for language and for logic.

'Rules,' in addition to being a word of the shiftiest philosophic duplicity, has minor treacheries. Here is Mill on rules again, also from that hastily composed Inaugural Lecture.

> But in great things as well as in small, examples and models are not sufficient: we want rules as well. Familiarity with the correct use of a language in conversation and writing does not make rules of grammar unnecessary; nor does the amplest knowledge of the sciences of reasoning and experiment dispense with rules of logic. We may have heard correct reasonings and seen skilful experiments all our lives—we shall not learn by mere imitation to do the like, unless we pay careful attention to how it is done.

The last sentence has much to commend it; but 'pay careful attention to how it is done.' Is *that* what most things which school-

[1] Some further speculations along these lines will be found in the Appendix at pp. 407-11. *See also* the Motto to the Third Landing Stage.

masters call 'rules' make us do? On the contrary, the commonest function of a rule is to save us this trouble, it tells us what to do, not how or why to do it. And thus, as the history of grammar and logic in the schools displays *ad nauseam,* rules are the enemy of understanding. Learning the rules is the fatal course, if we do not, by some other means, also learn to look behind them to the reasons which make them useful.

The Third Landing Stage

Everything, that is, implies everything else. But in judgement you fail to include the condition on which your idea is true of the Real And you also fail to include the condition on which your judgement itself, as a fact, exists. And these two disabilities in the end are one.

F. H. BRADLEY, *Essays on Truth and Reality*

As all teachers know, the *actual* difficulty of a passage or exercise is extremely hard to estimate in any reliable fashion. 'Difficult?' For whom, in what ways, for what causes, under what conditions of time, of inducement, of preparation, and in comparison with what? Still harder is the *appropriate* difficulty to estimate. Whether lingering is profitable depends on what is being lingered over, and that is harder to know than we sometimes suppose. Even instructors in physical exercises are often uncertain whether it would be better, looking ahead, to polish easy tasks or open the first clumsy essayals of new ones? And their problem is easier in that they can see more clearly what is happening. Behind the frowns and sighs of our pupils may be a real travail of spirit, or merely the boredom of blind routine, or, very likely, irrelevant gestures. Nor do the scripts that result separate themselves, except here and there. The absurd and muddled rigmarole may be much nearer the student's problem (at the stage it has reached in him) than the good sensible second-class product which has come easily to its author. And we are always guessing whether the problem ('and the use of theorems,' said Hobbes, 'is for the construction of problems') is behind a pupil or still ahead of him on his secret private course.

We know this well. The morals that I find in the discussions of this Grammar Section are, first: that old one again, that the pupil must herein be his own adviser. He can see, as we cannot, where his doubts come from and where his efforts are aimed. But sometimes we can help him in this, by helping him to see how many more alternative modes of reasonable understanding are open to him.

So the second moral is that very few tasks we can offer are actually, as they will work out in the minds of the class, nearly so

simple as we will suppose them to be—after even our best efforts to make them unambiguous. And, if the task is worth setting (except as a routine check-up), those will not be the worst minds which surprise us by 'entirely missing its point,' or rather by finding lines to follow that we did not suspect were there. When this happens we have two regions to cultivate, where the new line leads and the region from which it led off. If thought about Grammar—about the interactions of words—can teach us teachers anything, it should be to be tolerant and patient and sympathetic about such vagaries; to recognize them as inevitable, and as much part of our own interpretative practice (with its only slightly altered problems) as of the ways of a normal child.

Misunderstanding, then—unless it springs from persistent special causes and so should be a medical matter—is no crime. If it is not actually to be *welcomed,* it is at least *an opportunity for teaching* which, in the absence of overt misunderstanding, will not so certainly be occurring. And the same comprehension by the teacher that the ways of reasonable misunderstanding, as of understanding, are many, will not only make him charitable to his pupils but charitable to himself and to his own efforts in teaching. It is not the most orderly and uncriticizable exposition that throws the most light as a rule. When the class marches in step with its teacher and arrives without break of rank at the destination, members of it may for a while be able to repeat *that march* by themselves; but they will hardly have a general grasp of the terrain. It is the traveller's *judgment,* always and *only,* that we have to train. All else is means and occasion merely.

Lastly, since we cannot, with any good exercise, tell which decisions between rival ways are bringing in what further ramifying, *but then's* and *if so's* that never will be expressed except by the outcome; and since the outcome—except in the sciences—is no certain test of the merits of the internal dramas (p. 248) of interpretation which have led to it; and since the self-control (p. 16) these internal dramas require and develop is our concern and not any outcomes except as they are a part of the dramas; we shall not be afraid of exercises that take time, that may even seem to ask for the rest of life, or for eternity, to settle them. Factual manipulations and indoctrination so hold the field today; so many

teachers submit to the flattering expectation that they have the answer and will produce it when they think fit, that the opposite view may safely be urged. It is, then, not our business to teach conclusions, but to help in the framing of questions; that is to say, in the choice of definitions—which is the central problem of Logic.

Part Three: LOGIC

That it may be of itself clear and perspicuous to all men; as indeed it is, saving to such, as reading the long discourses made upon this subject by the writers of metaphysics *(which they believe to be some egregious learning) think they understand not, when they do.*

HOBBES, *Computation or Logic*

Chapter Eighteen: The Interpretation of IS

It is the more striking that the common-sense world with its things, classes, and laws, should consist of phenomena, that it has all been felt and lived, growing for us with our growing grasp, and that no belief is imported that is not an expectation of which sense can give proof. For animals this world is free from reflection and language; and, in spite of both taints, ours can be seen in quite the same practical character. Common sense is not so guilty as its language appears to say. It stands a poor examination on the meaning of simple words like thing, is, has, I, act. But it learns them not as definitions but as physical signs; it knows nothing of them but their applications; and so their implication is felt as merely a mutual analogy among the instances. When it says 'this thing has an odour,' there need be nothing vague, let alone an error. When it says 'a stone broke the window,' there need be no confusion till it is cross-examined; it is saved from confusion, as well as from error, by its ignorance.

SIR WILLIAM MITCHELL, *The Place of Minds*

This Part is, for a number of reasons, more tentative than the others. The ground it explores seems, at first sight, less promising as an exercise field for relatively unambitious teaching—Milton's complaint that the Universities presented to 'unlearned novices, at their first coming, the most intellective abstracts of Logic and Metaphysics' returns warningly to the mind. I have to present things that are hardly distinguishable from these, and all will depend upon how it is done. Can they be presented in a way that is tolerable to the pupils—not as mere 'intellective abstracts,' but as urgent, necessary, unavoidable, and fruitful questions? That is the teachers' problem. I need, I think, spend little time insisting that they are such. These questions are no recondite things to be left to sheltered academic experts. They concern the warp and woof of all our

thinking. Without some practical mastery of them thought goes astray every hour. But thought is not the same thing as deliberate reflection; it commonly succeeds *in practice* with problems which baffle it at once when they are explicitly set for reflection. 'Should we not then,' someone will ask, 'be content to let thought, in practice, be as logical as it can; and not bother our pupils with these abstruse puzzles which they—and more eminent logicians—are quite unable to settle?' The answer is that they will bother *themselves,* the more hopeful of them, in any case. A point must come, in all education, and often comes early, at which these matters are forced into prominence *in and through* the other things we are endeavouring to teach. And we could teach these other things much better if we could find good ways of making the logical troubles less perplexing. The difficulty of finding good ways will not be underestimated. Neglect of the subject, all but universal in modern teaching, witnesses to it. I hope to show that this neglect is unjustified, and I believe it to be most unfortunate. Some of the difficulty would vanish if the subject became more familiar. It will be soon enough to be sure that Logic is unsuitable in school-use when it has been tried out by modern-minded teachers. But the worst part of the difficulty would remain. It needs a preliminary word here.

Because they are so central and so universal, these problems of the forms of thought have been worked at, *technically,* with good *and bad* techniques, more than any other problems. Inquiry into them has been, in a sense, over-developed; the ground has been dug and mined until the workings in it are a danger to all who come near. The labours of generations of logicians have added maze upon maze to a terrain initially labyrinthine enough. Thus the questions that automatically occur may easily be lost, if we take expert guidance upon them, in a new set of worse questions about the answers we are offered. No one who spends much time on Logic refrains from comparing it to a cave—to one of those awesome intricate pot-holes of the limestone country, or to the grim gorges that some mountain torrents cut—so deep that it seems impossible for the stream of thought falling down out of sight in the depths to find its way into daylight again. The image not unfaithfully suggests some of the dangers that the introduction of novices to Logic must incur. With these problems we cannot help

feeling that we are losing sight of the outer world of common experience, that dark vacuities surround us, that there is nothing under our feet and nothing to grasp but obsolete tackle, left dangling by former explorers, from Aristotle to Jevons, men in any case long-dead and probably ill-advised. These feelings are inevitable when thought turns to consider itself, and no discussion of logical problems can avoid them. The remedy is to recognize this peculiar vacuousness and blindness of the subject as essential to it, and as, indeed, a source of the values of the study. In some Swiss gorges, engineers have hung a convenient hand-railed track through the more spectacular gulfs. It is no part of a teacher's duty to do that for Logic; our aim is not to attract tourists but to train thinkers. We want to make nothing in this subject easy—except the genuine exploration of it by minds that are relying upon their own enterprise.

We can however save them some of the embarrassment that comes from the excessive provision of duplicatory and reciprocally entangling tackle. Above all we must try to see that they get at the problems before they get at the traditional answers. Most logic-teaching has failed in the past because the students have had to learn a doctrine before they realized, in their own experience, how interesting and important the questions were that the doctrine was trying to explain. I shall, therefore, be studying here the presentation of only a few typical logical problems, and the presentation rather than the problems themselves or their treatment. This will explain, I hope, some things which would seem odd about my treatment if I were writing for logicians. It cuts rather drastically through some, and ignores others, of the traditional expected formulations and distinctions. But I am convinced that the growing mind can take up these problems much more directly than it has been encouraged to do. The technical apparatus should only be brought in later—and then frankly as mere bits of apparatus bringing their own problems, as interesting to the student as the uses he will try to make of them. So the physicist must understand his apparatus *physically* if he is to use it; when he does not, it becomes the object of his research. Here, in the elements of Logic, more than in any other study, what we must avoid is the incantation. The Terms of this Art work no wonders. 'Open, Barley!' 'Open, Oats!' 'Open, Beans!—Open, Rye!—Millet! Chickpea! Maize! Buckwheat! Rice! Vetch!'

There is not even one 'Open, Sesame!' to be remembered. That was another cave and in another story. Yet have I seen the ghost of more than one wretched Kassim lying in the mouth of this in six parts.

I began my experiments with the word 'is'—putting the following set of sentences before my audience and the appended request:

EXERCISE FIVE

(1) Barkis is willin(g).
(2) The Emperor is captured.
(3) A bacillus is a vegetable.
(4) To obey is better than sacrifice.
(5) To doubt is to think.
(6) She's a duck!

Please distinguish between the uses of 'is' in the above, and say which, if any, of the sentences you take to be true by definition. Write, if you can, a parallel set of sentences between which the same distinctions may be made.[1]

By way of encouragement and to forestall despair I gave a little preparatory homily somewhat as follows: I mentioned our astonishing practical command over the complexities of language and our relatively limited theoretical understanding of how it works. Alluding to the analogy I had been using about the skill of our digestive system and our lack of skill, until recently, as chemists (see page 288), I remarked that the parallel was hardly fair, and that a better one would be with our practical ability as cooks, say in contriving suitable sauces, compared with our inability to explain the physiological principles of taste they depend on. I pointed out that we do all use the word 'is' with incredible adroitness, but that our theoretical understanding of *how we do so* lags far behind. And that in inviting them to test how far they could theoretically explain and describe differences in their uses of 'is' I was not suggesting that we do not all, in practice, succeed pretty well in coping with its tricks. The experiment, I said, would not reveal anything new or startling or disconcerting. Still less would it suggest that we should change the ways in which we ordinarily use 'is.' On the other hand, it might draw attention to some risks we run of misunderstanding one another through the trickiness of the word; and it might shake our bad habit of treating most things we read or hear as though *of course* we knew what they meant and, conversely, of writing as though no one but a fool could possibly mistake our meaning.

[1] This request, as the outcome showed, was excessively ambiguous—both as to 'uses' and as to 'true by definition.'

I put in all this here in case any part of it may help to explain some of the strange things that happened in the next half-hour. They need a great deal of explaining and might easily be conjectured about on the scale of Exercise Two. I believe that a full analysis and discussion of a similar experiment might be extremely valuable. It should be more carefully prepared and followed up by interviews with the writers, perhaps, to bring out more clearly whether they really thought at all as they wrote. A large proportion were too baffled by the novelty of the task, or too distracted by uncertainty as to what it was, to be held responsible. They did not collect their wits enough to consider what could reasonably be being asked, and wandered every way in pursuit of random reflections. These protocols chiefly point towards the improvements that would be desirable in further inquiries, but some of them also show well enough what a need there is for more inquiry and what interesting things it would have to look into.

I will illustrate both aspects briefly. But before the mystery men begin, let us have a comment from an intelligible writer to serve as a norm:

5.1.* (1) Not true by definition. Parallel case: This dog is friendly. It means Barkis is possessed by or possesses a certain characteristic.

(2) This means the Emperor *is now* captured. Cf. The war is over, The meal is finished etc.

(3) Definition. (I know nothing about this but should assume, if I read it, that I was being given a definition.) Cf. Iron is a metal, Fear is an instinct (perhaps it isn't; but if I read this I assume it is a psychologist's definition).

(4) Nothing to do with definition—'is' here relates obedience to sacrifice in a certain way, 'better than.' Cf. 'To be weak is miserable.'

(5) This looks like definition. It might mean 'In the ensuing passage I intend to mean by doubting, thinking.' It might mean to be a general definition—Doubt and think are interchangeable—to doubt is always to think [which it clearly isn't], to think is always to doubt [unfortunately equally untrue]. The sentence seems to me to be really an expression of an attitude of mind towards doubt.

(Cf. Donne's 'Who stands inquiring right' etc. (Satire III) or Tennyson, *In Memoriam.*)

(6) This is clearly not definition! The duck has become through some language history unknown to me a symbol which we recognise as standing for 'charming' or the like.

This is the kind of comment I was expecting. What I got was more often like this:

> 5.11.* In all these sentences it is perfectly clear what is meant, owing as has been said to the way in which after years of use we are able to interpret the meaning of the word 'is.'
>
> The word 'is,' if one wished to be pedantic, has probably no proper use with anything which is not animate. As ~~the~~ a part of ~~the word the to~~ verb to be *is* implies living or being, all being is in essence presumably confined to living things. Therefore to say that 'the table is . . .' is probably incorrect, although it is habitual.
>
> In the sentences 'is' performs many duties. In (1) it is equivalent to (is in a state of). Barkis is in a state of willingness—as it were. (2) It is equivalent to *has been* and carries some of that sense. (3) ~~This is probably the most correct (in academic use)~~ use of is. A ~~curious~~ use of is, ~~not~~ with the same meaning as equivalent to. Bacillus may be a vegetable. But ~~And~~ a vegetable is a bacillus. (6) Not an equivalent. A duck is not necessarily a she.

I hope that this 'correctness' talk is not the effect of my struggles to analyze Campbell—and Gardiner, Kittredge and Arnold—before the class! I had been giving them the gist of Part Two at some length, and I would feel a little dashed if I thought this writer had been listening to me all those hours. But the audience changed somewhat between the Lent and Easter Terms, and I like to think that this man was a new-comer. I have left in all his corrections to show that some of his oddest ideas were not first thoughts. They may be compared with some of the exhibits in the pedantry-shy which opens Part Two.

He was not alone in feeling that if IS is used in various ways, all but one of them should somehow be wrong:

> 5.12.* In Nos. 1 and 2 'is' is used in the same manner except that one is followed by the present participle and the other the past. It is quite a correct use of 'is' as an auxiliary.
>
> No. 3 is a statement of fact and is also correct.
>
> Nos. 4 and 5 are proverbial uses of 'is' and it is here that 'is' does not come under the proper definition of the word.
>
> No. 6. A slang expression—and does not come under the definition of the word. A human being cannot be a duck!

He is one of several who took 'true by definition' not as applying to the sentences as wholes but to some supposed true or 'correct' use of IS:

5.13.* (1) By definition 'is' would seem to refer to a state of present being. To say, therefore, that 'Barkis is willin'' presents no difficulty, for that sentence conveys the simple sense that Barkis, for whatever reasons, is disposed in such a frame of mind that he will be responsive. The only function of 'is' is to link the adjective to the noun.

(2) If one attempted to translate this sentence the fact would emerge that 'is' has here a double sense. The Emperor is in a state of being and therefore 'is'; captured may be looked upon as an adjective describing his state of being. Yet 'captus est' would mean 'is having been captured,' so that the function of 'is' either becomes enlarged to include some of the past tense of the verb; or is relegated to the smaller category of the previous example.

(3) Assuming that a bacillus may justly be called a vegetable, which I, in botanical and zoological ignorance, am inclined to doubt, the function of 'is' appears to consist in identifying one class of objects with another, in whose larger scope the laws of the universe have placed it. 'Is' breaks down the differentiation between the two classes of objects, but only in so far as one might later suppose that any particular bacillus was not a vegetable.

(4) This dogmatic utterance lays down the law that by a particular standard of moral values, obedience is superior to sacrifice. For the didactic purpose of the phrase a positive and definite form has been adopted, snatched by force from its true meaning of a state of being.

Any stick will do to beat a dog with; and perhaps 'the true meaning' of IS, in the last remark, is being merely turned to the service of a prejudice which several obscurely felt against sentence (4)—that 'dogmatic utterance.'

5.131. To obey { is better than / has less benefit than } sacrifice.

Freud, or Adler, would enjoy this *lapsus calami!*

5.132. Sentence (4) is the most baffling. 'Is' here has a smaller number of possible meanings than 'is' in (5), where it might possibly mean 'entails,' 'implies,' 'includes,' etc., as well as 'is the same process as.' In (4) 'is' is used vaguely, as a piece of stuffing, to give the sentence orthodox shape.

Quite why (4) is not entitled to use the word IS, and why IS should be thought vaguer here than elsewhere are points that might well have repaid a little delicate questioning. The separation of 'entails,' 'implies,' 'includes' etc. from 'is the same process as' is also interesting. Differences in the uses made of these terms are among the chief matters an elementary Logic course could clear up.

A large number seem just unable to separate IS for contemplation; they load it with the meaning of the whole sentence or with functions which the other words perform:

5.2.* (1) 'IS' stands for the state-of-being-willing. Barkis admits to being equal to an indefinitely protracted state-of-being-willing, i.e. the state-of-being-willing is what he wishes his name to stand for for the present.
'IS' = Barkis
(2) 'IS' = has been
Neither 'is' nor 'has been' are true by definition.
(3) 'IS' used instead of =
Not entirely true by definition, a vegetable must mean one vegetable among the whole class of vegetables before it is true.
(4) The act of obeying is better than the act of sacrificing. 'IS' = an act.

This is not, I think, what it seems; but just the effect of attempting an unwonted sort of abstraction.

5.21.* (1) Barkis *is* willin'.—Used to signify 'is in a state of'
(2) The emperor *is* captured—'has undergone a certain experience'
(3) A bacillus *is* a vegetable—'Belongs to a certain { species / class } of things' [which has been defined]
(4) To obey *is* better than sacrifice—'Accords with accepted standards [of behaviour]'
(5) To doubt *is* to think—'Produces as a necessary consequence'
(6) She'*s* a duck!

Some struggled in much the same way at greater length and what is happening is easier to follow:

5.22.* (1) Defines by attribution a mental state of a particular person. The situation is particular, and the statement entirely acceptable in so autonymous and arbitrary a thing as a novel.

(2) 'is' has a descriptive force here. It *describes* an alteration of external factors. It is true in the sense that it is unambiguous and possible. In so far as it is a report it is subject to further confirmation or modification.

particular

(3) ~~This is a highly generalized~~ Here *one* ~~kind of~~ being is attributed to a *kind* of being. It is untrue ~~of~~ by definition.

(4) This might be called the judicial use of 'is' whereby a superior quality is attributed to *one*, of two considered complex dispositions of will ~~reason~~ and impulse. It is a highly general statement possible to make only in a highly particular set of circumstances. ~~It~~ As such it cannot be true or untrue by definition. The situation itself would dictate several criteria for truth, pragmatic or absolute.

assert

(5) The use of 'is' here is to ~~attribute~~ one particular set of mental operations to as comprehending the whole. It is untrue by definition for the powers free to make this categorical assertion are not agnostic. To doubt is to doubt. There are of course certain suppressed mental operations in the statement which when explicit, define and qualify until a certain kind of assent is possible. In so fundamental a statement about consciousness 'is' is important as attributing a certain underlying quality to both doubt and thought—i.e. being.

(6) Here 'is' attributes not so much a definite quality to a person as inhering in them. It is a social judgement. It describes the effect of one person on another—perhaps in a very special situation—almost empathy.

The writer steps over, with the word 'attributes,' what he intends to be talking about; and then finds himself discussing other differences between the sentences. The others will have seemed naïve; this one's difficulties at least are not due to unfamiliarity with or fear of philosophic verbiage. 'Categorical,' 'pragmatic,' 'empathy'! I wonder what he made of the books or talk from which he learnt them. This is the use of language that a good course in Logic would NOT tend to promote.

At this point let me put in two ordinary normal sets of comments—otherwise I shall feel too like 'Our Sam' in the story. His mother, it will be remembered, was watching them march past and cried, 'Look! They are all out of step except Our Sam!'

5.23.* (1) This 'is' means in context, 'has the emotional state of being . . .'

(2) In its context, this 'is' means 'has the physical state of being . . .'—But in both cases, this sort of explanation necessitates a just as involved use of 'has,' and 'being'—In each case, the 'is' may more simply be considered as a copulative between two phrases or words, which are somehow related.

(3) This statement is true by definition (if my meagre biology does not play me false). The 'is' is that of classification; a member is shown to be included in a larger class.

(4) This statement, owing to the ambiguity of terms, *might* be true by definition, depending upon which senses are given to 'duty' and 'sacrifice,'—Since the last example involves rigidly defined scientific terms this ambiguity does not there arise.

The only way this 'is' can be interpreted, it seems, is to consider 'is better than' as a unit, which connotes a certain relation between 'obeying' and 'sacrificing,' in the mind of the speaker.

(5) This statement, by the usual psychological interpretation of the two words is true by definition.

If so, again, the 'is' is that of inclusion in a 'class'; those facts denoted by the state of 'doubting,' are included in the larger class of facts denoted by 'thinking.'

(6) The exclamation mark leads me to expect that this, too, is true by definition: 'duck,' in a colloquial use, connoting almost anything complimentary the speaker wishes.

The 'is' may be interpreted as 'attributive': *she* having the *qualities* denoted by *duck*.

5.24.* 1. IS—simple connection between person and attributed quality—*now* understood.

2. denotes state of the Emperor. *now* understood.

3. *can be proved to belong to the class of* (vegetables)

4. is—positive affirmation—*is*, in the face of those who behave as if it were not so.

5. (The action of doubting) *leads to, causes, necessarily implies* (the action of thinking).

6. ostensibly 'belongs to the class of' and in certain contexts could be taken literally as parallel to 3 in some respects.

In other contexts—as an emotive statement—she has the qualities which for people using my slang vocabulary are denoted by the word 'duck.'

I'm still not sure that I understand what 'true by definition' means —but I think it could apply only to 3, to 6 in certain contexts (if you could take her out of the pond and see that she had all the

necessary parts of a duck), and—if you interpreted *is* in 5 in a different way from mine, possibly there.

Presentness—is *now*—only implied in 1 and 2.

To return to the mystery men:

5.25.* (i) *'Barkis is willing'*—This use of 'is' shows that it cannot convey sense by itself—the sentence is only half complete. In the context of course the meaning is clear, but as an isolated remark it is not; the 'is' does not explain 'willin(g)'—willing to do what? or what is B willing about? or does 'willing' express a feature of B's character? 'Is' is not a 'self-contained-sense' word. Not true by definition.

(ii) *'The Emperor is captured'*—The 'is' again depends upon the word it described (?), namely 'captured,' and since 'captured' contains its own meaning the 'is' becomes unconsciously joined to it, so that it is no longer 'is' but 'iscaptured';—it is simply the auxiliary showing that the capture has taken place and it is elided into 'captured.' True by definition.

(iii) *'A bacillus is a vegetable'*—this is the use of 'is' which most gives it an existence as a word in itself. It is a connection; 'bacillus' and 'vegetable' are related to each other by it. On this use of 'is' all other words depend, it expresses existence (as, in another person of the verb, Jehovah is called 'I am,' with the same significance of the word 'is' or 'am.'

(iv) *'To obey is better than to think.'*

Any, all, and none of the sentences were declared with some confidence to be 'true by definition.' Sentence (2) was especially a favourite for this distinction, I suppose, because whether he was captured or not was felt to be the sort of thing that somebody could be 'definitely' certain about. These protocols confirmed a suspicion I had been long entertaining that any attempts I might make to discuss definition would have to start by assuming a very much blanker background than, for example, Part Two above assumes. But 'blank' is a misdescription. The background is not merely blank; it is not open to us to fill in as we will. It is actively hostile, I believe, to thought about definition. The word excites a peculiar resistance, rather like the word 'obey' in Sentence (4). Suspicions arise that 'catches' are being planned, that liberty is being stolen, that somebody is going to be made to seem stupid, unfairly and by mere cunning. In the more docile a confused stupor takes their

place, similar to, but even more disabling than, the clouding of the faculties that follows the word 'grammar.' The feeling that one will be expected to follow and remember something that one has not 'seen' or 'taken in,' is paralyzing to us all. Any discussion, then, of definition must be very wary, must expect to be often a failure, and should begin by attempting to win a much more positive interest in the topic than is usual. Otherwise the outcome will be the despair voiced under (4) by 5.25 above.

It would be useful to know whether those who picked out (3) as the only sentence which would naturally be taken as true by definition were mostly science students, familiar with that sort of classification and its uses. We would also wish to know what science they had studied. Biologists, chemists and mathematicians develop different attitudes towards definition because the characteristic definitions of these sciences are of different types. The biologist is more familiar with reclassifications, for example, and uses a definition as a provisional instrument; the chemist thinks of components in a structure; the mathematician, since he relies on definitions more than anyone else, wobbles between an extreme freedom and an extreme dependence on them. We may agree that one of the chief benefits of some scientific training is that it forces the student to recognize, in his own subject, the difference between statements that are true by definition and those that are not. But we may doubt whether, by itself, it helps him very much with the same distinction in general non-technical matters. We all know eminent scientists who, when they talk politics or morals, mix, quite as badly as any of us, the sentences which are true because the words are being so used that they must be, with the sentences that may not be true, and need inquiry. A more general ability to distinguish between these cases, or at least to keep on the lookout for the distinction, would be a main aim of a course on Logic. But, *above all,* in pursuing this aim, we must beware of haste. Fluid thought can change meanings in a flash; but solid logicalized argument, using discrete meanings, preferably fixed and constant for its chief words, has lost this happy freedom. It may take a long time to dismantle one definition and erect another. We often think we have changed them when we have not. Moreover the initial process of freezing solid meanings out of a flux often needs hours when discourse only gives it seconds. I am inclined to think that 'the definition horrors' are

largely due to this. We expect *not* to understand the moment people start giving us their definitions or attacking other people's. We have been forced too often to try to follow these movements in the fluid state; and the required adjustments can only be made when ideas 'stay put' in the solid.

Let me review, a little further, what was said about Sentence (3). A number, quite properly, did not know whether a bacillus is a vegetable or not. But that did not prevent 5.1, 5.21 or 5.23, from recognizing the sentence as of that sort. 5.24, with his 'can be proved to belong to the class of' is with them; his 'proof' would be a comparison of the characters of bacilli with those defining the class of vegetables. 5.13 tangles himself up with his word 'identifying' but perhaps breaks his way out again. 5.2 more thoroughly merges the notion of inclusion in a larger class with that of identity. What 5.22 is doing I decline to say.

The other protocols supply scores of varied confusions about (3):

> 5.3. (3) 'is' is used in its purest sense, i.e. as a simple equivalent between two things to express their identity.

Others pointed out the obvious objection to this:

> 5.31. 'is' is used to attach a small thing to a group or family of things. It does not identify the Bacillus with the vegetable, because otherwise every vegetable would be a Bacillus. It merely adds the Bacillus to a long list of vegetables.

The 'small thing' is the sub-class, not the minute bacillus; and I expect he has some reasonable notion of how the 'long list' is made in the back of his mind.

'Equivalent' and 'equals' were used in very free and unconventional fashion, and gave much trouble:

> 5.32.* Two uses of 'is' seem quite obvious; one of them is that of replacing other words while the other is that of serving as an 'equals' sign. 'The Emperor is captured' means 'The Emperor has been captured.' As for the equals sign, I should say that a proper illustration of this would be Mussolini is Il Duce or Il Duce is Mussolini. I doubt if any one of the examples presented fits in this category. 'To doubt is to think' can be reversed and the product of such an operation, to think is to doubt, although possibly a true statement, does not have the same implications as the other, nor would it be the product of the same reasoning.

It seems to me that 'is' can serve as various other algebraic signs as well as equals. For example, the sign > (meaning is greater than) means 'is' with a comparative adjective. 'To obey is better than to sacrifice' fits in this category.

Another use of is is that of serving as 'resembles.' When we say 'She is a duck,' we imply a metaphorical use.

This is useful thinking of a kind which, if continued, *via* 'The King of England is the owner of Buckingham palace,' 'A three-angled figure is a three-sided figure,' 'Henry is Ford,' and so on,[1] would take him to a happy clarity. The opening suggestion about IS replacing other words is particularly promising. The next writer would be harder to help and is in more need of it:

5.33.* *'Is'* The first use of 'is,' descriptive.

The second use of 'is' verbal (implies 'has been')

The third use of 'is,' as identically =

The fourth use of 'is' within a phrase that might be written as one word isbetterthan—comparative

The fifth use of 'is' (mistaken) as identically equal ? (allied to 3).

The sixth use of 'is'—as identically equal (allied to 3)

Of these the third use is the one that can be least quarrelled with. It approaches the mathematical sign ≡ . Even so it must be understood that a vegetable is not used in the sense of one of the many different kinds of vegetable, i.e. as cauliflowers—but as a single one of a certain variety. It would therefore be just as possible to say 'bacilli are a vegetable.'

The fifth use carries this point to a further stage. The identically equals sign cannot possibly be placed here, for if to doubt does involve a process of thought, it certainly does not involve the whole process which 'to think' here implies. And yet the objection is only the same as that raised against (3)—so if 3 is allowed to stand 5, should be.

A large amount of proof would be necessary for 6. The use is 'identically equals' but it has to rely on the hearer's idea of duck—used in this sense.

The itch to quarrel with IS goes well with the false confidence about 'the mathematical sign ≡' of equivalence. I can't believe he meant that 'A bacillus' should mean 'a single one' rather than 'any bacillus.' And why may we not say, 'Cauliflowers are a vegetable'?

[1] See the discussion of descriptions and names below, pages 328-33.

Probably these remarks are just fumblings towards 5.31's point, fumblings which have lost it in quite different considerations. He crosses yet more threads in trying to deal with (5) and (6). We could hardly have a better example to show how perniciously the minor matters of variants in grammatical formulation can interfere with the perception of the important thing—the logical form of the thought expressed. I shall be coming back to these difficulties in Chapter XXIII when I discuss what may be called the Principle of Equivalence in Grammatical Formulation.

Some, when dragging in 'equals,' were careful to explain that they did not mean it! I give whole protocols whenever other fascinating problems occur in them:

5.34.* True by definition are (2), (3) and possibly (4). (2) is true because 'is,' an auxiliary to a transitive passive verb, is a mere device to change the emphasis of thought. (3) is true because 'is' means 'equals' in the sense of a part being included in the whole.

(1) is not true by def. because an opinion is all that is stated; hence 'Barkis is a man,' etc., but 'Barkis seems to me to be willing,' or 'I think Barkis's mood is such that he may be urged to . . . etc.' A proper authority for Barkis's willingness is lacking; so 'is' has not the axiomatic truth of definition that it has in (3).

(4) is possibly true by definition; difficulty here is closeness of bond between 'is' and 'better than.' 'is' means more than 'is' in (4); it means not only 'is,' but more, 'is better than.'

(5) is not true by definition; like (1) it merely uses 'is' to express an opinion and not a self-evident fact. Logically, it might eventually be proved that (5) is true, in fact the syllogism I think would prove so, but as it stands, (5) is opinion.

(6) is an ellipsis, is not true by definition, although true *enough* for practical purposes in discussion. 'She's a lady' would be true use of 'is,' 'She's a duck' means she is in one or more ways agreeable, etc., and the trouble arises not from 'is' but from the more or less colloquial use of 'duck.'

The second sentence gives much too good a recipe for truth; grammar is again interfering. The absorptive 'better than' again, the puzzles of 'opinion' and 'self-evident fact,' the mysterious powers of the syllogism, the imagined 'discussion' of (6) and the 'true use of "is" ' in 'She's a lady' are noteworthy.

5.35. In (3) 'is' is an equals sign that only works one way. Its expanded meaning might be 'comes under the general heading of.' 'Is' in (6) is, in one context, a sign of equivalence. In one context, this sentence seems to me the only sentence true by definition.

This 'equals sign' is horribly like Mussolini's adherence to the Covenant. What a way to handle the fundamental machinery of intellectual order!

5.36. (5) Here 'is' has a rather difference sense—a less 'direct' meaning. To doubt is not the same as to think. In (4) 'is' does not mean equal to, but it belongs to the class of 'equal to' meanings. To obey is not only equal to sacrifice it is *better,* but that may be called a 'degree' of 'equal to.' (5) carries its meaning by saying at first to doubt = to think but this is complex for actually not even the *exact* opposite is meant. A certain amount of doubting is contained in thinking i.e. as a stimulus to thought but 'doubt' cannot in *any sense* be used as a substitute for 'think.'

(6) She is *not* a duck. Dare I say that this is a metaphor? Rather similar to (5). (5) being a metaphor connecting 2 'abstract' things, 'doubting' and 'thinking' and (6) between 'She' a *person* and a 'duck' a *bird.*

I suppose I must take some responsibility for the 'metaphor' fog here. But, if how 'equals' works here is so dubious a matter, I can hardly feel aggrieved that my attempts to expound a theory of metaphor sometimes met with little success. In the next, some very giddy changes are worked with the senses of 'particular' and 'general'; 'converse,' as usual, misleads; and 'equal' does its worst:

5.37.* The use of the word 'is' in sentence 3 is the direct converse of its use in sentence 1. Of all the things that Barkis might be said to be, the statement directs our attention only to the fact that he 'is willin',' the word 'is' leads the reader from a general idea to a particular circumstance. In sentence 3 this process is reversed, and the particular idea of the bacillus is placed among the ideas bounded by the word vegetable. In sentence 2 'is' is a substitute for 'has been.' In sentence 5 'is' is used to place one idea within another idea, as in sentence 3: but sentence 3 cannot be reversed: 'A vegetable is a bacillus,' whereas it is possible to say 'to think is to doubt' with as strong an appearance of truth as 'to doubt is to think.' The meanings of the words 'doubt' and 'think' are assumed to be equal, and therefore transferable and able to substitute for each other: but in

sentence 3 there is no such assumption of equality between 'bacillus' and 'vegetable.'

If sentence 4 ran 'to obey is to sacrifice' the use of the word 'is' would be as in sentence 3. A difference is introduced by the words 'better than' and it is there that the difference must be sought, the change that takes place in the word 'is' cannot be discussed separately.

The manoeuvre in the middle of this protocol is worth special attention. It shows how easily the experimental manipulations which logic must give exercise in and on which it partly depends, may increase stupidity at first, not remove it. The writer notes that (3) cannot be reversed and that (5) can. So far good. But he does not notice (unless, of course, his 'are assumed to be' means 'I here will assume') that, though 'To doubt is to think' and 'To think is to doubt' may both be true, this need not be in virtue of any formal equivalence, and is no proof of it unless we have means of knowing that 'doubt' and 'think' retain the same senses. He has either set aside or blurred out the common reading 'If you think, then, as a consequence, you will doubt.' (Compare 'If you breathe in, you will then breathe out.') And I cannot help thinking that he is rather blurring this than setting it aside, together with the interpretations that occurred to 5.36.

After this we can appreciate the simple confidence of the next at its right value:

5.38.* (1) Here 'is' denotes the state of mind of Barkis. It almost means 'exists.' 'Barkis exists in a willing state of mind,' giving a sense of continuity.

(2) Here 'is' hardly means 'is' at all but something far more like 'has been.' The Emperor has been captured, and, so far as is known, he is still under captivity.

(3) This one and nos (4) and (5) are very similar. They are plain statements with no tricks in them, the only difference being that in (3) 'is' links two nouns, in (4) a noun and a verb-noun, and in (5) two verb-nouns.

(6) This also would be a plain statement if it weren't for the metaphor. It can be taken for granted that 'she' is not a duck. Therefore 'is' is lying and it is difficult to determine its exact function, but it appears to do very much the same work as the 'is' in number (3).

True by definition are numbers (4) and (5), particularly (5), and perhaps also number (6) according to who and what 'she' is.

Nothing could better show where Grammar, as it has been taught, stops and Logic begins.

Comparing the results of manipulating sentences is the analytic *method* of Logic. Here is a healthy effort:

> 5.39. In 1, 2, 4 and 6 the reversal of the subject and complement does not alter the meaning as it does in 3 & 5. There is therefore a fundamental difference between these two sorts of uses. This (on second thought) does not get us far, for only in 3, 5 and 6 can the symbol = be substituted for 'is' and in 3 and 5 it cannot be used with mathematical precision. A bacillus is contained in the classification of things called vegetables and there is a feeling that there is the same sort of meaning of 'is' in 5 though different words are needed to express it.
>
> From the vast multitude of *elements* of meaning that can be expressed by 'is' in different contexts compounds of these elements are chosen in each particular context. The compounds vary in composition, and in the 6 sentences differ in varying degree. But there can be seen elements of meaning common to more than one of them, and different common elements are used in the following sets.
>
> | | | | |
> |---|---|---|---|
> | α | 1 | | 6 |
> | β | 3 | 4 | 5 |
> | γ | 1 | 2 | |
>
> This latter method seems the only possible way of finding elemental meaning, and if I had time, I might find it possible to continue to classify the sentences as above until every element in the compound meaning would be indexed.

Let us now try to see how far, with time, he might have continued along these lines.

Chapter Nineteen: Some Senses of IS

A mighty maze, and all without a plan.
A mighty maze! But not without a plan.[1]

Pope's hesitation certainly would have been in place with the uses of IS. Any attempt to sketch their plan (if there is one) suffers from having to use IS itself in the plan, or, at the cost of painful grammatical contortions, to use words—'has,' 'does,' 'existence,' 'ascribes,' 'attributes,' 'connects,' 'relates' and so on—which themselves reproduce, in their own multiplicity and with their own variants, portions of the maze. Yet no one who looks beyond his momentary embarrassments will blame IS for its changeableness, its adaptiveness, its occasional obstinacy or its trick of suddenly sometimes disowning all responsibility. It is the servant, the all-but inexhaustibly resourceful servant, of a number of masters who by no means coincide in their demands. If language in general does not work well enough there are still cases in which it works too well. But the very difficulties that IS creates in meeting all demands are among its best contributions to civilization. We have only to compare the work it does and the way it sometimes goes on strike, with the behaviour of the agents which take over some of the same functions in other languages, to appreciate IS more justly. Here, for example, is Mr Arthur Waley's account of the doings of *yeh,* in ancient Chinese. (*The Way and its Power,* p. 63.)

> In all languages it is the smallest and most innocent-looking words which have given rise to the most trouble. A large number of the tangles in which European thinkers have involved themselves have been due to the fact that the verb 'to be' means a great many different things. The fact that Chinese lacks anything exactly correspond-

[1] Mr Empson's remarks (*Seven Types of Ambiguity,* 259) that a maze *is* only a maze by having a plan, etc., are to the point here: we learn or impose the plan in varying degrees.

ing to the verb 'to be' might at first sight seem to put Chinese logicians at an initial advantage. But this is far from being the case. Chinese assertions take the form 'commence begin indeed,' i.e. 'To commence is to begin.' And this pattern of words, attended upon by the harmless-looking particle *yeh,* 'indeed,' has caused by its reticence far more trouble than any Western copulative by its assertiveness. Some of the things that this simple pattern can express are as follows: (1) Identity, as in the example given above; (2) that A is a member of a larger class, B. For example 'Boat wooden-thing indeed,' i.e. 'boats are made of wood'; (3) that A has a quality B. For example 'Tail long indeed,' i.e. 'its tail is long.'[1] If words have a fixed connection with realities, the Chinese argued, *yeh* ('indeed') ought always to mean the same thing. If for example it implies identity, one ought to be able to travel hundreds of leagues on any 'wooden-thing'; but in point of fact one can only travel on a boat.

There is a case for saying that IS—and its opposite numbers in the other Western Languages, together with the verb-forms and verb-functions which IS in English can replace—deserves a main part of the credit for the peculiar intellectual development of the West. It has drawn and held attention to a set of problems that the still more versatile 'empty words' of Chinese may have managed to prevent from becoming too notorious as scandals.

How to begin giving some account of the uses of IS, which might be helpful—to the protocol writers, say—will be admitted to be a delicate problem. Evidently, misunderstanding must be expected in this subject. But if everyone, writers and readers alike, could be made to expect these misunderstandings a little more frankly, and with a little more comprehension of the reasons why they must be expected, that, by itself, would be a substantial gain. Here, as with my other sets of protocols, there were moments when I felt that the best possible thing I could do would be simply to have the whole collection of comments reproduced, to give every member of the audience a complete set, and get them to spend the rest of the time

[1] Mr Waley adds in a footnote, 'This is in reality only a special case of (2); for the category of "long things" is a large class, embracing such tails as happen to be long. But the Chinese regarded "qualities" in rather a different light, looking upon them as "something added to" the thing in question.' So, I may add, do a large proportion of a Cambridge audience and eminent Western logicians are not exempt and have at times thought of some qualities in this way. It may be doubted if there is any 'reality' to be appealed to here. See pp. 324-7.

studying the discrepancies between their neighbours. So most Examiners, I fancy, must have felt that if they could commandeer the examinees and force each one of them to go through the toil of perusing and marking the scripts, that in itself would be a more educative thing for them than anything else they have undergone in all their years of schooling.

This may seem too simple a recommendation to be made seriously. But in all seriousness I would urge that something of the sort would be well worth trying. A collection of protocols is not an unmanageable thing—when the class is less than 100. And with sets of protocols such as these, to give a selection to each member of the audience and invite the preparation of a report upon them, would be a good way to begin to teach Logic, for it would mobilize, as nothing else could, native interests, and that immense already acquired aptitude in such things, to which, after all, we must ceaselessly appeal. We can only work with and from what is there already. It is at once the handicap and privilege of the Logician that he employs in his exposition the very processes of distinguishing and analyzing that his discourse is intended to dissect. So before attempting to clarify the uses of IS before my audience, I would have preferred to give them first as big a display of the protocols as appears in the foregoing chapter. But to read out such things is impossible. To expect anyone to be able to reflect in any useful way upon them *as heard* would be to forget the most elementary things about interpretation. It may, in passing, be remarked that countless ventures in lecturing founder upon this obvious reef. The ear cannot replace the eye—certainly not for a modern audience unaccustomed to listening. I thought when I taught in Peking that some of my Chinese audiences had an advantage here, but I really know very little about what was happening in their heads. In general, the efforts that lecturers and audiences in the humanities make to study by the ear what can only be studied by the eye are ridiculous and pitiable. They are as wasteful with poetry as with Logic. No one can think intelligently about a poem if he has only heard it once, or if he is expected to be somehow able to remember it sufficiently on the mere mention of its name. So too with every effort to improve our conduct of language. We sometimes need not look very far to see why general courses on Literature, for example, are not profitable.

I began with a Short List on the blackboard of the main jobs (a safer word here than *functions*) that IS may be required to do. Usually it will be doing several of them at once.

1. Assertion: it can assert something
2. Existence: it can assert the existence of something
3. Naming: it can bestow a name
4. Connection: it can connect
5. Identity: it can identify
6. Modification: it can modify
7. Belief: it can indicate and invite believing
8. Presentness: it can assert contemporaneity

In trying to explain these, it is well to admit frankly the troubles likely to arise through our use of IS (or some equally versatile substitute) *in the explanations.* We might cut these troubles out, if we could find specimen sentences in which IS occurred with only one job at a time. But we cannot. Sometimes a special setting may cut them down to two or three and some are often taken over by other words in the sentence; but against this must be set off the fact that there are a large number of minor jobs that IS can do (emphasis, correction, ironic overtones: 'Lo and behold,' 'Though you may not think so,' 'after all,' etc.) which often come in to be combined with a selection of the above. What IS is doing is never independent of the setting, nor can we settle it by summary inspection. So, in a detached sentence, such as those offered for comment in the last chapter, the best we can do is to suggest, in order of probability, some of the things that IS might in varying settings be doing.

Since we cannot, for reasons which soon become obvious, find pure uses, we must do the next best thing: find uses in which as few jobs are being done at once as possible, and thus proceed from the moderately simple to the more complex. The list begins at least by following this plan. The simplest use of IS is a combination of (1) and (2): an assertion of existence—'I am' or 'it is.'

It is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to say less than these say. Which says least is a problem which—though they do not put it so—splits modern philosophers into camps; but we need not be troubled with that here. IS in 'It is,' AM in 'I am,' say something, that is, *assert;* and what they say is that something *exists,* namely it or I.

So far we seem on safe ground. But it is extremely important to

realize how little we have said so far. A chief trouble in Logic is that we nearly always suppose that much more is being said. If we suppose so, everything goes wrong. I have known scores of earnest students who never realized how little Logic said and therefore never understood why it could be so confident. Here, for example, both *assert* (*say*) and *exist* must be drastically pruned down to the bare minimum or we will have said too much. This drastic elimination of extras is so contrary to our ordinary procedures with language that we easily relapse into complexity.

(1) ASSERTION

Take *assert* (or *say*) first. When a man asserts something we ordinarily take him to be believing it, or at least pretending to believe it. We take him to be saying it is *so*, whatever *it* is, or, at least, to be professing to think it is so. We may add in too some suggestion of vigour, as in 'an assertive person,' 'busy asserting all sorts of things,' 'a remarkable assertion,' and these often carry implications that what is asserted is *not* necessarily so, etc. All these things must be left out if we are to get to the minimum sense in which IS asserts; though all these and many more can be added in to be carried by IS in special contexts and with special intonations and so on. In this simplest sense of *assert*, in which IS in 'It is' asserts, nobody's belief is implied. The assertion just puts the proposition forward. Believe it or not, as you like; but before you can do either you have to have it to believe or not and IS gives it you so.

But you may say, 'No! The proposition can stand by itself, without IS to assert it—witness single word sentences such as "Fire!" or "Rain!"' The reply is, Yes, of course, but *that standing* is the assertion I am talking about; that coming forward, or being put forward for contemplation—that *pro*position—is the assertion carried peculiarly by IS, and in sentences not containing IS by the verb component; to say that IS carries assertion is not to deny that in special cases other words may not carry it in place of IS.

The danger of such explanations as these is that they go on too long; the reason for a distinction is lost in the pains taken to make it. The reason here for clearing out all but a minimum sense of 'assert' is to keep the formal relations of sentences to one another free from confusion with anyone's attitudes of accepting, believing, doubting, questioning or disbelieving them. That is why Logic

makes such play with the technical term 'proposition.' But that term, as we shall see later, is a potent bewilderer: it is better, though, than 'judgment' and 'belief,' which are frequent substitutes for it in Logic. I recommend 'assertion'—with the explanation I have sketched—as the key-term because it happens that its etymology provides a convenient mnemonic which will keep its minimum sense in mind. [f.L. *assert-, asserere,* to put one's hand on the head of a slave, either to set him free or claim him,' says the O.E.D.]

(2) EXISTENCE

Now let us consider 'exist.' To get at the sense in which 'It is' asserts that It exists, we have to turn out time and place from *exist,* as well as all assumptions about the status, or mode of being, of the things said to exist—that they are private experiences or public objects, for example, products of perception or of fancy, illusory or real, substances or qualities, abstractions or concretes and so on. Events have times and places, and we are commonly much interested in their times and places, but we talk about things which are not events—the number five, red, inches, laws and the word 'not.' Whatever account we give of these miscellaneous other things (see Chapters XXI and XXII) we certainly talk about them, and rightly, as though they were nowhere and nowhen. So *exist,* in the minimum sense, discards place and date, and all prescriptions as to status. 'It is,' in this minimum sense, merely puts It forward, lays a hand on It as 'being what it is' regardless of its here or there, its then or now, or any other allegation as to its mode of being. (See pp. 329-333, below.)

These minima are uncomfortable things to handle, the mind holds so little with them that they seem to merge into one another and then fade into a common nothingness. The reason is that to think of them is to use such universal contexts. We only keep one notion distinct from another in virtue of differences in the contexts which support them; and these supreme abstractions, the minimal senses of IS, have all things and all experiences as their contexts. So it is not surprising if *exist* and *assert* seem to come to the same thing—that is, virtually nothing. But they are different: talk about 'nothing' drops *exist.* The point to insist upon is that these all but vanishments do not show that thought has failed with them but that it has

succeeded—as has been frequently remarked by the best logicians.[1]

The advantage of making this movement of thought, in itself, is nil. It is useful only in dealing with the more complex uses of IS that we now go on to. We can only see clearly what they *add,* if we have seen, for a moment, what they add *to*. Resistance to these manoeuvres easily takes the form 'Isn't this simply not so?'—but the right question would be 'What is this being set up so for?' (See pp. 370-373.)

(3) NAMING

'Who is he?' 'He is Barkis.' Naming, fortunately, can be taken here as an obvious and easy matter, though if we do not separate it from the other jobs of IS, or extend it to cover some of them, we land ourselves in endless trouble. To give a thing a name says nothing whatever about the thing *except that that is its name.* Names here, then, are 'proper' names, Barkis, Tom, Fido, *Paradise Lost* and the rest—not to be confused with other descriptive (i.e. connection) words. (But see pp. 338-341 below.) 'This is *Paradise Lost*' and 'This is Milton's poem' will here make different uses of IS, if the first merely names the thing and the second tells us something about it. We may, of course, know things already about *Paradise Lost*—for example, what the second sentence says—but we are not told them when the thing is just given its name. 'This is Barkis' is short for 'This is named Barkis.'

(4) CONNECTION

How IS, by connecting *words* together, tells us that *things* are connected may be explained in a variety of ways. None of them should profess to be more than a device for helping the mind to think about what it is doing. None of them can claim to state what really happens, for each has to assume in its statement the very thing it pretends to be describing. But, naturally enough, logicians

[1] 'To speak, indeed, of "pure, unrelated Being," and at the same time admit that there is none such, means the same as to speak, not of the existent (which it is still necessary somehow to make good as "*existing*"), but of the non-existent,—something which this view considers possible, but which we consider a mere abstraction that has absolutely no direct significance with reference to actuality.' Lotze, *Outlines of Metaphysic*, § 14. It is comforting to note that Lotze began his course with the remark: 'The two simplest of the conceptions here employed, that of a "Thing" and that of its "Being," however lucid they appear at first, on closer consideration grow always more and more obscure.'

can rarely be bothered to remember this; they may feel that they would stick fast at the start if they did. So too much of traditional logic has been a wrangle about the rival claims of the various ways —not as being more or less helpful to thought, but as being true or false accounts of what 'in reality' is the case.

(a) If we like, that is, if we find it helpful, we can take any word or phrase as covering a certain field of things. (This is 'reading propositions in extension' as the books say.) Then IS, as connecting, puts the field of one word inside the field of another: puts the field of the Barkis things (there happens to be only one of them) into the field of willing things.

(b) If we like, instead, we can take our words as being handles to properties. (It is honester to be frankly metaphorical in our talk here. To do so is not popularization: it is only avoiding technicalities in a subject where unsuccessful attempts to technicalize are the main obstacle.) These properties (qualities, attributes, characters, etc.) we shall have to think about later (Chapter XXI). Here, any specimen will do to work with, say 'willingness.' If it helps, we can think of IS in 'Barkis is willin'' as attaching the property 'willingness' to Barkis. To be a little more elaborate: 'Barkis is willing' can be read, 'The thing named Barkis has the property of being willing'; *being named Barkis* is one property and *being willing* is another and IS puts them both on to the same thing.


(c) If we like, we can take a third way of explaining what IS does here. We can take it as a mark of relation. (But that is the sort of empty sentence which stumps all but the logician who writes it!) To try again, it may help to think of Barkis as linked by 'willing' to what he wills. But what is it? The sentence does not tell us, though the David Copperfield setting does.

No matter; let us write 'Barkis is loving Peggotty.' Then the connecting job of IS seems to have been taken over by 'loving Peggotty.' That phrase by itself connects whatever it applies to (here Barkis) with Peggotty. But IS then still seems to have to apply 'loving Peggotty' to Barkis. So the connecting job may seem to be done twice over, by 'loving' and by IS. But there is no catch, and neither account is mistaken, or less 'the right account' than the other. Prejudices one way or the other, though, die very hard because these alternatives may be useful for different purposes.

In this third way, IS is taken as noting a relation between Barkis

and something else, and we then can give various accounts of the something else—make it Peggotty, or 'being willing' or 'being in love with Peggotty' or 'loving Peggotty.' These, if we were sorting *language* forms, or analyzing mental processes, or doing lexicography or several sorts of grammar, might have to be treated as very different, but for this relational explanation of the *connecting* IS, their differences do not matter. IS just notes a relation between various things, and to make plain how specific the relation is and what the things are, is a job left to the rest of the sentence and the setting.

The three ways of explaining IS can be pictured; and usually picturing them makes what we are doing much clearer. It drops the misleading threads of the verbiage. It also helps to prevent us from supposing that we are settling something in our choice of way; or doing more than can be done. In picturing we are frankly 'as it were'-ing. In the strictest would-be-technical writing we are doing no more.



(a) The B things (here Barkis only) *are in* the Willing Things
(b) The B things (") *have* willingness
(c) The B things (") *will* whatever it is
i.e. are related in such or such a way to whatever it is.

The classes, fields, or *extensions* way (a) gives little trouble and often clears up tangled topics like magic. But there are other tangles that (a) does not help with, for which (b) and (c) are useful. I shall be touching on two groups of them later: the Projection Group (compare 'A is beautiful,' 'A is pleasing,' 'A is solid,' 'A is sweet') and the Organic Group (Does the mind change with what it thinks of? Do relations modify their terms? See p. 339, below.). Here I want only to note that these different ways of discussing the use of IS, as connecting things, are all useful and not rivals or exclusive of one another. Let us take them, provisionally at least, as machinery, as modes of considering how IS (that machine which they too use) does its work. IS connects, we say; and whether we say it does so by

putting things with others in a class, or by attaching characters (which other things may also have) to things, or by relating things to things, is no matter to quarrel about. We can profit by our supernumerary resources in description, if we do not let the *embarras des richesses* hold us up before we start.

(5) IDENTITY

An old puzzle, said to have been started by Antisthenes the Cynic in the 4th century B.C. (who got a bad name for it, perhaps undeservedly, for he may merely have been sketching out this paragraph for us) haunts this use of IS. If A is B, in this sense, then A and B become not two but one and so cannot be said to be the same. By mixing up this sense of IS with others, drastic general consequences can be made to seem plausible, including the impossibility of discourse. These amusing but unprofitable tricks can be exposed by noticing that 'A is B' may be written '"A" means what "B" means,' or '"A" and "B" are names or descriptions of the same thing.' Whenever we say that one thing is another, or that one set of things is another, i.e. IS identically the same with it, we are, for Logic, talking about the names or descriptions which apply to one thing (or one set of things). I put in the reservation, 'for Logic,' not because in some other study this can be otherwise, and different things somehow mysteriously be one another, but because the pretence that they can is so often *rhetorically* successful. Exercises in the shift from the thing (whatever it is) to the words we are using as name or description of it, the shift we make when we write in or cross out inverted commas (in one of their uses) could be developed into an extremely valuable mode of teaching.[1] The shift needs practice, and I do not see why we should disdain to play games with it in school. The bearing of the question 'Am I talking about my words and their uses or about things?' on the Definition Problem is direct; and I fancy that one way in which the resistances I spoke of in the last chapter, the Definition Horrors, might most easily be broken down or smoothed out would be by systematic exercise in this shift—exercises which need never mention Definition. After all, most people would have a heavy resistance against mental arithmetic, if they had never been given any systematic exercise in add-

[1] Some simple suggestions for beginning teaching in this matter (for pupils of 13) will be found in Mr Roy Meldrum's *An English Technique*, pp. 246-251.

ing or multiplication. The word-thing shift is a far easier operation than subtraction; but that does not keep us from going dizzy or from making absurd mistakes with it. This IS of identity (No. 5) is a matrix for any number of exercises in the shift, from 'Henry is Ford,' at one end of the scale of complexity, to 'Love is God' at the other.

I have used the phrase 'name or description of a thing.' I had better say a little here about 'descriptions,' though a proper discussion of them should come much later in a course on Logic. We need to clear up first a fairly large number of other problems, and for lack of this, the theory of descriptions has been made by modern logicians an extremely fearsome subject.

We describe things by connecting them, through general words, with other things. A descriptive word or phrase—whether definite, *my right hand,* or indefinite, *some readers*—can be regarded as a compacter notation for a sentence with a connecting IS in it. ('X is my right hand and,' 'XYZ . . . are readers and'). To write them out looks very artificial and deceptive until we consider how we use them in sentences. 'My hand holds a pen,' expands to 'X is my hand and X (the same X) holds a pen.' But in doing this we have to be careful not to put an IS of belief, or an IS of presentness or other specification, in as well, without making sure that they are safe. For example, 'The roc picked up Sinbad' can only be expanded to 'X is a roc and X picked up Sinbad' provided it is clear that no one is invited to believe there was historically a bird, the roc, which did such things. Formal Logicians want to study pure forms of thought regardless of what is put in the form. They therefore write their sentences with symbols in place of words. Thus: $(x) : \varphi x > \psi x$ is their way of writing 'All that is φ is ψ.' It reads 'for all values of x, x is a φ implies x is a ψ.' Obviously, we might deny that the roc swallowed Sinbad on many different grounds: for example, on the ground that there was never such a bird, or such a man as Sinbad; or on the ground that he didn't *swallow* Sinbad. So modern mathematical logicians have had to devise very ingenious formulations to make statements containing descriptive phrases safe for manipulation and to keep themselves from saying more than they want to.

To explain how they do it would take a longer chapter than this,

and the account usually needs a year's familiarity with it before it becomes intelligible. The devices can be picked up as a rote-technique quickly by persons of mathematical ability or training, but to understand anything about the philosophical assumptions made in the modern logical doctrine of *propositions* and their *constituents,* which may include *particulars;* or to see where any modern formal logician is drawing his lines between the sentence, its general form, the proposition it expresses, its meaning and, let us say, *Charles the First* himself—who commonly is presented as a typical particular that gets into some proposition we may happen to be denying—all this is a very long business. The logician usually becomes so accustomed to these assumptions that they no longer seem to him in the least odd. But to an outsider—that is to all our possible pupils—they are likely to seem utterly unintelligible. It is a pity that this survival of an extreme philosophic Realism in modern logic, a Realism which has been in our time more widely and firmly removed than ever before from all other studies, and which is now yielding ground rapidly in the mathematical field from which modern Logic derived, should prevent what is still taught, say, at Cambridge or Harvard (and recently at last in Oxford, the home of lost causes!) from being of much use to us here. The barrier is philosophic. To note it regretfully is not to imply any under-estimation of the logical achievements which in spite of it have made this century already very eminent in the history of Logic. For the teacher, the trouble is that these modes of formulation presuppose certain habits of analysis and to break these down in an adept's mind is a formidable undertaking.

A short view of the struggles of this school with IS when they tackle it without their symbols may help to show that I am not exaggerating its hydra-like proclivities. I take this from Dr Stebbing's *A Modern Introduction to Logic,* pp. 159-160. It will be observed to illustrate the discussion of ASSERTION and EXISTENCE above, as well as the strangely humble dependence of this school upon the Doctrine of Usage.

'Nevertheless, a certain difficulty may remain as to how it is that we can *think of* that which in no sense is. It is this difficulty that has tempted many philosophers into holding that there are "different

modes of being," so that *men* exist, or have being, in one sense, and *ghosts* have being in *another* sense, for which the word "subsists" is sometimes used. Mr Russell, who has now shown us how to avoid these difficulties, at one time himself maintained that "whatever A may be, it certainly is." '[1]

'That whatever can be thought of must *in some sense be* seems plausible at first sight. Professor Moore has formulated a possible argument in favour of this view in order, it seems, to bring out clearly the errors involved. He suggests that it might be argued:

> ' "A thing cannot have a property unless it is there to have it, and, since unicorns . . . *do* have the property of being thought of, there certainly must be such things. When I think of a unicorn, what I am thinking of is certainly not nothing; if it were nothing, then, when I think of a griffin, I should also be thinking of nothing and there would be no difference between thinking of a griffin and thinking of a unicorn. But there certainly is a difference; and what can the difference be except that in the one case what I am thinking of is a unicorn, and in the other a griffin? And if the unicorn is what I am thinking of, then there certainly must *be* a unicorn, in spite of the fact that unicorns are unreal. In other words, though in one sense of the words there certainly *are* no unicorns—that sense, namely, in which to assert that there are would be equivalent to asserting that unicorns are real—yet there must be some other sense in which there *are* such things; since, if there were not, we could not think of them." [2]

'This passage states clearly the view that there *must* be *some* sense of "there are" in which it would be true to say "There are unicorns," and *another* sense in which it would be true to say "There are no unicorns." The second statement is equivalent to "Unicorns are unreal," so that this other sense of "are" would have to be such that we could say that *being unreal* (or *being real*) is a property which could belong to something in the same sort of way as the property of *being yellow* can. We have already seen this not to be the case. As Professor Moore points out, "unreal" does not stand for any conception at all. We use the *expression* "are unreal" to express the *denial of existence,* not to assert a *special mode of existence.* In an analogous manner we use the expression "are real" to assert an *affirmation of existence.* With this affirmation of existence we shall be con-

[1] *Principles of Mathematics,* p. 449.
[2] *Philosophical Studies,* p. 215.

cerned in a moment. We must first consider what is involved in our *thinking* of unicorns.

'Professor Moore contrasts three pairs of propositions, viz.: (a) Unicorns are thought of; Lions are hunted; (b) I am thinking of a unicorn; I am hunting a lion; (c) Unicorns are objects of thought; Lions are objects of the chase. The second proposition in each pair could not be true unless there *were* lions; but, Professor Moore urges, "it is obvious enough to common sense that the same is by no means true of the *first* proposition in each pair, in spite of the fact that their grammatical expression shows no trace of the difference."'[1]

An attempt to thread this maze would be a very advanced exercise. I insert it partly for Professor Moore's lovely supple prose, partly to suggest how technical habituation may make it difficult even for very able people to notice or remember many things ordinary folk are in no danger of overlooking. Have no alchemists hunted for the Elixir? And if you are looking for a man who will lend you a thousand pounds must there be such a man? The outsider's frequent reaction to such pages is: 'What, do you mean to say they haven't settled long ago which senses of IS, PROPERTY, REAL, STAND FOR, and CONCEPTION they are using? I should have thought they would have had to. They are the tools for the work. You must be mistaken. They must know how they shift and have done something about it.' He turns a few pages and comes to, say, this:

'Socrates and Aristotle are of the same logical type, because *Aristotle* can be substituted for *Socrates* in any significant proposition about *Socrates* and the result will not be nonsense, though it may be false. But I cannot significantly substitute a *number* for a *unicorn*. I can say "I fed a unicorn," but not "I fed a number." To see that this is so it is sufficient to know what "number" and "unicorn" respectively *mean;* we do not further need to know whether there *are* any unicorns. The point is that no one can use "There are unicorns" with the sense of "are" appropriate to "numbers" or "relations." Hence, there is no justification for saying that unicorns *subsist*. If there *were* any unicorns, they would be individual objects of precisely the same type as *horses*.[2] Now, it is clear that it does not fol-

[1] *Philosophical Studies*, p. 215.

[2] How 'horse' or how 'unicorn' is to be read is *assumed* to be understood ('no one can use etc')—but that is the problem the discussion requires us to solve. All these troubles in fact derive from naive notions about 'usage.' And no attempts are made to connect the 'unicorn' senses with such things as rainbows, objects seen in mirrors,

low from *I am thinking of a unicorn* that there is an individual object with regard to which it can be said "*This* is a unicorn"; hence, we can think of unicorns although there are none.'

Then, seeing that they are still asking language to do for them what they should be doing for language, he closes the book with a feeling that mother-wit after all provides him already with a better technique.

The problem of how to talk about unicorns even if there are none is troublesome only when we add in a *belief* IS, or a *now* IS or some specification as to a mode of being, to the *assertion* IS; that is, when we take ourselves to be saying more than anyone who talks about unicorns ever says. Or, when we confuse tales or pictures with the imaginary things they are of, or these last with things we might ride on, or hunt outside a story. We all manage to keep these different familiar sorts of things in fairly good order with very simple devices. The logician's way of doing so is very complex. Roughly, he takes a remark about a unicorn as being really about 'The property of being a unicorn.' This he thinks is safe, on the ground that 'even if there were no unicorns there would still be the property of being a unicorn—though, it applies to nothing.' Thereby he aspires to formulations which escape saying that anything is a unicorn, and so cannot lead even the most distraught logician to suppose that because we can talk of a thing it therefore must 'exist'[1] to be talked of. But did anyone who was not stuck fast in an injudiciously technicalized set of words ever suppose anything of the sort? In interpreting ordinary fluid language with full settings there is no need for these ingenious devices. And, if we want to argue, a simpler plan, which will deal with such possible troubles and with many more, is to anatomize the uses of IS in the fashion which I am sketching here. It will be noticed that 'is' and 'exists' in the passages I have been quoting have much more than my ASSERT and

represented in drawings, told of in stories, dreamed of, hoped for and so on, which are in varying aspects parallel. The unicorn case is taken as the type and argued about without being compared carefully with its more *and less* similar analogues. Such comparison is however the only safe and useful method of enquiry.

[1] Inverted commas here to mark that 'exists' is taken as meaning *something more* than 'can be talked of' (the IS of ASSERTION and mere EXISTENCE). What the *something more* might be, which varies greatly from case to case, would be the profitable thing to inquire about.

EXIST senses. Belief certainly and some special mode of existence, and presentness probably, come in too. The riddles that Phoenixes must exist if we can deny that they do, or that there must be a King of France if we can deny that he has a beard—to solve which Russell invented the theory of descriptions—can be solved equally well by discriminating better between our uses of IS. And to do so is much more useful in the ordinary conduct of language. But I am not, in this, denying that *for the calculus purpose of formal logic* Russell's formulation is a valuable device.

All this is an excursion or anticipation which should not, I think, properly come at this early stage in a course on Logic; though, for some, the 'Phoenixes exist' riddle—like the paradoxes of the Theory of Types—is, I have found, a popular diversion, and, perhaps, even a useful enticement into Logic. Let me finish off more briefly the rest of my short list of IS jobs.

(6) MODIFICATION

This might perhaps equally well be taken as a special case of (4) Connection. It sometimes stands, though, in a rather important sort of opposition to other connection uses. The typical case is when something is broken. When I merely move a bit of chalk, take it in my hand or lay it on the desk, we get a series of sentences describing its adventures. 'It is on the desk, up in the air,' and so on. But when I break it, the case is different, 'It is broken.' When I gradually spread it on the board, still more so, 'It is spread out as a dusty film.' Am I, in saying so, making a different use of IS? In the first series of sentences I am putting one thing, the bit of chalk, into various relations with other things, the desk, my hand, and so on. In the second series, I seem to be no longer talking about one thing. I seem to be saying that it has become, or is becoming, another. We can, if we like, as I have said above, include this under (4) by saying that what before had the character of being one piece now has another character, of being several pieces. But, still, this seems to miss something important and peculiar to uses of IS in describing changes—not in a thing's relations to other things but in the relations of its parts to one another. And as remarks recording and communicating this sort of change (change of nature, of constitution, of being) are evidently extremely important to us all, there seems enough reason to mark this off as another sense of IS. More-

over, remarks about these changes are often extremely tricky and give rise to different interpretations that have immense practical consequences. Most questions about growth bring the difficulty up. Am I the man I was yesterday? Is the child only father of the man, or is the man still the child? So do political questions: What has happened to the Germany that was Goethe's in the Germany that follows Hitler? Is Mazzini's Italy Mussolini's? All this has, of course, to do with the process of thing-making, by which we receive, or frame for ourselves, the objects we claim to be saying something about. But with the statements in which internal changes in these 'things' are being discussed goes a peculiar use of IS (and of the IS component of any verb which takes its place). And that is what this separate listing of an IS of modification proposes to call attention to. I think it would justify itself by heightening that 'sense of position' on which intelligent discourse depends.

(7) BELIEF

On this IS component much might be said. The less, perhaps, we introduce about it in an elementary study of logic the better. The deeper problems here may be left to ripen for later years. But if they are to ripen a clear separation *early* of the IS of mere assertion, the IS that merely presents the meaning of a sentence for contemplation, from the IS that announces the speaker's, and claims the listener's, adhesion to what is stated in the sentence, is very desirable. Without it, we can neither develop 'the sunshine comparative power' (p. 12) nor go on to meditate the differences between the kinds of adhesion appropriate to different purposes. Every teacher knows the pupil who is too busy believing or disbelieving to pay any serious attention to what it is he is so honouring or contemning; and that other equally frequent pupil who can take no interest whatever in subjects which offer no food for private fanaticism. I do not suppose that a course on Logic can do much for the extreme cases, but a recognition that belief expressions are no necessary part of exposition, and acceptances no necessary part of understanding might, I think, ease the strain, or elicit response, in much work which is over- or under-belief'd at present, owing to the supposal that every assertion is an utterance of and an invitation to belief. I am not, of course, in this touching the problem of the liar!

(8) PRESENTNESS

This is the only IS job that IS not puzzling, except in the special case of relativity physics in which events which are neither before nor after a given event may surprise us by being not contemporaneous with it but just elsewhere. In ordinary language everyone understands contemporaneity and the simple transferences—the historic present and so on—from it.

The above attempts too much in too compact a form for the opening of an introductory course in Logic. On the other hand, a worse mistake would be to attempt too little, since to be intelligible, here, is to be hard. All the central problems of thought depend upon one another, lead into and out of one another and, with luck, illumine one another. So the shape that may be given to any *exposition* of a fairly wide range of them, may vary immensely without the problems themselves or the treatment they receive being much changed. The order in which they are taken makes great differences, and only experiment can show which order would be best.

However, if this chapter seems needlessly pernicketty, if it splits hairs in one paragraph and is too all-inclusive in the next, if it is alternately inarticulate and diffuse, trite and obscure, these defects should be judged with reference to some of the stresses in what follows. Though a modern Logic would discard and discourage metaphors from building (Who can *understand* the *foundations* of anything? How tell the top from the bottom of an explanation?) preferring a general 'astronomic' metaphor by which how any problem behaves is a reflection of how all other problems are behaving, yet in exposition, if not in thought, we have to prepare for what follows. And here the peculiar would-be-infinite rigour of Logic has to be remembered. Perfect, impeccable consistency is something the boldest logicians can hardly aspire to—for long. Those who have been most interested in language have seen that a logical treatment of language cannot dream even of *high* consistency. To expect beyond a certain point that words will behave with regularity (even after we have allowed each of them a large variety of senses) is to pay for illusory order with

blindness to the facts. For words, following the thoughts they convey, vary their behaviour with their company, and, as no one is ever thinking of everything at once, or ever of one thing at a time only, words have no absolute ways. The value of a piece in a position in chess varies with the positions of all the other pieces. But chess is a small and simple system compared to language; and as we further logicalize (that is try to provide for consistency in) the central operative parts of language, up jumps the order of interconnectedness that would have to be respected. It very quickly jumps right out of sight or reach. So, a prudent and sagacious Logic uses a language *inside* the language and cares about the uses of only a few important words and about only a few of their senses. Then ordinary language-users complain that Logic is not helpful and condemn it as scholastic, out of touch with modern needs, and academic.

A more venturesome, faith-ridden Logic—such as is sketched here—risks over-cultivating the meanings of too many words. It multiplies its distinctions to a point where their interaction becomes too complex for any man's watching or control. Meanwhile it tends to say—against the prudent who weed and are exclusive—that words have more senses than we can find them in, and that ordinary unwatched thinking is really in much better order than we could admit, unless we allowed for these unmarked multiple shifts. If we knew what he was *thinking,* then what he said would not seem so silly, is its shy and tender-minded creed.

There is, we will agree, only one Logic; but we may cultivate different parts of its field. Logical cultivation imposes the peculiar task of remembering what we have done, and observing our own ordinances. The most general ordinances are not our own; we are not free to vary *them,* for all order would vanish if we did. But under them we have freedom to vary our arrangements and try experiments. If we can make our pupils realize this, Logic changes for them from a tyrannic mystery into an enticing game. The parallel with games like Bridge and Chess is close and instructive—up to the point when we forget that the ultimate rules of Logic rule us too and that we are part of its game. As in Bridge, say, there are certain rules which constitute the game, and, under them, a choice of plans that we can make and change, so in Logic. If I decide to try it *so,* then, remembering that, I must do *so.* But

Logic, when it uses ordinary language, is playing almost blindfold. The first part of its training is to increase our power to remember what we have done, and what we want to do; which comes down to remembering which of their possible senses we are giving to our words and why.

Chapter Twenty: 'True by Definition'

> *In general, it is safe to suppose that, whenever any problem proves intractable, it either needs definition or else bears either several senses, or a metaphorical sense, or it is not far removed from first principles; or else the reason is that we have yet to discover in the first place just this—in which of the aforesaid directions the source of the difficulty lies.* ARISTOTLE, *Topica*

If we now look through the sentences I offered in the experiment, with some such list of IS jobs at our elbow, the practical advantages of discriminating between them become prominent. We have, of course, in each case, to supply, by recollection or invention, a setting; and by changing the supplied setting we can change the use of IS. This in itself can be no slight lesson in interpretation.

(1) BARKIS IS WILLIN'

Few recalled the David Copperfield setting in any detail, and those who recognized it vaguely may have suffered from the fact that 'his being willing' was the only thing they did remember about Barkis. So, a feeling that 'Barkis' was less a name than a substitute for 'a man who is willing' may have helped some to decide that (1) was true by definition—but I doubt if that happened often, and I have no clear case of it. The same trouble would arise with other literary references, 'Poor Tom's a-cold' for example. His 'being a-cold' might seem to be implied by 'his being Poor Tom' in a way that 'his being plump' would not be implied by 'his being Napoleon' in 'Napoleon is plump.'

But taking 'Barkis,' with most, as a pure name with no descriptive component beyond 'being the name of someone,' is it not interesting that many thought it true by definition? It is easy to show why, on any recommendable view of definition, it could not be. Barkis is his name, was his name before he became willing,

would be his name, if, later, he became unwilling. His 'being *named* Barkis' settles nothing about his willingness; and in considering whether he is willing or not we are not asking anything about whether he is named Barkis. The IS of connection just puts him in the class of willing things (there might have been no one else in it, of course, if Peggotty had been very unlucky: but a class can have only one member, or no member). Alternatively (p. 326), it attaches the quality willingness to him, or it links him to what he is willing, as we please. However we describe it, what IS does in no way makes his being willing a part or a consequence of his being Barkis, and so the sentence is *not* true by definition.

Has the last sentence, I wonder, given any reader *a turn?* There is a way of reading it in which it seems openly false as well as one in which it is undeniably true, and the wobble between these readings is the heart-beat of many uses of IS. It accounts, I fancy, for very much of the difficulty of thinking clearly about definitions. Here is the turn. Are we not saying with 'Barkis is willing' (or was not Barkis saying) that the Barkis who is willing is a changed man from the Barkis who once was not willing? This brings in the IS of modification and Barkis might be compared to my piece of chalk which is broken.

The sentence may very well be taken to be saying this, and taking it so was possibly a reason why some thought it true by definition. They felt that a Barkis who is willing couldn't be the Barkis he is unless he was willing, that his willingness was part of his Barkisdom and so his Barkisdom implied or included his willingness. All that is so, but it does not give us any good reason for saying that the sentence is true by definition, and to see why it does not, and also why it is thought to give one, is important.

I can reproduce the misleading ambiguity conveniently with the word 'meaning.' Whether a sentence is true by definition or not depends upon the meanings of the parts which are separated by IS or some equivalent. And here willingness is *not* part of, nor does it derive from, the meaning of 'Barkis.' If we question this, we are using a different sense of 'meaning' from the one used in the last sentence when that sentence is certainly true. Which these two senses of 'meaning' are, and how they differ, can, I think, be sufficiently clearly shown without much trouble and with that the

imbroglio is temporarily cleared up. It returns, though, and has to be cleared up again and again.

To avoid a lot of notation tricks and parenthetic explanations, I introduce a picture: this, , is Barkis, the complete actual man with all his characteristics, including his willingness, his handkerchief, his morality, what you will, and the rest of him. And 'Barkis' is his name. If now I say

'Barkis' means

and 'Barkis' means 'the man named "Barkis"'

I shall sometimes be saying the same thing with them, sometimes not. For the phrase 'the man named Barkis' may slip over to mean ; or it may stay doing no more than I here want it to do—that is, pointing to a man in respect only of his having that name. But this phrase, and all possible phrases, will slip too—to mean —if we let it.

This shift (which is a normal and invaluable fluctuation of innumerable words) can be followed more easily with a word like 'song.' Suppose so and so sings that song, and suppose we agree that that song is tuneful. Does it follow that what so and so sings, i.e. his singing, is tuneful? By no means, as, were I so and so, would soon be proved. Here we don't have any trouble in seeing that 'What I sing' and 'my singing' are to be distinguished, or how to distinguish them. We do have recurrent and terrifying trouble in distinguishing between 'what it means' and 'its meaning.'[1] The reason is that with 'song' we are free to concentrate upon one ambiguity; with 'meaning' a hundred others in the background are distracting us.

This may seem an odd way in which to expound an old distinction—between the properties in virtue of which a word or name is applied (no properties in the case of the pure proper name) and the properties in fact possessed by the things to which it is applied. But it attempts to start from the actual puzzles, and the shifts causing them, for which that distinction and the whole technical apparatus of denotation, connotation, comprehension, essence, attribute, accident etc., have been contrived as remedies. These

[1] In such uses as those I am making here, of course. For innumerable purposes there is no need to bother about the fluctuations of either phrase.

remedies are perhaps more dangerous than the disease if the patient does not first realize what they are for. Frequent analysis of actual occurrences of such shifts is the way to make Logic useful. The technical apparatus may be brought in later, but not without warnings that its use is exposed to similar troubles, and that it will make confusion worse confounded unless we are able to watch for them.

The 'catch' here with 'what it means' and 'its meaning'—with [illegible] and 'the man named Barkis'—is not, of course, merely a case of 'language tripping us up'—though it makes a good point against Mill's simple view that in learning Grammar we are learning Logic. It is a case of gross confusion of *thought* that enshrines and protects itself in language, and mere changes of terms will not avoid it. Heaven knows how much thinking has lost its way here. Most of the situations in which we use words of the 'meaning' group give occasion for it. I will take only obvious examples where the slip or shift is easily followed and therefore not dangerous: you may desire something which will in fact destroy you; you don't therefore desire your destruction; and yet you do! You may know someone who is in fact a murderer; you don't therefore know a murderer; and yet you do! Similarly—but this *is* dangerous—we may mean by 'Barkis' someone who in fact is willing; we don't therefore mean by 'Barkis' a willing man.

No one can reasonably be expected to study Logic unless he realizes that he needs it. Here is a confident student:

> At first I attended my lectures assiduously and faithfully; but the philosophy would by no means enlighten me. In the logic, it seemed strange to me that I had to tear asunder, isolate, and, as it were, destroy those operations of the mind which I had performed with the greatest ease from my youth upwards, and this in order to see into the right use of them. Of the world and of God, I thought I knew about as much as the Professor himself!

'Performed with the greatest ease from my youth upward'? Well, this is Goethe, on his Leipzig Lectures, and perhaps *he* may have done so. His was not an ordinary youth. But most minds do not perform their operations of strict reasoning with any ease, and those do best who are most discerningly aware of the dangers. To know them better is the way to escape being frightened by them.

(2) THE EMPEROR IS CAPTURED

This is an easier sentence than (1) since the IS connects without modifying. We can, of course, imagine if we please, that the Emperor was heartbroken by his capture, that he never smiled again, and was an utterly changed man and so on. But none of this is said by the sentence. So we escape some of the reasons which perhaps made some take (1) as true by definition. None the less, more still took (2) so—a fact I am too curious about to speculate on without better evidence. 'The Emperor' is a description, not *a name* like Barkis, which makes it clearer that, however we read it, it is *not,* and does not contain, a description, of *something being captured.* We could invent a context to make it true by definition, imagine a tribe which chose its Emperor by a ritual of capture, so that no one could be Emperor without being captured, but *that* was not how people came to think (2) was true by definition. And it is obvious that, when they said it was, they meant by this phrase something quite different from anything relevant here. For example, perhaps that it looked like 'a matter of fact' and that to say that something is 'a matter of fact' is sometimes a way of saying that it is true!

(3) A BACILLUS IS A VEGETABLE

This, too, is an easy sentence, if, as we are entitled to, we take 'bacillus' and 'vegetable' as being words with settled satisfactory definitions in biology. There may be problems about these definitions, but they are biology's business, not ours. We can accept the sentence as true by definition without having to know exactly what the definitions of 'vegetable' and 'bacillus' are which make it so. In fact we should have had to have done not a little work on minute organisms to get at them. So, recognizing that a sentence is true by definition is not necessarily seeing in detail how it is so. A main purpose of definitions is to guarantee sentences without our having to go into just what they say.

There are two main, equally reasonable, ways to read (3). Either as a statement about the things named bacilli saying that they are vegetable organisms; or as a statement about the use of the word 'bacillus' saying that it is to be used only for certain organisms which are vegetable. In this second reading it is, itself,

a definition, or rather a part of one; the rest would go on to say more about the organisms the word could stand for, separating them off from other vegetables. Read so, to say it was true by definition would be a way of saying that this definition was an agreed one. But most people, I think, would read it in the first way—as telling us about the things, not the word; and then, 'true by definition' would mean that while we were using the words with these definitions no bacillus would be found which was not vegetable, because the definitions had been so arranged that this must be so. A non-vegetable organism would not be counted a bacillus.

(4) TO OBEY IS BETTER THAN SACRIFICE

Nobody identified this as Samuel's utterance, though I suspect a feeling that it was Biblical had something to do with its unpopularity as a sentiment. The word 'obey' also has an important place in the marriage service. However, those, at least, who wrote, '"IS" is a forceful way, an exaggerated way, of saying "in the opinion of the speaker may quite possibly be,"' and '(4) is a speculation in which "IS" suggests the attitude of the writer but little more,' were free to invent their settings. If any had remembered that Samuel was speaking to Saul from the Lord, they might have had a good reason to take it as true by definition. For 'to obey (the will of God)' might well be, by definition, 'the best possible course of action' and 'sacrifice,' here, might be short for 'sacrifice when sacrifice is not the will of God'; and then the sentence would be true by definition. As they read it, forgetting Samuel, it is just a statement with a plain connecting IS in the forefront and a strong belief IS in the background. It is parallel to

This line ——— is longer than this line ——

which is a statement not true by definition but true in fact, since the lines just have lengths but are not given them by definition. What may have worried some is the fact that 'line' and 'longer' have definitions and we can only set about verifying the statement by respecting these definitions. But the statement is quite different in form from

A three-inch line is longer than a two-inch line

which would be true by definition. How different they are we can see at once, because nobody will try to verify this last statement.

The trouble that so many took to pack IS somehow into is-better-than may be partly explained by what I wrote about the class, quality and relation interpretations of the connecting IS. This is a case when to think of IS as relating one thing to another, as better-than it, is rather easier than to think of IS as putting obedience into a class of things better than sacrifice, or as attaching a quality, better-than-sacrifice, to it.

(5) TO DOUBT IS TO THINK

This, since we are so free to shift the imaginary settings, is the most puzzling sentence of my six. The protocols showed in how many ways it could be interpreted. We can make it true by definition by taking thinking as a genus of which doubting is a species; or, non-technically, by calling everything that happens in the mind 'thinking,' when doubting would be of course included. But there are plenty of other ways of taking them: 'Only think, man, and you can't doubt it!' 'Truths no thinking man can doubt,' 'Doubt is the enemy of thinking,' 'The purpose of thinking is to remove doubt.' We could contrast Descartes with Blake:

> What I can't doubt that I must think

with

> If the Sun & Moon should doubt
> They'd immediately Go out.

It is an interesting witness to the mind's subtlety in the interpretation of fluid discourse—making a sad contrast to its clumsy blundering with solid or logical argument—that we manage all these shifts without difficulty. When we are oppressed with unmanageable complexity it is comforting to admire ourselves in the fields of our success. There is no advantage in logicalizing this field—except of course for psychology. So too with:

(6) SHE'S A DUCK

Some, of course, kept it to ornithology and played Ducks and Drakes over the mill pond. Taken as a fervid compliment, it certainly does not, though many said so, accuse the person it is said about of being at all like a duck, of having a bill and paddles for

example. The metaphor, whatever its semantic history may have been, probably works in most minds through our attitudes to pets —'tender and amused liking' as one writer said.

In this we have left the appropriate field for logical cultivation. However this sentence works, we would surely be more than ordinarily confident—if we said it to someone—that it would be saying for us just what we wanted to say. And the person of whom it was said would feel so too. In this it is a type of the language which works best and may fitly close this discussion of an experiment in which we have seen language struggling with tasks it cannot manage so happily.

Chapter Twenty-one: Logical Machinery and Empty Words

As the manes of the departed heroes which Aeneas saw in the infernal regions, were so constituted as effectually to elude the embrace of every living wight; in like manner the abstract qualities are so subtile as often to elude the apprehension of the most attentive mind.

CAMPBELL, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*

In discussing senses of IS I have allowed more than a little which would have no proper place in an *elementary* Logic course to intrude; and thus illustrated the worst risk in the venture. You cannot defend a subject against philosophy without turning philosopher, any more than you can put down violence without using force. In this chapter the risk is greater. The way to meet it is to acknowledge it, study it and limit it. What I am noting down here are, at best, only the materials of a possible teaching subject. What should be considered *early* is still entwined with what should be considered *late,* if at all. But the separation must proceed by steps and any step here is better than none.

The protocols of Part One showed that current teaching leaves the use of words like 'concrete,' 'abstract,' 'general,'[1] 'particular,' 'definite,' 'vague,' in a state of confusion which makes them active adverse influences upon thinking. Can anything be done, by exercises and exposition, to clarify their use? A very great deal can be done, I believe; but, in attempting to do it, we have to take note of the sources of the confusions and that leads us inevitably into philosophical questions which are hardly elementary. Moreover the best and clearest instances for study occur in the writings of logicians, whose thought has developed some of the mistakes, which are embryonic or implicit in current practice, into open and

[1] See too Chapter XVI, p. 275.

sometimes glaring absurdity. But these instances, being in semi-technicalized language, are hardly suitable for a course which is endeavouring only to help the conduct of ordinary everyday thinking, and therefore does not aim at (should, in fact, do its best to avoid) producing logicians.

What follows, in these three chapters, is a sketch of a highly simplified exposition of some of the more important uses of the chief terms we may employ in analyzing meanings. It is interrupted from time to time by defensive excursions illustrating how they should *not* be employed and trying to say why. To decide just where the negative excursion ceases to be helpful in the understanding of the positive and recommended uses calls for the uttermost of the teacher's tact, since what helps him will not necessarily help others.

Let us begin with a list of the words which are our chief machinery for distinguishing, in analysis, between

(1) What we are talking of
(2) What we are saying about it

Subject	Predicate
Substance	Attribute
Entity	Property
Particular	Quality
Thing	Relation-ship
Being	Character-istic
Class	Universal
	Essence

All these words (except 'thing') have been introduced to help us in separating the 'its' we are talking about from the 'whats' we are saying about them. Most of them still carry, for some users, implications from the philosophic purposes and systems for and with which they were introduced. Some ('subject,' 'predicate,' 'attribute') have grammatical specializations. About most of them, if we may judge, say, by *The Times Literary Supplement,* there will ordinarily be some doubt as to just how they are being used. We have to look critically at the whole article or review—and, as a rule, beyond the immediate setting—to decide whether they are being used technically (according to the philosophy the writer was taught when an undergraduate), or in a broad and popular way,

quite at random, for merely decorative purposes, or to make the sentence look as though something carefully considered were being said. It would be easy to collect passages to show that all these words are frequently employed in such a way that it would not matter a jot if others out of the same column were put instead—and this in settings where, if the scale of the inquiry were more microscopic, a change would make important differences.

When serious and close attention to what is being said is not invited, such free indifferent usage is no occasion for complaint. But in most places where these words should be used we should be able to attend closely with profit, for an anatomizing or explanation should be in progress. And, apart from mere loose use, discrepancies between the implications brought in with these terms by writers of different training give much avoidable trouble. No one with an eye on actualities would recommend *uniformity* as a cure, or would try to prescribe fixed uses. That is not the remedy, for the training that puts the different implications into the words is going on, and must go on, in numerous *independent* centres, and it is not susceptible of regimentation. Moreover, uniformity would be disastrous, if it were possible. To take two current examples. Until recently Oxford-trained men and Cambridge-trained men hardly ever understood one another on any abstract topic—because their key explanatory words turned in different locks.[1] More recently something of the same sort seems to be dividing those who have absorbed Whitehead's influence directly or indirectly, from those who have not, and the same was true of Dewey's influence. The point is not merely that people with different general outlooks are out of touch. The differences are more detailed and specific; the modes of framing questions differ and the explanatory words work in ways which to the uninitiated are misleading.

The remedy is not regimentation into uniformity, but a lively awareness of the other things that may be being said. 'How are we to get that?' someone will ask, 'Is everyone to go and work diligently at all the intellectual centres, and read all the books with an intelligent eye? Splendid! But is this a practicable proposal for general education?' The answer is that none of the special

[1] A fuller account of these differences, with examples, will be found in my *Mencius on the Mind*, pp. 94-99; and I may perhaps refer the reader to Chapter IV in that book for a discussion of topics closely germane to those touched on here.

uses that may mislead are really unfamiliar to anyone. In learning ordinary English, even in gaining a very modest competence in it, we become acquainted with *all* the forms of thought. But the acquaintance is commonly fleeting and distant. What a regional philosophic tradition does is to concentrate attention upon some of the forms to the neglect of others; and make them seem the only possible forms. But meanwhile every mind is using (outside philosophy) all the forms in the common routine of existence. Using them, but *not* meditating them, that is the point. The task of education is—not to teach everyone all the philosophies but—to turn the attention more equally upon all the forms used in the everyday articulation of non-specialist thinking.

We could do this, I believe, by a direct study of these words and their uses, without allowing this study to wander far into the dangerous debatable lands of the philosophies. If we cannot yet do it, that may be mainly because we have not tried to.

The first division of the two columns into 'its' and 'whats'—things talked about and things said of them—breaks down. It has broken down in the last sentence with my shift of 'things.' We break it down whenever we talk about 'whats'; and this has given rise, in the technical discussions, to a thick growth of very subtle, perplexing and embarrassing questions. From these we must make a careful selection. Many of them are bred by miscegenation of Grammar and Logic, and these we can, at least in part, eliminate. Among those left are the questions from which, through familiarization, meditation exercises, analysis and exposition, we could effect, I believe, a considerable enlargement of intelligence.

I will begin with an example which will show how a traditional approach to the abstract-concrete divisions brings in things that need to be eliminated.

> The distinction between concrete and abstract names, as ordinarily recognised, may be most briefly expressed by saying that a *concrete* name is the name of a *thing*, whilst an *abstract* name is the name of an attribute. The question, however, at once arises as to what is meant by a *thing* as distinguished from an *attribute;* and the only answer to be given is that by a thing we mean whatever is regarded as possessing attributes. It would appear, therefore, that our definitions may be made more explicit by saying that a *concrete* name is the name of anything which is regarded as possessing attributes, i.e.

as a subject of attributes; while an *abstract* name is the name of anything which is regarded as an attribute of something else, i.e. as an attribute of subjects.[1]

The writer then points out that though, if we are comparing 'triangle' and 'triangularity,' 'man' and 'humanity' and so on,

there will never be any difficulty in determining which is concrete and which is abstract in relation to one another, yet the application of our definitions is by no means always easy when we consider names in themselves and not in this definite relation to other names. We shall find indeed that . . . the division of names into abstract and concrete is not an exclusive one in the sense that every name can once and for all be assigned exclusively to one or the other of the two categories.

We are at any rate driven to this, if we once admit that attributes may themselves be the subjects of attributes, and it is difficult to see how this admission can be avoided. If, for example, we say that 'unpunctuality is irritating,' we ascribe the attribute of being irritating to unpunctuality, which is itself an attribute. Unpunctuality, therefore, although primarily an abstract name, can be used in such a way that it is, according to our definition, concrete.

Similarly when we consider that an attribute may appear in different forms or in different degrees, we must regard it as something which can itself be modified by the addition of a further attribute; as, for example, when we distinguish physical courage from moral courage, or the whiteness of snow from the whiteness of smoke, or when we observe that the beauty of a diamond differs in its characteristics from the beauty of a landscape.

This leads him

to give up for logical purposes the distinction between concrete and abstract names, and to substitute for it a distinction between the concrete and the abstract *use* of names. A name is then used in a concrete sense when the thing called by the name is contemplated as a subject of attributes, and in an abstract sense when the thing called by the name is contemplated as an attribute of subjects. . . . It may be added that as logicians we have very little to do with the abstract use of names.

Not forgetting that Logic has been described as the art of misunderstanding whenever you can, let us look at this closely and

[1] J. N. Keynes, *Formal Logic*, p. 16.

critically. What has happened in it? The main change might seem to be the substitution of 'contemplated as' for 'regarded as' in the definitions! But this would be niggling; for the writer certainly supposed himself to be making a more important change and to be correcting, in the light of the admission that we say 'unpunctuality is irritating,' some serious inconvenience in the former definitions. What was this correction? Let us see more of his reasons for making it. The first definitions gave as a result,

> that while some names are concrete and never anything but concrete, names which are primarily formed as abstracts and continue to be used as such are apt also to be used as concretes, that is to say, they are names of attributes which can themselves be regarded as possessing attributes. They are abstract names when viewed in one relation, concrete when viewed in another. It must be admitted that this result is paradoxical. As yielding a division of names that is non-exclusive, it is also unscientific.

This is a harsh description of the result, but it need not frighten us. That is how 'names,' as the writer is using the term here, do behave; and in substituting 'uses of names' for 'names' as what are to be 'abstract' and 'concrete,' he is recognizing that the word 'name' in this connection needs much more careful handling than we usually give it. It is a correction in our definition of 'a name' that he is making. In the first definitions names were regarded as things with meanings apart from their use, and it is this assumption, not 'the result,' which is paradoxical and unscientific. But to write 'use of names' for 'names' for a page or two, will not put things right. We must clearly and persistently realize that a name apart from our uses of it is nothing but a shape on paper or an agitation of the air. One would suppose that nobody could forget this, least of all a writer discussing distinctions between the uses of names, yet we all do endlessly forget it; passages which show a similar oblivion could be found in a score of deservedly esteemed logicians. With such things in view, we need not wonder that Logic has not done for the study of interpretation all that we may hope that it can do.

My quarrel then with this passage is primarily that it is disablingly unreflective in the conception of names which it displays. True it corrects the error in some degree; but insufficiently, for it

treats a fundamental and always stultifying misconception—that of the Divine Right of Names—as a mere difficulty to be avoided by an *ad hoc* subtlety. I have further bones to pick with it however. The next one is that it mixes the grammatical forms of speech with the logical structure of propositions. In 'unpunctuality is irritating,' 'unpunctuality' is *grammatically* the subject and 'irritating' grammatically the attribute. But we can put the same proposition[1] into other speech forms—'irritation is caused by unpunctuality,' or 'We are irritated when something happens before or after the time we expect it,' and then we get new grammatical subjects and attributes. Similarly, in 'snow is white' and 'white is the colour of snow' *grammatically* the attribute of the first becomes the subject of the second, and yet there is at least one proposition which they may indifferently express. It is both a besetting vice of Logic and an inexhaustible subject of complaint by logicians that we mistake the forms of speech for the forms of thought, and yet elementary Logic does little or nothing but encourage it by the way it talks about terms and by the choice of its examples.

Thirdly, 'an attribute may appear in different forms . . . we must regard it as something which can itself be modified by the addition of a further attribute' and so on. May it? and Must we? Why? Because language, in our Indo-European syntaxes, behaves so? But these are the very questions which Logic has to enquire into! And answers to them are here being docilely accepted from language as though language had some unquestionable authority to teach us them. How do we settle that an attribute which appears in many forms is one attribute? Why do we take it as one sometimes and at other times as many? Is it because we happen to have one name for it (them) or can stretch 'white' to cover snow and smoke? Or because it suits our purposes to do so? It is the business of Logic to study these sorting operations which language can be made to record. By studying them it can free us from endless mistakes between sortings made for, and useful for, different purposes. But it will never do so while it takes its lessons from language in this unwary fashion. It is by this sort of subservience that most of the idle problems of the speculative

[1] When it is the same proposition and when not is, of course, the important thing, practically, to decide. It is just because this mixing of Grammar with Logic hides and blurs the grounds for such decisions that I am objecting to it.

subjects are perpetuated. For example, the beauty of a diamond, the beauty of a landscape, the beauty of a hot gammon![1] A library of wastepaper esthetics has been written by people who tried to observe how they differed in their characteristics instead of reformulating the questions. (See p. 367.)

Lastly: 'As logicians we have very little to do with the abstract use of names.' This means that logicians read the terms in propositions as 'subjects of attributes' and it cuts their logic down to that examination. It leaves out, as something they have not to do with, a great part of the conduct of their own discussions, and so can summarize my complaint. They *have* had far too 'little to do with the abstract use of names'; seeing that they are making that use themselves half their time. They have been too much occupied with the technical developments *within* the subject to spare enough attention for the presuppositions of their work.

I must come back now to my two columns of verbal machinery and try to suggest something more helpful that can be done about them. Three things can, I think, be done. (1) We can give reasons which will prevent certain obstructive and inappropriate questions being raised about these words. (2) We can supply a kind of natural-history classification of their varied uses in ordinary speech and thought. (3) We can show how confusion between these creates innumerable bogus and unanswerable questions and prevents important answerable questions from being raised or pursued.

The obstructive and inappropriate questions may be put in the form 'What *is* a thing, an attribute, a subject etc.?' If we ask such questions and persist, we land ourselves in the toils in which thinkers from Plato and Aristotle onwards can be observed to struggle. They may have gained something for the world from it all; our pupils will not, and what was gained is now attainable otherwise. Perhaps few will persistently ask such questions, but still they will feel, if we direct their attention, as we must, to such words, that there *ought* to be answers forthcoming. They will feel that in default of respectable answers, the whole thing is airy and vague. So there is a very considerable advantage in showing that the lack of answers to these questions is no defect, that there

[1] See *The Waste Land*, line 166.

cannot be answers and that why there are no answers can be reasonably explained. This then is a first step, not very important in itself, but removing a frequent obstacle to intelligent interest.

I must now show more clearly just what questions these are. Suppose someone asks, 'What is an apple?' Our answer might be, 'It is a fruit that grows on a tree.' To which he might reply, 'I was not asking you where it grew; I was asking you what it is.' We try again, 'It is a refreshing fruit.' He replies, 'I was not asking you what it was like or what it did; I was asking you what it is.' Suppose we say, 'It is an assemblage of cells, a system of molecules, atoms etc.' He can always reply, 'I was not asking you what I should see if I took a microscope to it or what chemical hypothesis would explain what would happen to it if we did certain things to it etc. I was asking you, quite simply, what it is?' In this way, he has us beaten from the start. We can only dispose of him by saying that his question is illegitimate, and that, if we define a question as something that theoretically can have an answer, his demand is not a question. It is only supposed to be one by having the same verbal form as some things which are questions and so, theoretically, can be answered.

We can put anything we like in place of 'apple' here and if our questioner will not accept as an answer, either a statement about causes or effects, or a statement grouping it with other things that are like and unlike it, or a statement about its parts and their relations to one another, or a statement about its place as a part in some larger whole, but insists on being told *what it is* in some other sense than these, then we have to leave him unsatisfied. Or rather, the only way to satisfy him is to show him that he is not asking something that can possibly be answered, that he is mistaken as to what he wants, that he is seeking perhaps some rest of mind in the wrong fashion. It is interesting to consider how much embryonic philosophizing of an unprofitable kind would be prevented by a recognition of the emptiness of this question.

This aberrant use of IS with WHAT, since the question is equally empty whether we ask about the self, an apple, the universe or the number 2, is *not* the one in which to ask 'What is a thing, a subject, an attribute etc.?' is illegitimate and fruitless, though it often comes in to complicate this other seeming-question. I have discussed it first to get it out of the way. The more troublesome

question about an attribute, an essence, a substance, an entity, a relation and so on, is one we *can* legitimately ask with most other words. We can ask, 'What is a man?' for example, and get all the useful sorts of answers which our enquirer above rejected in the case of the apple. And even for the Universe we get some of them —though no one will tell us what it is like or of what whole it is a part.

'What is a man?' may be taken as asking a variety of questions, which can be written otherwise:

> What things are we calling men? or What are we putting inside the sort 'man'? What set of properties (attributes etc.) is peculiar and common to men? i.e. What have men in common that no other things have? To what other sorts (e.g. animals) do these things belong? How do these things behave? What are the parts of one of these things?

But these questions, if for 'a man' we put 'a particular,' 'a property,' 'a substance,' 'a thing,' and so on, no longer make sense, and cannot be answered; and therefore are not questions, if by a question we mean something that can be answered. Of course, we can say, as Dr. Keynes did above, 'By a thing we mean whatever is regarded as possessing attributes' and 'by an attribute we mean whatever a thing possesses.' We could continue, for a short while, ringing the changes on our small collection of bells; but that is not a way of providing information *about anything but the formal relations between bits of this machinery*. And we can say of them all that they are machinery, or a 'dodge' (as Jowett called Logic) for helping us to talk about the forms of thought. But of a 'form' we have then to say that it is another dodge for the same purpose. And if we do this we see that we are talking *about* the practical uses of the words 'form,' 'property,' and so on, not talking *with* the words about something else, as we were in the case of 'a man' and might do if instead of 'a man' we put anything—except a bit of logical machinery.

There are many ways of explaining this peculiar emptiness of logical machinery, but it is not hard to see that they could not do the work we require from them if they did say anything. They must not say anything, for they are our means for analyzing other things that have been said. They are dissecting instruments and

their virtue is to divide without separating and without adding or distorting. Any comparison with other words will show why they are empty: to say what things we are calling 'men,' for example, we take a sort, things-to-be-called-men, M, and then create another sort *in another way,* say, rational-animals, R-A, or featherless-bipeds, F-B, such that

> All the things in M are in R-A (or F-B) and
> All the things in R-A (or F-B) are in M.

That is, the sorts are coincident. But to say what things, T, we are calling 'things' in a similar fashion is impossible. How are we to create another sort, X, *in another way,* such that

> All the things that are in T are in X and
> All the things that are in X are in T?

We cannot, with the inclusive sense of 'thing'; because to create a sort is to separate what is in it from what is not in it. Hence the convenience of using a circle ◯ to represent a sort. In this sense of 'thing' there is nothing outside. If we throw everything we have (i.e. that there is) into a bag, we cannot be said to have done any *sorting!*

All we can do with 'thing' is to find another word, such as 'being' or 'entity,' and say

> All things called 'things' can be called 'entities' and
> All things called 'entities' can be called 'things.'

But that plainly is not what we did with 'Man' and 'Rational Animal.' 'Man,' 'Rational Animal' and 'Featherless Biped' did separate what is from what is not a Man, a Rational Animal or a Featherless Biped. They could be used in statements about something else than uses of words. The sorts they control link up with, or exclude, other sorts and so are useful to us in ordering knowledge. But 'thing,' 'entity,' 'property,' 'attribute,' 'substance,' 'relation' do not create such sorts and do not link up with or exclude all other sorts in a similar fashion. They can be made to link up with, and exclude, *one another,* in an analogous way, as we shall see, and that is a main part of their service. They could not be used as an abstract schema of everything unless we could make them do this. But they are not names for things in the fashion in which other words are

names for things; and no question we can ask with other names can be legitimately asked with them.

To ask 'What is a particular?', 'What is a substance?', 'What is a property?' as though we were asking, 'What is a man?', is like asking, 'What is the universe inside?', or, 'What is space in?', or, 'Could time stop and go backwards?' These likewise are forms of words which only seem to have a sense through illegitimate analogy: for 'universe' and 'space' and 'time' are also bits of logical machinery. We can ask 'What is the earth inside?' or 'Can a train stop and go backwards?' But we cannot ask 'What properties has a property?' or 'What sort of thing is a thing?' And 'sort' and 'link' (as I have been using them through this discussion) are logical machinery belonging with the rest, unquestionable because assumed in the framework of every question.

'Sort' along with 'kind' is popular English for the technical logical term 'class,' and Logic has devised a number of ingenious paradoxes about the use of classes which illustrate the more general point. One of these has proved in many classrooms a favourite and unfailing stimulant to interest. Try to think of all classes. That is a class, seemingly—the class of all classes. What will it contain? Will it contain the class of 'all classes' among the rest? And can it reasonably be thought both to contain itself and to be contained by itself? Try to escape from this by a declaration that no legitimate class can be a member of itself. Legitimate classes are those which are not members of themselves. Then that declaration has created the class of all classes that are not members of themselves. Now, suppose we ask, of *this class*, 'Is it a member of itself?' what happens? We are in a fix either way. If we say it *is*, damning it, then it becomes all right, *not* a member of itself; but if we say it *isn't* a member of itself, hoping to save it, then it becomes a member of the class of all classes that are not members of themselves, that is to say, alack, an indubitable member of itself. There is no way out, except to agree that either to affirm or deny that a class can be a member of itself is nonsense.

What this ingenious riddle shows about 'class'—namely that we should not ask of a class anything that we can ask of a member of it—is true *mutatis mutandis* of 'property,' 'relation,' 'substance,' and 'thing.' To have a property is not a property; a relation is not related to what it relates; substances have no substance, and thing-

dom is not a thing. Whenever we think of logical machinery as though it were of the same kind as what it handles we are thinking nonsense through bad analogy. So to ask about any of these words these questions which we rightly ask about other words, is, in Dodgson's parable, looking at the grin without the cat.

Instead then of asking 'What is a property, a particular, a universal?' and so on, we must ask another question, namely: 'What use to us are these terms?' A full answer would be a complete course in the classification, ordering and articulation of thought, and to give it would be the second of the things we could try to do (see p. 353); but I can only sketch and illustrate a few leading uses in the next chapter.

Chapter Twenty-two: Logical Machinery: Some Uses

He that knows names do not always stand for ideas, will spare himself the labour of looking for ideas, where there are none to be had. It were therefore to be wished that everyone would use his utmost endeavours, to obtain a clear view of the ideas he would consider, separating them from all that dress and encumbrance of words which so much contribute to blind the judgment and divide the attention. In vain do we extend our view into the heavens, and pry into the entrails of the earth; in vain do we consult the writings of learned men, and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity; we need only draw the curtain of words, to behold the fairest tree of knowledge, whose fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our hand.

BERKELEY, *A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*

All thought is sorting. We never think of a mere 'it'; we always must make a 'what' of it in thinking. Similarly we never contemplate a mere 'what'; we always must take it as the 'what' of 'its.' This, which in technical language is the inherence of universals in particulars and of particulars in universals, has been central doctrine since Aristotle, offering, through the mistaken analogies glanced at of the last chapter, plenty of chances for misunderstanding. What it says fundamentally is that the terms in the two columns on p. 347 (and any substitutes we give them) are relative to one another. We never have to do with a thing apart from its attributes or with attributes apart from things which have or haven't them. Language by its ellipses will often make us think it is otherwise; but if we expand our language we find that we are always referring to things and referring to them in some distinguishable way.

Let me now attempt a summary descriptive classification of a selection of the words in my two columns. It does not pretend to indicate current usage faithfully; that is so shifting and free that a whole book would be required to display it. My notes are no more than a hint as to an obvious form of exercise that could, I believe, be made both attractive and instructive. In settling some words to fixed uses for my purpose in the rest of the chapter, I am being arbitrary. That does no harm if it focusses attention on their uses. We have nothing to teach here; all we have to do is devise good ways of directing attention, so that our pupils may take note easily of what they know already.


What we have to avoid is the suggestion that each of these words has only one proper use, and that if we use it otherwise we shall be wrong. That suggestion leads to mere despair. As a specimen of the wrong way of explaining their uses, here are some extracts from a worthy work on *English Synonyms* by George Crabb, 1826:

> *Quality* signifies such a thing as really is; *property* signifies belonging to a thing as an essential ingredient; *attribute* signifies the things bestowed on or assigned to another. The *quality* is that which is inherent in the object and co-existent; 'Humility and patience, industry and temperance, are very often the good qualities of a poor man.' ADDISON. The *property* is that which belongs to it for the time being; 'No man can have sunk so far into stupidity, as not to consider the *properties* of the ground on which he walks, of the plants on which he feeds, or of the animals that delight his ear.' JOHNSON. The *attribute* is the *quality* which is assigned to any object;
>
> Man o'er a wider field extends his views,
> God through the wonder of his works pursues,
> Exploring thence his *attributes* and laws,
> Adores, loves, imitates, th' Eternal Cause.
>
> JENYNS.
>
> We cannot alter the quality of a thing without altering the whole thing; but we may give or take away *properties* from bodies at pleasure, without entirely destroying their identity; and we may ascribe attributes at discretion.

It will be noticed that the author's various declarations disagree sadly: can we take away at pleasure "essential ingredients? that his distinctions do not distinguish, and that his quotations fail to support him; but the important point is his pretence to possess some

mysterious warrant to arrest these words if they do not behave as he would have them. Actually he is trying to give them, *in general,* what are specialized uses taken out of various different philosophic traditions. If we can avoid doing this, avoid, above all, adopting the legislative attitude in our turn, then, I think, a very important use in teaching might be made of such examples from the Synonym Books. It would be worth while to experiment with them; to give sets of words that occur frequently (perhaps easier words than these, say, *Beautiful, fine, handsome, pretty,* as well as, say, *Cause, condition, conduce, contribute*) with some attempts such as the above to discriminate them; and to see what a class could do with them at leisure and with some weeks perhaps in which to collect and study examples. I can think of no more fruitful way of showing them how words really take their meanings from their settings.

Not forgetting this, let me in my turn attempt a classification of these words.



Properties, as the table suggests, I take as a general term including Qualities and Relational attributes. Perhaps through the modicum of life left in its metaphor, *property* seems to resist the specializations that *predicate* and *attribute* undergo. *Predicate,* having a main use in grammar for the part of the sentence containing what is stated about the subject, keeps the fact that something is being said in mind; it may carry suggestions that something is being seriously maintained, but is not necessarily so; like *property* it includes both Qualities and Relational properties. *Attribute,* too, covers both; but has often a strong suggestion that what is thought or said to be so is not so, or may not be (from 'attributed to Shakespeare,' and so on) and sometimes an equally strong 'of course' gesture ('to bear a club is an attribute of Hercules; being Hercules, he has his club, of course'). This can go further to suggest that a thing's attributes are what make it what it is, that is, are among its defining properties. *Predicate,* I fancy, keeps clear of this. But *character* and still more *characteristic* do not; both suggest 'really belonging,' not accidental to a thing but essential and inhering, *part* of or manifesting its *nature*—to bring in two more

words that are sometimes only bits of logical machinery, and may be used as freely and loosely as any of them.

Quality I am technicalizing by putting it where I do in the table as a sub-division of properties over against relational properties. Actually it wanders with the rest and can be used for an unmistakable relational property ('Autolycus in his quality of a picker up of unconsidered trifles'). It has an important specialization in suggesting value, 'good quality.' *Character* shares this. Both are often words of praise; *characteristic* on the other hand has sometimes a derogatory smack. These gestures are worth noting because undoubtedly the complex ironies these words have been used to carry have been among the factors preventing any development of rigid logical uses. They have had, from the point of view of the conversationalist and the literary man, more important work to do.

For our purposes here, though, the contrast between *qualities* and *relational properties* is what matters most. A quality is the simplest form of property. But this, for the reasons discussed in the last chapter, is a way of putting it which is likely to mislead. As the simplest form of property, we ought, we may think, to be able to give examples. *Red, cold, painful* may occur to us as names of qualities. If we look into what we mean by them, however, doubts will arise. Do they, after all, stand for qualities or for relational properties? But this again is not the best way of putting the question. Not *what they stand for* but *how we take them* is what we have to inquire into.

Consider 'Diogenes is wise.' We can take it as attaching a predicate (attribute, quality, character, characteristic or universal) to Diogenes. All these words may in some settings be interchangeable indifferently, but in others a change may make an important difference. But before discussing that, it will clear things to consider 'Diogenes' a little. What does it do? With this, we take a glance at some of the words in my left-hand column. We can take it as doing various things and some of these will give us different propositions.

(1) We can take it as a mere name, that is, as 'the thing called Diogenes'—regardless of which thing it is except as having that name. It might be a dog, for example, and I have known a tortoise of that name.


(2) We can take it as more than a mere name, as carrying with

it a further description, say, 'the Greek philosopher who lived in a tub.' That is, we are sorting differently as we use it; we are taking the 'it' we are talking about as being a 'what' in further respects. It is no longer just 'what has that name,' but also 'what was a Greek philosopher who lived in a tub.'

(3) We may (on either (1) or (2)) take what we are talking about to be the whole life of the thing (the man, Diogenes, say, for simplicity) or some limited period in his life (when he came out of his tub for example) or more narrowly still, some single instant of his existence, some one of his acts, not his acts in general. And, with that, one of the main uses of 'particular' comes in to mark whether it is some particular act that is wise, or whatever Diogenes does (among such of his doings as can be wise).

This instance is almost as simple a one as I could choose; but, even in the simplest cases, there is room for such alternatives, between which we must decide, with the help of the setting. The fact that the examples we can hardly help using in these discussions are without settings has had an unfortunate effect throughout Logic. We have to compensate for it by frequently reminding ourselves that sentences never occur in actual speech without some guiding setting, shadowy or full, suggestive or decisive.

Here the setting consists only of 'is wise'—little enough, but still something,—and what we take ourselves to be *talking about* with 'Diogenes' is governed in part and varies with what we take ourselves to be *saying about it* with 'is wise.' What *are* we saying with 'is wise'? Grammar suggests, and logicians have too often been ready to follow it blindly, that 'wise' names a simple predicate. That is, all 'is wise' does is to attach a quality 'being wise' to Diogenes. A diagram of the proposition would then be D^W. Or, to use other machinery, that we are putting Diogenes in the class of 'wise things,' when the picture would be



and wise things would be things having a quality, W. That may be a sufficient account for some purposes, but if we go on asking what we mean by 'wise' it is clear we may mean something much more complicated than this account takes note of: e.g. 'Diogenes is wise' = 'Diogenes sometimes (or always) does what, under the circumstances, is the wise thing,' and then, pursuing the question, 'What is the wise thing?' we may get, say, 'The thing which will lead, in all reasonable expectation to the best result.' And then, if we ask about 'best' in its turn, we shall get a definition out of some ethical doctrine. In this way the simplicity of D^W as a picture of what we are saying becomes inappropriate. We shall need more complex machinery to exhibit the form of the proposition expressed by 'Diogenes is wise.' Something more like this for example:

'Some of the acts of Diogenes, occurring, as they do, in certain relations to other things (events, say, happening before, during and after his acts) cause (short for a very complex set of relations between the acts and other things) events which are the best (which, let us say, means are such that they will lead to all concerned being as happy as is possible).' A picture of this would be unendurably complicated but an outline of it would be something like this:

Things being thus and thus	D ⋮	his acts	Cause	Events which make	A B C etc.	happier than if D's acts had been otherwise.

This is a long way from the seeming-simplicity of D^W. But there is no doubt that anyone who on an ordinary occasion said, of a man he knew, 'He's wise' or of one of his acts, 'That was wise,' would be saying something of this order of complexity, and would, for most purposes of discourse, be using the word 'wise' as a short handy expression for a proposition whose form would be more like my picture than like D^W. Just what form he would take his proposition to have (or we, in listening to him, would take it as having) would depend upon the purpose and occasion. But only if we were talking to tots in the nursery would we give it a D^W simplicity! For all ordinary purposes it will be pretty complex, as

we can see from the remarks it normally calls forth; for example, 'I don't know about that. He seems to be forgetting what nationalism is like.' Here 'having taken account of the relevant factors' has been *included* in the form of 'is wise.'

The point I am making is the one discussed in Chapter XVII—that the forms of propositions do not tally with the verbal forms of their expressions. It is an extremely obvious point, but, like other obvious points, is incessantly overlooked, and overlooking it is the source of much stupidity. As Mill wrote, 'Were we to search among men's recorded thoughts for the choicest manifestations of human imbecility and prejudice, our specimens would mostly be taken from their opinions of the opinions of one another.' And this comes about chiefly through giving inappropriate logical forms to what they are saying.

The degree to which we illegitimately derive our opinions of other men's opinions directly from the verbal forms of their expressions can hardly be over-stressed. But before discussing some mistakes it leads us into I must say more about our choices of variable forms of proposition for sentences that remain verbally constant.

It may be thought that this variability only occurs with such words as 'wise'—that the trouble is that this word stands for a peculiarly nebulous, shifting and unstable notion. Let us take 'white' instead, and say 'Chalk is white.' This looks much more certainly a proposition of the form, $Ch.^{W}$, in which a quality, white, is just attached to a substance, chalk. These colour adjectives are in fact the favourite examples used in illustrating the simplest types of propositions. And for most purposes such an analysis is sufficient, but only because the conditions under which we say that chalk is white are so conveniently constant. We can pack them all up (normal lighting and eyesight, no colouring matter added, and so on) into a conditional clause which we need not express because everyone will suppose them assumed. But go outside the routine of ordinary settings in any direction, start talking physics or physiology or psychology, and 'Chalk is white' has to be given a much more complex form. It becomes a relational proposition with a large number of different terms, among others the condition of the visual system. Have a bad enough attack of jaundice (or take a dose of santonin) and white chalk will turn into yel-

low chalk. This, you will say, is a catch. I have shifted my sense of 'chalk' from the substance, chalk, to what I see when I look at it, i.e., the appearance of it to me. If I have, that brings out my point here, that even so seemingly simple and reliable a sentence as 'Chalk is white' or 'I see yellow chalk' can express propositions which must be given highly complex forms if they are to be understood sufficiently for even a mild discussion to be possible. Everybody perhaps will grant this. But the fact that so much of the practical daily routine of language keeps within spheres for which the governing conditions (as with buying and selling coloured chalks) remain so constant that they can be assumed unmentioned, misleads us. We think that what we are saying is much simpler than it is. All that is true is that we can *safely take it as simple.* The constancy of the conditions keeps the complexities from worrying us.

Compare, now, 'loud,' 'long,' 'sweet,' 'warm,' 'hard,' 'heavy.' We take all such words for most purposes as standing for qualities; but everyone is familiar with the situations in which we have to give this up and take them as making a covert comparison. Whether it is loud then depends on the rest of the hubbub and so on. So, too, but more frequently and obviously, with 'pleasant,' 'boring,' 'exciting,' 'wonderful.' They are often used as though it was safe to take them as qualities, but we all know that what pleases one does not please another; and their grammar here gives a hint that they name complex properties.

We have an interest often, in addition to our inclination to simplicity, in taking such words as standing for qualities. To say 'It's boring!' is not the same in its effects as to say 'It bores me.' The first suggests that all right-minded people would be bored by it too, that its power to bore is inherent in it as part of its very nature. The second is humbler and opens the gate a little wider to speculations about the causes of the boredom.

These everyday problems in the choice of logical forms swell suddenly into what seem formidable and profound philosophical affairs when we come to the use of 'beautiful,' 'good,' and 'true,' but are not changed. The disputes which have raged over them make us suppose that whether Beauty is a quality inherent in things, or a capacity for arousing certain effects in beholders (and equally disturbing problems for 'good' and 'truth') is a momentous

question to be settled. But 'Is Beauty a Quality?' (Or, 'Is Beauty Objective?' which may sometimes mean the same) is a question very likely to be vitiated by the vacuities I discussed in the last chapter. To say it is a quality is to say *nothing*—except that, for certain purposes, to take it so would be a sufficient analysis of a proposition about beautiful things. It would be in 'She was only a beautiful Princess,' for example. But in 'Beauty resides in the eye of the beholder,' it would not.

I do not know whether it is more saddening or encouraging to reflect upon the enormous labour of thought which has been devoted to these topics; devoted so often in vain because the thinkers failed to observe that they dealt with similar problems all the time successfully in their conduct of other words. There is no 'general problem' of Beauty, or of the Good or of Truth, any more than there is a general problem of Funniness, of the Clean, or of the Straight; of Oddness, of Health or of the Exact. There are a million specific problems about beautiful, good and true things, in the many senses of these words, instead. But this is only a provoking way of saying that some problems which men have set themselves under these titles are products of the mistaken analogies which make us treat qualities, properties, universals, essences and so forth as though they were not logical machinery. How this happens both in these august topics and in humbler everyday matters is for the next chapter to discuss. Here I want only to insist that every sentence we reflect upon brings up questions about the choice of a logical form for it, and that *that* can never be settled apart from its purposes and occasions. Thus, in a very different sense from Mill's, every sentence can be made a lesson in logic; and the best sentences for that purpose are not those of philosophy but those of everyday life, for with them we are all, at times, consummate practical logicians. To control our skills a little more constantly is all we need.

So far I have been discussing the uses we make of this logical machinery in the background of every sentence, in settling what form we give to the proposition. But there are more explicit uses and abuses, and failures to notice the logical form of the proposition appropriate to the purpose beset whole subjects. Consider the logical forms appropriate in discussing for different purposes what

we so easily call 'a poem.' We have a choice of many different types of object here. Among them are:

(1) Some one person's reading of certain marks on paper, his experience, let us say, as he reads them. As such, it has a date, lasts two minutes and, to turn to Column One, is an individual or a particular, that is, *unique,* as all occurrences are. And, as such, it is excessively hard to talk about with any certainty that we are not talking instead about what we remember of it, which may be very different and is of another type. For memories recur and recur, but the poem (in sense 1) does not. What memory holds of it is certain similarities between recurrent 'rememberings' which call themselves 'rememberings of it' and, as the psychology of evidence shows very disturbingly, what we think we remember grows and changes strangely with frequent rememberings. Thus already we have two poems: (1) the vanished particular occurrent, (2) a memory of it which is a recurrent product of various efforts to recall it. This is not a particular in the strict sense; it is something we can have more or less the same again and again. It is a class of similar rememberings and therefore a thing of a different logical form. (3) Now suppose we re-read the lines and study them. So we arrive, perhaps, at 'an understanding of the poem.' By this let us mean, for simplicity, some fairly settled interpretation which we expect will be our interpretation of it in the future—whenever we read it while alert, and unless we improve or deteriorate as readers, or unless someone points out something new about it. (4) Now suppose a number of people read the lines and agree 'in admiring the poem,' as we say. What are they admiring? Each is admiring a poem of type 3 let us suppose. In all probability, however, some of them will only have got as far as 2. So 'the poem,' which they all admire, cannot be what we will pretend it is, if we have not thought about the problem. It is not a single thing, however much we talk as though it were a single thing *there* publicly before us all to be directly examined. Instead it is a class of things (interpretations of different people and of the same people at different times), which we replace, for social reasons, by a fictitious single object.

In having this status, or being of this type, it is not at all peculiar. Tables and chairs have the same status and are of the same type. But the conditions under which we perceive chairs are for-

tunately much more constant than those under which we interpret poems. Otherwise we would all die young of broken backs. Thus in literary gossip we would, if we ventured more often to go into details about our interpretations, find ourselves patently talking about differing poems. But talk about poems may have all sorts of purposes behind it: social, suasive, literary, comparative, analytic, scientific. . . . Behind the words, 'literary criticism,' we will find at least as many different studies with diverse aims as was the case with 'Grammar' (see p. 189). And here too these aims get in one another's way. The parallel deserves to be worked out in detail. Meanwhile confusion between these aims is the chief source of controversies about general critical theory. While it reigns no one can expect his opinions to receive what will seem to him fair treatment. Undoubtedly, it would be healthy for literary studies, if the different logical forms of 'Shakespeare wrote a good poem,' appropriate for different purposes, were more widely recognized.

It will be noticed here again that the pretence that the appropriate logical form is $S \rightarrow P^G$ is much more *persuasive* than, say,

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="4">S → words which</td><td>interpreted by A give a</td><td rowspan="4">and a (mine) excites, under heaven knows what conditions, in me, enthusiasm</td></tr>
<tr><td>" " B give b</td></tr>
<tr><td>" " C give c</td></tr>
<tr><td>" " " give "</td></tr>
</table>

$S \rightarrow P^G$ is more apt to make people think they agree. In this it is useful. The same inducement that we noticed with 'objective beauty' is at work. But for other purposes a fuller analysis is more useful. This need not lead anyone to abandon the customary modes of writing and talking about poems. I am not suggesting that anyone should adopt the ridiculous plan of trying to make his conversation, or his Essay, accord verbally to what he takes to be the logical form of his propositions. (See Chapter IX, page 152, *re* definite, V, ideas.) He would soon become unbearable if he did. This disclaimer would be out of place if readers were not so fond of supposing that this *is* the recommendation. I have been complaining that we too often derive logical form, mistakenly, from syntax. The remedy is certainly not in pretending to reverse the process and to derive our syntax from logical form. We cannot do it, and would deceive ourselves if we tried. What we can

do is to separate them more clearly; write in one way and think in another, which I believe is what the best writers do. And their readers must follow the thought, not the words. As Berkeley wrote, 'They advise well, that we attend to the ideas signified, and draw off our attention from the words which signify them.'

But Logic is an exception. In examining logical problems we have to try to make our analyses accord with or indicate form more fully *when we can*. For, on the forms of propositions their relations to one another depend, and we can only contemplate forms persistently when they are expressed. But because the forms of most propositions of ordinary discourse are too complex to be represented with any precision, Logic confines itself to studying a few simple forms out of which by combination the more complex forms are built up. This gives an artificial air to its treatment which is depressing, unless the student understands why it must be so. The examples that logicians discuss are usually *not* instances of what they profess to be discussing—unless we agree to treat them as such, that is in a fashion quite unlike that in which we treat them in ordinary speech. For example, a logician will say [1] that

(1) *Mussolini is mortal*
(2) *Voltaire is witty*
(3) *Havelock Ellis is old*

express propositions of the same form. The moment we look into them and ask 'What do "mortal," "witty" and "old" mean?' we see that this is flagrantly not so. *In an ordinary setting,*

(1) 'is mortal' = 'will die sometime'
(2) 'is witty' = 'makes remarks which cause, in certain people, a peculiar pleasure, and in others a peculiar annoyance'
(3) 'is old' = 'has lived through many years'

And with these expansions the seemingly similar adjectives stand for very different logical forms. But that was not what the logician was interested in. His point was that if we took these adjectives *as standing for qualities,* and thus took the three prepositions as

[1] Cf., e.g. Dr Stebbing's *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, p. 51. I have discussed this question from another angle in *Basic in Teaching, East and West*, p. 9.

having the forms M^M, V^W, and E^O, they would have the same form. And, if we did so, undoubtedly, they would. There is thus a very important 'Let's pretend' condition governing the logician's choice of examples. They are chosen, *not as examples,* from current speech, of certain forms, but as *illustrating* them, if we agree to accept certain conventions. And these forms we must not expect to meet with in ordinary discourse any more than we expect to meet with geometrically straight lines or perfect circles in our ordinary commerce with things. And the parallel may be carried further. The fact that nothing in experience is straight does not make geometry useless. Similarly Logic's concern with simple forms does not make Logic useless; the simplicity is the condition under which logical analysis can be conducted with rigour. But an explanation of this point would prevent much misunderstanding.

Similarly, Logic commonly takes a proper name, such as 'Socrates' as naming a particular. When we learn what Logic means by 'a particular,' we see at once that 'Socrates,' as we commonly use such a name, does not stand for a particular, but for a class. It stands equally for Socrates-at-that-moment and for Socrates-at-the-next-moment and so on. The virtue of a name is that it does so. It is only useful if we can go on using it for different occurrences of Socrates. But a particular does not recur. It is something on the model of our old friend, a point (or a point-event)—something unique and single which we invent (as we invent points) for purposes of analysis. As such, it cannot be *named* in the fashion in which we name other types of objects, for these other types of objects are classes or series of particulars, or universals.

This brings up a more troublesome matter. Logic invents for purposes of analysis, objects which it calls, in opposition to particulars, 'universals'—that is, whats. A universal (other names for it are 'predicate,' 'attribute,' 'property'—including qualities and relational properties) is, for Logic, an instrument in analysis which, if we do not see what Logic is doing with it (and too many logicians also do not see this) will rightly seem to us very queer. I remember spending some of the leisure of youth disputing with certain logicians about their doctrine that 'even if there were no things at all, there would still be the property (universal) of being 107 in number.' It would, they agreed, belong then to nothing at all, but still would be a universal. The dispute was idle; each thought

the other was being wilfully perverse. We were forgetting Aristotle and taking these universals, and the word 'is,' too seriously.

The point, however, is worth some attention, since no beginner in Logic, at present, can avoid some struggles with it. Current doctrine in Logic invites misunderstanding, many logicians are themselves ensnared, and one of the most important of logical distinctions is commonly expounded in a fashion which makes a distracting miscomprehension all but inevitable for a while. This is the distinction between what are known in Logic as the *connotation* and *denotation* of terms. Both words have a long and varied non-technical usage. Mill, I believe, technicalized them for Modern Logic; at least the references given usually do not go further than him. In non-technical use, the connotation of a word or phrase is what it suggests—often something extraneous and quite inessential. 'Pinks,' for example, may make one think of summer gardens and the sea-side, things not at all necessarily involved in something's being a pink. That may be the connotation of the word, for someone on a given occasion—what it suggests to him. And, similarly denotation, in free usage, is often no more than a name or description applicable to a thing. But technically the two words mark distinctions, which, if we can avoid the misconceptions which much current teaching imports, are extremely useful in any discussion of definition and in any attempt to explain the differences between the necessary, or essential, and the accidental, or contingent, characters (or properties) of things. These distinctions are a main part of the machinery with which we handle the link-up of words with things (see Chapter XXIII, pp. 385-389), and the shifts I was illustrating in Chapter XIX, pp. 338-341. These matters are so important for the conduct of thought that even the most elementary logic course must treat of them. The danger, as the history of the subject proves, is that we are thereby so likely to introduce metaphysical suggestions that are much more a hindrance than a help. In itself, a grasp of the distinction between an accidental and an essential property is as easy to acquire as it is useful. In practice, in choosing an apple for example, we have all mastered it perfectly. But in the process of reflection and analysis the student is likely to develop a conception of properties which will do him nothing but harm.

The *connotation* of a name, let us say, is the set of properties

that anything must have if the name is to apply to it; the properties implied by the name. The *denotation* of a name is just the things the name applies to; the things which have these properties which entitle them to be called by the name.

Try this distinction out with the words for which it was introduced, class names like *cat, pint, triangle,* and no difficulty arises. It is obviously useful in cleaning up several sorts of ambiguities in 'What the word means,' 'The meaning of the word,' 'What I mean by it' etc. It helps us to separate (1) *All* the properties possessed in common by all the members of a class (or the comprehension), and (2) The properties we happen to think of as possessed by all the members (subjective intension), from (3) the connotation proper, those properties on account of which anything is put in the class and called by the name; and to separate all these from the things, the members of the class. These are great services. On the other hand, if we try making the distinction with other kinds of words, the perils that were discussed in Chapter XXI crowd upon us *and others with them.* In what follows I shall keep to these others, though Chapter XXI is also being illustrated here.

A chief trouble comes with abstract names. Dr Keynes writes, 'An abstract name *denotes* the qualities which are *connoted* by the corresponding concrete name.' *Redness* denotes what *red* connotes. This looks neat and right and seems to say something useful, until we try to see just what has been said. Then we notice that we may be introducing a very rash piece of metaphysics with the universal that *redness* denotes, or shifting the sense of 'denotes,' or both. The metaphysics appear very plainly in such an account as Jevons gives:

> Abstract terms are strongly distinguished from general terms by possessing only one kind of meaning; for as they denote qualities there is nothing which they can in addition imply (connote). The adjective 'red' is the name of red objects, but it implies the possession by them of the quality *redness;* but this latter term has one single meaning—the quality alone. Thus it arises that abstract terms are incapable of number or plurality. Red objects are numerically distinct each from each, and there is a multitude of such objects; but *redness* is a single existence which runs through all these objects, and is the same in one as it is in another. (*The Principles of Science,* p. 33.)

The artificiality of this account and its arbitrariness are very evident. But, and this is perhaps the most important point for the teacher, the account is by no means put forward, nor are such accounts usually taken, as either arbitrary or artificial. It is the orthodox view of the grammar books (so far as they have one) as well as of Logic, and readers all but inevitably get the impression (so far as they get hold of anything at all) that it is an account of some very fundamental facts about language and how it works, not a tricky set of suggested definitions to be used only for certain purposes of analysis. Of course, I am not complaining that the account is artificial. The burden of Chapter XXI was that any account of this machinery must be artificial, since the machinery itself is. The complaint is that such accounts pretend to be about something other, and more, than our devices for displaying differences of meaning. They pretend to be about the structures of meanings in some 'absolute' sense of structure. Thus, at the heart of our whole system of distinctions for comparing our meanings we have, in traditional teaching, a gross case of that very confusion between statement and definition which we have seen, at so many points above (especially in Chapters XV and XXI) to be most frustrating. And it occurs just where thought is most needed; that is, on the 'how' of all our distinctions. It imposes upon what is in any case a hard enough matter a dense unnecessary mystery. 'Abstract' and 'concrete' are words that cannot be easy to handle. Their *useful* senses are too mixed and too shifting for that; but there is no necessity to make them more obscure still by giving a first place, in this fashion, to a sense for 'abstract' which is *not* useful, which is a strayed piece of metaphysics unintelligible *out of its supporting system,* and which is therefore a prime source of the fear of bewilderment that haunts this subject. It is vitally important that we should make the differences, and the peculiar powers, of abstract and concrete thinking as clear as we can to our pupils. But we cannot hope to give them any insight if we encourage this traditional confusion. On the other hand, we cannot ignore it. Our pupils will have received it already, and language prompts it with a thousand suggestions a day. The only thing to do is to take some vigorous statement, such as this from Jevons, invite close attention to it, and expose it boldly. We shall find, that such an examination gives, at the same time, a useful exercise in several other mat-

ters: among them, in that manoeuvring with inverted commas (see Chapter XIX, p. 327) for which a perfected curriculum would willingly find abundance of time.


First as to the metaphysics: '*redness* is a single existence which runs through all these objects, and is the same in one as it is in another.' Or, as Dr Keynes wrote, summarizing this view, 'An attribute considered purely as such and apart from its concrete manifestations is one and indivisible.' That is a familiar kind of Platonism and delightful, and much more, *in its proper place,* which is not here in the theory of words. So I should be brief, and say dogmatically that any philosophic doctrine such as this is something to be considered in the light of everything we can consider (The Ideas are, in origin, *religion* and belong there), not something to be smuggled, as a light assumption, into our account of how language works. If we smuggle it in, we will naturally then find that language supports it. It is probably not true that Plato, as some have said, derived his doctrine of Ideas from the behaviour of language; but, in any case, the behaviour of language can be made to support all conceivable views as to the nature of the universe. Assumptions about language are necessarily chief determining factors in all brands of metaphysics; that very fact should make us wary in basing our linguistic theories on any metaphysical doctrine. And we should be still more distrustful of any attempt to draw philosophic conclusions from what we suppose, or profess to observe, about the ways of words. If we keep the Doctrine of Ideas for elsewhere, and refrain from treating 'redness' and *redness* as more than analytic devices for comparing red things, we will be better placed to make observations about what words do. And it is these observations which are helpful. Anti-metaphysical (or, more specifically, anti-Realist) bias here is simply a protest against a method which needlessly obscures these observations.

One of them is that, in Jevons, 'denotes' shifts its sense importantly between '"Man" denotes *men*' and '"Redness" denotes *redness.*' For men are only denoted by 'man' through possessing the properties which 'man' connotes. 'Denotes' and 'connotes' in this sense are correlative and co-operative words. But with 'redness,' according to Jevons, this is not so. And we shall find this a case in which metaphysics, if taken seriously, interferes with Logic.

The reader may have felt that Jevons was niggardly, if not harsh,

in the passage I quoted. Why should not poor 'redness' have its connotation? Why should there be 'nothing which it can in addition imply'? As *denoting* a quality, why should not 'redness' connote such properties as *redness* must have in order to be properly called 'redness'? For example, being a colour, being extended, being the colour opposite to greenness? Why should he not treat 'redness' as we treat 'man'? The answer is that to do so would expose the artificiality of the whole business too much. There is nothing formally to prevent our doing so to any length we think worth while.

A diagram will perhaps help:




We could go further and say that 'visibility' connotes being perceptible; and 'perceptibility' connotes being apprehensible. If we want to carry on further still, we shall have to invent some new words, but there is nothing *formally* to preclude us from introducing, for contemplation, abstractions of any degree of remoteness from red objects that we please.

And for the view of logical machinery that is recommended here, there is no objection to doing so, since these terms are merely instruments of formal analysis. And there are clear advantages. The distinction between connotation and denotation has often been described as the *pons asinorum* of Logic. If we preserve the symmetry of their applications by keeping the metaphysics out, the distinction becomes very obvious. When we talk of pickled walnuts no one has any difficulty in distinguishing between the walnuts that are pickled and the pickling they have gone through. The denotation-

connotation distinction, if handled by itself, is no harder to grasp than that.

This abstraction scale runs parallel with a more familiar scale of generality, which we can picture simply with an enclosure series.



This scale of higher and higher generality is the one we commonly use, and the more elaborate-looking abstraction series is derived from it. Generality (or inclusiveness) is the handier comparing device, because while there need be no doubt that 'to be visible' is a wider notion than 'to be red' (since we know many visible things which are not red, but no red things which are not visible) there may well be doubt whether visibility is more abstract than redness. In fact there must be doubt until we have settled just what we mean by 'abstract' and in what sense one abstract thing can be more abstract than another.

The reason why accounts of abstract terms, such as Jevons', stop short so arbitrarily may now be evident. Give an abstract term an inch of connotation and it takes an ell! Jevons, of course, is well aware of this danger. Having said, in my quotation, that 'abstract terms are incapable of number or plurality,' he adds:

> It is true that we may speak of *rednesses* meaning different kinds or tints of redness, just as we may speak of *colours* meaning different kinds of colours. But in distinguishing kinds, degrees, or other differences, we render the terms so far concrete. In that they are merely red there is but a single nature in red objects.

The cloven hoof shows most in the last sentence. That is how the realm of thought is peopled with the natures that most lead men astray. That is the magical trick by which the Bushman finds a single malefic nature in all the objects in connection with which death has occurred. It is a queer part of the Principles of Science

that there should thus be 'but a single nature' in blood, sunsets and rags, and all that is 'merely red.'[1] But more to the immediate point here is the manoeuvre in the preceding sentence. If, in distinguishing kinds, 'we render the terms so far concrete,' it is in quite another sense of 'concrete' (and 'abstract') from that in use in his opening sentence. For 'bright-redness' and 'dull-redness' are every bit as abstract (in his first sense of 'abstract' as being the name of a quality, not of an object) as 'redness.' By distinguishing degrees of an abstract quality, we do *not* make the words we use, or our meanings, less abstract in this sense. There is a confusion here, which appeared above in my citations from Dr Keynes; and if we wonder whether, after all, these abstruse-seeming topics *are* of any importance for general education, the answer is that while such confusions lurk in the teaching of them, we can hardly expect them to be of much benefit.

My point is that these topics are only abstruse because unnecessarily and remediably confused. And I give this avoidable confusion a high place among the factors which prevent that self-examination and self-control of thought on which improvement in general intelligence depends. Anyone who asks himself what he is doing in abstract thought and how to do it better must encounter these difficulties at present; and we make no attempt to help him with them. We cannot, unless we can first clear them up, in some degree, ourselves. I do not pretend that this account clears them up; but it attempts to show that they can be cleared up, in some degree, and that here is one way in which education might become less wasteful in its technique. The struggles of the protocol writers with 'concrete' and 'abstract' over the case of Love and the Motor Car will remind us that these problems cannot profitably be dealt with by dodging them.

In much of the above I have been following Sweet, whose dashing paper, 'Words, Logic, and Grammar' (1876), marked the beginning of a new epoch for linguistic studies. His discussion will state one of the main confusions clearly for us:

> An instructive instance of the dependence of logic on the accidents of language is afforded by the distinction it makes between such

[1] I am not quarrelling, of course, with the view that red things share a common property, but with a misleading mode of formulating that view.

> words as 'white' and 'whiteness.' 'Whiteness' is correctly described as an 'abstract' name, as signifying an attribute without reference to the things that possess the attribute. 'White,' however, is held to be connotative: it denotes particular objects and connotes the attribute 'whiteness.' How a word can be said to denote an object which is entirely unknown until the name of that object is joined to it, was always a matter of bewildering astonishment to me, when I first began to study logic, and probably has been to many others as well. The truth is, of course, that 'white' is as much an abstract name as 'whiteness' is, the two being absolutely identical in meaning. I consider, further, that all attribute-words are denotative and connotative, they denote an attribute and connote attributes of that attribute. (p. 19)

Unluckily he now shifts the sense of 'connote' inadvertently, impeding his exposition but providing a useful exercise in these distinctions. He continues:

> Thus the word 'colour' is the name of an attribute, but it also connotes all the various kinds of colour, red, blue etc.; 'bright' connotes various degrees of brightness, and so on.

This, I think, is a slip, not an intentional change of 'connotes.' 'Colour' is the name of a general attribute and 'red,' 'blue,' etc. are names of relatively specific determinations of colour, but 'colour' does not connote them any more than 'animal' connotes being a pig, a donkey, etc. Reds, blues, etc. may be denoted by 'colour' and their specific attributes *being red, being blue,* etc. are included in *being coloured* as the members of a class are included in a class, but they are not, except in a changed sense of 'connote,' connoted by the name of *being coloured,* i.e. 'colour.' Similarly any brightness will have some degree, but the various degrees of brightness are not connoted by 'brightness.'

However, on page 18, Sweet states the source of the main confusion about abstractness admirably.

> Such a sentence as 'Whiteness is an attribute of snow' has identically the same meaning as 'snow is white,' and 'white snow,' and the change of 'white' into 'whiteness' is a purely formal device to enable us to place an attribute-word as the subject of a proposition.

This takes us back to Dr Keynes and his 'unpunctuality is irritating.' (p. 350) His 'abstract use' and 'concrete use' of names de-

rives from the grammatical distinction. Whether a word is put as a subject or as an attribute in a sentence has nothing to do with whether, in another and a more important sense, what we are thinking of is thought of abstractly or concretely. This more important sense is best explained by means of an instance.

Suppose we are thinking of a bit of chalk. We can think of it as a white, light, smooth, smeary, small, fragile, rigid thing, here, now, in the hand. It has its own peculiar shape; it is going to be used in a certain way; it has a history behind it, was made by a certain process out of stuff which may have been dug out of a certain pit and once was laid down on the bed of an ancient ocean. The more completely we take note of it, and of everything that has to do with it, the more *concretely* (in this sense) we will be thinking of it.

Instead we may, for convenience and according to our purpose, set aside some of these innumerable possible aspects of it. If we only care for it as something to use on a blackboard, we think of it as just a bit of chalk. If we are chemically interested in it we think of it as calcium carbonate. Or, going a step further, we can think of it as a solid, or finally as just a thing. These may (in the sense) be said to be progressively more *abstract* ways of thinking of it. We have left out more and more of its distinctive properties.

There are clearly innumerable ways of abstracting. For example, we can think of this bit of chalk as being yellow, as being coloured, as being visible, as being able to be perceived by the senses, as being able to be thought of. This is another way of leaving out its distinctive properties. It will be noticed that these two ways of abstracting seem to end at the same point, the point at which we are merely thinking of it as a something—as a mere *it* with hardly any *what* about it, at which point it is barely distinguishable from a nothing. This is the most highly abstract sort of thinking and it is evident that so far from being difficult, highly abstract thinking is extremely easy. What is difficult is to keep *distinctions between abstractions* in order. And our logical machinery is intended to help us in this and has its only justification by so doing. Unhappily, instead of helping it usually hinders.

It is perhaps important to insist at this point that abstract thinking is not a highly specialized sophisticated intellectual feat. In all our thought we are abstracting to some degree, and the simplest

organism when its behaviour is selective is abstracting. As William James said, 'A polyp if it ever thought "Hallo thingemabob again!" would thereby be a conceptual thinker.' English philosophy throughout its best century was distracted into fruitless argument by a blunder about this. And I could have taken my examples not from recent text-books of Logic but from Locke and Berkeley. It was supposed that the mind began with concretes and then performed a peculiar operation which resulted in abstract ideas. But the mind is primordially abstractive; of whatever it handles, it takes some aspects and omits others, and the distinct things (Sense One of 'definite') it thinks of are from the beginning themselves products of abstraction. Thus we are naturally skilful beyond description in abstracting. What we are not sufficiently skilful in, as this chapter has tried to show, and has doubtless also inadvertently shown, is in reflecting on how we abstract.

Chapter Twenty-three: The Essential and the Accidental, and the Freedom in Definition

Man, proud man,
Drest in a little brief authority,
Most ignorant of what he's most assur'd,
His glassy essence, like an angry ape,
Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven
As make the angels weep; who, with our spleens,
Would all themselves laugh mortal.

Measure for Measure

The reason for cultivating reflection upon the process of abstracting—and with this I return to the point touched on when I began to discuss connotation and denotation (p. 372 in the last chapter)—is that only so can we improve discrimination between what is essential and what is accidental in a matter.

The flounderings of the protocols show how frequently people do not know what they are talking about: in this sense, that they cannot separate *the properties which determine the thing they are talking about* from other properties which may or may not belong to it *without* its being thereby any less itself. They wobble in a fatal indecision as to which exactly of the things they happen to know *about* a thing they will include *in* it, and constantly use accidents, or inessential properties, as defining 'its very nature.' The process, then, of clearing up their views must be that of giving them increased power to form new and better arranged *things* to think about. Or, rather, of making them recognize that what they mean by a word is within their own control—not given them inexorably by the language. And that in their choices here they create the things they are talking about.[1]

[1] For example, every sentence here may be confidently misread by those who wish to. 'Create'? We do not create anything ever! 'Its very nature'? As though things possessed natures of their own! 'Not know what they are talking about'? Who does ever? And so on.

Exercises with this intent are easy to frame. Most controversies supply them. Best of all, perhaps, as I have suggested above, are selections of protocols illustrating other people's conceptions of a common topic. Sets of sentences following familiar *ambiguity paradigms* (See Appendix) may be useful and need less preparation. And translations into or from Basic force these decisions ceaselessly into attention. But what matters most in all such exercises is that the learner should be made to watch the consequences of his decisions, and see that what a word means (that is, here, what the *thing* is that he is talking about) depends upon the purpose in hand. It is no use expounding to him the difference between accidental, or contingent, and necessary, or essential, properties unless he sees that what is essential for one purpose is inessential for another and why. Thus many favourite ways of illustrating the difference do little good. If, as logicians have lately been fond of doing, we take our examples out of the exact sciences, or from those parts of them for which the problems of definition have been finally settled, we are likely to create an unhelpful impression that the task turns on *knowing* the answer, not on *finding* it. Thus, if we explain that 'being a plane curve,' 'having its radii equal,' and 'having the angle in the segment subtending a diameter a right angle,' are *essential* properties of a circle; but 'having a diameter 3 inches long' is an *accident,* we will be illustrating the difference but may hide the reason. It suggests that circles *are* so; not that for the purposes of the geometer circles have been made so. And this often imports a notion of 'correct meanings'—valid enough and for good reasons in the sciences—which is not valid and merely obstructive outside them. It is better to take some word like *man* or *beautiful* or *poetry* in place of *circle,* and try what happens with say,

Human nature never changes
Man is a creature of infinite variety

There is no 'correct meaning' for man or human in such sentences. The task of interpreting them is that of finding out which meanings work best for which purposes. In other words, of trying various choices among properties which may be taken as essential to the meaning of *man* and seeing what happens with them.

Man is, in one way, better for such purposes than *beauty* or *poetry.* For it is not quite so likely as with other words that we

will suppose that there is something which man *really is,* and that we could know what this is and thereby settle the question of his changeableness. But people do very frequently behave as though there were something which beauty *really is,* and another thing which poetry *really is,* and that doubts about questions using the words *beauty* and *poetry* are due to our ignorance about these things and not about our use of the words. I will not dilate upon the mischiefs which these absurd supposals cause. I have written about them elsewhere, especially in *Basic Rules of Reason,* and could write again for they are an inexhaustible theme.

This has brought me to the last main point I can discuss in this summary sketch of a course in Logic, namely the freedom of definition. I have said something at several places above about the peculiar paralysis which the mention of definitions and, still more, the discussion of them induces. It can be prevented, I believe, by stressing the purposive aspect of definitions. We want to do something and a definition is a means to doing it. If we want certain results, then we must use certain meanings (or definitions). But no definition has any authority apart from a purpose, or to bar us from other purposes. And yet they endlessly do so. Who can doubt that we are often deprived of very useful thoughts merely because the words which might express them are being temporarily pre-empted by other meanings? Or that a development is often frustrated merely because we are sticking to a former definition of no service to the new purpose?

The limitation of thought to successive moments, its discursive character, we can bear:

> The troubles of our proud and angry dust
> Are from eternity and shall not fail.
> Bear them we can, and, if we can, we must.

But that our thought, which is clear and in order one moment, should, in the next, be twisted, clouded, closed, merely because we are insufficiently supple in changing the meanings of our words, is harder to bear; for it is, in a large measure, unnecessary and remediable. Logic usually stresses the other aspect—the excessive ambiguity of words—but their excessive rigidity and obstinate at-

tachments to inappropriate meanings should be at least equally noticed. It makes a happier starting point for a discussion.

Subject only to our purpose—which, I need hardly say, *includes communication*—we are free to define our words as we please. This, of course, applies also to the word 'definition'; and I am availing myself of this freedom here. A first consequence is that there will be many different things which, for different purposes, will equally properly be called definitions. Logicians, who tend to neglect explicit discussion of purposes, usually attempt to restrict the word severely, and economize in their explanations. But a fairly full explanation is the only way to disperse the atmosphere of mystery, if not of hanky panky, which hangs over the topic.

The main varieties of definition have been touched upon already in discussing denotation and connotation. A statement of the connotation of a word is what is usually meant in Logic by a definition. I pass by the familiar troubles that afflict the question; 'Does such a definition define a *word,* its *sense* or a *sort of things?'* noting only what an opportunity for exercises in the use of inverted commas it affords. Let us consider definitions by denotation, or exemplificatory definition.

I defined in this way the most important sense of 'abstract' above, and in Chapter IX the most important sense of 'definite' (Sense IV). As we all know, such a method is very often by far the most convenient and the clearest way of showing how a word is to be used. The most effective definition of a finger (or of 'finger') is 'This and this and anything like them!' Similarly an epic may often most conveniently be '*Paradise Lost, The Odyssey* and such.' 'And such' is, of course, the difficulty: 'anything like them' in what respects? It may be excessively hard to say. In the limiting case there may be no relevant similarities whatever between our examples. Then we shall be deceiving ourselves, persuading ourselves that we are talking about a kind of things when there is no such kind. This happens probably more often than we would care to believe. Fairly often the only similarity is just that we call them alike—as Croce suggested in his definition of the Sublime (p. 247 above, Chapter XV).

But, none the less, we do succeed frequently in using these exemplificatory, extensive, denotative definitions with great advantage, in spite of being unable at the moment, or perhaps ever, to *say*

what are the common properties which make what we are talking about into a kind. Of course, they are a kind in so far as we call them by the same name; but they need to be a kind in another way, and this other way is, we hope, the ground for our calling them by a common name.

It is a fundamental truth that we can sort things rightly without knowing how we sort them. If we could not do this, we could never know anything. From our earliest, our behaviour is all sorting. William James' polyp with its 'thingemabob again!' was sorting. We may pick out things as alike in relevant respects without necessarily being able to say (or even think) anything about the respects in which they are alike. Between merely *recognizing* things and being able, in reflection, to discern the respect of likeness there is an immense gap in development. Most human beings grow across it at some points. Chimpanzees may perhaps cross it here and there; the lower animals probably never do. But even the most reflective humans cross it, hitherto, at relatively few points. Those who pretend that there is little further scope for human development are being unimaginative. We might indeed describe general education as the process of advancing this development at the nodal points. And one of the nodal points is certainly this question of our use of the word 'definition.'

Some logicians object to the process of giving examples being called 'definition,' and the objection will make the problem clearer. Dr Stebbing, for example, writes:

> It may, however, be doubted whether the giving of typical examples can be rightly regarded as a process of defining. . . . After being given the examples a man would then know more or less how to apply the word, but it seems doubtful whether he would know what the word (say, 'sonnet') expresses. Definition is only one of the means through which we come to understand words. We must be careful not to use 'definition' so widely that it comes to stand for any process enabling us to learn the application of names. These processes are so different that to call them by the same name leads to confusion. (*Op. cit.* p. 422.)

The first sentence, with its 'doubted' and its 'rightly,' seems to me to suggest that we are supposed to be inquiring here into facts about *something other than our uses of the word* instead of discussing a policy. If so, it illustrates my freedom of definition point.

The suggestion would be that, *if we knew more,* we could somehow settle the question whether giving typical examples is a process of defining or not, one way or the other. But we already know here all we need to know. This is not a question of fact like whether the tallest man in Cambridge has a g in his name; it is a question of policy, namely, whether, if we call this process 'definition,' we shall mislead ourselves and other people. And to *that* question the answer is, I think, that it depends on the explanations we give, and on our and their conceptions of the uses of words *in general.*

The rest of the passage is about this large question of policy. I must insist how large it is, otherwise there is some risk of the question seeming petty and 'merely verbal.' What is at stake is not just whether this one word 'definition' is to be used widely or narrowly, in one technical use or in many varying uses, but our whole conduct with words in assigning to them their meanings. Are we to control them by fixing, and remembering, single technical meanings or by familiarizing ourselves with the paradigms of their fluctuations in different settings? That is the really important question.

I grant, of course, and at once, that for technical purposes the logician can restrict the word 'definition' in any way he chooses. And if the 'we' at the head of Dr Stebbing's penultimate sentence stands for 'we Logicians,' I have no complaint. Let them be as careful as they like, if they let us see what they are doing. But this 'we' is not so unambiguous. On the opposite page we find 'what is ordinarily meant by "definition"' is the object of the chase and not just a technicality; and Dr Stebbing introduces the problem by considering 'under what circumstances in ordinary discourse we should need to ask for a definition.' So the caution seems to be addressed to users of the language in general, and it is this general legislation that I am concerned to challenge as being strategically calamitous. But as the situation is highly complex, the strategy is complex too.

The technical sense of 'definition' which Miss Stebbing recommends is described as follows:

> Two expressions are used, so related that the one is equivalent to the other. Definition always involves two expressions: the expression

(which may be a single word) to be defined, and the defining expression (which must contain more than one word).

The last qualification seems wilful and would be inconvenient for the Esquimaux or any other user of one-word sentences; moreover, may we not define 'incomputable' with 'incalculable' as well as with 'not able to be calculated'?

But this is trifling. The important points concern the words 'expression' and 'equivalent.' An expression, for the logician, is a word or group of words (or a mathematical or logical symbol); and the two expressions are equivalent if whatever we say with one can be said with the other. But 'say' is, as we know (along with 'expresses,' see Chapter VIII, pp. 135 ff. above), a trickily ambiguous word, and we shall do well to keep our eye on this. However, the logician's purposes are such that many things that are very troublesome to the literary man and the student of interpretation need not often bother him. The important point for him should be, how is he to prevent his definitions (in this sense) from remaining merely a circular system of more or less complex equivalent symbols? In other words, how is he to get them to apply to anything? For if, when we define a word, we merely supply an equivalent group of words for it, then the question *'What is this word's sense here?'* just gets bandied about through the vocabulary and is not answered until and unless we apply some other mode of definition in answering it. The question is rarely if ever, 'What other words could I use instead?' *That* question this restricted kind of definition does answer. It is, 'What sort of thing does this word stand for?' or 'What should I understand by this word' or 'What should I be saying (expressing, etc.) with it?' and these questions the account of definition I have been considering does *not* meet, though it professes to do so. We can see this by challenging it to define 'say' or 'express' or 'understand.' It can then take either of two courses. It can ring some changes with further words that may take their place; or it may reply that these words are *indefinables.* The first course does not meet the demand but only shifts its incidence. The second brings me to the point I have been approaching; which is that the 'equivalent expression' mode of definition (*the* logical mode) only does the work that both the logician and the general public require definitions to do when, at very many points, it links

up with modes of defining of *another sort.* Unless verbal expressions are equivalent at certain points with *other things than words,* definition remains merely a system of verbal manipulations unable to answer the reasonable and necessary demands, of many distinct kinds, which 'in ordinary discourse' we make when we ask for 'what is ordinarily meant by a "definition."' And it is because an understanding (we *all* understand—until we discuss the subject) of how verbal definition links up with other modes of definition is supremely important in the conduct of thought and language that I described the logical strategy in the matter as calamitous.

What we have to do is to extend the senses both of 'equivalent' and of 'expression' and then Dr Stebbing's process of definition becomes a special case of a more general process. We can also then take account of the articulation of words and meanings with life and action in a fashion which Logic too often neglects to do. But not all logicians leave that problem out; W. E. Johnson, for example, included it by recognizing what he called *ostensive* definition, that is, 'the act of indicating, presenting or introducing the object to which the name is to apply.' In brief by pointing to it, with our finger or with a glance. That is the fundamental mode of definition, as we all know if we are beginning to learn a language. The word thereby becomes equivalent *to the pointing.* We should be rather careful here not to suppose that the word on this view is said to be an equivalent for *the thing pointed to.* Dr Stebbing, for example, makes this mistake and refutes the view by writing, 'The process of pointing (whether metaphorically or otherwise) to the referend (her term for "what is signified"; here, what is pointed to) is not a process of defining since the referend is not another expression equivalent to the defined expression.' The referend is not, of course; but the pointing to it is. The word and the act are, with respect to the setting and purpose, *equivalent expressions.* This extends 'expression' to include any act whatever that may be found (in a given setting) a useful way of indicating the sense of a word. If we want to show what 'smirk' means, and have some voluntary control over our features, we do not try to give a verbal definition; we give an ostensive definition! This extension of 'expression' also establishes that wide and varied articulation between language and life that Logic sometimes leaves in such mystery. Indeed, if language were not being incessantly con-

trolled by extra-linguistic, non-verbal, definitions, and if words were not constantly equivalent to acts, it would soon lose all touch with anything, and simultaneously we would all lose intellectual touch with one another.

Extending 'expression' so, we are forced to recognize that 'equivalent' thereby acquires a variable range of senses. The strictest sense, which Logic aspires to use, makes two expressions equivalent where the one does *everything*, and no otherwise, that the other does. But this (as our discussion of translation in Chapter VIII showed) is a limit not in actuality ever attained. But with respect to some restricted purpose (for Logic, plain sense) one expression may on occasion be a perfect substitute [1] for another. Thus, as with translation—it is the same problem—we should recognize that definition is always *partial*. If we disregard all but a restricted purpose (or limited mode of communication, as Logic commonly does) we can overlook this and set ourselves very rigorous standards of precision. But a general theory of interpretation, which takes strict logical statement as only one mode of discourse, will remember our inevitable partiality, and point out that no expression whatever is entirely and in all respects equivalent to any other.

There is then nothing lost but everything to be gained by using different sorts of definitions for different purposes, or giving the word 'definition' various senses, provided we know and can make clear if need be to others what we are doing. That making clear will be itself a process of defining, of showing how we are proceeding. To put the matter in these terms is, I believe, a good way of dissipating the obstructive mystery about definition that is so daunting. Another is to invite the view that a definition is itself an invitation, a request, or, on occasion, an imperative; but *not* a statement. It is difficult in practice, so strong are normal writing habits, not to *urge* that this *IS so*. There is a temptation here to *insist* that definitions, properly regarded, are not statements, not true or false therefore, but only wise or foolish, prudent or imprudent, more like a

[1] Dr Stebbing (*op. cit.* p. 423) regrets that 'Mr Johnson has been led to the extraordinary view that definition is *nothing but substitution*.' She says, 'In defining we do not *substitute* one expression for another. We use *two* expressions related as we have explained. It is true that since the expressions are equivalent it is permissible to substitute one for the other on any occasion of its use. But the definition is not a *statement* that the one *can* be substituted for the other.' Johnson said that a definition was a substitution, not that it was a statement about it.

resolve to eat six dozen oysters than a record of fact. But if we adopt this plan, then clearly we have no business to insist or make statements about it: we are offering a definition (of 'definition') and if a definition is a request it should be expressed accordingly in the appropriate mood, which is not the indicative but the optative. So I should not say 'A definition is a request' but 'Come! let us understand by "a definition" an invitation to regard a certain word as meaning so and so. Will you be so good as to accept?'

This is the principle of Freedom in Definition and, evidently, like other freedoms it increases our responsibilities. I would add a subprinciple, or special assistant, namely, the Equivalence in Grammatical Formulation—which may lighten them. To propose a defining choice *in one grammatical form only* is always dangerous. The classical examples have been 'What is Truth?' and 'What is Beauty?' These suggest that our job is to catch an already determined universal.[1] Let us agree instead that:

What sorts of things are beautiful?
When are what beautiful?
Beautiful things are which things?
How is 'beautiful' used here?
With which logical form would it be convenient here to take 'x is beautiful'?

and so on . . . are all proper alternative formulations for the definition question we are asking. If we do so, we are much better placed to avoid mistaking logical machinery for what it handles.

A choice of a grammatical form very often seems to impose the use of a logical form. As I have urged repeatedly in Chapters XVII, XXI and XXII, this misleads us; a given sentence may, and often must, be read with varying logical forms. This principle, that we are free to use different grammatical forms in definitions as logically equivalent, states the complementary case and is a further defence against the tyranny (which feels like support) of logical machineries —against the restrictions we suffer if we forget that they are devices with no authority which does not derive from their services to us in analysis and comparison. They are modes of apprehension (mental

[1] We may recognize universals to be logical machines and thus harmless and yet note the distortions that metaphysical beliefs in them induce. In this they are like ghosts—to be feared though not believed in.

forceps), not things we grasp; but, forgetting this, we take them to be the very things themselves we aspire to talk about. 'Things themselves'! It is a notorious phrase and may make me seem here to be overlooking the limitations of thought. My point is only that what we think of is not to be regarded as necessarily having the logical form we find convenient in handling it. But still we can handle it only with some form of thought, with some logical instrument, though we can vary these—very much as we vary a word without changing our meaning. Logical machines are not themselves words; but they behave like language; so our handling of them reproduces the alternatives of the verbal situation.

In all this I am using my freedom of definition, offering an invitation to try how a view serves.

Of course, every such invitation can be parallelled by a statement 'that it has been offered'—as here—and so this proposal is not as drastic as it may seem. Yet the indicative mood is nowadays frequently a tyrannous usurper and—to continue in the optative—may we not think it would be a big mistake to identify the *invitation* with the *statement* that it has been offered? The advantage of regarding a definition as a request is that this clears up the question why it is neither true nor false. Bertrand Russell pointed this out in the Introduction to *Principia Mathematica:* 'A definition is not true or false, being the expression of a volition, not of a proposition.' I do not know whether he was consciously echoing Aristotle's remark in the *De Interpretatione:* 'Every sentence is not a proposition; only such are propositions as have in them either truth or falsity. Thus a prayer is a sentence, but is neither true nor false.' But Dr Stebbing is misreading him when she comments: 'This statement is certainly false. If a definition expresses a volition, it must be of the form "I am going to use 'X' to express what 'Y' expresses." This is a proposition which will be true if the speaker does so use "X," false if he does not.' Quite so, as to the last point; but a volition and a prediction are, alas! not the same. 'Expresses' is a terribly deceitful word, if it catches Dr Stebbing out so. For who will not agree that a definition, if it does express *a volition,* should be of the form, '*Let* "X" express what "Y" expresses'—as the mathematicians have it?

This is a rear-guard skirmish. None the less such things suggest exercises in interpretation that would open a new sort of approach to many old questions. And the considerations that decide them

have a bearing beyond Logic, or even beyond Grammar: they go to the heart of Rhetoric and Poetics, and concern the deepest divisions of the language functions. Perhaps Ethics and Religion, like Logic, should be written in the optative; make no statements but express volitions. Perhaps they *are* so written (in an ellipsis which can be mistaken for the indicative) and perhaps they are read so by those who best know their way about. The difference between these moods is often no more than an intonation. If so, the sometimes crude antithesis between Emotive and Scientific utterance would be translatable into happier terms. There would, of course, as with Logic, be always a possible derivative statement describing and distinguishing between the choices that were being made. But that would merely *represent* what was done by the utterance; it would not be the utterance. If we recognized more frankly that *how* any word whatsoever is used is a matter of choice, of invitation and consent, not of regimentation, conformity and compulsion, should we not *then* better understand how artificial are the imagined discrete senses of our words, how dependent they are on the meaning we give to the sentence. The more optative our view of definition, the more humane Logic becomes. On this view we can do as we please and the more we take any sentence as an invitation or request, to be considered on its merits—rather than as a mere statement, like a blow, to be suffered or repelled—the more we civilize communications. The thresholds of the moods are within our control, though as we change them, we are changed with them. And they shift perceptibly from generation to generation. What the mid-19th century parent thought was a mild appeal, we are apt to look upon as a bit of emotional bullying. So, all through the scale, the modes of utterance vary. Our meanings, not only in content but in modality, are in flux. Until recently, however, it would have been supposed that at least the indicative mood stood put! We are beginning to know better:

> What one in the rout
> Of the fire-born moods
> Has fallen away?

Nowadays, very evidently in Science, the indicative rests on an optative basis and is indicative (over widening fields) only within optative constancies. 'Let us think so, and go on still further think-

ing so, while we see what happens,' that is what we have to compare today, have we not? with 'It is so.' Admitting this, though *overt* syntax denies it in every sentence, we see that an optative, or invitational, Logic requires a more subtle and versatile, a better sustained and a more sensitively ordered art of interpretation. Otherwise our choice is only between crudity and chaos. An exploring writer not only uses more varied words than the ordinary man but he uses most of them in *many more ways*. He has to offer a far wider range of invitations to interpret, though never so many as Shakespeare was prepared to extend to *his* audience. Shakespeare's extreme freedom of definition has triumphed because he combined with it an unparallelled virtuosity in Grammar and, when he needed it, a supreme rhetorical tact. But let us remember how far we have come from the cradle, and then even Shakespeare will not seem too far above the generality of mankind to serve as an ideal of the command of life in language.

The Final Landing Stage

We can by no means require of the pure practical reason to be subordinated to the speculative, and thus to reverse the order; since every interest is at last practical, and even that of the speculative reason is but conditional, and is complete only in its practical use. KANT

From this vantage point we may look back to observe the incessant interaction and interdependence of Rhetoric, Grammar and Logic, and the strategic importance of keeping their problems in mind together. The Optative view of Definition (which is the central problem of Logic) makes the creation of the-things-to-be-thought-of, that is, the demarcation of Sense from the other language functions (which is the central problem of Rhetoric), a matter of our choice—subject, however, always to the exigencies of communication, that is, the provision of sufficiently stable inter-verbal action (which is the central problem of Grammar). By Definition things arise. If Berkeley had said of the objects of thought that TO BE was, for *them,* TO BE THOUGHT OF, few would have hesitated to agree; and yet this is not far from what he was most concerned to say. If we choose, wittingly or unwittingly, to think as the passions rather than the reason—the most inclusive integrating action—would have it (thus forcing on Rhetoric its degraded sense), or to speak without regard to the extant articulations of the senses of the words in the language (the dehumanizing disintegration of Grammar), we thereby become incapable of human companionship, that is, insane. The two departures often go together; but not always, alas! There are several spell-binding maniacs among the great personages of the world today. But, in general, the loss of reason entails the loss of efficient speech. Perhaps, if we can take a long enough view, that may be true too of the ruling madmen, their speech may destroy them; but meanwhile it is only too effective upon the correlative

madmen who are subservient to it. However that may be, it is still certain—

> That this pragmatical, preposterous pig of a world,
> its farrow that so solid seem,
> Must vanish on the instant did the mind but change
> its theme [1]

We can, moreover, almost daily notice that it changes. 'The eye altering, alters all,' and the eye—the intellectual organ that, in defining, determines the limits of things—is always altering, for worse there, for better here, we hope. But no one eye, no one creative outlook, settles anything. Like the words in a sentence, we are meaningless unless we take our senses from one another. The individual, alone, is nothing; though the whole takes its value from the individuals within it. Society thus has a Grammar—the co-operation of its members. This breaks down easily unless the instruments of co-operation, the languages of its members, serve and grow with it. And the sciences, the operative Logic through which alone modern societies live, have equally to be preserved—from the distortions and the taints of disloyal desires. The physical sciences are comparatively free from this danger. The social sciences are much exposed to it, and among them the linguistic studies, the practice and theory of the teaching of literature, for example. Rhetoric guards from these contaminations both Logic, and the deeper integrations of myth which speak for reason. It contains religion, as Logic contains science, and Grammar contains communication, and has the largest scope of the three. For in Rhetoric's care is that unity or, as Coleridge would have written, coadunation of the mind which is, whatever the deviations, the aim behind and before our strivings—an increasing organic interinanimation of meanings, the biologic growth of the mind in the individual and in a social inheritance maintaining the human advance.

[1] W. B. Yeats, on 'God appointed Berkeley that proved all things a dream.' 'Blood and the Moon,' *The Winding Stair,* p. 12.

Appendix: Some Suggestions Towards Class-room Exercises

> *For one instance of mere* logomachy (*i.e. unnecessary refinement of distinction*) *I could bring 10 instances of logodaedaly, or verbal legerdemain, which have perilously confirmed prejudices and withstood the advancement of truth. . . .*
>
> *For one useless subtlety in our elder divines and moralists, I will produce 10 sophisms of equivocation in the writings of our modern preceptors; and for one error resulting from excess of distinguishing the indifferent, I could show ten mischievous delusions from the habit of confounding the diverse.* COLERIDGE, *Aids to Reflection*

I put together here, in very tentative form, some Notes on a few types of exercise that might be modified by trial into means of implementing the policies suggested in the text. As I treat them, they are evidently of University, rather than of School or College order, though a good teacher would manage to scale the best of them down to near the Kindergarten level.

I will begin with those 'parallels' which caused so much headache when the comments on Campbell (see Chapter XII) were being collected. I gave this problem to my audience:[1]

> Please frame parallel sentences to the following, indicating whether your parallel supports, or does not support, the argument that the author in your view intended to urge.
>
> 1. Let those who look upon style as unworthy of much attention, ask themselves how many, in proportion to men of genius, have excelled in it?
>
> 2. The teaching of a foreign language can as little replace the teaching of the mother tongue as a finger can replace the use of the hand.

[1] The instruction was very badly phrased.

3. Meaning is an arrow which reaches its mark when least encumbered with feathers.

The last two were exercises in the interpretation and judgment of argumentative metaphor. The first seems simpler; it was an outcome from an experiment with a passage of Landor (from *Opinions of Caesar, Cromwell, Milton, and Buonaparte;* see Mr H. Read's *English Prose Style,* p. 171) that I had earlier put before my class for comment. I have not used their comments. They were too bewildering. The passage from Landor was too difficult. All that the comments would have shown is that a majority of the audience were quite unable to interpret such prose, or form a defensible opinion as to what it says or as to its merits. This second experiment with a detached sentence from it (the audience being already very familiar with the context) was also disappointing. The closer parallels offered ranged from 'Let those who look on penmanship as unworthy . . .' to 'Let those who look on virtue . . .' but the further task of comparison was so confusedly handled that I must conclude that the exercise was unsuitable. A few pointed out that 'those who look upon style' so are the last people in the world to be influenced towards a more *favourable* view of style by such a request. But, in general, the problems raised by the sentence were too intricate to be discussed without taking more time (with my voluntary audience) than the upshot seemed likely to warrant.

The second sentence is from Sir Philip Hartog's *The Writing of English.* On the whole, my audience did succeed in displaying it as a comparison which will bear very little study.

The third sentence is from Mr Herbert Read's *English Prose Style,* p. 16; it gave rise to a large number of interesting comments. I append later the full context from which it comes.

The adventures of this sentence in the minds it went through were remarkably various; and illustrate the processes of interpretating metaphor very clearly. I will give some analysis first:

The sentence contains a double metaphor. Meaning, before it is compared to an arrow, is already conceived as something *expressed,* something *shot out in language.* (Though the degree of adequation of course differs greatly from mind to mind.) The expression or missile-vehicle is so familiar that we may hardly recognize that it is a metaphor. When we consider it we may find that we are giving

more attention than it can support, and are in danger of asking it to do more than, in free common use, it is attempting to do. Common sense with it, as with Sir William Mitchell's 'a stone broke the window' (see Motto to Chapter XVIII) is saved from error by its ignorance; and it would be silly to quarrel with so handy and unpretentious a stopgap in language—unless someone takes it more seriously. The missile-vehicle is so familiar that it does not need comparison with an arrow (the second vehicle) to support it. In fact it is so ready to a mind thinking about meanings that *it* supports the arrow-vehicle, rather than the other way about. Very few of my commentators refused to let it do so, rejected the first latent vehicle (shot out = expressed) and therefore complained of the second vehicle (the arrow) as inappropriate.

App. 1.1. Meaning is *the mark:* the sound made by the mouth, or the sign made by the pen, is the arrow.

What the arrow-vehicle did for the others was to offer a specification of the latent missile-vehicle. And whether it was acceptable or not to them—the feathers question—turned partly on a struggle between the general and specific vehicles as to which should control how the other was taken.

Everybody knew—quite apart from the arrow's appropriateness—what Mr Read meant. They knew this in virtue of the general missile metaphor + 'encumbered.' 'Meaning is a missile which reaches its mark when least encumbered with extras.' Obviously, in general we can only ask whether an author has written as he should if we know somehow what he is trying to say. The readers knew this here. And two sets of considerations controlled the way their decision as to the appropriateness of the phrasing went. Thoughts about meaning (the tenor) and about the behaviour of arrows with and without feathers (the specific vehicle). Thus a large number of objections with very different sources were possible.

The main problem I thought I was setting them was this: To contrive other sentences either about meaning, or about something else, which would raise similar questions as to whether the comparison was apt or not. A number took it so:

App. 1.2. Meaning is an airship that reaches its base when not encumbered with a rudder.

App. 1.21. . . . a bicycle which will travel most swiftly and directly when relieved of the weight of handle-bars.

App. 1.22. . . . a mousetrap that works best when least encumbered with a spring.

App. 1.23. . . . a bird which reaches its mark when least encumbered with wings.

App. 1.24. . . . a swimmer who gets furthest when least weighed down with clothes.

App. 1.25. . . . a poison which works best when least diluted with water.

The first four, I think, were intended to show up an absurdity in Mr Reid's sentence. Whether they are fair or not depends on how we read 'least encumbered.' If we take this to suggest that any feathers at all are an encumbrance, then evidently the sentence disregards the behaviour of arrows. I have tried it out on some eminent literary men (in as unprejudicial fashion as I could contrive) and they have usually asserted strongly that *that* is the suggestion they receive and that therefore the sentence is unhappy.

On the other hand, it may be taken only as saying that *any excess* of feathers would impair efficiency and that only the excess would be an encumbrance. Reading it so, several (rightly) said the comparison was apt and clear.

App. 1.3. Yes! But the metaphor is not all embracing. The epigram is more effective than pages of wooliness; but it is possible to 'reach the mark' by a cumulative process—building up an edifice or wearing down the reader or what not. But a sound and effective metaphor so far as it goes.

App. 1.31. Meaning is like a letter which gets there when concisely and clearly directed

It will be noticed what a wealth of queer problems most of these parallel sentences raise in their turn. A letter arrives by the same post even if its address is redundant!

App. 1.4. Meaning is a machine gun which kills most men with fewest bullets.

Does it? Or is the writer attacking Mr Read's sentence? I doubt it.

App. 1.41. Meaning is a motor-car which reaches its destination when least encumbered with petrol.

This *is* an attack, but it has shifted the point too far to be fair. Motor cars rather haunted the protocols:

App. 1.42. Meaning is a car which is more likely to break the world land speed record if it is stream-lined.

This is either in support of Mr Read, or an 'improvement' on him; but the mark to be reached has faded out of the problem.

App. 1.43. Meaning is like a man with a purpose who accomplishes his end the less scruples that he has.

The inadequate feathering of the thought here seems well parallelled by the verbal deficiencies.

With the next a throw back to the tenor has brought up a different problem:

App. 1.44. Meaning is a picture most easily appreciated when enclosed in a simple frame.

This, in its turn, would require just as much care in interpretation as Mr Read's metaphor. So too with:

App. 1.45. Meaning as a pill is most efficacious when uncoated with jam.

But what a pill will *do* is to be distinguished from how readily it will *be taken!*

App. 1.46. The simpler the gown the more likely it is to be well cut.

I am told that this is unfortunately not so; it is only more necessary that it should be!

But the most interesting comments were those which showed how a difficulty in fitting the arrow-vehicle to the tenor—of finding as close a resemblance between them as was desired—broke down the underlying shot out = expressed vehicle:

App. 1.5. The parallel does not hold good, because 'meaning' is an infinitely complex and difficult matter whereas the shape of an arrow is constant. The abstract word is narrowed down to something only true of the concrete.

This would prevent us from ever talking simply about anything if we pressed it. (See 'Definite,' Sense V, Chapter IX.) The 'concrete' versus 'abstract' troubles that arose over Love and the Motor-car (Chapter III) are back in action. A half-way house to this:

> App. 1.51. Carries an unfortunate suggestion that meaning is a simple straightforward thing, whereas it may be very complex and inevitably encumbered with feathers.

Why so few took up the question, 'Just what do the feathers on an arrow do?' is difficult to explain. Many were, I believe, just ignorant, and being unfamiliar with arrows, thought that feathers are a decoration only. Others simply overlooked their function. Others still, like the last, were, I fancy, distracted by other considerations.

A few held that, since the sentence used a metaphor, things might pass which would *not* do in a simile; that 'meaning is like an arrow' would have been wrong, but that with a metaphor we are asked to imagine a special kind of arrow exempt from the necessities of real arrows and able to fly straight without the aid of feathers. I do not think that this distinction will save the situation. But it is true perhaps that we are more likely to challenge a bad simile than a bad metaphor, and current teaching, I am afraid, encourages the assumption that metaphors are somehow not to be looked into. The merit of such exercises as this would be to reverse this tendency.

I append Mr Read's account of the difference between simile and metaphor—as an example of the sort of teaching which is not very helpful:

> Simile and Metaphor differ only in degree of stylistic refinement. The Simile, in which a comparison is made directly between two objects, belongs to an earlier stage of linguistic expression: it is the deliberate elaboration of a correspondence, often pursued for its own sake. But a Metaphor is the swift illumination of an equivalence. Two images, or an idea and an image, stand equal and opposite; clash together and respond significantly, surprising the reader with a sudden light.
>
> This light may either illumine or decorate the sentence in which it is found; and perhaps we may divide all metaphors into the *illuminative* and the *decorative*. By doing so we can make more distinct the limited relevance of metaphor to prose writing; for while both kinds

are appropriate to poetry, only the illuminative metaphor will be found appropriate in pure prose style. (*English Prose Style,* p. 28. This passage introduces the translation discussed in Chapters V-IX above.)

I do not think I am being perverse in finding something amiss in every sentence of this. 'Degree of stylistic refinement': what is that here? 'Deliberate elaboration': sometimes, perhaps, but by no means always. The usual trouble about 'images' (see pp. 34-37 above). 'Equal and opposite': both words are very questionable, and they must be questioned if we are to advance at all in the theory and practice of metaphor. 'Clash together'?—my decorator recently declined to paint a bell-push white for me. He said, 'I don't think white would clash well, Sir, with the wallpaper!' We may perhaps ask whether the metaphors in Mr Read's account are themselves *illuminative* or *decorative.* It is a way of discovering that the division does very little to help us.

I append further the paragraphs in *English Prose Style,* pp. 15-16, from which the sentence we have been examining comes, as an example of the kind of discussion of the choice of words which a study of interpretation should question:

Man is no doubt an abstraction, built up of many particular events and acts of perception; but there is a limitation in this very abstraction; a vague but ready image is present in the mind, ready to be particularized by some concrete epithet. To say *a man* is merely to conjure up our own private idea of the typical man, perhaps a man in a black coat, striped trousers and a bowler hat, or perhaps the ideal athlete of Greek sculpture, or anything between these two extremes. To add an epithet implying an abstract quality like goodness scarcely makes any difference to our image; and this is the simple reason why such epithets are to be suspected of redundancy. To add a numerical epithet like *many* either multiplies the image in its indefiniteness, or creates another indefinite image of quantity, that is, *many men* is equivalent to *a crowd.* But to add an epithet of *quality* is to progress from the abstract and therefore vague entity of *substance* to the definite entity of a *sense perception.* And since this is a progress from vagueness to vividness, it suggests that clear definition is an elementary need in prose style. But not all substantives are vague; and of epithets, not all that are appropriate are necessary. Indeed, we shall consider epithets under these two heads: namely, their Necessity and their Appropriateness.

A loose orotundity leads to the insertion of unnecessary attributes. It might seem to a novice that to introduce as many words as have a bearing on the subject must necessarily enlighten it. But meaning is an arrow that reaches its mark when least encumbered with feathers. *A man crossed the street* is a definite statement, vivid enough. To say *a man in black crossed the busy street* is to lose a certain immediateness of effect; for unless the context of the statement requires a man 'in black' and a 'busy' street, definitely for the furtherance of the narrative, then the understanding is merely delayed by the necessity of affixing these attributes to the general terms; for men are often enough in black, and streets busy. To say *a man in scarlet crossed the deserted street* is indeed to add to the vividness of the phrase; but these exceptional epithets, 'scarlet' and 'deserted,' would never be used unless demanded by the context.

We may notice the misleading remarks about images; the confusion in 'abstract and therefore vague'; the queer play with *definite, definition* and *definitely;* and the consequences of comparing with one of the assertions,

'Many men have gone mad in solitary confinement.'

I have no wish to suggest that Mr Read's conceptions of language are in any way exceptional. On the contrary, the case for such exercises in school as I am suggesting comes wholly from the prevalence in all quarters of first thoughts on these matters. A considerable step might be taken merely by putting such accounts before our pupils and inviting them to mark (with signals borrowed from the railway perhaps, |\ and |‾) the words and phrases that they think, after a careful reading, may be safely treated as suggesting 'Line open!' or 'Line closed!' Whether we would succeed finally in eliciting their doubts clearly (which amounts to settling them in most cases) may be doubted. But if we manage merely to cause them to attend sufficiently to feel the stir of a question, we shall have done a great deal. To give such discourses on language without a warning and without opportunity and stimulus to examine and dissect them with care is a ruinous procedure. It blunts all the edges of thought.

Other exercises with the same modest aim—to excite a heightened, more leisurely and reflective attention to verbal differences—seem easily devisable. I illustrated them in the text, with 'concrete' and 'abstract' (Chapters III and XXII), with 'expresses' (Chapter VIII),

with 'definite' (Chapter IX), with 'ungently' (Chapter V) and with a sample synonym exercise (Chapter XXII). And the comments on the protocols were raw material for hundreds more. Indeed almost anything general that anyone says may be made into a useful exercise if taken from the right angle.

Any sentence which enshrines a general problem, the simpler and more general the better, with a sufficient but not too complete setting, will serve. We have only to vary its wording:

> These conceptions of language are in no way extraordinary
> Such ideas about language are not at all unusual
> These opinions about speech are not in the least peculiar

and invite our pupils to indicate any differences they detect between what is said. Their comments will then guide the discussion if the sentences are judiciously chosen. These examples above may combine too many variations and draw distinctions that are perhaps too fine. We may find that though our pupils can *perceive* differences between them they are unable to describe them. To avoid this difficulty we may perhaps borrow from the technique adopted in some psychological experiments[1] and invite the class to *match* the variants against a supplied list of sentences. Thus, sentences containing the key-words, 'composed,' 'consists,' 'constituted,' 'formed,' may be matched against some such set of sentences as these:

> A pile of sand is made up of the grains of sand in it.
> A sentence is made up of words.
> A plant is made up of cells.
> An hour is made up of minutes.
> A nation is made up of individuals.

The task might be to match with these, say:

> A sonnet consists of fourteen lines.
> A mind is an assemblage of experiences.
> A cloud is composed of minute drops of water.
> A yard contains three feet.

[1] Notably, for our purposes here, in Dr Thouless' experiments on 'Phenomenal Regression to the Real Object,' *British Journal of Psychology*, XXI, 4 and XX, 1, 3. These are experiments that show how factors of setting enter into the judgments of the apparent size, shape and distance of objects. They can be illuminating as regards parallel problems in the interpretation of words and may, indeed, be used as a means of reinforcing with a new, accessible, and amusing subject-matter the lesson of the dependence of interpretation upon setting.

And the class might be asked to suggest briefly the reasons of their choice, or if they cannot decide, to note any considerations that seem to them to bear upon the decision.

Only experiment would show how far such methods of introducing important general problems—here the different kinds of unity—*as mere exercises in verbal discussion* could be taken. But, as all the main key-ideas, and indeed the ground plans of all the philosophies, are already implicit in everyday language and are handled there with astonishing skill by us all, *provided we do not ask explicit questions about them,* I do not doubt that this is the way to go to work to improve still further our skills.

Other games with such words as 'agreement,' 'meaning,' 'cause,' and 'reason' readily suggest themselves. Some materials for them as to 'agreement' may be found in *Basic Rules of Reason.* As to 'meaning,' a bundle of sentences such as

> Do you mean beautiful or pretty?
> Do you mean John or James?
> Black clouds mean rain.
> He means well.
> He means mischief.
> That word means nothing at all.

to be compared, say with

> Do you mean 100 yards or 100 meters?
> Do you mean manslaughter or murder?
> Bad dreams mean a guilty conscience.
> That means war.

would, if we were not too ambitious, be a good exercise ground on which perceptions we are all possessed of already but do not keep in good *reflective* order may be at least made a little more controllable. That an improved reflective command here gives a *general* benefit I have no doubt. I had intended as part of my experimental course to prepare and try out some more precise experiments upon the uses of 'meaning.' But time, and the elaborations of a similar experiment on 'reason,' prevented this. What happened with 'reason' confirms my feeling that something useful could be made not only out of 'meaning' but also out of 'knowledge,' 'beautiful' and 'true.' For materials see *Mencius on the Mind,* Chapter IV. As

the 'meaning' exercise stands above some preparation would be required before it could be tested.

My experiment with 'reason' took this form. I gave to my audience:

> 'Why do we believe that 2 + 2 = 4?'
>
> If you find that that answers itself too easily, then take the most important word in the answer and ask, 'Just what does —— mean here?'

The answers I got were as varied as I could have desired. All the main philosophic doctrines on the problem appeared among them, usually with no sign that the writer took them for philosophical theories, or was remembering an opinion rather than framing one for himself. I shall not give much of the protocols here in detail—rich though they were in minor points of interest. I can summarize the main positions without citation; it will be easier so to sketch clearly the kind of discussion which may profitably be developed, and the morals that may be drawn.

The main views offered may be grouped under five headings:

(1) Something happens in the head—as a consequence the belief occurs.

(2) Experience has taught us that it is so; i.e. associations have been formed through which the ideas of 2, +, and 4 have become progressively welded together so that now the connection is irresistible; and the reason for the belief is this association or close connection.

(3) The reason is that I see it must be so and cannot be otherwise. Two cannot be two and four be four without 2 + 2 being 4; and that is a better reason than anything else I could appeal to in support of my belief.

(4) We were told so authoritatively when young.

(5) We believe it because to do so works well.

Having indicated by citations the general division of the answers under these five heads, I began by pointing out that we should not hastily say that there were thus five different answers to 'the same question.' It was more likely that they were answers to five different questions, and so naturally different. And that, in any case, to put it so gave us a more hopeful start in going on to consider which of them were good answers than if we assumed right away

that we must choose between them. They were (it was) the same question in the sense that the same words were used in asking it (them). But whether any more than this was the same would have to be shown.

I then widened the moral by saying that in this respect the question is a central typical model for innumerable other disputable matters over which muddles are always being made; and that, more immediately, it was a model on and with which to study a muddle which may be expected whenever anyone is giving *reasons* for beliefs, alleging *grounds* for convictions, *proofs* of assertions, or *causes* of views and so on. Knowing the Marxist tendency of a section of the audience, I cautiously suggested here that the problem had a bearing on the theory of the Economic Determination of History and the derivation of individual attitudes from the class bias. Similarly, for possible psychoanalysts, and followers of Mr Eliot, in the audience, mentions of rationalization and of tradition seemed to be in place. The discussion, I continued, was not intended to throw light on the multiplication table or on the foundations of arithmetic so much as on what is likely to happen generally when we deal in reasons and connect remarks by 'because,' 'for,' 'since,' and such.

I then tried, by directing attention to each statement in turn, to make the differences between the questions they answered more clearly apparent, pointing out, meanwhile, that the ordinary way of showing that two questions are different, *namely by stating them in different terms,* is not very satisfactory here. We could try by saying that the first doctrine states something about the physiological antecedents or concomitants of the belief; that the second talks about the psychological causes of it, that the third declares the immediate ground or justification of it as a valid belief, that the fourth alleges a fact in the history of the belief, and the fifth dilates on its consequences. All these are distinct enough and unlikely, so formulated, to be confused; but the task is not to distinguish *them* so much as to distinguish, *with the original formulation, 'I believe it because . . .'* the varied interpretations that are being taken up *there.* In ordinary talk all these different things may be said with words like 'cause,' 'reason,' 'ground.' We may regret it, but it is so; and we shall not protect ourselves from misunderstanding (of or by ourselves or others) by pinning down different meanings for these words and trying to hold the words to them. We have, instead, to

trust ourselves to distinguish their possible meanings, one from another, even though we (or others) are using the same words and phrases for them all. And we can do this.

This incidentally discourages much crude theory, which is currently preached, about language being identical with thought.

The next step is to consider whether these answers, when we realize what questions they answer, conflict with one another. They certainly have been supposed by many to be in violent opposition. The camp-followers of the philosophers, if not the generals, have endlessly scrapped over the question, 'Which is right?' But, if each keeps to its own business, there seems nothing to object to in any of them. They don't *then* seem to conflict more than, say, 'The Baby is called Peter,' 'He is very beautiful,' and 'He is digesting his last meal,' conflict.

And yet a large proportion of thorough and careful students of these and allied subjects have held that a choice between them is necessary, and have been led, at points, into violent battles about 'The right answer.' Why should this be so?

To suggest that it is because they can be stated in similar words and so be made to seem rival answers to one question, would be far too simple an explanation. The *grounds, causes, reasons* (I am using all three words here in many senses) of the dispute go much deeper and concern the ways in which the accounts fit in with the much more comprehensive accounts, not just of such beliefs (whether they are a priori, a posteriori, intuitive, analytic, synthetic, empirical, pragmatic or what not) but of *everything*, the accounts of the world which different thinkers have found most acceptable.

The philosophic topic—at least, if handled as the philosophies have handled it and in such-like terms—has no place in the schoolroom. What is useful to the growing mind can be taken from what the protocols themselves provide in terms of everyday speech. But, in a few sentences, the bearing of the deep differences of philosophic positions on ordinary non-technical thinking, and their consequences for ordinary discussions, can be indicated. We cannot ignore these differences; they reveal themselves in the interpretations of the simplest every-day remarks—as the protocols show. We ought not to try to go into them *technically* as part of general education; but we can and should note, and enforce attention to, this much about them. That, since not only 'cause,' 'grounds,' 'reasons,' but almost

all the general connecting words of the language show this versatility and can be using profoundly different assumptions and presuppositions (and thus can systematically offer, sentence by sentence, paragraph by paragraph, book by book, similar opportunities of treating one question as though it were another); it is an elementary part of intelligent behaviour in dissenting from or assenting to anything, to be on the lookout for evidence of the fundamental presuppositions. And we can perhaps go further, and suggest that this very versatility of language—being so systematic and extensive that holders of the most different philosophic positions can yet say almost everything in parallel forms—supplies an initial case for supposing that the different persistent philosophic outlooks (Materialism, Idealism, Empiricism, Rationalism, Pragmatism, Realism, Conceptualism, Nominalism, etc., etc.) are not necessarily so opposed as their professors commonly deem them to be. Though throughout in such speculations, we must bear in mind how different their appeal is to different moods which set as temperaments and are maintained as faiths.

The literary or plain man—not committed to any of them, or capable, for lack of a specialist's training in technical speech, of consistently maintaining any of them—uses them *all* in ordinary fluid discourse, freely changing from one to another as suits his purpose. They are, when elaborated into philosophic systems, only interpretations of our common courses of thought. We should not let any interpretation tyrannize here over the processes which it claims to interpret. To do so is to forget where its sanctions ultimately are to be found.

Thus the plain or literary man will do well to use all the philosophies—so far as he apprehends them—*positively* whenever he can, but not *negatively*. He must not let them bar him out from views to which his own thinking, if it is genuinely reflective, leads him. How many of the *best* minds prevent themselves from fairly understanding things most needful to them, and understood well enough by inferior minds, merely because they are trying to use some philosophy excogitated for other purposes.

The chief use of some knowledge of philosophy is this; that without it, even in the most seemingly simple and obvious matters, we shall endlessly be supposing other people to be saying things they neither intended to say nor said. Philosophic theories (in the large non-technical sense I have here in mind) are intellectual organs—

very like eyes. We think with them, not only when we are overtly talking philosophy, but equally whenever we are apprehending, trying to 'account for' or 'explain' anything. A philosophy, in this sense, is no more and no less than the mode of the contexts we are using (see Chapter II). Our meanings—that is, here, the things we think of, and the ways in which we combine and connect them—are to our philosophies as light is to the eye or hardness to the hand, or sound to the ear, or warmth to the skin. And as the ear does not hear light nor the eye see sound, so a man using one philosophy apprehends with it things, or meanings, that are not apprehensible with another. More often than we suppose, what we call differences *of opinions* are differences *of views;* the speculative organs that apprehend them are different, though often they will use the same words.

This moralizing is easily illustrated from the accounts of 'Why we believe that $2 + 2 = 4$?' They arose from looking at this seemingly simple question through different speculative instruments. When we survey them and compare them we are likely to do so again through different speculative organs; and, if we could not use several of them freely (but, in fact, unless we have been trained out of common sense, which is partly an ability to translate, we can), we should misread them. So the question 'Do these accounts of the reasons conflict?' carried much too simple assumptions about the philosophic organs by which we perceive them. Of theories, at least, what Berkeley said of all things is patently true—they exist only as they are perceived; and as Blake said, 'The eye altering, alters all.' As we change our perceiving organs these accounts sometimes conflict and sometimes do not. What we have then most to look out for is sudden unheralded changes in the modes of context, the speculative instruments, used. To follow them is the art of reading. It is these shifts, constantly necessary as they are to any non-technical writer's purpose, which make fair criticism so difficult and most polemical writing and controversy so profitless.

None the less, within the scope of any one speculative organ, there is, of course, good and bad perception. The protocols admirably illustrated this; and they showed too the systematic, cyclic ambiguities which have often been described as the gyres or spirals of thought. The same words, even within the scope of the same type

of theory, may stand for views of very different merit. Thus answer Number Four—the most popular type of answer: that we believe it because we have been told so—was sometimes silly and sometimes sensible. Some made it merely 'nurse's ascertion'[1] and left it at that. One put this into verse:

App. 2.1. You are old, said the nurse, 'tis time you knew
That four is the product of twice times two,
And later to dour enquiring expound
'Twas nurse's ascertion and therefore 'tis sound.
Q. E. D.

But obviously that does not go far enough. We were told in the nursery 'that the Moon is made of green cheese,' but we still don't believe it. Some of those who alleged authority as the source of the belief, showed too a kind of hankering to disbelieve—feeling it perhaps as an annoying sort of apron string. A few of them went further still into silliness and voiced surges of romantic rebellion against the multiplication table. Others seemed to think they might see one morning in the paper that someone had proved that $2+2=5$—a consequence, I suppose, of the debilitating influence of Relativity Popularization. Others, who stressed tradition, seemed to feel $2+2=4$ was a cultural treasure which might need defending!

App. 2.2. The problem here offered—why does $2+2=4$—is one which has repeatedly occurred ever since the first day of my kindergarten education. The answer, 4, was many times the goal of endless hours of intellectual toil, a goal which, once attained, marked the end of an epoch in my life. It is the basis of modern religion and modern sanity, and if this cornerstone of modern thought, this bulwark of civilization were swept away, the world would be cast into a state of blind and panic-stricken chaos.

We believe that $2+2=4$ because we believe in the existence of reason.

Against this let me put:

App. 2.21. '$2+2=4$' (are *identically* equal to) would be the extreme form of this mathematical *claim*—and '$2+2=4$' in common speech *does* claim that identity; a geometrical figure being produced to reinforce the arithmetic 'definition.' But we could of course

[1] Influenced by '*ascertain*, to establish,' see Chapter XV.


build up a whole new mathematics on $2+2=5$ surely without destabilising anything in ourselves.

The *mythology* would be an equally *useful* one—emotionally of course NOW it would be addedly satisfying as a departure from *habit.* But 'Why do we bother to make "claims" for the Nature of things in this patronisingly fatherly way?' is the next question to ask—Some 'mythologies' are apparently more 'useful' (in particular *contexts,* at least: e.g. the medical in a railway accident, etc.) though their 'usefulness' *except* as life-preservers may be questioned: we want greater psycho-physical health, and will get it somehow—'$2+2=4$' sometimes 'helps' us—and then we say we 'believe' it—But we should admit it is often use*less.*

A scorn-filled rebel, truly! How he would hate my saying that he does need a little help towards this greater psycho-physical *health!* The more desperate sceptical ventures merit some pedagogic attention as well as illustrate the gyres of thought. Doubt has its depths and shallows like belief, and it is important to disconcert those who enjoy doubting without realizing in some degree how far their doubt would take them.

The better authoritarians added such phrases as 'and have never had any occasion to doubt it' to their, 'We were told so,' or said, 'We were taught to use the symbols in such a way that it is true.' Many straddles between different accounts occurred. The last is not far from views of Groups Five and Two. Some in Group Two distinguished between habit (or association) as causing us to use the symbols as we do, and habit as the reason for the belief. Very crude association theories were frequent. Here is a gloomy protocol:

App. 2.3. I think we believe that $2+2=4$ because we are taught so from our childhood. If formerly in order to go to Liverpool from London one had to go via C as there was no direct train, an old man would not believe that the new direct route A→B would be nearer because he had all his life looked at the journey from A to B through C. Experience only confirms our prejudices, what we learn in our childhood. Hence we go on believing that $2+2=4$ and not 5 even if we are shown that it is $=5$.



Character is the result of suppressed impulses and moulded into one channel. Character stands for something definite, otherwise there is no character, 4 stands for what we have

been taught, our character, the resultant of all our inhibitions and the lack of them.

On a crude enough association theory it should be impossible to learn anything new after one had heard or experienced the contrary often enough. But, of course, we all know that it is not so. The possible gyres of thought may however be observed here again. There are habits of thought that we are not able to change even when the desirability of changing them has been made plain. The gyres perplex the doctrine of associationism especially; it is easy to refute simple associationism and not very hard now to improve it to the limit of Bradley's or Koffka's ranges of attack. But is it then still associationism?

Pragmatism, too, was maintained foolishly *and* wisely:

App. 2.4. We believe because it is more convenient for us to do so, and man is naturally lazy. 'Convenient' = what will cause us least effort or discomfort.

That might be a good enough account of why we hold some beliefs, for example, that our handwriting is sufficiently legible! but it is no sort of adequate reason here. I cite it because, although pragmatic reasons for beliefs ('that they work well') can be very good ones, and sometimes are by far the best and most fundamental reasons that can be given, they can easily be cheapened and parodied in this fashion to become very superficial and easy to refute. If we are going to appeal to the work that a belief does as its justification, then we must really look into the sort of work it does for us and compare this with what rival beliefs (if there are any) would do. The important thing of course is to realize on what different planes different beliefs are, as regards their pragmatic sanctions.

Group Three ('that I see it is so') displayed the gyres too. The 'lower rounders' hung themselves up by exaggerating *vision*, mere optical vision through the eye, not allowing 'see' to take its metaphorical extensions. 'Because I can actually *see* the material relations.' 'The belief is dependent on the honesty of the visual sense.' The reply is of course that blind men can count! Even without touch or motor sensations we could count sounds. Another writer, taking a speculative dive, and echoing Locke, said, 'If we had had no senses we could never have known it. 'But if we had had no senses, could

we ever have known anything? To give *this* as *the reason* of the belief would be like giving, 'Because we are alive!'

This may seem frivolous, but it brings up a vital point in all explanation, which is, Where does it stop? How much should an explanation include? How do we pick the relevant explanation out of all the rest which is implicated as the indispensable background of conditions. There is no useful *general* answer. Practice, reflection on particular cases, and the liberal arts teach us; and nothing is more important than this for all forms of intelligent behaviour.

One last incidental point arose often and a discussion of it might look back to the 'consists of' exercise on unity above. It is 'What is one thing?' and was provoked here usually by that troublesome object, a drop of quicksilver. Add 2 drops of mercury to 2 other drops and the result is not 4 drops but one big one! A surprising number were too content with this observation to look for the answer, which is, of course, that $2 + 2 = 4$ applies to units and to things only as far as they are units. And a unit is a logical machine, something we use in counting. Units need not be similar (except as being taken as units). Many assumed and some actually insisted that units must be exactly the same in all respects. But a whistle and a bang and a smell and a pain may be added together to make a group of four. ('Longinus' e.g. enumerated five sources of sublimity: 1. great conceptions, 2. passion, 3. figures, 4. choice of words, 5. spirited composition; but left out pen, ink and paper or he could have made them eight!)

This exercise seemed to me capable of becoming a really useful tool. Its initial simplicity allows deeper and deeper questions to develop naturally out of the first thoughts. With a well-managed circulation of a selection from the protocols, I believe a class could in a few hours be given an insight into some extremely important matters involving every aspect of their practical conduct as well as their abstractive intellectual range. I have evidence that the interest taken in it was exceptionally keen, and that the questions raised were felt to be important *and* manageable. It might do something to encourage a speculative curiosity about types of reasons, in time to protect the learner from the destructive efforts to doctrinize him that he is likely to suffer from all but the better teachers of philosophic

subjects later on. And it might help him to recall that these processes of speculation—which, if treated in the wrong ways, yield elementary logic, methodology, epistemology, psychology, and metaphysics, in sets of more and more distractingly abstracted, will-o'-the-wisp jargons—are still the springs of thought and that a 'knowledge-how' of them is the whole secret of intelligence. If this danger is remembered the exercise can be followed up by rather more complex studies which rely upon the same groups of perceptions; for example the following pages on the same topic by Sir William Mitchell might be offered, as an admittedly tough, and perhaps uncrackable, morsel for interpretation. If we frankly admit that perhaps no one but the author (and perhaps he only at his best) is fully able to understand them, there will be advantage in the very difficulty. The process of slowly recognizing what has appeared already in the protocols will increase confidence, and the residuum is too deep in its implications, however simple its language, for failure there to feel humiliating or frightening to anyone.

What are the causes of my belief that twice two makes four? Four answers have been given, of which three are good.

The physical cause has to be imagined. We have to suppose that portions of brain-tissue have already taken a disposition or pattern whose reaction gives my belief. The pattern has to be copied from what I feel, and is therefore diagrammatic at best. Room for it is found by following the growth of my sense of number from its beginning in perceptions, whose cortical areas are known. But there is no temptation to press the pattern on the room, any more than to press a colour, or a second, or anger, on their places. Two is a small number, but the sense of it is no easier to place than the sense of twenty; twice two is difficult, for there is no observer. Worst of all, the calculating machine has to substitute causes for reasons, which alone command my belief. What I feel would therefore be very hard to copy. Next, is the pattern to be histological, chemical, or electrical? And, in all, the same piece of tissue has to serve two masters; there is the belief which is its product, and there is its own cause from outside. Suppose we knew the physical means by which number makes itself known, why do they give knowledge at all, and why not of themselves but of number? These questions are too hopeless not to be in error. But rather than surrender a likeness we may think there is a secret one, the cortical cause being merely phenomenon. That calls for cause number two.

Since there is nothing in nature out of which feeling can come, and yet feeling comes by physical causes, is there not a secret cause of which the physical are phenomena? It would be the real cause by which number makes itself known through cause number one. Such causes were first introduced for the ordinary work of nature, but there, having been left with nothing to do, the concurrent causer of causes has become superfluous. Physical causes are no longer completed by such a means. They are completed by their system, or by a more general system, never by a cause from which nothing can be calculated. There is no reason for dealing otherwise with the cause of knowing number, and we strike this one from the list.

By the third cause my belief that twice two makes four is product of my past experience; and the force of the belief is product of an association of ideas, or their more intimate welding, that has grown from strength to strength, and made the belief inevitable. By the fourth cause, on the contrary, my belief is due to my knowing arithmetic, and its force to nothing but arithmetic. So far the two are quite separate causes, and conflict. They cannot be reconciled by saying that the third is a cause of which my belief is effect, while the fourth is only a ground, of which my belief is a consequence. For the ground is cause when it is known.

It does not enter like an autocrat, tyrannising over the power of old associations and empirical beliefs, as reason was thought to do; it rules by persuading. But so do they. The fourth cause enters as early as the factors of the third, when the factors persuade. It is their unity, their function, their final cause, the end to their means. An idea is born knowing; its function is born with it, and it develops into a body of knowledge at the object's behest.

This language about a final cause, and about an object as cause, to say nothing of its behest, makes the fourth cause appear metaphorical, and ask to be dissolved into means. But it is the very character of minds, which makes them higher forms of life, that their reaction is to objects. Their degrading consists in reducing them to organised energies, mental or physical, which a stimulus discharges. Their actual decadence is a falling to that. My belief may answer from the theory of numbers, or from instances, or from the 'indissoluble association' of the multiplication table. These mean three grades of mind, and, though the higher among them grow from the lower, the lower do not become the higher, but become tools. If the three came to blows, it is the meanest that would prove universal; I might babble the table though unconscious. But the strength of my belief is not from the strong association either in instances or in words. They are both

superseded, without any effort, when I happen to know better. There is nothing indeterminate about the final cause, which is the object. I am still bound to believe; but it is arithmetic, not habit, that has cost me my liberty to think that twice two makes five.

The Place of Minds

That would be a luxury task however for an exceptionally good and leisurely class. So too would be this:

Compare the uses of *surface* in:

'Familiarity with scientific experiment at least does the useful service of inspiring a wholesome scepticism about the conclusions which the mere surface of experience suggests.' MILL, *Inaugural Lecture*

and, 'The sensible world is the surface of nature; it consists of phenomena, and therefore answers all its own questions. The deep questions that seek a better grasp accept the surface, and their answers have to be verified by it.' SIR WILLIAM MITCHELL, *The Place of Minds*

More needed are simpler exercises which must not, however, be therefore 'merely verbal,' as they say; catches, that is, without a *general* problem in them. Puzzles are useless unless they turn on language tricks that recur and can be seen to be likely to cause trouble. Here is a famous conundrum which turns on an extremely simple ambiguity of the words 'round' and 'opposite.' I have tried it out, and feel some confidence that it is neither too hard to be practicable nor yet too obvious to be diverting.

Some years ago, being with a camping party in the mountains, I returned from a solitary ramble to find everyone engaged in a ferocious metaphysical dispute. The corpus of the dispute was a squirrel—a live squirrel supposed to be clinging to one side of a tree-trunk; while over against the tree's opposite side a human being was imagined to stand. This human being tries to get sight of the squirrel by moving rapidly round the tree, but no matter how fast he goes, the squirrel moves as fast in the opposite direction and always keeps the tree between himself and the man, so that never a glimpse of him is caught. The resultant metaphysical problem now is this: Does the man go round the squirrel, or not? He goes round the tree, sure enough, and the squirrel is on the tree; but does he go round the squirrel? In the unlimited leisure of the wilderness discussion had been worn threadbare. Everyone had taken sides, and was obstinate; and the numbers on both sides were even. Each side, when I appeared,

therefore appealed to me to make it a majority. Mindful of the scholastic adage that whenever you meet a contradiction you must make a distinction, I immediately sought and found one, as follows.

WILLIAM JAMES, *Pragmatism*

Can you state, unambiguously, a distinction which solves the problem and shows clearly what each side was maintaining?

All sorts of things happen when this question is asked, and by pooling the results for study a great deal can be taught about how and how not to think. I will only give one specimen comment—by a Scholarship Candidate of 18:

App. 3.1. The writer clearly states that the man and the squirrel each go round the tree in opposite directions. Let us suppose that the man goes round in a clockwise direction. The squirrel therefore goes round the tree in an anti-clockwise direction. Consequently at two points, the man must pass the squirrel, assuming that the squirrel's speed is not greatly in advance of the man's. We must say therefore that the man was inobservant enough to miss the squirrel when he passed it.

It seems possible to carry out William James' intention here and make the passage not only an example of the varying interpretations of a word, but also a type of, and introduction to, the sources of controversy in general. Thus some two such statements as the following—in which to decide whether they disagree *or not* is a matter of nice discernment—make a good sequel.

The proper stimulus of the will, namely, some variety of pleasure and pain, is needed to give the impetus. . . . Without an antecedent of pleasurable or painful feeling—actual or ideal, primary or derivative—the will cannot be stimulated. Through all the disguises that wrap up what we call motives, something of one or other of these grand conditions can be detected. BAIN

It has been proved beyond all controversy that even the passions commonly esteemed selfish carry the Mind beyond self directly to the object; that though the satisfaction of these passions gives us enjoyment, yet the prospect of this enjoyment is not the cause of the passions, but, on the contrary, the passion is antecedent to the enjoyment, and without the former the latter could never possibly exist. HUME

It may be wise to insist that both passages are about matters with which we are all as familiar as ever Bain or Hume were, and that

it should not be beyond anyone's interpretative power to decide what each means, or at least what the alternative possibilities in each case are. *Then* whether they do or do not conflict and, at what points, settles itself. To make all this out takes some time, and few can do it in their heads as few can compare maps there. But with paper to blacken and opportunity to experiment,

> And time yet for a hundred indecisions
> And for a hundred visions and revisions . . .
> For decisions and revisions which a minute will reverse,

these give good practice in distinguishing just what is being said from what is just not being said. And these provisos are required for all exercises whose aim is to teach us how to think. 'Time,' Bergson once wisely said, 'is resistance; the resistance against everything happening at once!'—which would come perhaps to the same thing as nothing happening at all; nothing worth *while.*